

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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

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RELIGIOUS VALUES

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A striking characteristic of contemporary philosophy is the attention given to theory of value. The subject has been given a new and more empirical turn by the work of Meinong and his followers. It is the purpose of the present essay to suggest a way of applying the results of such an empirical analysis and classification of values to the study of religion.

I

First, a word as to the sense in which I shall speak of "values." Religion expresses, I take it, the most profound solicitude of which we are capable, tinged with that confidence or optimistic bias which must attend all life. Religion signifies the most good that we can expect or hope for from this world of ours. To lose one's religion is, then, to hear bad news—to reduce expectation and abandon hopes. It is not merely a matter of changing one's opinion, but of reconciling one's self to altered fortunes. A religious philosophy is a report upon the cosmic state of affairs with reference to man's investments—a stock-taking, an appraisal by which a man may know his inheritance and his prospects. Different philosophies will render different reports, and they may differ, not only as respects their correctness, but as respects the degree in which they

exceed or disappoint our expectations. *What philosophy makes the most favorable report?* It is evident that if any such comparative judgments are to be made, they must be made in terms of some constant standard of value. It is inevitable, then, that we should ask how man's fortunes are to be measured. What is the unit of value of which all good things are compounded, and in terms of which we may compute or estimate profit and loss?

It appears to me fairly clear that nothing is of value except in so far as it is wanted or liked, or comprises some wanting or liking; and that wanting and liking are of value only in so far as they reach or possess their objects. There is value, then, when there is *having of what one likes* or *getting of what one wants*. For the sake of abbreviation, it is convenient to use the term "interest" to mean any activity or disposition of liking or wanting, or of their opposites disliking and fearing, and the term "fulfilment" to mean the peculiar relation which an interest bears to its object. Having what one likes or dislikes, or the realization of one's desire or fear, would be instances of interests fulfilled. The fulfilment of interests of one class, such as liking or wanting, would then constitute goodness; while fulfilment of the opposite interests, such as dislike or repugnance, would constitute evil.

It will be useful to make several further distinctions. The fulfilment of an interest, including interest, object, and the peculiar relation between them, may be called an *intrinsic* value, in the sense that such value does not involve reference to anything beyond itself; whereas any means or condition of such fulfilment would be an *extrinsic* value. Of extrinsic values there are two important classes, immediate and instrumental. Immediate values are objects that fulfil interest directly, that is, objects in which interests terminate, things liked or wanted for themselves. Instrumental values are causes of immediate values, things owing their value to their efficacy in producing objects of interest.

One further distinction and we shall have completed our terminology. Among the extrinsic values, both immediate and instrumental, there is an important difference between the values of ideality and those of reality. One cannot employ terms of such equivocal import without carefully guarding them. By ideal in

this context I mean an imaginative representation of the object of interest. It is not necessary here to enter into the epistemological niceties of the question. I have elsewhere¹ recorded the opinion that the synthetic act of consciousness brings into existence complexes which otherwise would not exist at all. I have been impressed with the originality and caprice of the creative imagination, and I am inclined to regard it as genuinely creative. It is further characteristic of the imagination that it often prefigures the fulfilment of interests. I fancy, dream, suppose, and tend to believe what I like or loathe, desire or dread. Such an object, invoked by an interest and held in existence only by the act of imagination, I propose to term an ideal. By real value-objects, on the other hand, I mean objects which fulfil interest and exist independently of the interested subject's consciousness of them. This consciousness may have been instrumental in bringing about their existence, but now that they exist that consciousness may be withdrawn and they will nevertheless remain as parts of the world of organized fact. To avoid a possible misunderstanding, let me say that consciousness may be a part of such a real object. Thus, I may long to see God, and fancy that I do. My seeing God, *then*, exists only by virtue of my imagining that complex. When I *do* see God, however, though my consciousness is a part of the fact, that complex fact itself is independent of any ulterior consciousness. But it matters not into what epistemological terms one translates it, as long as one provides for such a distinction as that between imagining that one is in Rome and *being* in Rome.

The ideal object possesses values similar to those of the real object which it prefigures. He who longs to be in Rome enjoys imagining himself in Rome, and he who hates snakes shrinks from their image as from their actual presence. The values of ideality are real as values, since interest is fulfilled independently of consciousness of the fact; but bearing in mind that the term "ideal" signifies the status of the object, rather than of the value itself, we may for the sake of brevity call them ideal values, and we may call the values of reality real values. Ideal values, as well as real values, may be either immediate or instrumental. For the objects

¹ *The New Realism*, pp. 139-40.

of the imagination not only may interest me for themselves, but may serve as means to their own realization, or to the fulfilment of other interests. With these distinctions in mind, let us consider the values that may be in question in religion.

II

In order to spend as little time as possible in preliminary definitions, I propose to state shortly what I conceive religion to be. I shall present the matter somewhat loosely in order to remain within the limits of familiar and generally accepted ideas. The constant feature of religion seems to me to be not any unique part of human nature but a specific aspect of the environment. There always has been and there always will be a difference between that part of the environment which man controls, and that part which controls him. Man proposes, but only to a limited extent does he dispose. And that which man does not control is always more potent as respects success and failure than that which he does control. This fact may be brought home to him in connection with any of his interests. The love of life, of friends, of wealth, of truth, of power—any of these may bring man to the sobering sense of dependence or failure. There is a cosmic drift of things, a something going on, a current of time and tide, in which a man emerges for a moment, in which he is swept along even while he exerts himself most desperately, and into which he seems again to disappear. That which, having been before him, is all about him and will continue after him—past, circumstance, and future, viewed as source, fortune, and destiny—this is the reality to which in religion man addresses himself. The necessity of religion lies in two incontestable and universal facts: first, the presence of this environing potency; second, the importance of taking account of it. The peculiar subjectivity of religion, the religious consciousness, with its vague “spiritual longings,” its faith and its ideas, is not the original fact, but the result of the experience of this *practical situation*.

With this view of religion in mind, let us make use of the distinctions introduced above. There may be said to be two sorts of religious objects, the real and the ideal; and the values of each

may be termed religious values. The real objects of religion are the ultimate cosmic forces themselves; and the ideal objects are all of the works of the cosmic imagination. Let us consider each of these in turn with a view to applying further distinctions.

1. *The real religious values.*—The ultimate environment of life may conceivably be one or many. In other words, human fortune and destiny may be a resultant of diverse forces operating independently, or it may be determined by a single force governed by a single law. Man may belong to one cosmic system, or he may belong to intersecting systems and be subject to several irreducible laws. Any ultimate ground or explanation, whether monistic or pluralistic, possesses the cosmic character which is peculiar to religion. Since the term "God" might seem a question-begging epithet, let us speak of such an ultimate ground as a cosmic reality.¹

In discussing the type of value which such an object might possess, we are met at the outset by the difficulty of deciding whether we may properly limit our account to extrinsic value. A cosmic reality might certainly possess intrinsic value. This would mean, as we have seen, that it would consist of or contain the fulfilment of some interest. An Epicurean god, original, independent, and indifferent to man, is entirely conceivable. And such a being would undoubtedly possess value. But would it possess religious value? One thing is clear. Historically, at least, the Epicurean gods possessed religious value either in respect of their indifference to man as shattering his illusions or in respect of the satisfaction which they afforded his aesthetic or intellectual interests. In other words, their intrinsic value, or value in relation to their own interests, did not give them their religious status. The God of Christianity who pities his children, and without whom not a sparrow shall fall to the ground, may be said to realize his interests in the well-being of his creatures, and so to constitute an intrinsic value which is inclusive of man. But here again it seems to me evident that the religious aspect of the value lies in the relation to man. The religious value is the value to man of a haven

¹ I take it that the term "God" signifies an agency with whom man may enter into social relations. It is not clear whether this "personality" of God is always assigned to him "really," or whether it may be regarded as added by the religious imagination.

of refuge after the wanderings of sin, and not the joy in heaven over his repentance.

This view of the matter is consistent with our general notion of religion. For religion springs from man and not from God. The cosmic reality is its object, but not less truly is man its subject. The motive of religion is a human and not a cosmic need. The cosmic reality is a religious object in respect of its bearing on man, and its distinctively religious values must be determined in that reference. Whether the cosmic reality be regarded as external to man or as comprising and intending his good, in either case its religious value is to be defined in relation to man's interests so far as these are fulfilled by it. I shall therefore confine myself to the extrinsic values of religious objects, with the understanding that such values will consist in a tendency of such objects directly or indirectly to fulfil human interests. Extrinsic values may, as we have seen, be either immediate or instrumental. Let us consider each of these possibilities in turn.

(1) Immediate value attaches to an object that is capable of fulfilling interest of itself. Is there any human interest that terminates in cosmic reality? This is most certainly the case with the intellectual or cognitive interest. Curiosity or wonder, the desire to look above or below, or on the inside or the other side of the proximate aspect of things; the desire to explore one's world and touch if possible its uttermost boundaries; the desire to explain, or to see what unity and order there are in things—this is a fundamental spring of action. And the cosmic reality, whatever be its specific nature, is its supreme object. Contemplation or philosophy is then the first, as it is perhaps the most sure, of real religious values. That the cosmic reality as such is an object of aesthetic interest is probable, but less certain. By the aesthetic interest I mean the bias of the conscious faculties themselves—their impulse to prefer certain objects for their exercise. It would appear that there is a specific "fascination" in the speculative or reasoning process as this leads from appearance to reality; or in the consciousness of the gravity and import of "first and last things"; or in the sense of the complexity, majesty, and prodigious power of nature. But it is evident that the degree of its aesthetic value is

dependent upon the specific nature of the cosmos, as is not the case with its cognitive value. A revelation of the ultimate, while it would inevitably satisfy the will to know, might afford an aesthetically intolerable spectacle of discord and futility.

This dependence of cosmic value upon the specific nature of reality is even clearer in relation to the social interest. If the cosmic reality be in fact a *socius*, an "other mind," as Professor Hocking conceives it, then as "intimate, infallible associate" it satisfies man's craving for companionship as no other object can.¹ But if, on the other hand, the reality be a dead waste surrounding a minute oasis of life, then it defeats the same craving and is the occasion of a profound sense of loneliness and desolation.

As truth, or beauty, or unfailing companion, the cosmic reality may, then, possess immediate value, or serve as itself the object of human interest.

(2) The instrumental values of the cosmic reality appear more prominently in the history of religion, and their importance is more easily apprehended. It is implied in the very notion of cosmic reality that in the last analysis it should determine the existence of all those objects and agencies by which man succeeds and fails in his manifold undertakings. To it man owes his food, his shelter, his money, his power, his friends, his life, and from it he suffers the loss of these good things. A cosmic reality will possess positive instrumental value in so far as it gives, and negative value in so far as it withholds or takes away, these objects or conditions of success. The general notion is obvious enough. But there is a difference among instrumental values that has a profoundly important application here. Instrumental values may be beneficent or benevolent; injurious merely or malicious. In other words, the cosmic reality may be conceived as accidental or as intentional in its bearing upon human interests.² It may lend itself to human uses, or devote itself thereto from love and ministering care or from a ruling purpose to bring about and maximize human happiness.

¹ Hocking, *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 224; Part IV, *passim*.

² An interest *in* interest, such as a benevolent cosmic reality would be conceived to have, would correspond to my notion of a *moral* interest.

It is scarcely necessary to remark that religion almost invariably attributes to cosmic reality a motive that is judged friendly or hostile by its works. Indeed, not uncommonly God is conceived as no more than a benevolent interest in general, its apparently injurious or mixed effects being supposed to be instruments or phases of a total good that is taken on trust. The superior value of benevolence to accidental beneficence lies, of course, in the greater guaranty of its permanence and consistency.

2. *The ideal religious values.*—The ideal religious values will be those attaching to the objects which are created by the religious or cosmic imagination. The cosmic ideals possess, like the cosmic reality, a character of ultimateness and supremacy, but differ in the important respect that thinking makes them so. I mean, of course, human or finite thinking. I am still anxious to avoid raising fundamental differences of opinion. Everyone would, I suppose, admit the distinction between the soul's being really immortal and my supposing it to be immortal. The suppositional immortality is of my own making, and is an example of what I shall call an ideal religious object. Generally speaking, these ideal objects arise in response to a demand for their corresponding realities. In other words, such cosmic objects as would possess value if they were real tend to be created by the imagination; but when so created they possess a value in relation to the same interest which generated them. In other words, as we have already noted above, interests employ the imagination to provide them with an ideal fulfilment; and, where the interest is in a cosmic object, the result is an ideal religious value. In discussing values of this class, I shall again make use of the distinction between immediate and instrumental values; for theory of value is, as Oliver Wendell Holmes would say, "like splitting a log; when you have done you have two more to split."

(1) Immediate ideal value attaches to those works of the imagination that satisfy in and of themselves. For every real immediate value there will be an ideal immediate value which answers to the same interest. Thus a cosmic first principle satisfies the cognitive interest. That being the case, one will like to *conceive* of a first principle. If a cosmic "other mind" would pro-

foundly satisfy man's social instincts, then the *supposition* of such a companion will satisfy them, at least so long as the supposition lasts. But we cannot proceed further, alas! without splitting our splinters again. The cognitive and social values just cited attach only to ideal objects of a certain sort, to what may be called *beliefs*. They attach only to apparent reality, or to what is *taken to be real*. The aesthetic interest, on the other hand, will find fulfilment in the work of pure fancy or in an obsolete belief. The difference is by no means unimportant to the understanding of religious phenomena. A myth would seem to arise originally in response to the cognitive interest, and so long as it is believed it satisfies that interest by a sense of contact with original things. After the myth is recognized as fiction, it may, however, retain its beauty or picturesqueness, or perhaps for the first time acquire it, and so be transposed from the cognitive to the aesthetic interest. But the immediate values of fancy are by no means confined to the aesthetic interest proper. Any interest whatsoever may express itself, not only in beliefs, but in idle dreams, from which, though they are known to be idle, it may none the less derive a certain satisfaction.

But belief-value, again, is evidently of two sorts, according as it is or is not conditional on truth. There is an immediate value in belief that attaches to judgments or supposals *whether they be true or not*, and that attaches equally to illusion, hallucination, and make-believe. Such a value is "subjective" in the sense that it is independent of the reality of its object, provided only the unreality of its object be not known. Thus, if I believe in a Divine Companion, and can vividly represent him, I may enjoy him whether the facts would justify me or not. Where, on the other hand, the imagination follows the outlines of an independent reality, one may speak of true values.

Two general points remain to be remarked. First, it must not be supposed that immediate ideal values are necessarily good. As one's fears may breed ghosts, so cosmic *horror vacui* may generate an image of desolation, or agoraphobia, or a haunting sense of cosmic scrutiny, or malice. Second, true values imply real values: that is, a true belief implies whatever extrinsic values its object would possess if real. Thus true belief in a Heavenly Father not only

possesses whatever values it has as belief but implies whatever values would attach to a real Heavenly Father.

(2) The threefold division of ideal values that has been applied to immediate values—the division into the values of subjective belief, true belief, and conscious fiction—will serve us also in the classification of instrumental values. As a whole, these will be the values possessed by products of the imagination in so far as these cause or condition the immediate objects of interest. By the instrumental value of subjective belief is meant the liability of belief to bring about the existence of other value objects, real or ideal, whether it be true or not. Value of this sort may be described as mental hygiene. There are certain beliefs, such as the belief in the triumph of good, or the belief in the supremacy of spirit, that have a generally wholesome effect upon the human mind. They aid achievement through removing anxiety or through furnishing incentive, or, where the belief is a belief in the achievement itself, through affording confidence. These values depend on the content of the belief and are independent of its truth. Thus a man may be moved by faith to heroic and partially successful exertions in behalf of what is in fact a lost cause. On the other hand, there are certain instrumental values that attach to true belief whatever its content. Such would be the cognitive value of true ideas, of ideas which anticipate reality and lead to verification in immediate experience. A true cosmic hypothesis would possess such value superlatively. All religious symbols, in so far as they are true, possess it in a measure. And there is the more familiar value of practical guidance. A true idea is an idea to live by. The whole value of applied science is of this type. In religion a similar value attaches to a true opinion of the foundation of things, of the deeper operative causes, or of the future of the soul. Such truths may enable a man to control his fate or prepare to meet it.

Finally, fancies or fictions may have an instrumental value. Like subjective belief, they may operate as specific remedies for the soul's disorders and provide the needed sedative or stimulant. But they render a more far-reaching service in furnishing clues to action. I mean to refer to the office of the imagination in representing to the will its own ends or aims. Ideals in this sense are

not beliefs, but preliminary plans of action which serve to mark out its course and give it steadiness and continuity. The multiplication of such imaginary possibilities, furthermore, contributes to speculative and practical resourcefulness, giving belief and action a wide range of choice.

As in the case of immediate values, we must not fail to remark that instrumental values may be evil as well as good. Subjective beliefs and fancies may be depressing as well as tonic, morbid as well as wholesome. False belief is misleading and dangerous. Furthermore, in the case of instrumental ideal values we meet with the peculiar and far-reaching fact that good may itself be the cause of evil. Thus subjective values may, on account of their immediate or instrumental good, stand in the way of true values. The hopefulness of a false belief in the cosmic centrality of man may prevent his acquiring the true belief in his insignificance. Or the delights of a fanciful heaven may divert a man from his endeavor to enter into the real heaven. Or the satisfaction afforded by a belief in a beneficent Providence may prevent a man's availing himself of the real forces of nature by which he may assist himself, as when from trust in God a man forgets to keep his powder dry.

III

This *conflict* of religious values is the central theme of every serious philosophy of religion, and makes it necessary to define some principle by which a rational choice or reconciliation may be made. But by way of furnishing further preliminary distinctions that may be useful in a philosophy of the matter, I wish to survey religious values from a slightly different angle. I wish to consider the relation of religious values to other values, to what may be called, by contrast, the "secular" values. This is equivalent to asking what a man may expect to get from his religion that he would not have without it. If this question is conceived in the broadest possible way, it brings into view three notions concerning religion that seem to me to be well worth setting down. Religion may be conceived as *auxiliary*, that is, as facilitating the secular life; or as *disciplinary*, that is, as correcting and reducing it; or as *compensatory*, that is, as substituting new goods for old evils.

(1) The values of religion are auxiliary in so far as they supply objects or instrumentalities for interests that have arisen independently. Religion doubtless presents itself first in this guise. The first lessons of experience teach one how to get what one wants. The most naïve attitude toward any new object is to look for aid from it. Things present themselves first to the child as what he wants and confidently seeks to enjoy, or as what he dislikes and can refuse or avoid; persons are friends to be used, or enemies to be escaped or retaliated upon. The first deities are patrons, tutelary spirits, ancestral, tribal, or national allies that signify man's hope of having his way in this world. He is not permitted to enjoy this hope long. Except for the spoiled children of men, it is soon shattered by experience of failure and the consequent recognition of limitation and dependence. But this first attitude, naïve as it is, most perfectly and purely expresses the motive of life. To live is to seek, with the expectation of success. The most ardent and generous hope dreams of unlimited and universal success. This is the first hope, which is not yet sobered by disillusionment and which haunts later life as a departed and lamented vision. The most extravagant and immoderate ideal is that every imaginable person should have everything that he could possibly want. Therefore experience leaves one a sadder as well as a wiser man. Therefore one looks for consolation or compensation. For one now hopes to save something, or to succeed in part, or to secure an equivalent, or at least relief from one's worst fears. In any case the promise of religion is compared with the first hope and measured in the same scale.

(2) The values of religion are "disciplinary" in so far as they fulfil a remnant of interests only at the cost of abandoning the rest. The second lesson of experience teaches one, not how to get what one wants, but what not to want, or how to do without. The child must soon learn that in order to possess at all he must give up. In religion this appears in the recognition that the god will serve his worshipers only conditionally. He will not answer every prayer, but only prayers for prescribed goods. As man learns in a secular way to be thankful for small favors, or to want but little here below, so he regards his god less as an indulgent grandnother

and more as a stern parent to whom he addresses himself with mingled fear and hope, and whom he loves not so much for the greatness of his bounty as for the smallness of the worshiper's desert. This disciplinary principle in religion may be carried to any extreme. "We are not meant to succeed," says Stevenson. "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit," says the Psalmist; "a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise." That these things should be said without bitterness is a triumph of religion. They do not signify the bounty of the universe, however; but rather the capacity of man to reduce his demands to whatever modicum the universe will yield. They specifically imply a decline of hope from its first natural buoyancy, and a recognition of the hardness of the lot of one born into such a world.

The Christian's pious resignation is, however, far exceeded by the total renunciation of the Buddhist. Suffering is here judged to be as universal as desire itself; the fruition of desire is an illusory and dangerous phantom inviting man to prolong his misery. There is nothing better than relief from suffering through "the cessation of desire." Here religion is unmistakably a best *possible*, or a minimum evil, rather than a best imaginable; a saving of the most precious possession when it is impossible to save all, or a bare escape in the presence of general misfortune. In short, the disciplinary value of religion implies a diminution of total value; a religion which promises only such value must, even though it bring acquiescence and peace, be admitted to offer less than a religion that promises man the positive fulfilment of his original stock of interests.

(3) The values of religion are "compensatory" in so far as they may be substituted for secular failure or loss. "Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted." "Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." Such is religion's offer of consolation. It offers assured hope with which to replace the vain hopes of this world; or success in another field for failure in the field of secular endeavor. Here it is important to recognize that the need of consolation implies actual evil and loss; and that greatness of the need is proportional to the greatness of the extremity. The consolation of religion may

even be like the opiate which is administered only when the pain is insufferable or recovery impossible; or like the pathetic comfort of parents who, having lost their first-born, take refuge in one another. Misery loves company and may be mitigated thereby. But then the good company is measured by the evil of the misery which it offsets. And the net good may be less than zero.

Where religion promises new values that shall be additional, or that shall surpass the evil which they cure, they are still at any rate measured by the standard of present interests. This idea underlies Höfding's notion of the "conservation of value." Religion in this sense promises better things to replace what is lost. It unfolds new possibilities, or enriches life by the creation of new interests. Although first invoked as a necessity, accepted as a hard lesson, or resorted to as a second best, religion may turn out to be a greater opportunity. But even in this case the original impulses constitute the nucleus to which the new must be added, if it be indeed an increment, or a measure which must be exceeded if the new end be in truth a "greater" good.

IV

The value of this threefold distinction lies in the light which it may throw upon the comparative degrees of value in religions. It emphasizes a fact of prime importance, the fact, namely, that no religion save the most childish proposes to fulfil the hope of first intent. All religions that reflect any prolonged experience of life recognize the inevitableness of partial failure and the need of a reconstruction of life that shall reduce hope and adapt it to more or less hard and exacting conditions. Hope springs from existing interests, from love of life or of friends, from concrete preferences and ambitions. Religious hope, in so far as it is naïve and follows its first promptings, looks to cosmic realities for a guaranty of long life or of immortal life, or of the prolongation of social relations, or of success, or of happiness. The fullest and freest hope, the dream of unlimited good, imputes to the cosmic reality the realization and preservation of all values, together with the possibility of adding more. And this dream remains a best possible by which more sober and modest hopes are judged. The disciplinary factor in

religion reflects the fact on which all morality is founded—the fact, namely, that life will bear no fruit unless it is pruned. The shoots of instinct and desire are cut back in order that a few, or at least one, may flower. This course is not dictated by hope pure and unbounded, but by hope qualified by a recognition of hard circumstance. The motive is the same outward pressure of impulse, but effort is concentrated in directions in which circumstance permits advance. The course implies a recognition of tragedy, though that tragedy may be forgotten through a schooling of the mind, or through gratitude that the loss is not greater. And the need and acceptance of consolation reflects a still further reduction of first hope. Consolation or compensation comes after a recognition of loss or of the impossibility of attaining a prior aim. And the measure of consolation must be its equivalence to, or its balance over, that first love.

In short, life here presents itself in successive phases: first, the effort to get whatever one wants; second, the effort to get some of what one wants by sacrificing the rest; third, the acceptance of something else in place of what one first wanted. Religion may promise one what one wants; or, teaching how to reduce one's wants, promise the remnant; or offer one new values in exchange for what one wants. In the last case it may be claimed that the new or peculiarly religious values that replace secular values so far exceed them as to make their loss negligible. It may even be claimed that the loss of the secular values is better than their gain or preservation, on the ground that such a loss stimulates or occasions new interests which would not have been possible otherwise, and which are more profitable than those from whose defeat they spring. But if such a claim is to be proved, it is evident that the new values must be shown to be commensurable with the old; which is to acknowledge that the old are in truth values, and their loss a genuine loss. In other words, unless there is real loss there is no gain; if that which is subtracted is not value, then neither is that which is added. So that this most sanguine religion is still built upon the acceptance of tragedy; it hopes for a good that is less than one can imagine, even though it be more than one had once feared was the most to be expected.

These are distinctions which I think might prove useful in an attempt to estimate the promise expressly offered by any religion or implied in any philosophy.¹ I have not attempted more than a rough draught of them. But I do not see how the philosophy of religion can become more exact without moving in this direction. The subject is more complex perhaps than any which philosophy is called upon to discuss. And I should regard it as worth while had I merely emphasized this complexity, and called attention to the necessity of a more elaborate and refined analysis than is customary. But I feel confident also that such analysis should in part at least follow the outlines here indicated. It is necessary to distinguish values attaching to the beings which are the objects of religious experience, from the values attaching to these experiences themselves—to the creatures of imagination and belief. In this second or "ideal" class of values it is especially important to distinguish those which are and those which are not conditioned by truth; to note the possibility of conflict between these subclasses and to judge their comparative weight. And it is necessary to define the categories or standards by which increase, diminution, substitution, equivalence, and reconstruction of values are to be defined and estimated. But perhaps in the present essay I shall have done no more than illustrate my conviction that, in view of the widespread underestimation of its complexity, religion is a subject that cannot be made clearer until it has first been made more obscure.

¹ In another essay I have attempted to apply these distinctions to "Contemporary Philosophies of Religion"—cf. *Harvard Theological Review*, July, 1914.

RELIGION AND WAR IN ISRAEL

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Yahweh was always thought of in Israel as supplying all the needs of his people. Not that there were never any other gods recognized within the social group. Quite the contrary; for until a relatively late period deities of many names functioned in Israel. They were looked upon as protectors of various family, individual, and special interests within the Israelitish circle. But they were all subordinate gods, operating each in his own sphere within the nation and in no real sense rivals to Yahweh whose function it was to preside over the national fortunes and destiny as a whole. In this sphere he brooked no opposition. To be sure, Yahweh kept encroaching upon the domains of these specialized gods and in course of time displaced and expelled them all. In the early days of national life, the felt needs of Israel as a whole were relatively few and simple and, such as they were, they were met by the grace of Yahweh.

Among the functions of Yahweh called into play by Israel's needs, the leading place in the earlier times was held by war. The nation was struggling for "a place in the sun." Again and again the decision between life and death for the nation had to be fought out upon the field of battle. A god who could not be counted upon in such times of crises would have been no god at all. Hence Yahweh is constantly represented as a war-god. He it is who marches at the head of Israel's armies (Deut. 33:27); his right arm brings victory to Israel's banners (Exod. 15:6); Israel's wars are "the wars of Yahweh" himself (Num. 21:14; I Sam. 18:17; 25:28); Israel's obligation is to "come to the help of Yahweh, to the help of Yahweh against the mighty" (Judg. 5:23); Israel's enemies are Yahweh's enemies (Judg. 5:31; I Sam. 30:26); Yahweh is Israel's sword and shield (Deut. 33:29); yea, he is "a man of war" (Exod. 15:3).

As the leader of a nation at war, Yahweh was credited with the military practices of the day. He shrank not from drastic and cruel measures. Indeed, he lent his name and influence to the perpetration of such deeds of barbarity. Samuel hews Agag in pieces at the very altar of Yahweh and in compliance with Yahweh's will (I Sam. 15:32 f.). Yahweh orders the total extermination of clans and towns, including man, woman, and child (I Sam. 15:3; Josh. 6:17 f.). Nothing less than the full performance of the fell command could assuage the fierceness of Yahweh's wrath (Josh. 7:26). The promise made to Yahweh in return for his aid in battle had to be kept, no matter if the heart of a father was broken and the beautiful life of a young daughter brought to an untimely end (Judg. 11:29-40).

At this stage of the god-idea, it is quite natural to find that the scope of the god's domain is determined by the power of his people's armies. He goes wherever they go and stays where they stay. Wars between nations are wars between gods. All wars are holy wars. All gods are equally real, and all alike entitled to what they can obtain one from another by force. So Jephthah frankly places Yahweh and Chemosh upon the same plane in this particular (Judg. 11:23, 24). David, in being driven from Israel's territory into Philistia, thinks of himself as being driven out to serve foreign gods and as likely to be slain "away from the presence of Yahweh" (I Sam. 26:19 f.). In this connection, it is significant that the idea of one universal God, Lord of all the earth, did not arise in Israel until the Hebrews had been made familiar with world-wide conceptions by contact with the great world-empire of Assyria. "It was far easier to imagine a sovereign Providence when Assyria reduced history to a unity by overthrowing all the rulers and all their gods, than when history was broken up into the independent fortunes of many states, each with its own religion divinely valid in its own territory. By shattering the tribes Assyria shattered the tribal theory of religion, which we have seen to be the characteristic Semitic theory—a god for every tribe, a tribe for every god. The field was cleared of the many: there was room for the One."¹ No single influence brings in a great conception such as mono-

¹ G. Adam Smith, *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*, I, 54.

theism; but among the influences co-operating to that end in Israel, the militant Assyrian world-power holds a prominent place.

In a religion dominated by the war-spirit, as was that of early Israel, the leaders of the religious life must function militantly. Hence, it is not surprising that the first manifestations of the prophetic spirit in Israel are found in connection with war-propaganda. In Judg., chap. 5, we see Deborah, the prophetess, rallying the clans to battle at Megiddo against the Canaanites. Samuel's chief service to Israel was in finding in the person of Saul a suitable leader against the Philistines. The "sons of the prophets" seem to have been much involved in arousing the war-spirit in the name of and for the sake of Yahweh (I Sam. 10:5; I Kings 22:6 ff.; II Kings 6:9 ff.). Elijah and Elisha, indeed, were considered worth as much to Israel for offense and defense as her troops (II Kings 2:12; 13:14). Religion and patriotism supplemented and reinforced each other. Success in battle was the best possible proof of Yahweh's satisfaction with his people as well as of his superiority to other gods who dared to challenge him to battle. The prophet co-operated with the soldier in a holy enthusiasm, both alike working for the glory of Yahweh. It would not be safe to say that the prophet was originally called forth in Israel by the necessities of war, for we know too little about the circumstances attending the rise of prophecy. But the earlier prophets certainly found their chief mission in stimulating the nation's faith in Yahweh and in nerving its arm for the great struggle for existence upon which it had entered. The only way to maintain independence was to fight for it, and prophecy did its full share in equipping the men for the fray.

With the progress of civilization in Israel, war gradually, and indeed somewhat rapidly, lost its place of pre-eminence in the nation's life and thought. Religion ceased to concern itself so largely with military concerns. Other interests crowded upon the national consciousness, bringing with them other problems. The content of religion became richer and more varied. Ethical and social ideals were rapidly developing and demanding full recognition in the religious life of the times. Yahweh could no longer be thought of as primarily a war-god. The interests of Israel

were expanding in many directions. Agriculture, trade, and commerce were displacing war in the hearts and minds of the people. Other virtues than courage and skill in battle were called for by the complex and growing civilization of the age. Indeed, Israel by its weakness was hopelessly handicapped in any ambitions she might have entertained for supremacy in the political and military world. This very weakness itself was, perhaps, one of Israel's most valuable assets. It forced her to look beneath the surface of life and to base her religious faith upon fundamental verities. Whereas Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia each in turn, in the glory of its might, went blithely down the centuries conquering and still to conquer, Israel's lot was suffering and still more suffering. They were sated with victory and prosperity and were well content. She was wearied with buffetings, disappointments, and empty longings. They had little incentive to deeper thought and keener self-inspection. In the main, affairs went well with them. Why should they trouble themselves? Was it not better to let well enough alone? When the end of those nations came, it came quickly. Little time was afforded them for reflection. They died as they had lived, without any consciousness of the wide areas of religious experience upon which they had never set foot.

How different the fate of Israel! The repeated disasters that befell her at the hands of these conquering nations called for explanation. Was the trouble with Yahweh or with herself? Her unswerving loyalty to Yahweh forbade her making him responsible for her misfortunes; she must, perforce, bear the blame herself. The way in which the Hebrew prophets, from the time of Amos on, interpreted the defeats and calamities of Israel is familiar to all students of the Old Testament. They found the root of all the difficulty in the sins of their people. They made the armies of the foe to be Yahweh's instrument for the infliction of punishment upon his disobedient and stiff-necked people. They urged them to repent of their evil ways and promised them pardon only upon that condition. When yet new invaders appeared time after time, the prophets probed deeper and deeper into the national life, seeking to find the cause for Yahweh's wrath. Outer misfortune relentlessly drove them on from one position to

another, ever seeking a place whence they might survey the moral universe undisturbed.

It would not be true to say that the prophets always, or in every case, received their inspiration to prophecy from the course of events as it was foreshadowed by the movements of the armies of the contending world-powers. Amos, at least, seems to have been certain that doom awaited his people for some time before he was able to point to any specific foreign nation as the agent of Yahweh's punitive wrath, if indeed he ever arrived at certainty upon this latter question. A similar certainty seems to have burdened the heart of Hosea, though he vacillated in his judgment between Assyria and Egypt as the executors of Yahweh's will upon Israel. Both of these prophets were convinced that the sins of Israel were so repugnant to Yahweh that he could not leave them unpunished. The imperative necessity of punishment was apparently clear to them before the form and agent of its execution were yet known. But in other cases, the prophets seem to have been very largely influenced in their judgment of the situation by the fact that formidable enemies were on the horizon. The content of their preaching was to a considerable degree determined by the political situation in their day. The way in which Isaiah adjusted his message to the successive situations produced by the Syro-Ephraimitish invasion, the siege and capture of Samaria, Sargon's campaign against Ashdod, and Sennacherib's siege of Jerusalem, each in turn is familiar to all students. The doctrine of the inviolability of Zion, established in Judah by the escape of Jerusalem from Sennacherib's power, was set at naught, even at the time, by Micah, and not improbably by Isaiah himself,¹ and later on under other circumstances was denounced by Jeremiah. Jeremiah and Zephaniah, it is quite probable, were both called forth into prophetic activity by the terrors of the threatening Scythian invasion.² Their day of Yahweh was distinctly a day of battle fraught with disaster to Judah. Ezekiel's entire preaching

¹ It is very doubtful whether Isaiah ever preached such a doctrine, and, if he did not, it probably did not arise until after the crisis was past and men had had time to meditate upon its significance.

² See J. M. Powis Smith, *Zephaniah* (International Critical Commentary, 1911), pp. 169 ff.

in the period between the two main deportations was directed toward preparing the people for the impending fall of Jerusalem and showing to them the true significance of that event. Habakkuk, driven to the wall by the successive onslaughts upon his nation and the almost unbroken story of defeat and disaster, found his impregnable stronghold in a more profound faith and flung forth the splendid challenge to hostile circumstance, "the just shall live by his faithfulness."

The great influence of the political history of Western Asia upon Hebrew religious development has long been recognized. The place of war in that history was of first importance. The influence of history, therefore, was largely the influence of wars and rumors of war. How great it was could best be shown by the story of its effects upon the development of certain great ideas. The conception of God is a case in point. As pointed out at the beginning of this article, the early Hebrew conception of Yahweh was largely controlled by the fact that he functioned for Israel as a war-god. As long as victory for the most part attended Israel's armies in their frequent fights with Canaanites and other troublesome neighbors that conception of Yahweh served its purpose well. But when mightier foes came into the field and the tide of victory ebbed, giving way to a steady stream of disasters and defeats, the war-god view no longer sufficed. It is no mere accident that it was just on the verge of this radical change of fortune that Amos appeared with a broader conception of God. Yahweh's power and interest were not confined to Israel, but he rebuked the neighboring nations also for their crimes against humanity (chaps. 1 and 2). The movements of other peoples besides Israel were under Yahweh's guidance (Amos 9:7). Yahweh has clearly transcended the limits of a national war-god and is well on his way to become the only God. Progress in this direction had been aided by two facts in particular. In the first place, the long and doubtful struggle with Syria had given pause to all thoughtful minds. Many times defeat and permanent subjection had stared Israel in the face. The explanation that Yahweh was angered by the sins of his people and was using Syria as a punitive agent in itself implied a certain control over Syria's movements on the part of Yahweh. It is probable too that some

realized that the theory of punishment for sin was being overworked; and, in seeking a new explanation, they may well have wondered whether Yahweh's interests and preferences were after all as exclusively Israelitish as they had been taught to believe.

Another factor working toward the same end was at hand in the wars between Judah and Israel in the days of Rehoboam and Jero-boam (I Kings 15:6), again under Asa and Baasha (I Kings 15:16), again under Amaziah and Jehoash (II Kings 14:8-14), and finally under Ahaz and Pekah (II Kings 16:5). The disruption of the kingdom had introduced a new religious phenomenon. With the setting up of an independent government in the north, there came into being the fact that two independent and rival kingdoms were now acknowledging the exclusive leadership of the same god. Not only so, but these nations were engaged in conflict one with the other. It was the case of a house divided against itself and of Yahweh fighting against Yahweh. Such a situation compelled thought upon the idea of God. The unthinking masses on either side might dismiss the matter easily by deciding that those of the opposite side had deliberately turned their backs upon Yahweh and in defiance of his will had maliciously attacked his people. But the fact remained that both sides alike called upon Yahweh for aid and that victory was granted sometimes to the one army and sometimes to the other. It would force itself upon some minds, at least, that Yahweh was after all the God of both foes alike. The eighth-century prophets certainly accepted that truth, and there is no reason to suppose that it was a new doctrine with them. But if Yahweh might be the God of two independent nations, what was there *per se* to hinder his exercising his sway over still others? The stepping over the national boundary in such a way as to share his favors between two peoples at once did away in principle with the whole concept of a national deity. It left the door wide open for the entry of the conception of a universal God.¹ Furthermore, with two rival candidates in the field for

¹ It is strange that no attention to the effect of the disruption upon the God-idea is given in any of the treatises upon the religion of Israel. In the last book upon the subject, viz., J. P. Peters, *The Religion of the Hebrews* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1914), there is a chapter entitled "Effects of the National Schism." But even that does not raise this question at all in any of its aspects.

Yahweh's favor impetus would be given to the efforts of both to obtain the advantage by securing that favor. This would naturally mean, at least in periods where the rivalry was keenest, a greater loyalty on both sides to Yahweh's will and a greater sensitiveness as to those things likely to occasion his displeasure. This would bring reinforcement to every progressive movement in ethics and religion which could be shown to be in line with Yahweh's will, and thus indirectly war would stimulate piety.

Monotheism, however, did not present itself in Israel immediately after the way was open for its entry. This great conception of God did not find acceptance to any general extent until the time of the exile. In the presence of this great and appalling disaster, the last defenses of the nationalistic idea of Yahweh were abandoned. The fact that Yahwism survived the exile and came through it purified and elevated was due to the preparation for this event that had been forced upon Israel through her repeated wars and accompanying defeats. Had Israel been forced to confront the loss of her political power and prestige with no better theological equipment than her old thought of Yahweh as God of Israel and Israel alone, her religion would have been snuffed out of existence like those of all the other little peoples who fell before Assyria's might. But, as it was, at the very moment when Yahweh lost control of his local habitation, he attained world-dominion. The constant blows of fortune had challenged Israel to the exercise of her highest powers, and now in the hour of supreme crisis her courage and her insight did not fail her. Israel may almost be said to have had monotheism beaten into her by the hammer of war.

The dogma of the inviolability of Jerusalem, whether held by Isaiah or attributed to him by later revisers of his words, was in reality only the last remnant of the old idea of Yahweh as geographically limited. Though it had become evident that Yahweh would not save his land as a whole from profanation by the invader, the faithful in Israel tenaciously held on to the belief that Jerusalem, the holy city of Yahweh himself, would not be yielded by him to the conquerors. Yet one man, at least, contemporary with Sennacherib's invasion, ventured to look forward to the fall of Jerusa-

lem and to warn its citizens of the coming disaster (Mic. 3:12). Micah even declared the approaching destruction of the temple itself. This was the most stunning blow that could be dealt to the old conception of Yahweh. It was the first time in Israel's history that any prophet had contemplated such a possibility. Samaria and the Northern Kingdom had fallen, without any serious wrench to the faith of Yahweh's people in Judah. Was not the Southern Kingdom left to uphold his glory? But now, Micah, and perhaps Isaiah too, dared to think of the fall of his last stronghold. It is not likely, however, that Micah or Isaiah really expected the complete overthrow and destruction of Judah as a nation. Micah, at least, in all probability placed his hope for the future of Yahweh and his kingdom in the people of the countryside, who to the prophet's mind were less corrupt and nearer to the heart of Yahweh than the wicked citizens of the capital. There is no evidence that Micah went so far as to dissociate Yahweh from the soil of Canaan, making him independent of all local habitations. That final step in the emancipation of Yahweh was taken by Jeremiah and the prophets of the exile at the time when the title-deeds of Canaan passed from Yahweh to Nabu, Babylon's god. Then, of necessity, Yahwism became monotheistic. Anything less than that meant extinction.

Sennacherib's invasion made itself felt religiously in yet another way. His armies overran Judah and carried fire and sword into all of its strong cities and villages. Only Jerusalem escaped. That widespread ruin included the desecration and destruction of the local sanctuaries throughout the land. There can be but little doubt that this discrediting of the local shrines on the one hand and vindication of the Jerusalem temple on the other hand went far in preparing the way for the Deuteronomic reform in 621 B.C. Yahweh had placed the seal of his approval upon the temple and just as markedly had repudiated all the other sanctuaries. Thus a superstitious and fanatical confidence in the protecting efficacy of the temple was firmly fastened in Judah's mind and ultimately proved one of the most serious obstacles to the development of true religion (cf. Jer., chap. 7). But meantime it aided greatly in the carrying out of a thoroughgoing reform of the worship

which could never have been effected so long as the prestige of the local sanctuaries was unimpaired.

The period of the captivity, during which Judah was incapable of waging war on her own account, yet furnishes an excellent illustration of the effect of war upon Judah's religion. Buried in exile, there seemed no possibility, humanly speaking, of the nation's resurrection. Never was there a more hopeless outlook. But Cyrus set out upon his career of conquest. Foe after foe fell before him. The great Hebrew, who wrote Isa., chaps. 40-55, watched the progress of the conqueror. His faith took to itself wings and soared in ecstasies of joy. He saw in Cyrus the anointed of Yahweh. He interpreted his career as ordered of God for the liberation and restoration of his people. He strove by argument and promise to kindle a corresponding faith and enthusiasm on the part of his captive fellow-countrymen. He sought to prepare them for the dawn of the messianic age which he conceived Cyrus to be ushering in. The faith of the prophet was not wholly at fault. Cyrus did conquer the Babylonian empire and did inaugurate a more liberal policy toward the subject peoples. Hence the opportunity to return to Judah was open to the captives; and such as desired to return to the ancestral home and could do so took advantage of the occasion. All this gave Yahwism a new lease of life in many hearts. But the glowing future depicted by the prophet failed to materialize. The returning exiles found the conditions of life hard in the old home. Business was paralyzed; crops were poor; Judah still remained a vassal people; the messianic kingdom seemed farther away than ever. So life dragged along for nearly twenty years. Suddenly there came a change. Cambyeses, the successor of Cyrus, died. Rival aspirants for the vacant throne sprang up throughout the empire. Factions quickly formed and civil wars set in. Finally after two years of anarchy order was restored by the energetic Darius, who established himself as king and organized the kingdom thoroughly. But prophetic observers in Judah were keenly alive to what was taking place in Persia. They saw in these disorders signs of the imminent downfall of the empire. Haggai and Zechariah consequently, following the example of their great predecessor in the captivity, set them-

selves to prepare Judah once more for the coming of the messianic age. They united in insisting upon the erection of the temple as a suitable sanctuary for Yahweh upon his return to reign over his people. They rebuked the people for impatience because the expected glory did not immediately reveal itself. They pointed to the disturbances in the Persian world as evidence of the stirrings of Yahweh's might among the peoples. They both agreed that the Messiah was already present among them in the person of Zerubbabel, their prince, who was awaiting the time of his exaltation to power (Hag. 2:20-23; Zech. 3:8; 4:6-10), and they even went so far as to have him crowned as messianic king (Zech. 6:9-15). But this dream, like so many others, was robbed of realization by the evidently unlooked for success of Darius; and it is more than probable that the succeeding "sixty years of silence" were ushered in by some drastic punishment of Judah by Persia for its seditious activities.

It is, of course, impossible to say what Hebrew religion would have become without its warlike environment. We can know only what it did become under the influence of war. Whether, on the whole, war was an aid or a hindrance to religion is not easily determined, for that reason. War certainly forced the Hebrews to think. It was not possible for Hebrew saints to pursue the even tenor of their way unmindful of the world about them. The varying fortunes of Israel thrust the deeper problems of faith continually upon their attention; there was no escaping them. The continuance of Yahwism was contingent upon the activities of a train of thoughtful men. War made intellectual atrophy incompatible with spiritual vitality. It stripped away all external support from faith. It forced it to stand alone and unaided. Faith in the goodness of God is always easy as long as things go well with the believer. But in the latter part of Hebrew history things never went well; they were always getting worse. Faith under these circumstances was hard to maintain. But only a robust faith could survive. Faith fed upon its disappointments and grew ever stronger. It did not stop at removing mountains; it looked for the overturning of worlds. The more war shattered Judaism's hopes from man, the more did she center her expectations in

God. In that sense, at least, war actually made Israel more deeply religious.

In similar fashion, war made the religion of the Hebrews concern itself with inner and fundamental realities, rather than content itself with external and incidental things. Deprived of most of the blessings and satisfactions with which more successful nations satisfied themselves, Israel was forced to make good their loss by the discovery of new treasures. She was driven by the storms out into the deep waters of life. She was forced to find sure anchorage. Compelled to let go of temporal things, she laid firmer hold upon eternal truths. Progress toward genuine spirituality was an imperative necessity for her, if she was to remain loyal to her God. She had to spiritualize and ethicize her longings in order to be able to continue to entertain them. The hopelessness of all materialistic prospects left the way clear for the entrance and development of a faith that was independent of sensuous interests. The transfer from the outer to the inner was by no means completed in the experience of Israel. Her religion maintained certain aspects of externalism in marked degree up to the end of her history. But the trend of the Hebrew religious movement was on the whole toward this more spiritual conception of life; and, though her hopes for the future were highly colored by materialism, she was forced by unfavorable outer circumstances to learn the lesson of living the life of the spirit in the present.

While we may set such values as the foregoing on the credit side of the war account, it is hardly necessary to say that there are countervailing items for the debit column. One of the heaviest of these charges is the effect that war had upon the attitude of Israel toward the world at large. As a result of war, Israel was, as we have seen, driven closer to God; but at the same time the breach between her and the rest of the world was widened. Natural antipathies and enmities were intensified. Hatred of foreign oppressors, accentuated as it was by long continuance, was reinforced by religious hostilities and became extremely bitter. No picture of Israel's glorious future was complete that did not portray vividly the humiliation or destruction of her foes. No religious literature can show more of concentrated hatred than that exhibited

in the Imprecatory Psalms; e.g. Pss. 69:22-28; 83:9-18; 109:1-20. The provocation was great; the desire for vengeance was correspondingly great. It was perfectly natural that the Israelites should entertain such feelings. It is unreasonable to condemn them severely on this score. Indeed, there are aspects of their wrath against their foes that are highly praiseworthy. For that natural anger was never wholly divorced from a feeling of outraged justice and a demand that the character of Yahweh as the righteous God should be fully vindicated by the overthrow of the wicked nations. But the inevitable accompaniment of such wrath was an attitude of narrow exclusiveness and particularistic self-righteousness. This was the bane of later Judaism. It is clearly present in such passages as Isa. 59:16-21; 63:1-6; 66:14-24. The wonder is, not that the majority of Jews felt hostility and hatred toward the heathen world, but that here and there among them were those who breathed a more generous air and exhibited a spirit of "malice toward none, charity toward all." The difficulties that had to be overcome by the spirit of universal brotherhood were almost insuperable. The inheritance from ages of strife and bloodshed laid a paralyzing hand upon all aspirations after better things. Yet the Hebrew sages, and men like the authors of Ruth and Jonah, persistently set themselves the task of cultivating a kindlier attitude in Israel and of interpreting Israel's mission in broader terms. In so doing, they were but carrying on the work of the great poet-prophet of the exile who out of the very midst of the most trying period of suffering interpreted that suffering as endured by Israel in behalf of those who were thus afflicting her.

Another way in which the effects of war wrought injuriously upon the religious consciousness of Israel is seen in the Jewish concept of sin. The repeated disasters of Israel were each in turn interpreted as indicative of Yahweh's wrath. But Yahweh's wrath was due to Israel's sins. Hence there became fastened upon the Hebrew soul an almost morbid sense of guilt. Her whole later ritual resolved itself into one continuous effort to propitiate the wrathful but holy God. The sin-consciousness overshadowed and darkened the whole of life. It interposed a high barrier between

the worshiper and his God. It exalted God at the expense of man. It hung like leaden weights upon the wings of hope and retarded the progress of religious achievement.

On the other hand, the very weariness with war and the reaction against it gave rise to certain dreams of a world at peace. Such passages of prophetic idealism as Isa. 9:1-7; 11:1-9; 65:17-25; and Mic. 4:1-4 are evidently the utterances of men who hungered and thirsted for peace and had given up all hope of its permanent establishment except as it should come through the intervention of Yahweh. Whereas in the early days of the nation's history they had gloried in Yahweh as the god of war, mighty in battles, now they looked to him as the only one able to bring war to an end and to establish peace on earth. Having failed to achieve peace for themselves by force of arms, they now leave the task to God. It must be remembered, however, that Israel never wholly abandoned the war-god idea. Her dreams of universal peace seem always to have involved the conception of Yahweh as the supremely victorious God, who had put all enemies under his feet. The allegiance of the nations is evidently thought of as growing out of their fear and awe in the presence of the irresistible God. He reigns as a great conqueror. He fights no more because there is nobody left to oppose him. The peace that is to prevail is a peace that has been conquered by the sword of Yahweh. The day of Yahweh which is to usher in the Golden Age is the day of battle upon which he from the heavens sets the battle in array and once for all overthrows all his foes, whether spiritual or temporal. Israel could not suddenly cease thinking of Yahweh in terms of militancy, after having so thought of him for centuries. It was left for later generations to free the God-idea of these associations and to set peace upon the throne of the universe.

War in Hebrew experience was neither an unmixed evil nor an unmixed good. It was one of the elements, and a most important one, that went to make up the difficult environment amid which Israel had to develop its religious and ethical ideals. The struggle for existence goes on in the world of ideas and ideals as everywhere else. Only the fittest survive the ordeal. But they come through it strengthened, enriched, and purified by the testing. There was

no release from that law in the development of Hebrew religion. If anything, it would seem that the difficulties with which faith and righteousness had to contend were greater there than elsewhere and that the spiritual victory achieved there was correspondingly greater. Apparently insuperable obstacles in the way of the Hebrew spirit did but drive it into higher altitudes. The late Professor Cramb in his last book, *Germany and England*, said that no great advance in either politics or religion had been made in the history of Europe apart from war. Politics and religion were inseparably associated each with the other and with war in early Israel; but it was the part of war ultimately to bring about a divorce between the other two. Thus there was made possible for religion a type of progress not open to her so long as she was involved in political vicissitudes. Even so, the contribution of war, and its consequences, to the religious life of Israel, first and last, was clearly of supreme value; not necessarily that there could have been no religious progress apart from war, but that the direction the progress took and the rate at which it was made were determined in large measure by the conditions set for it by a warring world.

THE MODERN TREND IN SOTERIOLOGY

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The term "salvation" is the most significant in the language of religion. For the religion of every man is just his way of seeking salvation. If theology is the religious man's theory of things in general and at the same time his way of vindicating his loyalty to the religious life, then soteriology, or the theory of salvation, is an attempt to vindicate the motive of the religious life by an intellectual construction of it. It is the effort of intelligence to establish the worth of the specifically religious experience of an ascension from a worse state to a better by showing that it has a normal place in the whole of our human experience and, in the end, an ordered place in the whole universe; that the experience of moral betterment is the root of all sociology, and soteriology is the point of view central to all theology. A theological system is simply organized soteriology.

It seems, then, that a new soteriology is to be looked for when a fresh advance in the religious life has become a subject of conscious reflection. The new experiences into which men come in those spiritual movements that we call a religious revival or reform always seek for themselves an intellectual vestment in which the subject of them may come to know their worth and meaning and interpret them to others. A history of soteriology becomes a record of progress in the better life, that is, when each of the new formations of soteriology is a genuine product of its time. To inquire for the present trend in soteriology is first of all to ask for the present direction of the prevailing religious spirit.

It means more than this. For the very effort to apprehend the significance of the better life places it in relation to the whole realm of our experiences and calls into its service all the forces of current thought. A new soteriology, therefore, will appear also whenever

a step forward has been made in scientific interpretation, in social life, or in economic industry. If it be not forthcoming, the religious life becomes gradually alien to the rest of our life and suffers decline. A soteriology fashioned in the days when men thought the sun went round the earth or when they submitted to a social and political control that emanated from an autocrat or an aristocracy must be as unsatisfactory to the denizen of the modern world of diffused intelligence and democratic self-government as the hope of salvation from the Hebrew Yahweh could be to a modern Christian. Accordingly, the modern trend in theology can be discovered only by inquiring for the great influences (not only the religious but as well those not commonly called religious) that have been shaping our lives in the broad in modern times.

Our question becomes, therefore, In what way does an intelligent religious man of our times, aware of the inner relation of our religious life to our whole being, proceed to answer the question, "How are men saved?" Or, if we confine our attention to the Christian, the question becomes, In what way does the Christian believer scientifically construe the transformation he and his fellow-believers have made from the lower to the higher? The answer ought to show the character of the peculiar experience through which the modern Christian passes and the manner in which it stands related to the world of his consciousness. The present trend in soteriology will be shown when we point out the direction in which the thought of the modern Christian moves when he attempts to expound and vindicate the assurance he has of moral betterment.

In all soteriology there are two principal issues: first, the end to be attained in what we call salvation, second, the means of attaining it. The first of these is fundamental and the second is tributary to it. In the history of theological controversy, however, the second has received the emphasis, the difference in the views of what constitutes the good which has come to men in the saving process being the main root—though commonly unobserved—of controversy. Yet this is not so much to be wondered at if we remember that it is never possible for us to tell precisely wherein salvation finally consists since it has never been perfectly attained, whereas the means of salvation has always been more definitely

presented because its acceptance is supposed to be a matter of immediate practical necessity.

In the primitive Christian era salvation was conceived to be found in participation in the purity and righteousness of the kingdom of God, and the consequent freedom from misery and destruction at its coming. The way of salvation was found in the manner in which the transition was to be made out of the earthly, temporal, and sinful kingdom of this age into that better kingdom. It would be accomplished by the coming of Christ when the wicked should be overwhelmed in the cataclysm that should destroy the present order of things and the righteous share his glory after his final pronouncement upon their state at the judgment. Associated with this was the present personal attitude of the believer or unbeliever toward the Christ. In addition to this catastrophic view of salvation there are others, of which the view that Jesus made expiation for sin on the cross and that men are in a sense already saved is the most important. But it did not displace the first mentioned.

In the early Catholic era the Greco-oriental view that corruption flows from man's finitude and his consequent weakness and ignorance, and the longing for escape from this finitude into the infiniteness, light, power, incorruption, and immortality of the divine as the end of salvation, led to the Christian acceptance of the view that salvation is by deification. The human personality of Jesus was fitted into this scheme of thought. The idea of Incarnation became central to the theory, of salvation and controversy centered in the question of the divine-human personality of Christ. The means to salvation was found in the communication of incorruption through the mysteries.

In the mediaeval Roman church, with its assumed task of regulating the lives of men with a view to their eternal well-being, salvation was conceived, not through the contrast between mortality and immortality, but, immortality being accepted as universal, the contrast was between a blessed immortality and an immortality of woe. This blessed state would consist in the absence of sin and suffering and the possession of purity and happiness. The church was divinely commissioned to minister this salvation and possessed in her sacramental system the instrument for its bestow-

ment. Salvation was a matter of divine government. The means was found in actions prescribed in conformity with this legal system.

In the early Protestant time the view of salvation as an end was not very differently conceived but the immensely deeper view of sin that underlay the Reformation demanded a different view of the means. The nature of the divine government was more profoundly understood, sin had a more serious character, and moral necessity took the place of legality, or at least gave a deeper meaning to it, in the matter of salvation from sin. The infinite demerit of sin demanded an infinite penalty for its expiation and an infinite sufferer for the propitiation of the Lawgiver. Hence the way of salvation was solely by divine grace, effected solely through the divine sufferer, and received absolutely as a gift, by faith. But faith was purely a receptive attitude, and as a means was itself provided by God. Hence controversy attached to the question of justification.

For orthodox Protestantism, as for mediaeval Catholicism, salvation was conceived as within the framework of the divine government. The mediaeval terminology was substantially retained, but its meaning was deepened. The interest of the divine government was supreme and salvation was administered according to a predetermined "plan." The personal career of Jesus and the teachings of the Bible were set within this scheme and adjusted to it.

Modern soteriology is affected by all these views. It finds itself confronted by the terminology to which these views have given currency and a body of ideas that they represent, but the spiritual atmosphere in which it moves is vastly different. For early Protestantism possessed a wealth of spiritual potency that soon began to burst through the somewhat artificial limits set to its activity in the creeds and confessions of faith. The story of its progress in this direction is the history of modern theology. A brief outline of the principal spiritual forces let loose in Protestantism and the manner of their operation will bring us to a moderately clear view of the developing modern view of salvation.

1. The story of the evolution of the spiritual potencies of Protestantism brings out evidence that the Reformation released a powerful current of spiritual energy that had been dammed back

by the Catholic system. Men became possessed of a new confidence in the native ability of the human mind to discover ultimate reality and to interpret its meaning. The material universe lay invitingly before them and challenged them to discover its secret. The heavens were brought near, and men like Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton worked out a revolutionary view of the whole cosmos. Bacon's *Novum Organum* elaborated the method of investigation through which Nature would yield her response to him who interrogated her as to her character, independently of all that was called revelation. The old cosmology was destroyed, and with the new came the necessity of reconstructing that representation of salvation which depended on the old cosmology and had made it a work of transferring a man in safety from earth to heaven rather than to hell, and also of reconstructing the representation of Christ's saving work so far as it has described him as coming from the place of heaven to the place of the earth and reascending to heaven. Such externalities could no longer have significance except as symbols.

The Protestant vindication of the prerogative and power of the individual human mind to interpret the divine revelation issued in a profound confidence also in its inherent creativeness. Beginning with Descartes and Spinoza and continuing down to Hegel, the attempt was virtually made to exhibit the whole of reality, known to man, as the product of thought. Deism in England and Illuminism in Germany disavowed the claim that saving truth could come to men only by a miraculous and miraculously attested revelation that implied disregard or contempt for native rational power. Many of their arguments were misleading because of extreme assumptions and ignorance of history, but, in the main, their plea for the dignity of the human intellect carried conviction to the intelligent world and made it impossible for a later age to regard the process of salvation as counter to the normal activities of the mind or in any degree independent of them.

Since those days there has been going on a steady obliteration of the opposition, and even of the boundaries, between the natural and the revealed. As a consequence, the former familiar contrast between nature and grace has been gradually abandoned. The

mode of salvation and the experience of it have their validity for the modern man when they are seen to coincide with the normal activities of our human spirituality. The aim of psychology to reduce to order the apparently chaotic occurrences within the human consciousness and the aim of physical science to reduce the apparently chaotic condition of the material world to order rest upon the assumption of the ultimate unity of all things. This has become a settled conviction with the mass of intelligent people and they are unable to give their adherence to any theory of human betterment that ignores or challenges the order of the cosmos.

2. Growing out of this confidence in the knowability of the natural and the universality of its laws, a kindlier view of the *character* of the material world and the worth of its processes for our highest good has emerged. To the devout Catholic the material world was, at bottom, evil, the material body was a clog upon the soul, and attention to the claims or the goods of either involved impurity to be expiated by penance. The orthodox Protestant only partly discarded this view. Calvinism took, on the whole, a gloomy view of the world and of the destiny of its denizens. Nature, human and non-human, was corrupt. Natural birth was birth in sin, without the personal consent of the sinner. Sin would cleave to men until they were separated from the body, when the believer should become instantaneously holy and the unbeliever should instantly become hopelessly lost.

The developed Protestant spirit finds itself in sharp antagonism with such a view of things. It has found itself increasingly at home in the present order and it has no fears of the discovery of the ultimate nature of the world. Nature is responding in kindly manner to our inquisition of her character and is placing her resources at our disposal. Her once supposedly malignant forces are turning out to be good for those who know how to use them. Matter appears not to be the foe but the friend and the instrument of spirit. Men are coming to feel that they are the heirs and fore-ordained masters of the world. He who by discovery and invention is enabling men to know the world and take possession of its wealth in the interest of humanity is contributing to human betterment, is working out human salvation.

In consequence, life has been taking on a richer meaning. Our regard for the worth of it has been deepened. The range of its activities has been widened. The obligations of life have been multiplied and the sacredness of them has been intensified. The attempt to escape from the physical is seen to be immoral. The "piety" that cherishes the ideal of world-flight is irreligious. The theory of salvation that counsels men to avoid the common things of life, with the associated toil and strain, or that places one's hope of purity in release from physical conditions is damning. Salvation can no longer be represented as deliverance *from* the world with its cry for aid, but as deliverance from a wrong attitude *toward* the world.

He who explores the heavens for men, or measures the geologic ages, or seeks the inner principle that relates man to all organic life, or discloses the pathway men have taken out of the past, or analyzes our psychic processes, or interprets the significance of the impulses that move us out into the vast unknown that still awaits our arrival is a laborer together with God. The process of salvation in the religious sense is not to be separated from this general movement of the spirit of the man out into the regions of the universe and his appropriation of its resources.

The Protestant tendency in soteriology is to see in the Christian revelation of the higher life the radical impulse that generates this movement above described, determines its end, and regulates its direction. Christianity is seen to be a faith in our divine sonship that rouses the conviction that all things are ours, fills us with an eagerness to make ourselves at home in the universe and to place its treasures as bounties at the feet of every man. Therewith come deliverance from the terror of this world or of the world to come and a joyful anticipation of blessedness in both.

3. With this growing view of the relations of men with the universe there have come a new insight into the continuity of human life and a new interest in its course. The historical spirit is abroad. We are trying to understand life in its unity—not merely in a metaphysical sense—but in its evolution in time. There is a persistent effort to find some sort of developing order in the tangled skein of life and even in the mutual antagonisms of men and the

strifes of race with race to trace the steps of a forward movement. The Christian ideal of the kingdom of God is obtaining an interpretation barely dreamed of in the past.

The true historical spirit with its appreciation of movements in time was substantially unknown to theologians until lately. The significance of the rise of the historical spirit, as respects the doctrine of salvation, may be seen by reference to its characteristic attitude toward human life. The past is contemplated not merely as antecedent to, or even the cause of, the present, but as organic to it. The past fulfils itself in the present. The quantum or the character of the life of the past is not preserved unchanged. There is a *plus* which comes out of the past but is at the same time worthier. Thus the well-being of the present generation of men consists in the perpetuation of the spiritual attainments of the past generations and their enhancement in new lives under new conditions. Salvation is a spiritual momentum expanding in mass and force as it progresses. The blessings that come to men proceed horizontally, rather than perpendicularly. A "state of salvation" is a contradiction in terms.

We see, then, that the worth of any life, be it that of an individual person or that of a community, is dependent on the many streams of gracious power which have moved toward it and found their confluence in it, while at the same time the individual or the new community becomes a new coefficient of that spiritual power. The Christian salvation, if by that we mean the elevation of human life in dignity, purity, and power, is more than the rescue of so many people from a state of sinfulness or misery. It is a historical momentum moving down from Christ through the generations and in increasing volume perpetuating itself normally in the life of the present. It has a community character both in its successive aspect and in its contemporaneousness.

The purely individualistic conception of salvation is hereby set aside—not that the individual is overlooked or his value discredited, as we shall see presently—but his place in the kingdom of grace has been allotted to him in the course of the working providence that has brought him into contact with those currents of the power of moral uplift set in operation long ago and continued

through the communion that came into being as the consequence of the career of Jesus Christ. Hence the earlier Protestant view of salvation as coming to the elect in an unaccountable way, by the arbitrary choice of an absolutist God, disappears. In place of it the devout soul sees in the union of all those forces which constitute the history of the world the focusing of influences from far and near upon the personal subject who experiences salvation. A numerical estimate of the saved and unsaved also loses its value.

But most of all is the change seen in the abandonment of the view that the work of salvation is something done once and for all at a definite point of time and that the benefits are appropriated by each for himself. The idea of a redemption forever complete in the past loses its appeal to the thoughtful spirit. Christ can no longer be represented as having finished in a few years the work of providing salvation and then having left the world for the bliss of heaven, but he is to be regarded as having come spiritually into the stream of our humanity and as progressively permeating it with his holy divine personality according to those divinely ordained universal laws of the vital process. This, again, carries with it a displacing of the common view that the work of salvation was portioned among the persons of the Godhead, and the substitution therefor of the simpler view that the gracious personality of Jesus continues his saving activity among men in the Spirit that operates in the Christian communion, and that this is just the work of God. Hereby all history is filled with a new meaning. For in its ultimate significance history becomes just the story of the preparation and perfection of the Christian salvation.

4. At this point we become aware of the new estimate placed on human life. For the modern man the human personality has become possessed of an infinite sacredness. So long as he was set apart by himself the salvation or the ruin of the individual could not be a matter of far-reaching importance. God could spare him without a loss of his own glory. It is not so now. The man is essential to the race and the race, reverently, is essential to God. So to say, the energies wrapped up in the whole human race find their common focus in the eternal well-being of the individual human personality. He cannot be spared. The whole forward

movement of the race culminates in the perfection of his being. A few words may be added in exposition of his view.

The Catholic system clearly subordinated the individual to the interest of the community or—which was the same to Catholicism—the ecclesiastical order. The church was the depository of salvation; she imparted it to the man on condition of his submission to her authority or withdrew it when he became disobedient. The church must be preserved even though individual men must be sentenced to hell. Hence she limited his exercise of his native powers on every hand. The radicals of Protestantism reversed all this and exalted the prerogative of the individual. The church became with them a voluntary association of saved people. At the same time the community idea of salvation was not abandoned, though it was held with varying degrees of clearness or obscurity by various types of Protestants. The relation of the religious community-life to the salvation of the individual was only dimly perceived, and it was to be expected that in the violent reaction against Catholicism the emphasis should fall on the worth of the individual. On the whole this was a sound view, though it was an incomplete apprehension of the way of salvation.

The profound sense of personal worth that came into action in Protestantism developed a personal aggressiveness never before equaled. It was shown in the establishment, at great cost, of the right of personal liberty in the political, intellectual, and religious life. Modern constitutional government, modern educational methods, and the organization of the free churches are some of the fruits. Nowhere is the power of the new movement more manifest than in the jurisprudence of Protestant countries. The rights of a criminal are guarded as sacredly as the rights of the innocent, though it is recognized that some of his rights have been forfeited. The exercise of capital punishment is confined to the sole instance of murder and that usually when there are no doubts of guilt and no extenuating circumstances connected with the act. Public executions have ceased because they are degrading to the witnesses and *to the criminal*. Penalties are assessed in such a way as to minister, if possible, good to the convict as well as to the community.

This is all extremely significant. It exhibits the genius of Protestant religious faith and at the same time shows the working in Protestantism of a principle that was in danger of being forgotten by Christendom, namely, on the one hand, the absolute, indefeasible worth of the individual human personality, and, on the other hand, the identity of the worth and interest of the individual with those of the community. The root of it all is the awareness, on the part of the man, of his personal community of life with God—an assurance which resides within the self-consciousness—and the discovery along with it that he has thereby entered into a new and holy relation with his fellows. The community within which these convictions dwell can never sacrifice the individual to its own supposed interest. On the contrary, whether he be good or bad, the life and beneficence of the community focuses itself on him. The worth of the community is manifest in the personalities it produces. And, on the other hand, the life of the renewed man finds its true sphere of activity in the creation and development of such a community as becomes the true expression of the secret of his soul's communion with God.

There is herewith given a new trend to the doctrine of atonement. It has been set forth beautifully (though, I fear, defectively through a failure to appreciate the significance of Christ) by Professor Royce in his recent work on *The Problem of Christianity*. There will be no attempt here to state the position there presented. The point I wish to make is, simply, that the doctrines of atonement and justification take on a new character, the ancient methods of justice on which they were based having been superseded. The idea of the satisfaction of justice by a requisite amount of suffering, of a penal *substitution* of the innocent for the guilty, of a formal acquittal—all completed at a certain point of the past—must give way to a *vital* conception of atonement. We are coming to see that the glory of Jesus is that he has brought into human hearts the operation of the Spirit of God that was his own, whereby men have come to share in the divine prerogative of self-devotion to the cause of the sinful and the fallen, and there has come streaming into the life of humanity a redemptive energy that lifts men up from the life of baseness and brings them to the fulfilment of the potentialities of their being.

5. There is one other consideration to be mentioned, and very briefly. With the recent diffusion of the Christian community over great areas of life has come a corresponding deepening of the religious spirit of the Christian people. Their missionary undertakings have brought them face to face with multiform faiths of all grades of worth and unworth. It is no longer possible to regard any of these as simply and altogether false. It is found that each of them, even if in only the lowest degree, offers an avenue of approach for the preacher of the Christian gospel. In any case, from the standpoint of the missionary, the religion of any people is its best possession. The Christian is driven to reflection anew on the meaning of the religious life and its relation to the other elements of our human career. Self-examination and self-chastening inevitably follow. Moreover, the converts bring their own spirituality to bear on the problems of faith. A fresh adjustment of religious ideas is taking place as the life of historic Christianity mingles with the life of the new converts.

A new doctrine of salvation is sure to be the outcome. As the entrance of early Christianity upon the domain of the ancient Greco-Roman people issued in the doctrine of salvation expressed in the Nicene and later creeds, as the conquest by the Christian church of the European peoples issued in the early Protestant doctrine of salvation, so the melting together of an occidental and an oriental Christianity in the new world emerging into view is sure to issue in a new formulation of the meaning of the experience of salvation. What the new formulations will be it is too soon to say, but of one or two things, I think, we may be confident. There will arise a new explanation of the relation of Jesus Christ to history. Questions of his pre-existence and post-existence will be laid aside as unpractical and unprofitable. In place of these will come a conviction of his eternal presence and a deeper insight into his significance for the unification of the whole of humanity in a life of mutual devotion and for the sanctification of all things to a human-divine end. There will also arise a new interpretation of what we mean when we speak of the Holy Spirit of God—a subject almost wholly undeveloped in the course of Christian thought in the past. Let us hope that the new oriental Christianity which is arising as the fruit of modern missions may accomplish in this

aspect of soteriology what is little more than hinted at in traditional orthodoxy and that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit will receive its due from the meditative mind of the East.

To summarize: Modern soteriology tends toward an interpretation of the Christian salvation that will differ as widely from the accepted soteriology of early Protestantism as the latter differed from the soteriology of the ancient Catholic church. It is not principally concerned with the question of how to attain to immortality or how to avoid an eternity of misery and gain one of bliss, though it ignores by no means the hope of the eternal and blessed life. It is rather concerned with the perfection of the human personality in the whole range of its powers and in the task of interpreting the universe in terms which make it tributary to this supreme aim. It does not seek to fix the hopes of men on some special provision or fixed arrangement through which by using the "means" prescribed they may secure a guaranty of ultimate safety, but it rather seeks to make men aware of the presence and character of those purifying and ennobling spiritual forces which have come into human history with redemptive power from Jesus Christ and aware at the same time of their own inner capacity to share in this redemption. Hence it is peculiarly intent on describing those spiritual experiences in men's souls by which they become conscious of participation in that life of self-mastery and of pure and loving self-devotion which is the very life of the Divine Spirit in men, by which also they consciously enter into that communion of mutual service in all good things which we call the church of the Living God—a communion in which each believer gives himself to the whole and all give themselves to each, and in which they find themselves possessed of unity of purpose with the God who works all things together for good to them that love him.

THE GOSPELS AND CONTEMPORARY BIOGRAPHIES

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The Gospels of the New Testament were written in a period of enormous literary production. The Mediterranean world from about 400 B.C. to 100 A.D. (and beyond) created the greatest literature that the world up to that time had known—greatest in quality and greatest in quantity. Also, since that time this ancient literature has remained pre-eminent, until the rise of the modern literature of the last three centuries. The writings of the ancient period were: first, Greek; second, Roman; third, oriental (Jewish). They embodied history, philosophy, politics, ethics, religion, science, medicine, law, tragedy, comedy, poetry, rhetoric, oratory, and education. Our Bible is of course oriental; the books comprised in it were the finest moral-religious writings of the Palestinian Jews and primitive Christians. Jewish literature was limited in variety and amount; it was chiefly moral-religious, and was choice rather than extensive. The Greek and Roman literature was incalculably vast. Even the fraction of it which has survived to the present day makes of itself a great library. The extant writings of Plato alone are more extensive than the whole Bible. The same is true of the writings of Xenophon, of Aristotle, of Demosthenes, of Cicero, of Livy, of Plutarch and many others. It is also true of Philo and Josephus, who although they were Jews produced literature under the Greek influence and in Greek proportions.

In comparison with these elaborate literary productions of the Greeks and Romans, the Gospels were brief, special and popular writings. In extent a Gospel was about the length of a chapter in the large histories, or of an essay in the ethical writings, or of a play in the tragedies. In character it was a religious tract, intended to promote the Christian movement. In style it represented the

popular spoken language of the common people, for the author was not a trained philosopher or a professional *littérateur*. The Evangelists produced their books for the simple, practical purpose of preaching the gospel to the Mediterranean world. They were writings of the people, by the people, and for the people. They took on the characteristics which belonged to the Christian missionaries in their work. Their length, content, and style were such as to make them efficient propagandist media among the masses of the Empire who were in the main uneducated, poor, and obscure.

The story of Jesus was Jewish and Palestinian in origin. It arose among an Aramaic-speaking people and circulated in that language. But within the first thirty years (that is, by 60 A.D.) the Gentiles had shown greater interest in the gospel message than the Jews, and the Christian mission was chiefly successful in Syria, Asia Minor, Greece, and Italy. The Gospels arose, not in Palestine, but in these gentile countries. Their authors, with the possible exception of Luke, were Jews who had become Christians; but, instead of the narrow Jewish attitude toward non-Jews, they had given themselves to a mission among and primarily for the Gentiles. The Gospels therefore were written outside of Palestine, in the Greek language, for the gentile peoples. They told the Jewish story of Jesus, the Jewish founder of Christianity; but they told it in the universal language of the Empire, with a selected and adapted content, and with a universal color and objective.

The Gospels were not intended to be a contribution to historical or philosophical literature. They presented a religious belief and a moral ideal, which they sought to spread. That this message was put into writing was incidental and supplementary to the oral mission, for the Christian propaganda was mainly by word of mouth. The Gospels, however, proved increasingly attractive and useful as a means of evangelization; especially was this the case when the great missionaries of the first century passed away and smaller men succeeded to their duties. That striking, effective invasion of Southern Europe by oriental religion and morality in the centuries to which the rise of Christianity belongs was essentially promoted by the Gospel writings, in their rudimentary

and in their finished forms. The Jewish morality-religion, in the revision of Christianity, which caught so strongly and spread so rapidly in the Greco-Roman world that in two hundred years it achieved recognition as the state religion of the Empire, was not a new philosophy nor a new ethics destined to refute and overthrow the best gentile thought and purpose. Rather, it was a vital, popular hope, ideal and appeal which gradually fused with the Greco-Roman philosophy and ethics to make the highest religion of history. The Gospels are to be viewed, not as historical writings produced by a historical impulse and method, but as propagandist writings of this early Christian movement. They contain historical reminiscences, or memorabilia, of Jesus' ministry; but for the practical use these may serve in the evangelistic mission.

The authors of the Gospels took up into their works the events, deeds, and words of Jesus quite as the homiletical transmission of the first generation and the second generation handed them down. At no stage in the transmission of the memorabilia of Jesus, from the time of the ministry itself (28-30 A.D.) to the time when the latest of the Gospels was produced (the Gospel of John, *ca.* 110-125 A.D.) do the memorabilia appear to have been subjected to thorough, careful historical investigation and criticism for the recovery of the exact facts about Jesus. Nor does there appear to have been any disposition to view, estimate, or relate Jesus historically; the primitive Christian interest was religious and practical, concerned not with past facts as such but with present values and potencies. Jesus was to them a divine Redeemer more than a man of history; the memorabilia of his deeds and teachings were the message of an ardent faith more than the chronicles of past events. The Evangelists certainly did not intend to picture the life of Jesus inaccurately or inadequately. But neither can it be said of them that they had the impulse, the ability, the training, or the resources for determining the exact facts of Jesus' ministry—facts which belonged to a period forty to eighty years antecedent to the composition of their books and of which there had been only an informal, unsystematic, popular, and homiletical transmission. Luke's prologue does indeed speak of investigation and an improved order, but Luke's Gospel does not in fact present

an account of Jesus that is on the whole more historical than the accounts given by Mark and Matthew. Luke's framework of the ministry is taken over from Mark. He has incorporated nearly all the Markan material, and he gives these narratives in a form not more exactly historical than Mark's. The non-Markan material which Luke has in common with Matthew may be in some passages and features more exactly historical as given by Luke, but in the main Matthew retains more of the original content, form, and color of the Gospel memorabilia. The material which Luke alone presents, both that which is scattered through the sections paralleled by Mark and Matthew and that which is massed in the middle third of his Gospel, does not particularly indicate superior historical investigation or arrangement. As sources of historical information about Jesus, the Gospels of Mark and Matthew are primary in a larger measure than is the Gospel of Luke. The Lukan material is mainly secondary in the sense that it represents a stage of greater modification of the memorabilia in the process of selecting, expanding, and adapting the story of Jesus to the practical needs of the Christian mission toward the end of the first century A.D.

One may say that the Gospels are writings from which historical facts about Jesus may be learned, rather than that they are historical writings. These books were not called Lives of Jesus, but "Gospels" (*εὐαγγέλια*), i.e., evangelistic tracts to promote the Christian movement, to commend Jesus as Christ, Lord, Savior, and Teacher to the Mediterranean world. When we approach them with the historical aim, method, and spirit, to ascertain the literal and exact facts about Jesus as a man of history, we are seeking what they in part contain but what they were not principally designed to supply. From them we can in part reconstruct the life of Jesus, but they do not furnish this ready to hand; they furnish materials to which the full process of historical investigation, criticism, and interpretation has to be applied. The Evangelists prepared their Gospels with a practical moral-religious intent; in larger and smaller aggregates they collected from current tradition, chiefly in documentary form, the memorabilia of Jesus as they were known, taught, and used in the districts where they

wrote; they selected, revised, and arranged these memorabilia in accordance with their idea of what would serve the particular needs of their mission; and they put these writings forth as a supplemental aid to the oral propaganda in which as Christian missionaries they were engaged.

The Gospels are not chronicling but dramatic productions. They present pen pictures of Jesus as a divine Person on earth, revealing God, saving men, teaching righteousness, calling to repentance, healing sickness, heralding the new age. The simple, graphic style of these descriptions, and the glory and assurance which fill the story, made the Gospels incalculably influential and precious. They aimed to make men "see Jesus," not in the literal garb of a Galilean prophet, but in the transfigured raiment of the Son of God redeeming the world.

Then are the Gospels *biographies* of Jesus? No or Yes, according to the connotation given the term "biography."

In the historical sense, a biography is a writing which aims to present all the important dates and facts about a person, with perspective and exactness, including his relation to other persons and to his times. This involves research, criticism, and interpretation, according to the current principles of history-writing. It is obvious that the Gospels are not biographies in this sense of the term.

In the popular sense, a biography is any writing which aims to make one acquainted with a historical person by giving some account of his deeds and words, sketchily chosen and arranged, even when the motive of the writer is practical and hortatory rather than historical. The amount, character, order, and accuracy of the historical information contained in these pragmatic writings vary greatly, according to the purposes, interests, abilities, and resources of the several authors. The Gospels may be classified with productions of this kind; in the popular sense they are biographies, and we commonly so think of them.

The Mediterranean world, in the ancient period to which the Gospels belonged, produced a host of biographies. Naturally the popular biographies exceeded the historical ones in number, attractiveness, and influence, as more suited to the common mind.

The lives of many great men of the ancient period were more or less specifically narrated in the historical works produced by the eminent Greek historians, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius; by the eminent Roman historians, Livy, Tacitus, Dio Cassius; and by the Jewish historian Josephus, who wrote in Greek at Rome under the imperial patronage and according to the Greek models. But as early as the fourth century B.C. biography became differentiated from general history as the sketch of the life of a single individual. The first biography of this kind known to us is the *Evagoras* of Isocrates, written *ca.* 365 B.C. A few years later, under the influence of this, Xenophon produced his *Agésilas*. Xenophon's *Memorabilia of Socrates*, written perhaps somewhat earlier, was less biographical in form than the *Agésilas*. It was, however, a most important work in making known the spirit, aim, method, and teaching of Socrates. Plato's *Dialogues* were also in an essential sense biographical of Socrates. The development of this type of literature was made possible by the historical writings of Herodotus and Thucydides in the fifth century B.C.; and also by the individualism of Socrates, in and through whom personality came to fuller recognition. Plato and Euripides did much to advance interest in the individual man. "The Greek word *bios*, life, acquired a new meaning, charged with the whole contents of a man's actions and character." The development of biographical writing went on through the ancient period, particularly under the influence of the Peripatetic school, until it attained its highest stage in the first three centuries A.D., with the *Life of Agricola* by Tacitus, the parallel *Lives* by Plutarch, the *Lives of the Twelve Caesars* by Suetonius, the *Discourses of Epictetus* by Arrian, the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* by Philostratus, and the *Lives and Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers* by Diogenes Laertius.

These Greek and Roman biographies of the ancient period, from the fourth century B.C. to the third century A.D., achieve in varying manner and measure the biographical ideal. If one compares them with modern biography-writing—for example, the volumes of the "American Statesmen" series, or the "English Men of Letters," or the "World's Epoch-Makers," or the articles

in the *Dictionary of National Biography* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed.—one finds that they fall considerably short as respects aim, method, investigation, critical process, exactness, and completeness. Edmund Gosse maintains that the distinction between biography and history and the true conception of biography are modern and did not arise until the seventeenth century. But this appears to be an overstatement. The ancients did in fact write biography, and good biography, as an examination of the writings above named will show. They did not of course attain to the standard of biographical writing that has been recently developed by historical science. Particularly is it true of the ancient biographies that they seldom had a mere chronicling purpose; they were generally written to eulogize their subjects, or to affect political opinion and action, or to teach uprightness and usefulness by example. But it is also true of modern biography-writing that its aim is chiefly educational rather than merely recording, abstract, and scholastic.

The two types of biography are to be distinguished, as we have already seen, not so much by their purpose as by their method. If a writing presents a man's life with fair completeness, order, and accuracy, out of an adequate knowledge of the facts, it is a historical biography. It may at the same time have a practical purpose—eulogistic, political, social, aesthetic, or educational. On the other hand, if a writing presents only memorabilia of a man's life, disconnected incidents and sayings, without adequate chronology and connection, without showing his genetic relation to and his influence upon his times, it is a popular biography. The two classes of course shade off into each other in various ways. If the biography of a particular individual presents definite knowledge of his dates, his motives, his message, his characteristics, his personality, and his service to his period, we may classify the work as a direct contribution to history-writing. If, however, the data of the man's life are inadequately furnished by the writing, so that uncertainty exists as to the deeds, the teaching, the personality, the relationships of the man, we may classify the work as popular, because the didactic aim has operated to the neglect or the obscuration of the historical facts. Here

again it is clear that the Gospels belong to the writings of the popular class, because of the extreme difficulty of recovering the historical Jesus.

The fulness, correctness, and competency of a writer's account of another man's life must necessarily depend upon the quantity and quality of his knowledge of the man. If immediate acquaintance is not possible, the writer's knowledge of his subject must depend upon the sources of his information, written or oral. He can tell no more than he can learn, and he can tell it no more accurately than it comes to him. Moreover, the question always arises as to what ability this biographer has to comprehend and interpret that man. Biography-writing is certainly one of the most exacting of tasks; competency in knowledge and understanding, not to mention literary expression, is so difficult to acquire. No one then can think it strange that the ancient biographies fall short of satisfying the modern historical inquirer, or that the didactic purpose of some of the writers led them to accept and use without historical criticism the memorabilia that came to their hands concerning a man.

The ancient biographies were written chiefly about two classes of men: the great political leaders (warriors and statesmen) and the great intellectual leaders (philosophers and teachers). Plutarch's *Lives* present biographical sketches of famous Roman politicians like Solon, Fabius, Cato, Pompey, Caesar, Cicero; and of famous Greek politicians like Themistocles, Pericles, Alcibiades, Aristides, Demosthenes, Alexander. Suetonius narrates the lives of the first twelve Roman emperors, from Julius Caesar to Domitian. And of course the many massive histories written in the ancient period were full of the deeds of the eminent warriors and statesmen. On the other hand, the great intellectual leaders received literary monuments. In their case the biographies naturally took the form of accounts of their teaching, since their lives were in the main uneventful. The first great philosopher to be memorialized in literature was Socrates, of the fifth century B.C. Xenophon in his *Memorabilia of Socrates* gave sketches of his method and his message; while Plato in his *Dialogues* still more elaborately reproduced and interpreted Socrates' teaching.

Since both Xenophon and Plato were pupils of Socrates, their accounts of his teaching are at first-hand; and they also narrate not a little of Socrates' manner of life. Arrian, in the second century A.D., wrote out from his own verbatim notes the teaching of his great Stoic master Epictetus. Philostratus, in the third century A.D., produced from written and oral sources an extensive *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, one of the foremost philosophers of the first century A.D., giving both his deeds and his words. Diogenes Laertius, also in the third century A.D., wrote the *Lives and Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers*, containing biographical sketches of many of the eminent thinkers and teachers of Greece and Rome through the whole ancient period. The accounts of their sayings were interspersed and associated with incidents of their deeds and manner of life. Suetonius, in the second century A.D., had undertaken to write Lives of eminent grammarians, rhetoricians, and poets; but for some reason, probably the lack of biographical material, these sketches are mere fragments, averaging perhaps one page of narrative regarding each man.

These biographies of the Greek and Roman intellectual leaders were written primarily to exhibit and perpetuate their teaching. The major portion of the material is quotation of their words, and the main interest centers in their ideas. The teaching is often enlivened and made concrete by association with some event or act in the subject's life, which is recounted generally in the anecdotal form. The amount of narrative material joined with the teaching is larger or smaller, according to the picturesqueness of the philosopher or the disposition of the biographer. Arrian's work on Epictetus gives only his teaching, nothing of his acts or the incidents of his life.

At this point the transition from biography to philosophical treatise becomes easy. A great teacher might give his message orally and his followers might write it down, as was the case with Socrates, Epictetus, Apollonius, and others, including Jesus; or the teacher might himself write down his message, as was the case with Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, Plutarch, Marcus Aurelius, and others, including Paul. In the former case we especially need biographers, otherwise the teachings of these philosophers could

not be known to us and their influence would fail of perpetuation. In the latter case we have the messages of the intellectual leaders directly from their own hands; so the biographer has a secondary service to render—a highly useful service, however, because the teaching is more attractive and much better understood in the setting of the whole life. The greatest value and power in the history of the last two thousand years have attached to the first-hand writings. Aside from the Bible, the writings that have received the most attention and have exerted the greatest influence during this period have been the *Dialogues* of Plato and the philosophical treatises of Aristotle. Next to these have been the practical moral writings of Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, Epictetus (as transcribed by Arrian), and Marcus Aurelius.

In the matter of general attention and influence, the message of Jesus has been at a disadvantage as compared with the message of Paul, for the very reason that Paul wrote down his message (in part), while Jesus allowed the transmission of his teaching to fare as it might in the memories or at the hands of his followers. Among the Jews the public teachers were accustomed to do their work orally. But literature (with the exception of the Bible) received its widest and highest development among the Greeks and Romans, and the philosophical literature crowned the whole. Many of their intellectual leaders put their messages into writing—not only that, they wrote extensively and well; their compositions were great as literature not less than as philosophy. So that we have their teaching in immediate, full, and exquisite form. Had Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch taught only by word of mouth, their influence in the ancient, mediaeval, and modern world would have been incalculably less. Even good biographers, such as those who wrote about Socrates and Jesus, could not have reproduced their teaching in a way to make up the difference.

Among the biographical writings of the ancient Greek literature, the nearest parallels to the Gospels are the books which report the lives of Epictetus, Apollonius, and Socrates.

Epictetus lived *ca.* 50–130 A.D., and his teaching was written by Arrian *ca.* 125–150 A.D. Apollonius of Tyana lived *ca.* 10–97 A.D., and his biography was written by Philostratus *ca.* 217 A.D. Socrates

lived 469-399 B.C., and his teaching together with some incidents of his life were written by Xenophon in his *Memorabilia* and other Socratic writings ca. 380 B.C., and by Plato in his *Dialogues* ca. 380-350 B.C. It will be observed that in the case of Epictetus and Socrates, the interval between the life of the teacher and the writing of the life was brief; also, that the accounts were at first-hand, the biographers having been pupils for years of the men about whom they wrote. In the case of Apollonius, the interval between the life and Philostratus' biography was a hundred and twenty years; the biographer's knowledge of Apollonius was obtained from written and oral sources, chiefly the former.

It was the purpose of these writings to make known the personality and the message of these three great moral-religious teachers. The authors wrote with a practical, not with a chronicling intent. They did not make historical investigation, or give a systematic accurate account of the life (though the Life of Apollonius is in general chronological order, like the accounts of the Life of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels), but gave memorabilia of the teaching, with more or less incident in conjunction (the Life of Apollonius has much incident material, the writings about Socrates have but a small amount of incident, the *Discourses* of Epictetus have none). The message of each man was the thing of primary interest and value, together with the personality of the man behind his message. The events of his life, his genetic relationship to his environment, and his influence upon his times were secondary matters that received little or no attention. Therefore these lives of Epictetus, Apollonius, and Socrates, like the Gospels, are not biographies of the historical but of the popular type. They eulogize and idealize their heroes, they select their best sayings and interpret them for practical use, they give the memorabilia in an atmosphere of appreciation, they commend the message to the faith and practice of all.

Some account of these biographies of Epictetus, Apollonius, and Socrates will enable the reader to make comparison with the facts as to the origin, sources, contents, and characteristics of the New Testament Gospels.

Epictetus' biographer, Arrian (Flavius Arrianus) was a Greek historian and philosopher of Asia Minor *ca.* 96-180 A.D. He flourished in the reign of Hadrian (117-138 A.D.), who esteemed him and gave him high office. His eminent ability brought him the honor of citizenship at Athens, where he was given political position. A portion of his life was spent in Greece and Italy, but the later years were passed in Bithynia, the district of his birth. He was the author of many writings, his greatest original work being the *Anabasis* of Alexander. This contained in seven books a history of Alexander the Great from his accession to his death, and is regarded as our most complete and trustworthy account of him. Arrian in his young manhood at Rome became a pupil and friend of the distinguished Stoic philosopher and teacher Epictetus (*ca.* 50-130 A.D.). In his youth Epictetus was a slave boy at Rome. Having been given his freedom, he gained his philosophical education in that city under the eminent Stoic, Musonius Rufus, and later himself became one of the foremost Stoic teachers at Rome. But in 90 A.D., when about forty years old, Epictetus was expelled from Rome, along with the other philosophers, by the emperor Domitian, because these Stoic teachers condemned and aroused opposition to his tyranny. He withdrew to Nicopolis, in southern Epirus, where for about forty years he lived quietly and taught those who came to him, chiefly by private conversation. Epictetus did not himself put into writing any of his teaching.

But Arrian, during the years when he was studying philosophy with Epictetus, took full verbatim notes of his teaching. From these notes he later (125-150 A.D.) produced two works. The larger one was entitled *Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβαί* (the *Discourses of Epictetus*), and consisted of eight books, four of which are extant. The smaller work, also extant, was entitled *Ἐγχειρίδιον* (*Manual*), and contained in concise aphoristic form the main teachings of the *Discourses*. The neo-Platonist philosopher Simplicius, in the sixth century A.D., who wrote a valuable commentary on the *Encheiridion*, says that Arrian also wrote a Life of Epictetus telling what kind of man Epictetus was; unfortunately this has not been preserved.

Arrian, in a letter to Lucius Gellius, gives the following statement of his editorship of these books:

I neither wrote these *Discourses of Epictetus* in the way in which a man might write such things [that is, create the material out of his own mind]; nor did I make them public myself, inasmuch as I declare that I did not even write them [that is, put them into formal shape for publication]. But whatever I heard him say, the same I attempted to write down in his own words as nearly as possible, for the purpose of preserving them as memorials to myself afterwards of the thoughts and the freedom of speech of Epictetus. Accordingly, the *Discourses* are naturally such as a man would address without preparation to another, not such as a man would write with the view of others reading them. Now, being such, I do not know how they fell into the hands of the public, without either my consent or my knowledge [nor do we know]. But it concerns me little if I shall be considered incompetent to write; and it concerns Epictetus not at all if any man shall despise his words, for at the time when he uttered them it was plain that he had no other purpose than to move the minds of his hearers to the best things. If indeed these *Discourses* should produce this effect, they will have I think the result which the words of philosophers ought to have; but if they shall not, let those who read them know that, when Epictetus delivered them, the hearer could not avoid being affected in the way that Epictetus wished him to be.

This statement by Arrian is politely depreciative of his own ability as a reporter of Epictetus' teaching, and perhaps obscures an actual public intent in the preparation. At any rate, the *Discourses* deserved and received the most favorable attention. In the way of practical moral-religious instruction nothing finer has come down to us from the ancient philosophers and teachers of the Greco-Roman world. Epictetus upholds a high moral ideal, with great piety; he sets forth the principles of goodness, with impressive injunctions to right living. For example,

When you are going in to any great personage, remember that Another also from above sees what is going on, and that you ought to please Him rather than the other.

Remember never to say that you are alone, for you are not, but God is within. . . . To this God you ought to swear an oath just as the soldiers do to Caesar. . . . Never to be disobedient, never to make any charges, never to find fault with anything that He has given, and never unwillingly to do or to suffer anything that is necessary.

We must make the best use we can of the things which are in our power.

He is free to whom everything happens in accordance with His [God's] will.

This is your duty, to act well the part that is given to you; but to select the part belongs to Another.

Because the gods have given the wine or wheat, we sacrifice to them: but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit by which they

designed to show us the truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this?

When you have decided that a thing ought to be done and are doing it, never avoid being seen doing it, though the many shall form an unfavorable opinion about it. For if it is not right to do it, avoid doing the thing; but if it is right, why are you afraid of those who shall find fault wrongly?

Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish; but wish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have a tranquil flow of life.

You must know that if your companion be impure, he also who keeps company with him must become impure.

If I can acquire money and also keep myself modest and faithful and magnanimous, point out the way and I will acquire it.

Nothing is meaner than love of pleasure and love of gain and pride. Nothing is superior to magnanimity and gentleness and love of mankind and beneficence.

No man is free who is not master of himself.

Think of God more frequently than you breathe.

He is a wise man who does not grieve for the things which he has not, but rejoices for those which he has.

Arrian has included in the *Discourses* and the *Encheiridion* no biographical data of Epictetus, and has furnished no introductions or settings to the sayings. The teaching is arranged topically in chapters. The form is gnomic rather than argumentative. The style is that of the diatribe, or discussion, which was the popular method of the practical philosophers in the first century A.D. As we have seen, this is the title actually given them, *Διατριβαί*. In this manner of address there is but one speaker, yet questions are raised and answered as in a colloquy. Arrian's writings are practically the equivalent of so much material from Epictetus' own hand, like the moral treatises of Seneca and Plutarch; we may well wish that the non-extant portion of the *Discourses* (four additional books) might have been preserved.

The teaching of Epictetus which we have through Arrian is in quantity more than twice the entire contents of all four Gospels. How much more certainly and definitely we should know Jesus and his message if some competent follower had taken down into writing directly from Jesus' lips such a full and exact record of what he said! A full first-hand account of what he taught would distinctly advance our historical knowledge of him.

The second Greek biography of which some account is here to be given is the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, written by Philostratus *ca.* 217 A.D.

Apollonius was an eminent Greek philosopher and teacher of the first century A.D. (*ca.* 10-97 A.D.),¹ contemporary with Jesus and Paul. He was widely known and highly revered throughout the Mediterranean world, for he made extended journeys and sojourns in all parts of it—in Asia Minor, Greece, Rome, Spain, Egypt, and Syria. He was an itinerant teacher of practical morality and religion. Born early in the century, he lived almost to its close, having relations with Nero, Vespasian, Domitian, and Nerva. Palestine he did not visit, nor does he seem to have come into any acquaintance or relationship with Jesus, with Paul, nor with the Christian movement in any way. This was of course in accordance with the custom of the Greek and Roman philosophers of the first century A.D., none of whom showed any interest in or appreciation of the oriental, popular, ecstatic, idealistic, religious movement which was then spreading westward from Palestine. Christianity was ignored by Apollonius, Seneca, Epictetus, and Plutarch, as well as by the historians of the period, Tacitus and Josephus.

Like Socrates, Jesus, and Epictetus, Apollonius of Tyana did not put his teaching into written form.² He taught much and continuously, but in the way of conversation and informal public address. He was always going about conversing with people, somewhat as Socrates and Jesus did. But he did not use the dialectical method of Socrates, nor did he have a speculative mind that was always reaching into metaphysics and definition. As compared with Jesus, his style and method were gentile-philosophical rather than Jewish-prophetic. Instead of the intense religious ardor, the apocalyptical vision, and the martyr zeal of Jesus, Apollonius was

¹ Philostratus says (Book VIII, chap. xxix): "Neither has Damis told us anything about the age of our hero; but there are some who say that he was eighty, others that he was over ninety, others again who say that his age far exceeded a hundred." Cf. Book I, chap. xiv: "when he reached the age of a hundred."

² He is said, however, to have written four books upon divination by the stars, and still another book on the ritual worship of sacrifice. Neither work is extant. See Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius*, Book III, chap. xli.

mild, patient, and philosophical in his view of life, with a large sense of humor. He enjoyed travel and learned from it. He had a universal interest and sympathy. He lived through a long life of earnest, kindly, and efficient teaching, winning wide renown, and persecuted only by the vicious emperors. It happens that to us in the twentieth century Apollonius is little known, while his contemporaries Seneca, Epictetus, and Plutarch are better known; but it is probable that in the first century Apollonius was more widely known and more influential than they among the people as a whole, because Seneca and Plutarch were writers rather than oral teachers, and Epictetus taught privately rather than publicly. That we have their writings and teachings so fully, and that scholars have given and now give them so much attention, explains in fact our greater familiarity with them than with Apollonius, about whom we have only indirect information and whose teaching is preserved only in fragmentary form.¹

Apollonius was an earnest Pythagorean in his teaching and manner of life. He abstained from marriage, wine, and meat, from leather shoes, woolen garments, and shaving. At fourteen years of age he had become an apprentice to philosophy, first at Tarsus and then at Aegae. Neither the Stoic teacher at the former city, nor the Peripatetic teachers at the latter, impressed him so much as Euxenus, the follower of Pythagoras. As an attendant at the Temple of Asclepius in Aegae he acquired the gift of miraculous healing, and became renowned for his character and his deeds. "He turned the Temple into a Lyceum and Academy, for it resounded with all sorts of philosophical discussions." Some years later, in his young manhood, he returned to his home town Tyana. Soon his father and mother died, and the half share of their property which fell to him he divided among his brother and poor relations,

¹ Until two years ago the only English translation of Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius* was Berwick's, made in 1811. In 1912 a new English translation by F. C. Conybeare, together with the Greek text, was published in the "Loeb Classical Library" (New York: Macmillan, 2 vols., \$3). This makes the work available, and it will doubtless become better known. The *Life* contains not a little that is romantic in its descriptions of the adventures of Apollonius on his journeys through many countries, and much miracle as regards Apollonius' own life and deeds. But in the main it is to be regarded as a historical account.

preferring poverty for his own lot. Thereupon he began his journeys and sojourns in many lands, extending over many years.

For five years, in Asia Minor, he kept a vow of absolute silence, designed to increase and establish his wisdom. Then he entered upon his life-long career as an itinerant teacher of Greek practical philosophy, pursuing this calling wherever he went and with all he met, "the occasions providing as usual the topics he talked about." He visited Persia and India, and made long sojourns in Egypt. Finally, in 79 A.D., when Titus became emperor, he summoned Apollonius to a conference with him at Tarsus, to gain wisdom from him for his reign. The Tarsians during his stay there "became such devoted admirers of our hero as to regard him as their second founder and the mainstay of their city." Again he journeyed in Egypt, Phoenicia, Cilicia, Ionia, Achaia, and Italy. He criticized the imperial rule of Domitian, as he had that of Nero, and was summoned from Asia to Rome to clear himself of a charge of rebellion; but after being held for a time in prison, his trial ended in release. Then he continued teaching in Greece, and later at Smyrna and at Ephesus, where he died *ca.* 97 A.D., being unable to accept the invitation of the emperor Nerva to become his adviser at Rome.

Our knowledge of Apollonius rests back upon a full account of him written in the first century A.D. while he was active in his philosophical ministry. A man by the name of Damis entered into close association with Apollonius early in his itinerant career and remained with him in his travels as an attending disciple until his death; the relationship continued through forty or fifty years. Damis kept a journal of Apollonius' journeys, experiences, deeds, and words during all this period. The journal has not come down to us intact, but the extensive *Life* by Philostratus is made up chiefly from Damis' material. Presumably it was because the journal was so fully taken up into the *Life* that the journal itself was allowed to disappear.

Philostratus, the ultimate biographer of Apollonius of Tyana, was a Greek rhetorician at Rome who flourished in the first half of the third century A.D. (his date was *ca.* 127-245 A.D.). As a

young man he had studied rhetoric and philosophy at Athens, and later at Rome. He produced several works, the most important of which was his *Βίαι Σοφιστῶν*, *Lives of the Sophists*. These Lives "are not in the true sense biographical, but rather picturesque impressions." They belong to the type of popular biography in the period, a eulogistic and didactic method of writing about famous teachers, of which Plutarch's *Lives* and Diogenes Laertius' *Lives and Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers* are the best examples. The *Life of Apollonius* by Philostratus belongs to this class, but is much more extensive than any of the other biographies, a characteristic due, we may suppose, to the greater amount of material at hand and to its extraordinary attractiveness.

Philostratus produced his *Τὰ ἐς τὸν Τύανα Ἀπολλώνιον* at the suggestion of Julia Domna, the wife of the Roman emperor Septimius Severus, early in the third century A.D. As she died in 217 A.D., and the work was not published until after her death, that year may be named as the approximate date of its issue. Julia Domna, the empress, had been originally a Syrian priestess, and through her influence oriental religious rites had been made fashionable at Rome. She was greatly interested in the earlier accounts of Apollonius by Damis, Moiragenes, and Maximus, in which she found the eminent man described as a mystic, a magian, and a miracle-worker, as well as a Pythagorean philosopher and a teacher of practical ethics and religion. She therefore furnished all these materials, together with letters of Apollonius, and asked Philostratus to produce from them a worthy biography of him.¹ Such a rewriting was desirable because: (1) the sources being various, a unified account was needed; (2) Damis' journal, the main source, was in poor Greek style; (3) the reputation of Apollonius having been attacked, it was right that the public should be able to know him as he was. "It seems to me then that I ought not to condone or acquiesce in the general ignorance, but write a true account of the man, detailing the exact times at which he said or did this or that, as also the habits and temper of wisdom by means of which he came near to being considered a supernatural and divine being." Philostratus was well qualified to make over

¹ Conybeare's edition of Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius*, Book I, chaps. ii, iii.

these sources into a Life of Apollonius which for content, arrangement, style, and spirit constituted the work a classic.

The process by which Philostratus compiled the Life out of the oral and written information at his command he himself describes:

I have gathered my information partly from the many cities where he was loved, and partly from the temples whose long-neglected and decayed rites he restored, and partly from the accounts left of him by others, and partly from his own letters . . . [which] dealt with the subjects of the gods, of customs, of moral principles, of laws, and in all these departments he corrected the errors into which men had fallen.¹

There was a man Damis, by no means stupid, who formerly dwelt in the ancient city of Nineveh. He resorted to Apollonius in order to study wisdom, and having shared, by his own account, his wanderings abroad, wrote an account of them. And he records his [i.e., Apollonius'] opinions and discourses and all his prophecies . . . [he] told his story clearly enough, yet somewhat awkwardly.

And I also read² the book of Maximus of Aegae, which comprised all the life of Apollonius in Aegae.

And furthermore a will was composed by Apollonius, from which one can learn how rapturous and inspired a sage he really was.

For we must not pay attention anyhow to Moiragenes, who composed four books about Apollonius, and yet was ignorant of many of the circumstances of his life.

That then I combined these scattered sources together, and took trouble over my composition, I have said; but let my work, I pray, redound to the honor of the man who is the subject of my compilation (*συγγράμματι*), and also be of use to those who love learning.³

Damis, a native of Nineveh, joined him as a pupil . . . who became the companion of his wanderings abroad and his fellow-traveler and associate in all wisdom, and who has preserved to us many particulars of the sage. He admired him, and having a taste for the road, said: "Let us depart, Apollonius, you following God, and I you." . . . He stayed with him, increasing in wisdom, and committing to memory whatever he learned. This Assyrian's [Greek] language, however, was of a mediocre quality, for he had not the gift of expressing himself, having been educated among the barbarians [i.e., non-Greeks]; but he kept a journal (*διατριβή*) of their intercourse, and recorded in it whatever he heard or saw, and he was very well able to put

¹ The letters of Apollonius here referred to accompany the Life in the Conybeare edition, Vol. II, pp. 408-81. The letters, however, are brief and somewhat disappointing. They do not compare well with the letters of Paul in the New Testament.

² In fact, used; see Book I, chap. xii.

³ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chaps. ii, iii.

together a memoir (ὑπόμνημα) of such matters, and managed this better than anyone else could do. At any rate the volume which he calls his scrap-book (ἡ δέλτος ἢ τῶν ἐκφατισμάτων) was intended to serve such a purpose by Damis, who was determined that nothing about Apollonius should be passed over in silence.¹

For the sake of accuracy and truth, and in order to leave out nothing of the things that Damis wrote, I should have liked to relate all the incidents that occurred on their journey through these barbarous regions [Mesopotamia]; but my subject hurries me on to greater and more remarkable episodes.²

The memoirs (τὰ ἀναγεγραμμένα) then of Apollonius of Tyana, which Damis the Assyrian composed, end with the above story.³

It therefore appears that Damis' journal was the main source of Philostratus' work, furnishing almost the whole of the massive narrative from Book I, chap. xviii, when at the age of about 30 years he set out on his travels into the Far East, to Book VIII, chap. xxviii, which recounts his death. The closing pages of the biography contain material which Philostratus had obtained from oral report. His account of Apollonius' parentage, birthplace, birth, early education, his years at Aegae, and his adoption of the Pythagorean philosophy and manner of life was derived in part from his own investigations⁴ and in part from the document of Maximus of Aegae.⁵

These sources of Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius*, and the way in which he used them, may be compared with the sources and compilation of the New Testament Gospels. Philostratus had: (1) Damis' journal covering the main fifty years of Apollonius' public career; (2) Moiragenes' work of "four books about Apollonius"; (3) the writing of Maximus recounting Apollonius' young manhood years at Aegae; (4) oral tradition regarding his birth, early years, and death. The work by Moiragenes was hostile to Apollonius, and "ignorant of many of the circumstances of his life," so that Philostratus says he disregarded it.⁶ The sketch by Maximus accounted for but a short early period in his life. The

¹ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xix.

² *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xx.

³ *Op. cit.*, Book VIII, chap. xxix.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. ii.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chaps. iii, xii.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. iii.

oral tradition supplied but a small amount of information. Damis' journal was the chief source; from it nineteen-twentieths of Philostratus' biography were drawn. He did not use all that the writing by Damis furnished, but he perhaps used the greater portion of it; what he omitted was unimportant.¹ This material was first-hand and immediate, for Damis in company with Apollonius wrote down the events, deeds, and words from day to day as they happened. Philostratus was unable to subject Damis' narrative to a historical investigation, nor does he seem to have used criticism regarding it farther than to recognize that in some parts it was a "wonder-tale." He did have to revise or rewrite the narrative into good literary Greek. The process of compilation was to put together in a single story, chronologically arranged, the available information about Apollonius; this Philostratus did in an able, attractive manner. As Damis' journal had been written in Apollonius' lifetime (presumably also the sketch by Maximus), the interval of about 120 years between the death of Apollonius and Philostratus' biography of him did not much affect the trustworthiness of the main information concerning him.

Obviously the correspondence between Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius* and the Gospels as Lives of Jesus is only general and limited. They were similar in that: (1) the purpose in each case was a practical one, to promote morality and religion by eulogizing and commending the great teacher in his message and in his example; (2) the method common to each was to recount the life in a general chronological arrangement from humble birth to death and glorification; (3) the deeds and the words were intermingled in a narrative that consisted mainly in a chain of anecdotes; (4) the story in each case was full of miracle—divine person, miraculous birth, healing miracles, supernatural knowledge and foretelling, resurrection and ascension; (5) the biography in each case was written by one who was not an immediate disciple and observer of the hero, and who wrote a generation or more after his death; (6) the information was obtained partly from oral tradition, but chiefly from written memorabilia; (7) the traditional story was retold without much historical investigation or criticism, using the

¹ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xx.

material at hand almost as it was; (8) the Greek style of the sources was reworked more or less, to give the writing higher quality, acceptability, and usefulness.

On the other hand, the *Life of Apollonius* and the Gospels are dissimilar in the following respects: (1) the ultimate accounts of Jesus were four instead of one; (2) the Evangelists selected and interwove material from parallel memorabilia of Jesus' life, whereas Philostratus did little more than conjoin narratives of the several portions of Apollonius' life; (3) the Gospels were propagandist documents of an oriental religious movement invading the Occident, while Apollonius was proclaiming a well-known and established Greek philosophy; (4) the Gospels carried an elaborate, intense, theological doctrine of Christ, salvation, and the new age, in addition to their moral idealism and appeal; (5) the geographical area of the Gospels was the small country of Palestine, while Apollonius' travels and ministry covered almost the entire ancient world; (6) the Gospel story arose in Aramaic, and had afterward to be translated into Greek; (7) the early transmission of the memorabilia of Jesus was altogether oral—there were no immediate written accounts of what Jesus did and said; (8) the memorabilia of Jesus, oral and written, were used continuously for evangelistic and apologetic purposes, undergoing selection, adaptation, expansion, and supplementation to meet the needs of the Christian mission; (9) the Gospel of Mark, late, composite, theological, and pragmatic, corresponded closely to no document that Philostratus used; (10) the hypothetical document Q, or the written sources from which the common non-Markan discourse material of Matthew and Luke was derived, was not specifically like any source of the *Life of Apollonius*; (11) there was nothing corresponding to the Gospel of John among Philostratus' documents.

Some idea of Philostratus' biography of Apollonius of Tyana can be obtained from the following quotations:

He found [at Aegae] a peace congenial to one who would be a philosopher, and a more serious school of study and a temple of Asclepius, where that god reveals himself in person to men. There he had as his companions in philosophy followers of Plato and Chrysippus and Peripatetic philosophers. And he diligently attended also to the discourses of Epicurus, for he did not despise

these either, although it was to those of Pythagoras that he applied himself with unspeakable wisdom and ardor.¹

Since they [the gods] know everything, it appears to me that a person who comes to the house of God and has a good conscience should put up the following prayer: "O ye gods, grant unto me that which I deserve. For the holy, O Priest, surely deserve to receive blessings, and the wicked the contrary. Therefore the gods, as they are beneficent, if they find anyone who is healthy and whole and unscarred by vice, will send him away surely after crowning him, not with gold crowns, but with all sorts of blessings; but if they find a man branded with sin and utterly corrupt, they will hand him over and leave him to justice, after inflicting their wrath upon him all the more, because he dared to invade their temples without being pure."²

[Apollonius rebuked Euphrates] for doing everything for money, and tried to wean him of his love of filthy lucre and of huckstering his wisdom.³

He said that it was the duty of philosophers of his school to hold converse at the earliest dawn with the gods, but as the day advanced, about the gods; and during the rest of the day to discuss human affairs in friendly intercourse.⁴

When he conversed he would assume an oracular manner and use the expressions "I know," . . . "You must know." And his sentences were short and crisp, and his words were telling and closely fitted to the things he spoke of, and his words had a ring about them as of the dooms delivered by a sceptered king. And when a certain quibbler asked him why he asked no questions of him, he replied: "Because I asked questions when I was a strippling; and it is not my business to ask questions now, but to teach people what I have discovered." . . . This was the line he pursued in Antioch, and he converted to himself the most unrefined people.⁵

As they fared into Mesopotamia, the tax-gatherer who presided over the bridge led them into the registry and asked them what they were taking out of the country with them. And Apollonius replied: "I am taking with me temperance, justice, virtue, continence, valor, discipline." And in this way he strung together a number of feminine nouns or names. The other, already scenting his own perquisites, said: "You must then write down in the register these female slaves." Apollonius answered: "Impossible, for they are not female slaves that I am taking out with me, but ladies of quality."⁶

¹ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. vii.

² *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xi.

³ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xiii.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xvi.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xvii.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xx.

If I am housed above my rank, I shall live ill at ease; for superfluity distresses wise men more than deficiency distresses you [the King of Babylon].²

He offered to the gods the following prayer: "O ye gods, grant unto me to have little and to want nothing."³

Chastity consists in not yielding to passion when the longing and impulse is felt, and in the abstinence which rises superior to this form of madness.³

You perhaps imagine that it is a lesser thing to go wrong in Babylon than to go wrong at Athens. . . . You do not reflect that a wise man finds Hellas everywhere, and that a sage will not regard or consider any place to be a desert or barbarous, because *he* at any rate lives under the eyes of Virtue; and although he sees only a few men, yet he is himself looked at by myriad eyes.⁴

He also said that it was a mistake to go to war even over large issues.⁵

Those who drink water, as I do, see things as they really are; . . . they are never found to be giddy, nor full of drowsiness, or of silliness, nor unduly elated; but they are wide awake and thoroughly rational, and always the same. . . . You find them free and erect, and they go to bed with a clear, pure soul and welcome sleep, and are neither buoyed up by the bubbles of their own private luck, nor scared by any adversity; for the soul meets both alternatives with equal calm, if it be sober.⁶

[He] urged them to take pride rather in themselves than in the beauty of their city. . . . It was more pleasing for the city to be crowned with men than with porticos and pictures.⁷

[He enjoined] mutual rivalry between men in behalf of the common weal. . . . To me it seems best that each man should do what he understands best and what he best can do. For that city will recline in peace, nay, will rather stand up erect, where one man is admired for his popular influence, and another for his wisdom, and another for his liberal expenditure on public objects, and another for his kindness, and another for his severity and unbending sternness towards malefactors, and another because his hands are pure beyond suspicion. And as he was thus discoursing [at Smyrna], he saw a ship with three sails leaving the harbor, of which the sailors were each discharging their particular duties in working it out to sea. Accordingly by way of reforming his audience he said: Now look at that ship's crew, how some of them being rowers have

² *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xxxiii.

³ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xxxiii.

³ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xxxiii.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xxxiv.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. xxxvii.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, Book II, chap. xxxvi.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, Book IV, chap. vii.

embarked in the tug-boats, while others are winding up and making fast the anchors, and others again are spreading the sails to the wind, and others are keeping an outlook at bow and stern. Now if a single member of this community abandoned any one of his particular tasks or went about his naval duties in an inexperienced manner, they would have a bad voyage and would themselves impersonate the storm; but if they vie with one another and are rivals only with the object of one showing himself as good a man as the other, then their ship will make the best of havens, and all their voyage be one of fair weather and fair sailing.¹

It happened also that a young man was building a house in Rhodes who was a *nouveau riche* without any education, and he collected in his house rare pictures and gems from different countries. Apollonius then asked him how much money he had spent on teachers and on education. "Not a drachma," he replied. "And how much upon your house?" "Twelve talents, and I mean to spend as much again upon it." "And what is the good of your house to you?" "Why, as a residence it is splendidly suited to my needs." "And," said Apollonius, "are men to be valued more for themselves or for their belongings?" "For their wealth," said the young man, "because wealth has the most influence." . . . "My good boy," [said Apollonius] "it seems to me that it is not you that own the house, but the house that owns you."²

[Apollonius addressing the newly made emperor Vespasian], "For myself I care little about constitutions, seeing that my life is governed by the gods; but I do not like to see the human flock perish for want of a shepherd at once just and moderate. . . . The government of one man, if it provides all round for the welfare of the community, is popular government."³

What a splendid thing it would be, if wealth were held in less honor, and equality flourished a little more, . . . for then all men would agree with one another, and the whole earth would be like one brotherhood.⁴

I have studied profoundly the problem of the rise of the art [philosophy], and whence it draws its first principles; and I have realized that it belongs to men of transcendent religious gifts, who have thoroughly investigated the nature of the soul, the well-springs of whose existence lie back in the immortal and in the unbegotten.⁵

Now the inhabitants of Tarsus had previously detested Apollonius, because of the violent reproaches he addressed to them, owing to the fact that through their languid indifference and sensual indolence they could not put up with

¹ *Op. cit.*, Book IV, chaps. viii, ix.

² *Op. cit.*, Book V, chap. xxii.

³ *Op. cit.*, Book VI, chap. ii.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Book V, chap. xxxv.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, Book VI, chap. xi.

the vigor of his remarks. But on this occasion they became such devoted admirers of our hero as to regard him as their second founder and the mainstay of their city.¹

The counts of the indictment [which Domitian brought against Apollonius] are as varied as they are numerous; for your style of dress is assailed in them, and your way of living in general, and your having been worshiped by certain people, and the fact that in Ephesus once you delivered an oracle about the famine; and also that you have uttered certain sentiments to the detriment of the sovereign—some of them openly, some of them obscurely and privately, and some of them on the pretence that you learned them from heaven.²

There is between man and God a certain kinship which enables him alone of the animal creation to recognize the gods, and to speculate both about his own nature and the manner in which it participates in the divine substance. Accordingly man declares that his very form resembles God, as it is interpreted by sculptors and painters; and he is persuaded that his virtues come to him from God, and that those who are endowed with such virtues are near to God and divine (*θείους*).³

If anyone converses with a Pythagorean, and asks what boons and how many he shall derive from him, I should myself answer as follows: He will acquire legislative science, geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, knowledge of harmony and of music, and of the physician's art, godlike divination in all its branches; and the still better qualities of magnanimity, greatness of soul, magnificence, constancy, reverence, knowledge and not mere opinion of the gods, direct cognizance of demons and not mere faith, friendship with both, independence of spirit, assiduity, frugality, limitation of his needs, quickness of perception, quickness of movement, quickness in breathing, excellence of color, health, courage, immortality.⁴

It is a noble thing to regard the whole earth as your country, and all men as your brethren and friends, seeing that they are the family of God (*γένος θεοῦ*), that they are of one nature, and that there is a communion of each and all in speech, and likewise in feelings, which is the same no matter how or when a man has been born, whether he is barbarian or whether he is Greek, so long as he is man (*άνθρωπος*).⁵

Quotation has been made at some length because the *Life of Apollonius* is not entirely familiar. These selections represent the

¹ *Op. cit.*, Book VI, chap. xxxiv.

² *Op. cit.*, Book VII, chap. xx.

³ *Op. cit.*, Book VIII, chap. vii.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Epistle lii.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, Epistle xlv.

best that the Life and Letters contain in the way of moral-religious teaching. The whole amount of such teaching is considerable—perhaps a tenth part of the material, scattered throughout Books I–VI which contain the bulky narrative of his travels, and Books VII–VIII which recount extensively his relations with the emperor Domitian, his arrest, imprisonment, trial, defense, and ultimate release, shortly followed by his death at Ephesus.

Historical criticism of course regards as legendary all the supernatural elements in the story of Apollonius' life—the miracles of his birth and death, of his healings and other deeds, of his superhuman knowledge and foretellings, and the ascriptions of divine personality. It also treats as fanciful much of the detail in the travel narratives, as Philostratus himself did. The adventures of Apollonius were recounted somewhat after the model of the *Odyssey* and other epics of the classical literature. The geographical writers of the period, like Strabo in the first century B.C., were fond of including similar romancing stories of travelers in foreign lands. Such was in part the favorite fiction of the day.

Apart from the miracles and the romance in the *Life of Apollonius*, there is no reason to doubt the general historical character of Philostratus' biography. We may certainly ascertain from it the career, teaching, and personality of this great itinerant philosopher, public teacher, traveler, and adviser of cities and emperors.

Unquestionably there is a kind of parallelism, intentional or unintentional, between the *Life of Apollonius* and the life of Jesus as given in the Gospels. The nature of this parallelism, as already indicated, marks these writings as belonging to the same type of literature, namely, popular biography. The Gospels too contain supernatural elements and memorabilia of Jesus' deeds and words which have been adapted to popular use in the gentile mission, which call for historical criticism. But neither in the Gospels is the presence of such elements to be regarded as prejudicial to the general trustworthiness of the narrative of Jesus' career and teaching.

About the year 300 A.D., Hierocles, the proconsul of Bithynia, published a work entitled *Λόγοι φιλαλήθεις πρὸς τοὺς Χριστιανούς*, in criticism of the beliefs and the credulity of the Christians. He

drew attention to the parallelisms between Apollonius and Jesus, and as a Greek and a non-Christian he spoke in greater praise of Apollonius. Hierocles was doubtless influenced by racial, pagan, and intellectual prejudice against Jesus, the Gospels, and the Christians. Eusebius, the great Christian historian and apologete of the fourth century A.D., soon published an extended rejoinder to Hierocles' attack,¹ in which he indignantly denied and repudiated all the miracles and the divinity ascribed to Apollonius, at the same time defending with equal spirit and vigor all the miracles and divinity ascribed to Jesus. This was a deadlock of polemics on both sides, the historical facts being left to fare for themselves. Eusebius wrote:

I am quite ready to accept all [recorded of Apollonius] that is probable and has an air of truth about it, even though such details may be somewhat exaggerated and highly-colored out of compliment to a good man. . . . I therefore do not mind the author telling us that Apollonius was of an ancient family and lineally descended from the first settlers; . . . and that when he was young he not only had the distinguished teachers mentioned, but, if he likes, I will allow that he became himself their teacher and master in learning. . . . All this and the like is merely human (*ἀνθρώπινα*), and in no way incongruous with philosophy or with truth, and I can therefore accept it, because I set a very high value upon candor and love of truth. Nevertheless to suppose that he was a being of superhuman nature, and then to contradict this supposition at a moment's warning,² and to forget it almost as soon as it is made—this I regard as reprehensible and as calculated to fasten a suspicion not only on the author, but yet more on the subject of his memoir.³

It was not obvious to a Christian of the fourth century A.D. that the same kind of rational criticism by which he rejected all miracle and divinity in the case of anyone but Jesus must inevitably be applied to the Gospel narratives themselves.

Eusebius did not take the view that the *Life of Apollonius* had been produced by Philostratus as a pagan counterwork to the Gospels. During the eighty years since its publication it had not been so regarded or used. "Hierocles, of all the writers who have ever attacked us, stands alone in selecting Apollonius, as he has

¹ This writing by Eusebius is given in the Greek, with an English translation, at the close of Conybeare's edition of Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius*, II, 484-605.

² Eusebius is unconscious of analogous phenomena in the Gospels.

³ *Op. cit.*, Treatise of Eusebius, chap. xii; see also chap. xxxix.

recently done, for the purposes of comparison and contrast with our Savior."¹ It is not impossible that Philostratus was acquainted with the Gospels and was interested in the parallelisms between Apollonius and Jesus. It may be that the supernatural features of his biography were to some extent influenced, through tradition or through himself, by the wonderful stories of Jesus' birth, miracle-working, superhuman knowledge and resurrection. But Philostratus has shown² that he took up the preparation of the *Life of Apollonius* only at the request of the empress Julia Domna, whose attention in turn had been directed to the subject by "a certain kinsman of Damis" who in the first century A.D. had written the biographical journal of Apollonius. Neither Philostratus nor the empress seems to have had a specific intent or interest against the Christians and the Gospels.

The *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, in the English translation of the eight Books, contains 488 pages, about 136,000 words. This biography therefore is thirty-five times the length of the Gospel of Mark, and twice the length of all four Gospels together. That Philostratus could produce so full an account was of course due to the devotion and industry of Damis, the companion of Apollonius for fifty years and the immediate recorder of his deeds and utterances. Neither Jesus nor Paul had the advantage of such a biographer, and we are the poorer for that reason. But what Jesus' and Paul's disciples lacked as transcribers of their masters' lives they outweighed by active, faithful promotion of their mission. The gospel message of Jesus and Paul, proclaimed and established in the Greco-Roman world, threw obscurity over the life and teaching of Apollonius.

¹ *Op. cit.*, Treatise of Eusebius, chap. i.

² *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. iii.

[To be concluded in April]

A PREACHER'S INTEREST IN NIETZSCHE

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I

Ridpath relates that, when General Grant was transferred from Vicksburg to command the army of the East, he plunged at once into the Wilderness and gave battle to Lee in two days of terrific fighting. It was then that Lee said to his officers, "Gentlemen, at last the army of the Potomac has a head."

The incident will hint my main justification of a preacher's interest in Nietzsche. Many scattered forces—men of the world, men of letters, artists, plunderers, liberated Jews, epicures and high-livers, materialists scientific and aesthetic, captains industrial and military, crowned heads and financiers, lovers of Nature and the free life, instincts and passions, all manner of opposition to Christianity, worldliness generally—may be said in Nietzsche at last to have found a head. He is therefore no man for the tough-minded among the staff officers of the church of Christ to ignore.

Personally Nietzsche has interested me ever since the word Superman arrested my imagination. A revival of interest took place later when I began to bring back into use the almost obsolete word Anti-Christ and affix it as an epithet to this German revolter, iconoclast, poet, and dreamer.

But Nietzsche may well challenge the preacher's concern for other reasons. He may help us define more clearly just what our own Christianity really is. When my neighbor surveys his boundary lines I find my own farm laid out by elimination. If Nietzsche understands Christianity as essentially socialistic, democratic, that it "takes up the cudgels for idiots," "appeals to the disinherited everywhere"; if he reads the Christian morality as sacrificially redemptive, and the Adam Smith political economy under which Christendom piles up colossal fortunes for the shrewd as but a bold

substitute of our own Devil's law for the law of Christ; if he deems papal despotisms and Machiavellian Jesuitism more congenial to his Anti-Christ paradise than to the Kingdom of Jesus; if he understands that an egoistic race for heaven in the skies, leaving a wrecked world behind, is not Christian, but only a stupid perversion of the very jungle law he himself champions: then it seems to me he is either stealing my territory or throwing me acres that do not belong in my farm. In either case I must undertake to re-establish my own boundaries.

Then again Nietzsche catches my attention because of his scathing and artistic criticisms upon Christianity; for I think he may thus aid us very materially in our own house-cleaning—in that disagreeable scavenger-work within the churches which must somehow get accomplished before the right number of men in street and shop will take our message seriously.

Still again Nietzsche may splendidly serve us, and so deserve our interest, in driving us from many a hiding-place of ambiguity and straddling where men are today calling for plain speech. He may force us to state our views on socialism, self-sacrifice, democracy, depravity, suffering, art, nature, and the earth's future. The heretics and apostates have usually helped bring on ages of creed-making: it may fall to Nietzsche's lot to involve the church in deeper studies of her own foundations—to instigate another age of approximate definition.

If these things are even partly true they suggest ample justification for any preacher's interest in Nietzsche. For the chivalric warning of Oscar Levy, one of the rashest knights in the Nietzschean lists, is worth heeding for its simple truth, when he says, "A new philosophy may be a more powerful enemy than all the navies in the world, and therefore well worth knowing."

Who is this man, who are his antecedents and followers? Whence and what are his main ideas? What has he to say of Christianity? What is his substitute program for mankind? And what can Christianity do with him?

Nietzsche's outward life, meager in incident, may be passed over briefly here. He was a precocious German scholar of good family, lonely, ascetic, invalid, addicted to chloral, who spent some

years in teaching, much time in art criticism, travel, and in writing; who devoured philosophies as most men devour cigars and newspapers; who loved Goethe, Schopenhauer, Wagner, and Darwin; who revolted from all his teachers, examined anew the foundations of morality, with the result that he utterly broke with religion, theism, Christianity, most of all with the Christian theory of morals; who scouted "old Kant" as chief sinner among false philosophers, held Plato the first blunderer into the immortality delusion, accounted Socrates worthy of his hemlock; and who paired alcohol and Christianity as the two most noxious corruptions known to history. He was born in 1844 and died in 1900 after nearly a dozen years of insanity. Comparatively unknown until after his death, his works then began to be widely published and translated. He will be known hereafter as Christianity's diametric antithesis, loud-roaring in frankness and fury, reptilian in subtlety.

II

The Nietzsche cult is already large and keenly influential, embracing as natural allies many of those artistic souls who believe that all ultimate values are aesthetic, that the universe's sole justification is beauty—a phenomenon not of will but of art; many of those very free anarchic spirits who are against civilization on general principles; with a following also of the "liberated" Jews who by native bias despise Christianity.

The modus is distinctly literary. Nietzsche's own art is of the loftiest order. By force of his extraordinary style alone, at once orchestral and racy, his ideas would carry far. And of no mean ability in the literary tricks suited to their tasks are also his chief propagandists. Such men as Huysmans, pessimist, Baudelaire, devil-worshiper, Maurice Barres, egoist, Oscar Levy, Hebrew free-lance, Ludovici, a London Italian with the charm and polish of a William James, Orage and Huneker and Kennedy and Common: one and all wield quills of biting fluency. It is as a virile publicist "keeping German literature in touch with the needs and demands of the actual life of the present" and "preventing its losing itself in the clouds of an unworldly idealism" that Friedrich Nietzsche is recognized in the *Britannica Year Book* of

1913. And who shall venture to measure to what extent the great war of the nine nations now raging, kindled or kept aflame by the sudden outburst of a new German spirit, must be credited to the subterranean distribution of this Homeric war-worshiper's goading and vitriolic scorn poured out upon modern German decadence and peace-loving mediocrity! "Ye shall love peace," cries this son of the glorious savage,¹ "as a means to new wars—and the short peace more than the long." "Man shall be trained for war, and woman for the recreation of the warrior; all else is folly."²

But the thought-stuff of Nietzsche's writings is to many minds even more captivating than what has been called "the verbal music that makes him such a beguilement to read." Baron von Hügel, the modernist, in his Roman Catholic treatise on *Eternal Life*, dares, it seems, to reprove both Alfred Russell Wallace and Principal Caird for their lack of sympathy with "the good and true richly present in that wayward and chaotic man of letters, Friedrich Nietzsche."⁴ To those interested in reform and race betterment, Professor Devine of Columbia University recommends Nietzsche as useful "notwithstanding his abhorrent doctrines, as indicating the goal toward which a materialistic eugenic philosophy, unrestrained by the Christian ideal of service, would inevitably lead."⁵

According to Hermann, the gifted reviewer of Eucken, what the German immoralist and individualist has to say even meets a long-felt want. "Men everywhere are feeling the hollowness, the contradiction, the spiritual bankruptcy of our sleek and well-fed culture. Nietzsche's sensitive and impressionist soul, nervously fumbling after the inner life, recoils sharply from a blatant and self-conscious culture that wears down the fine edge of the individual. His revolt was noble in itself, and much blame rests with those followers who perversely underscored its most vicious

¹ Nietzsche, *Birth of Tragedy*, London, 1909, Introd., p. xxvii.

² Ransome, *Portraits and Speculations*, 1913, p. 94.

³ Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, chaps. ix and xiii.

⁴ Quoted in *Constructive Quarterly*, June, 1913, p. 360.

⁵ *The Family and Social Work*, 1912, Appendix, p. 160.

aspects.”¹ This long-felt want is picturesquely declared by Levy in his *Revival of Aristocracy*. For two thousand years Europe had degenerated beneath the anarchic evil and weakness of common Christianity. Amid the shrieks of bigoted mobs all eyes were vainly directed toward the hoarse-voiced demagogues (presumably the clergy) when “suddenly there flashed forth into view a philosopher who spoke like the man in the street, entitling himself immoralist, cosmopolitan, egoist, and very free, and sang a song of praise to revengefulness, avarice, lust, and cruelty—to Bacchic and classical enthusiasm, not to Jewish-Nazarene tameness.”²

True indeed it would seem to be that any warrior of Christ, looking for a foeman worthy of his steel, may well address himself to this notable figure on the field—of whom even the cautious *Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia* admits concern as to the havoc Nietzsche is likely to play before he is properly pigeon-holed. It says, “He was a prolific writer, and his works are exerting an influence on modern thinking in religion and philosophy which seems rather out of proportion to their real and permanent value.”

III

While it is possible to trace their influence upon him it must after all be admitted that the intellectual and philosophical forbears of Nietzsche are none of them really of his stamp and quality. It is affirmed that he used Max Stirner as a springboard—“Max Stirner,” that Kaspar Schmidt, *incognito*, whose little-known anti-socialist book, *The Ego and His Own* (1845), is declared to be a veritable breviary of destruction, the most revolutionary ever written, whose theories would make a *tabula rasa* of civilization. But there were other springboards, points of departure, who helped the expounder of Bismarck’s gospel of blood and iron in his leap above (or his dive beneath) the moral foundations of the modern world. There was Stendhal, the Napoleonic soldier and gallant, art critic and man of the world. There was William Blake, “mad naked Blake” whose little poem, “Tiger, tiger, burning bright,” still puts its poser to theologians—“Did He who made the lamb make thee?”

¹ *Eucken and Bergson*, Boston, 1912, p. 31.

² *Revival of Aristocracy*, London, 1906, pp. 42, 43.

And there too was the Russian novelist, Dostoievsky, who greatly helped Nietzsche find himself. Even more, there was Darwin, who gave him his entire scientific stage-setting. And there was Goethe with his gospel of a dead paganism, "Love thyself; learn to love thyself, but have reason to love thyself"; wise and wicked Goethe, Greek and Nature-worshiper, who provided Nietzsche with a world-hope to be inserted in lieu of the Christian's shattered heaven.

Less directly and from afar was Nietzsche aided by many a daring spirit of the last century who emitted flashes of erratic and dangerous insight critical of a civilization resultant from two millenniums of pallid Christianity in Europe: Hegel, Schopenhauer, Carlyle, and Emerson. All these the Nietzschean cult still deftly turns to the service of Anti-Christ, greedily lays hold of to slip them under the corner-stone of the new religion of Egoism and Aristocracy. Browning is pilfered, as is A. J. Balfour; Ibsen is captured bodily as the "sign-post of the twentieth century when the aristocratic spirit must enter into combat with the herd-instinct of a depressing socialism." Even our own Peter Forsyth will soon be furnishing ammunition for this enemy's camp, credited as he is with teaching that "theology is better than philanthropy, yea than much fine philanthropy."¹ These and a dozen other minds of almost first magnitude are already, by skilful interpretation, harnessed to the Nietzschean triumphal car in "accentuating the Ego, and aiming at individuality, selfness, and longing for passions mightier and stronger." And no wonder! For what allies these Nietzscheans have, hidden away in the hearts of all aristocrats of money, blood, intellect, and culture; in the native instincts of man unregenerate; in those imperishable self-preservation yearnings and joy-dreams of the very noblest spiritual quality which count so largely in religion itself!

But notwithstanding the eagerness with which all best literature is either put to the sword or rifled to aid and abet the Nietzschean cause, we are not allowed to forget that in Nietzsche himself the resurgence of man's natural life, after two thousand years of suppression, found its general. All others were only "as the mumbling under the earth of spirits of a healthier epoch long bygone." With

¹ *Literary Digest*, August 23, 1913, p. 289.

Nietzsche the volcano shot up, and "over the crosses and cloisters and torture chambers of Christendom there burst the glowing lava-stream of heathendom, fated to sweep away the ancient civilization, ready to rebuild a home for a happier humanity."¹ And Nietzsche himself claims to be all this. "I lay down my oath," he declared in a letter to Georg Brandes in 1888, "that in two years we shall have the whole earth in convulsions. Like the old artillerist I am, I can bring forth cannon of which no other opponent of Christianity ever suspected the existence."²

And here lies the weak spot in the whole system—the armor-joint to be searched out and thrust into: that the spring of it all opens up in the uniquely endowed heart of a school-boy. We may well take his disciples at their word and give to him all the glory; for the heart of the doctrine can best be got at genetically by the method of psychology. The system is but the explication of the Nietzsche temperament, genius, character, soul-heritage—these fed on adversity, chloral, and religion, provincial, overripe, and nauseating. Let one know the early life, the soul-soil, of the master and chief disciples of the cult, and one may trace the pathway from those psychological, pathological beginnings, clear on forward to its far goal in this most radical overhauling that the Christian civilization ever experienced; and may behold them as only the natural unfolding of the inner passions, the loves and hates, the unrestrained instincts and impulses of its originators.

Whatever injustice might in particular cases be done in thus going back to the unregenerate "natural man" within the Egoists to account for their ideas, it is the way consistent with their own confessions, theories, and usages. For one of their earliest principles is thus formulated by Levy, "Be natural, follow your instincts, be selfish."³ The entire philosophy centers round the justification and morally untrammelled exercise of the instincts and passions. Says Ludovici, "The basis of every action to be witnessed on this earth seemed to Nietzsche to be the instinct of self-universalization

¹ *Revival of Aristocracy*, p. 38.

² Huneker, *Egoists, a Book of Supermen*, 1910, p. 264.

³ *Revival of Aristocracy*, Introd., p. xi.

or self-enhancement, led by the thirst for power."¹ Entertaining this theory, it is not to be wondered at that he gave free rein to his own vigorous instincts and was willing to trample in the dust all the most cherished institutions of customary human life.

Indeed it is just in this manner the Nietzscheans account for all the chief doctrines that stand in their way: as witness the long argument of Ludovici in *Who Is to Be Master of the World?* to prove that the instinctive baseness and poverty of spirit of the humble sufferers who invented the Christian moral code gave rise to the Beatitudes and the whole unnatural doctrine of mutual service, sharing, and sacrifice so distinctive of Christianity. Perhaps Nietzsche's finished theory of the *Genealogy of Morals* lies in embryo here: "Will someone look down into the secret of the way [Christian] ideals are manufactured on earth? What they demand [from God upon their foes] they do not call revenge, but 'the triumph of justice'; what they hate is not their enemy, no! They hate 'injustice' and 'ungodliness.'"² That is, the Christian moral system is begotten in the inner demands of the souls of these "cellar animals, saturated with hatred and revenge." And Nietzsche himself explains the whole Christian revelation genetically as the perpetuation of the pleasant sentiments of an intensely love-sick soul; a soul too weak to be aggressive and successful in life, who surrendered meekly to all his enemies, inventing a hell for those who would not love; and who found in the indulgence of this tender passion a happiness which persuaded him that he had a life mission in its dissemination to all mankind.³

Now this method, we dare believe, leads toward the truth. In the case of Nietzsche's application of it to Jesus Christ it does not go far enough back into the soul; it is poor analysis, poor diagnosis. But the method justifies us in looking for the fountain-head of the philosophy we are examining back in the very soul of Nietzsche. And what do we find there? Abounding pride, sense of blood, egotism, the aristocratic air, intense passions, self-will, vanity,

¹ *Who Is to Be Master of the World?* London, 1909, p. 36.

² J. M. Kennedy, *Quintessence of Nietzsche*, p. 71; also, Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, Book I, p. 14.

³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (New York: Macmillan, 1911), p. 247.

hunger for power, suspicion, bitter hatred of moral compulsions, impatience of authority, repugnance to any servitude a keen scorn and despising of the common mass of men, "contempt for the mangy flock of mediocrity," as Huneker words it. These are the seed and the soil of Nietzscheanism. That they were the very tissue of his soul-structure no one can doubt who will open-mindedly read the several reliable sketches of his life.

Mr. T. M. Kettle, in his Introduction to Halévy's *Life of Nietzsche*, speaks of "that proud independence, one may almost say that savage isolation, which was the native climate of his soul"; and of "a vanity so monstrous that it seems from the first to have eaten of the insane root"; and affirms that he was "abundantly dowered with the insight of malice."¹ "He was obsessed by his indignations," says Huneker; while Halévy, speaking of the school-boy period, assures us that "the passions and the powerful desires, which thirty or forty years later were to inspire his work, already animated this child with the bulging forehead and the big eyes." Even in early life, says Kennedy, Nietzsche showed a "commanding, aristocratic nature." And in the sketch of his life by his sister, she speaks of "the aristocratic ideal, which was always so dear to my brother." He himself avers, "From my very childhood I sought solitude."² His Zarathustra is but Nietzsche's self when he advises, "If you have helped anyone, you must wash the hands that helped him, for they are unclean."³ Pity is the ultimate vice. "Where lie thy greatest dangers?" asks Zarathustra, and answers, "In compassion." Every indulgence of sympathy delays the coming of Superman. "The last temptation of the Superman is sympathy for a race revolving blindly in this cycle of change."

Among these native presuppositions in the soul out of which the system came, traits exposed in every variety of expression in all his books, there is one bias exactly fitted to be the original germ; we are assured that to Nietzsche the terms "good" and "bad" are but synonyms of "aristocratic" and "plebeian." Ludovici informs us that it was Nietzsche's appropriation of this idea found in the

¹ Halévy, *Life of Friedrich Nietzsche*, pp. 8, 10, 11, 23.

² *Quintessence of Nietzsche*, p. 4.

³ *Zarathustra*, quoted in Halévy's *Life*, etc., p. 12.

study of the old Greek, Theognis, for a school essay, in his twentieth year, "that gave him his first hint and put him on the right track."¹

Thus it is plain that aristocratic pride and will-to-power were two of the earliest and strongest instincts in the young Nietzsche. And we are assured that they were only kindred spirits whom the publication of his *Will to Power* summoned about him; everyone felt his truth "whose heart had not been grieved to death, whose Ego had not frozen within him." We have only to watch these traits grow dominant and override everything great and small that stands in their way—customs, philosophies, religion, the state, and even morality itself—to comprehend the genesis of the Nietzschean cult. It is the dominance of these instincts of pride and will-to-power in the elect souls, the natural masters of the world; it is the making of the evolutionary war principle of survival of the mightiest animal man, the measurement of all things, that gives point to the startling announcement of a coming "transvaluation of all values." And here it is that we shall find Nietzsche making many of his least gracious remarks about Christianity—mainly because the Christian has the shockingly bad taste to prefer (in his philosophy at least) God and heaven, and holiness and love, to the Nietzschean values, power, will, self, and Superman.

IV

Now Nietzsche's position is intelligible enough; rational enough too, if you permit him to sight along the barrel of Nature and determine her goal and method. To him Superman is the measure of all values. Evolution is the pathway; and selfishness is the method, the supreme secret of Nature's success. The issue is squarely drawn, then, between the methods of love, service, sacrifice for the weak, on the one hand; and of struggle, selfishness, dominion, exploitation of the weak for and by the strong, on the other hand. It is a question which morality is the better, considering the end: the "natural" or the Christian.

A society, we are told, that is built upon the perverse and unnatural sentiment of brotherhood, equality, love, mutual helpfulness, of carrying along instead of destroying the weak and

¹ *Who Is to Be Master of the World?* p. 38.

miserable specimens of humanity; a morality that preserves all that is unfittest, weakest, and least deserving of life and perpetuation—such a society, built upon such a morality, must come to utter degeneracy. And there, declares Nietzsche, with many a cutting proof and criticism, is where our civilization has now arrived after two thousand years of Christianity.

For it is the Christian system that has brought about the coarse and stupid mediocrity of the sodden European populations, a dead level of feeble life—notwithstanding economic divergences that would shame antiquity. This calamitous reversal of Nature's method—this revolt of the slaves against the morality Nature herself devised for the elevation of the type Man—must now be atoned for in the bloody sweat of a tumultuous repentance. This present Christian mockery of civilization must be swept away—this society self-confessed, in the words of Alfred Russell Wallace, as "rotten from top to bottom, the worst the world has ever seen." The boards must be cleared of it, and the race must return to the old Grecian Nature-pathway, to the life of instinct and indulgence, of joy in art and beauty; to the enthusiasms of power and conquest, of pride and strength; to a civilization built on force and the literal enslavement of the masses, and crowning itself with an aristocracy whose right it is to rule and to enjoy. Thus only shall the race evolve great personages, the predecessors and promise of Superman.

To sum up, then: the great blunder of all the eons of human existence on the earth is Christianity with its morality of helpfulness to the weak, its mission of saving the lost. Levy's words voice the verdict against Christianity for all the Nietzscheans: "The balm of Gilead is venom. Christ is a stain on the Jewish nation, the worst pollution of mankind. Christianity is insanity, a plague, the deadly foe of all that is truly great."¹ Holding these things to be true, it is no wonder that, as Huneker says, "they set out to smash Christianity."²

To picture the utter nonsense and perverseness of Christianity, Stendhal invented a gruesome sort of parable, almost too coarse for recital, which runs like this: "Once upon a time God was a very clever artisan. Day and night he kept on working and talked

¹ *Revival of Aristocracy*, pp. 107 f.

² *Egoists*, p. 265.

very little. But he was always devising something new, suns, comets, and so on. But one fine day God died quite suddenly—perhaps of heart disease. His son, who was being brought up by the Jesuits, was at once called in. He was a gentle and zealous youth, without an inkling of practical mechanics. He was conducted into his father's workshop and told to govern the world. Being in a quandary, he seized the levers and by mistake reversed the engines; and things have been going wrong with the world ever since.”¹

For evidence of how wrong things have been going, reference is made to Carlyle and Wallace and Dickens and Robert Hunter and Jacob Riis; to Siberia and the Congo; to factory systems and city slums; to the sky-scraping fortunes of the few and the crushing war taxes on the many; to traffic in vice and labor of little children; to the hog-and-hyena drama of drink; to thirty-thousand-dollar banquets and three-million-dollar temples of pharisaic self-worship; to pagan religions imported for the half-educated, and to Satan the Fourth (Mephisto was the Third) incarnated in plutocratic attorneys of industry lobbying in senate and parliament.

But now, at length—fortunately for the Universe—Nietzsche has arrived on the scene (perhaps a century or so too early—“the day after tomorrow only is mine,” he says) and is about to correct all this fearful blunder and get things back in the good old way again. Burke said that no discoveries were hereafter to be made in morality; Nietzsche says that the greatest discovery the world has known in two millenniums is to be made in morality, and that he, moreover, has made that discovery himself, the new having already begun to supersede the worn-out morals of the Christian order. Levy puts it thus: “If I have blamed here Christianity, the Christian morals; if I have spoken ironically of all the lighter, minor, and female virtues this teaching has produced and still produces: I have done so in the name of those who have lifted themselves above them, who have outgrown them, who have acquired greater than Christian virtues, who stand nearer to the pagan culture of Greece and Rome than to that of the revolutionary good people who supplanted them.”² Speaking of Napoleon—a dear exemplar of the

¹ *Revival of Aristocracy*, p. 24. See also, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 84.

² *Revival of Aristocracy*, Preface, p. x.

Nietzschean theories—and of his idea of starting a new religion, this modern Christ-despising Jew says: “Instinctively the great man felt that his greatest enemy was the old Koran, with its rights of the generality, of all of the people as against extraordinary men, the right of the weaker against the strong, of the uncouth against the beautiful, of woman against man, of the serf against his lord—this Nazarene view of mutual love, containing within itself the postulate of equality.”¹

And of course it may be added that the strong, then as always, would more successfully have snapped their fingers at the “rights” of the weak had not the weak somehow got their claims incorporated in a religion, in a system of morality that by hook or crook somehow got vogue; had not the weak been possessed fortunately of a Bible which, as Kingsley said, is from cover to cover “the poor man’s comfort and the rich man’s warning.”

Shall we run a little way farther into the beautifully consistent jungle-morality of these Nietzscheans, and see how thoroughly anti-Christian it all is?

Since the fall of the Man on Horseback (thanks to awakened Christian democracy) “philanthropy has become universal, and extended to all that is feeble, commonplace, pitiable, unsound, and helpless; and these elements, through the charity and humanity of the epoch, were horribly fostered.”² “A nation,” we are told, should consist of aristocrats, “exclusive of slaves, the serfs of commerce and agriculture, archaeologists and members of parliament. It should embrace only the free.”³ Stendhal, Huysmans, Baudelaire, and Stirner loathed democracy, hated “all gabble about fraternity and equality,” all sentimental fuss and fuddle of a pseudo-humanitarianism, the education of the masses, social prophylactics, the bitter medicaments of self-sacrifice and self-denial. “Humanity has become the Moloch to which everything is sacrificed.” “The Ego has too long been suppressed by the sacred ideas of religion, state, family, law, morals.”⁴ “Our wail about our neighbor’s soul is the wail of a busybody, the blight of modern life.” “Mind your own business is the pregnant advice of the new Egoism.” To

¹ *Revival of Aristocracy*, p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁴ *Egoists, a Book of Supermen*, pp. 359, 361.

displace the Ego is to invert the social pyramid. To love our neighbor as ourself is trouble-breeding.

The new Sermon on the Mount begins, "Become ye more evil, that goodness may increase and joy delight you."¹ Let us have the "courage to rebaptize our badness as the best in us."² They re-echo the epigram attributed to Fontenelle, "To be happy a man must have a good stomach and a wicked heart."³ To this school the hideous things to be shunned are such as marriage, family, calm, pity, contentment and comfort, the green-pasture happiness of the herd, together with security, safety, alleviation of life for everyone. Life, they affirm, is appropriation, injury, conquest of the strong over the weak, suppression, exploitation.⁴ Audacity, deceit, cruelty meet their approval. Their three cardinal virtues are pride, pleasure, and love of domination.⁵ Man's true nature is fiendish and aggressive; power is its loftiest and most wholesome craving. This true nature of man, they prophesy, cruelly calumniated as it now is, shall one day emerge from the depths and flourish again. The will-to-power is to be the redemption of humanity from its lapse into feebleness through the Christian perversion. These are the skilfullest prescriptions they can write for the health of the human race!

V

Something must now be said of Superman and the glad eons of race-development that shall lead to him as Nietzsche's substitute both for the heaven-goal of Christianity and for all collateral human interests in economy, statesmanship, and the humanities. Here is the siren-song he sings to the strong, ambitious, "enjoying souls" who feel within themselves the mighty powers which Christianity would subdue into meekness and yoke-bearing—that Dionysian enthusiasm and fulness of life characteristic of the best Grecian physical and artistic glory. Winsome contrast is all this indeed to the Apollonian correctness and conservatism, the piety, weakness, and death which characterized Grecian life before the coming

¹ *Revival of Aristocracy*, p. 45.

² *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 92.

³ *Egoists*, p. 238.

⁴ *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 226.

⁵ Halévy's *Life*, etc., p. 12.

of Dionysus, and which, the Nietzscheans affirm, is the distinctive trait of the decrepit and waning civilization that now marks the end of the second Christian millennium. No apostate Julian ever urged more ardently the rapturous possessions within arms' reach of the strong—if only the inhibiting morality of these Christians could be gotten out of the way. "If"—and that is no small word even to Nietzsche. For it is this same Christian morality he grants as appropriate to the slave-type of mankind¹—the vulgar masses, groveling souls who by nature and instinct "look up"; and are the servants of those above them, the hero-worshippers and train-bearers of earth's rightful lords. And these Nietzsche sees now in deadly combat with humanity's other type, Nature's favorites, the master-type with its appropriate master-morality; those proud and powerful spirits who by nature "look down" on the rest of the world as their rightful prey—their soil wherein to flourish. And in this combat lies Nietzsche's supreme horror—his fear for the welfare of Nature in her effort to evolve Superman;² the winner will determine the future of the race: whether Nature shall succeed in producing her Superman, or the world miss its mission and meaning, and have to go back and begin over again—with the hope of avoiding the Christian blunder next time.

Just who is this Superman? Of necessity largely unknown and imaginary³ (as are the details of our own Christian heaven), human history and literature can at least furnish hints—a sort of picture-language with which to sketch some strange superior creature as far beyond present man as present man is beyond ape and mastodon. And so, as Huneker says: "Nietzsche wove into Superman's make-up echoes of Wagner's Siegfried, Ibsen's Brand, Stendhal's wicked heroes, the Renaissance Borgias, the second Faust of Goethe, and not a little of Hamlet," making a monster of perfection "that may one day become a demigod for a new religion—and no worse than contemporary mud-gods manufactured daily."⁴ This, then, is Nietzsche's yearning—and mission in life: to persuade men to forego the "selfish" heaven-seeking of personal

¹ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, p. viii.

² *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 130.

³ A. R. Orage, *Nietzsche, the Dionysian Spirit of the Age*, 1906, pp. 70 ff.

⁴ *Egoists*, p. 267.

immortality, the mutual service and sacrifices here, that the largest possible number may in some eternity glorify God and (alas!) enjoy him forever; and so to live in unselfish indulgence in passions and power, in exploitation and cruelty, in war and pitiless lordship over the contemptible masses of humankind, that, dying, one shall leave some legacy of non-moral might toward the making of that race of Titans far off in the eons beyond all Good and Evil. A novel dream? No. It almost merges into something quite familiar. Perhaps that same slave-morality may win for its votaries, "according to promise," their far-off heaven! And perhaps those God-defying immoralists, avaricious of power and deity ("If there were gods, how could I bear not to be a God!"¹ cried Nietzsche), may, Lucifer-like, be assigned the other rôle in the drama of eternity and enter into the joy of—the Pit! Perhaps.

VI

Last of all, something should be said of a possible cure for all this spreading Nietzschean epidemic. What is Christianity going to do with Nietzsche?

Of one thing we may be sure: ignorance, silence, disinterest are no proper weapons with which to meet a mind of his type. It is easy, and to many of us congenial, to pursue the policy of quiescence, as if the main business of the soldier of Christ were to slip in personal safety through the battle of life and escape without a wound. Nietzsche is already poisoning thousands of souls whom the church of God should be ambitious to save to better ends. He can and he will do incalculable damage to the spiritual promise of humanity. To let him alone is wickedness; to underestimate is folly. To say, as does Professor A. T. Robertson in a recent volume, that "Nietzsche has had his vogue in Europe, but is passing,"² is to betray undervaluation of patent facts—inability to weigh and measure the volume of vital literature swiftly flowing from his affliated disciples. We must take him in hand. And to do this rightly and avoid a mere war of words we may well take counsel of Dr. Crothers, of Cambridge, and say candidly to Nietzsche: "It is of more importance that I understand you, than that

¹ Halévy's *Life*, etc., p. 12.

² *The Church, the People, and the Age*, New York, 1914, p. 319.

you understand me." He is Anti-Christ through and through, and proudly confesses it. In comparison with him the Paines, Ingersolls, Voltaires, Strausses, and Renans are but faultfinders within the Christian fold, all of them certainly within the Christian morality. Nietzsche is not. He will appeal to men of the "honest," irreligious, worldly type; to men who crave a gospel of strength, a gospel for sky-scrapers and hotel lobbies and battlefields. He will have disciples who love literature and art and brains, however deficient these may be in ethics. If Christian Science and New Thought and Theosophy and Hinduism and other "belly-gods and gods that heal" can find a following in the midst of our most fully worked Christian parishes, the chances are fair that in due time the Nietzschean cult will outnumber them all. For he too has immense masses of fact on his side—"fact gnomic, cutting, and ironical, that holds all figures of the orator." We shall need first of all to understand Nietzsche, and thus suck the strength of our living enemy, as well as eat honey from the carcass of the dead lion.

To this end the leaders of the Christian ministry must begin to appraise justly the eighteen volumes that stand to Nietzsche's credit—some of them truly masterpieces, Rubaiyats the world will puzzle over, dream over, and not believe, yet not let die. Such are *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, the *chef d'œuvre*, the gem of which all the rest are the setting; and *The Will to Power*, *The Birth of Tragedy*, *The Twilight of the Idols*. And what jewel chapters are to be found here and there in these! The Dionysian and Apollonian legend and world-clew; and the wise and useful little parable of the three metamorphoses of every ripened soul in its passage through to final play-time: how the spirit becometh a camel, the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child.¹ It is the history of mind: first a slavish burden-bearer of others' wares, then a devouring appropriator of possessions in one's own right, then oblivion and a new beginning, a prime-motor at the game of creating. The world will be richer and wiser for some of these Nietzschean gifts; and the rugged mind that can stand hard knocks will find both splendid foe and worthy recompense.

But the larger truth is that Nietzsche has come to our time as a call to judgment. It may be said of him, without irreverence to

¹ *Who Is to Be Master of the World?* p. 15.

Another, that in and by means of him "the thoughts of many hearts shall be revealed." A new alignment will surely be made apparent in things religious and moral as men come to their personal decisions for or against him. When the fight is over the men of the world and the men of the church will know better than they do now, for example, whether our Christian religion is, for the common practice of common Christians today, a religion and morality of sacrificial redemptiveness or not; whether Christianity is consistent or not with a world-program of race elevation here on earth; whether heaven and an eternity of life are in store for any of us or not; or whether heaven and eternity are not just about the sole and sufficient reason for there being any Christian faith at all.

In conclusion, and as the sole hint here of a direction in which we may look for a full philosophic answer to the Nietzschean position, let it be said that the same Germany which produced this literary and philosophic poison has produced also the great thinker who may help the Christian morality stand its ground. Poison is Nietzsche; and Eucken is his antidote. Eucken's reasoned message is that of a concrete spiritual life, a life begotten from above, and in substance less an affair of power than of vital and creative participation in the Good, the Beautiful, and the True, as these find material expression on earth and spiritual expression in the kingdom of heaven.

Our task is but the old task of Christianity in all times, though now there is urgent need that Christian men bow with all their might under the burden of its demonstration: to prove to the Nietzscheans and to the world afresh that love is nobler than power; that, as Frank Thilly says, "The social man is the Superman"¹—is already the forerunner of the better man that is to be, whether on earth or in eternity.

Once again power has met love and challenged it to mortal combat. These were precisely the forces that grappled, as we know, in Jerusalem two thousand years ago, where each had its characteristic triumph. Power there proved master in the realm of flesh by the murderous shedding of blood in pursuit of self-will; love there proved master in the realm of spirit by the sacrificial surrender of life in pursuit of heaven's loftiest ideal of holiness.

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, 1913.

THE RELIGION OF LUCRETIVS

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The Epicurean school of philosophy, which flourished within the Greco-Roman world from about 300 B.C. until the fourth century A.D., is still interesting because of its many analogies with modern modes of thinking. In its emphasis upon a strictly empirical method of acquiring knowledge it anticipated, in spirit at least, the scientific scholarship of today. Furthermore, its outright rejection of supernaturalism, its attempt to discover nature's secrets within nature itself, its materialistic explanation of the universe, and its application of pragmatic tests in the determination of moral and religious values—all these features are strikingly similar, at least outwardly, to many prominent tendencies in present-day thinking.

To the student of religion, Epicureanism is particularly interesting. It represents the greatest and most persistent protest made in that ancient world against the burdens which popular superstition, in the name of religion, imposed upon mankind. Apart from Judaism it was the most vigorous and consistent opponent of contemporary paganism for more than three hundred years before Christianity arose; and even then it continued, side by side with Christianity, its fight against the baneful influences of pagan superstition. Owing to the wide extent and popularity of Epicureanism before the beginning of the Christian era, it must have constituted an important item in the early Christian preachers' world. In its criticism of paganism it may have done much to prepare the Greeks and Romans to heed the similar protest of Christian missionaries, even though the latter in many respects were wholly out of sympathy with the Epicureans. But since in matters of religion the criticism of popular superstition was the dominant note in Epicureanism, Christianity may quite possibly have appealed to some members of this school; and when the

Christian preachers, in their world-wide propaganda, made converts from Epicurean circles, the virtues which the school had inculcated—contentment with one's lot in life, loving participation in the blessings of the fraternal community, and unswerving loyalty to the teachings of the founder—were at once rebaptized with the Christian name and became an integral part of the new movement's expanding life.

With the exception of Epicurus himself, Lucretius is today probably the best-known representative of Epicureanism. Consequently he may quite properly be made the point of departure for a general estimate of the school's significance, particularly on its religious side. He lived at Rome in the first half of the first century B.C., and was one of the earliest and most important advocates of this philosophy among the Romans.

Lucretius' memory is perpetuated chiefly by means of his well-known poem, *On the Nature of Things*.¹ The poem is mentioned by Cicero in a letter to his brother Quintus² written early in the year 54 B.C., and Jerome is authority for the questionable tradition that Cicero edited the work which had been left unfinished by the poet's untimely death.

¹ There is a recent edition of the Latin by C. Bailey in the "Oxford Classical Texts," and an English rendering by the same hand in the "Oxford Translations." H. A. J. Monro's text and translation are still standard, and several other editions and renderings are current. Further information about Epicureanism, from its ancient representatives, may be found in Diogenes Laertius, book v; the fragments of Metrodorus (edited by A. Körte, Leipzig, 1890); the writings of Philodemus (see *Herculaneum volumen*, Oxford, 1824 and 1861; various treatises have been edited by different scholars), and the inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda (edited by J. William, Leipzig, 1907). Opponents of the school often give a somewhat full exposition of its principles, e.g., the pseudo-Platonic *Axiarchus*; Cicero *De finibus* and *De natura deorum* (*passim*); and Plutarch *Contra Epicuri beatitudinem* and *Adversus Coloten*. The most complete collection of the sources is Usener's *Epicurea* (Leipzig, 1887). Good modern interpretations are to be found in W. Wallace, *Epicureanism* (London, 1880); J. Masson, *The Atomic Theory of Lucretius* (London, 1884); E. Clodd, *Lucretius and the Atomists* (London, 1909); R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean* (New York, 1910); C. Martha, *Les moralistes sous l'empire romain* (Paris, 1864, 1881²); J. M. Guyau, *La morale d'Épicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines* (Paris, 1878, 1881²); M. Renault, *Épicure* (Paris, 1903); E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 4. Aufl. (Leipzig, 1909), III, i, 373-494, English tr., *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics* (London, 1892), pp. 404-513; G. Trezza, *Epicuro e l'Epicureismo* (Florenz, 1877, Milano, 1885²).

² ii. 9. 13.

It comprises six books of about equal length. The first book is taken up with a statement of the fundamental principles of the author's natural philosophy. He posits two original constituent elements out of which the entire universe has been evolved. These are primal matter and empty space. All other phenomena are held to be either properties or accidents of these original existences. As we see nature, matter and space are mingled together; but at the outset matter was pure, a heterogeneous mass of "first bodies" (*primordia*) which we commonly term atoms. Space is said to be illimitable, and the atoms are believed to be infinite in number though exceedingly small in size.

Book ii is devoted to a more minute study of the atoms. Originally they all moved downward with equal velocity and uniform direction, but slight swerve in their downward course caused interaction and resulted in a mixture of the elemental substances, thus producing the varied phenomena of our world. This variety is due to the different interminglings of many differently shaped atoms. While the number of shapes is limited, the number of atoms in each species is infinite. Atoms themselves do not contain any secondary qualities, such as color, cold, heat, sound, moisture, odor, sensation. These result solely from the mixing of atoms. Since infinite numbers of these "first bodies" are in constant motion throughout limitless space, there must be an infinite number of worlds, and the process of creation and dissolution must be going on perpetually.

Book iii applies this atomic theory more specifically to a definition of the soul's constitution. Both soul and body are composed of atoms, but soul-atoms are so fine and light that the departure of the soul causes no perceptible diminution in the weight of the body. Owing to its exceedingly rarefied constitution the soul no longer holds together after leaving the body, consequently it is mortal and is dissolved into its primal atoms when man dies. While in the body, of which it is the vitalizing force, it is fourfold in its constitution. One part is airy, another is fiery, a third is vaporous, and the fourth, which is made of the finest, smallest, and smoothest particles, cannot be named on the analogy of any other known substance. This last part is the sentient division of the soul and

resides in the breast, but the other parts are diffused over the whole body, of which they constitute the vital principle. Since the soul-particles are dispersed immediately on leaving the body, and since the body itself immediately begins the process of dissolution at death, there is no such thing as individual immortality. Consequently it is sheer folly to fear death and the terrors of a future life which have been created by the fancy of popular superstition.

Book iv deals with psychological activities and emotions from the atomic point of view. All sensation is traced to the activity of atoms. All bodies are continually throwing off from their surface fine atomic particles which constitute a kind of shell or image of the original object. These images float off into space in rapid succession, moving forward with great celerity and producing sensation when they impinge upon the soul-atoms of sentient beings. In the process of transmission they sometimes become distorted through contact with other objects, or they blend with other images, thus producing ideas in the mind which have no real objective existence apart from these distorted atomic images. Even in sleep the motion of the atoms continues, and the impressions received are recorded in dreams. The soul is stimulated, through the activity of these sensation-producing particles, to will and action, and from this independent motion of the soul the whole complex of opinions results. Thus our entire mental machinery is explained on the principle of atomic interactions, supplemented by the notion of the will's absolute freedom—a doctrine which Lucretius can allow even in his mechanical system because he has admitted that atoms may on occasion capriciously swerve from their regular course.

In book v the poet describes the creation of the world, various phenomena of the heavens, the origin of life upon earth, and the beginnings of civilization. All of these things are accounted for in a purely naturalistic fashion, as the result of perpetual interaction and experiment. In the course of their downward descent the original atoms, slightly swerving, struck each other, the lighter ones bounded upward, and the contact produced a rotary motion causing the atoms to form in clusters which ultimately constituted worlds. Our world, which is thought to be a comparatively recent

formation, has been produced by a process of atomic segregation in which the heavier particles have become massed together to form earth, thereby squeezing out from among themselves those lighter particles which subsequently united to form water, stars, sun, moon, and air. Then the earth began to produce plants in great abundance; after a time animal life also appeared, spontaneously springing from the earth; and ultimately, by the operation of a law of the survival of the fittest, the present order of things came into being. Men at first were uncouth as the beasts, they were perpetually at war, and knew nothing of the arts of civilization. But with the discovery of fire the process of social evolution began. Gradually they learned to construct habitations, to make clothing out of skins, to establish domestic relationships, to communicate with one another by means of language, and to cultivate the arts of living and thinking.

Book vi discusses a number of isolated phenomena, such as thunder, lightning, waterspouts, clouds, rain, earthquakes, volcanoes, the magnet, and pestilences, closing with an account, taken from Thucydides, of the plague at Athens. These miscellaneous items serve to emphasize the author's main contention, that all events, no matter how seemingly exceptional, happen according to strictly natural laws.

Such, in brief outline, is the content of Lucretius' famous poem; and we may well ask whether there is really any place for religion in his system of thinking. Our answer to this question will depend very largely upon what is understood by the term "religion."

Even in ancient times the meaning of this word varied according to changing circumstances and conditions of life. At an early stage in his experience man consciously differentiated between himself and the objective world about him, and he immediately sought some means of adjusting this relationship for his own advantage. Since the outer world impressed him with its superiority, he personalized the forces of nature and devised ways and means by which he could appease or supplicate these superior powers, which he termed gods. Belief in these deities, together with the rites employed in their worship, constituted religion in the primitive sense of the term.

Religion, thus defined, is rejected outright by Lucretius. In fact, it is his chief aim to abolish forever from the life of mankind all popular superstition, which has foully prostrated men upon the earth and crushed them down under a burden of fear. He highly praises Epicurus, whose teaching he is expounding in this poem, for having opened up to mankind a way of deliverance from these terrors. To quote from the opening part of the first book:

When human life to view lay foully prostrate upon earth crushed down under the weight of religion, who showed her head from the quarters of heaven with hideous aspect lowering upon mortals, a man of Greece [Epicurus] ventured first to lift up his mortal eyes to her face and first to withstand her to her face. Him neither story of gods, nor thunderbolts, nor heaven with threatening roar could quell. They only chafed the more the eager courage of his soul, filling him with desire to be the first to burst the fast bars of nature's portals. Therefore the living force of his soul gained the day. On he passed far beyond the flaming walls of the world and traversed throughout in mind and spirit the immeasurable universe whence he returns a conqueror to tell us what can and what cannot come into being—in short, on what principle each thing has its powers defined, its deep-set boundary mark. Therefore religion is put under foot and trampled upon in turn; us his victory brings level with the heaven.¹

Lucretius would abolish all fear of the traditional gods by denying their existence and assigning to matter itself full responsibility for nature's activities. By showing how "nature can do all things of herself without the aid of meddling deities" he robbed the gods of their prey and delivered humanity from the thralldom of gross superstition. Nor does man need to fear anything after death, since the soul perishes immediately on leaving the body.

Lucretius' feeling of repulsion for "religion" will perhaps be better appreciated if we note more particularly the state of affairs against which he revolted. The life of the Romans, both private and public, was pretty generally dominated by belief in divination and fear of offending the arbitrary will of the gods. Polybius commends the Romans for their credulity in matters of religion and their practice of inculcating the terrors of superstition as a means of insuring virtuous conduct in both public and private life.² Others insist upon the benefits which have been derived from the maintenance of superstitious practices. Livy³ reports Appius

¹ Book i, lines 62-79 (Monro's tr.). ² Polybius *Hist.* vi. 56. ³ vi. 41.

Claudius Crassus to have said: "Who is there who does not know that this city [Rome] was built by auspices during war and peace at home and abroad?" While Appius admits that to some people it may seem a trifling thing if the sacred chickens do not feed, if they come out too leisurely from the coop, or if a bird chant an unfavorable note, yet he affirms that "by not despising these trifling matters our ancestors have raised this state to the highest eminence."

Superstition was rampant also in the daily life of the populace. Plutarch, though he lived in the latter part of the first, and early in the second century A.D., describes a situation true, at least in part, for Lucretius' day and environment. In depicting the life of the superstitious man, Plutarch deplores the fear with which the deities are worshiped. To many persons the chapels and shrines of the gods are regarded as "the dens of bears, the holes of dragons, the lurking-places of the monsters of the deep." All life was filled with imaginary terrors, and even in sleep "terrific phantoms, monstrous apparitions, and tortures of all kinds" occupied the minds of these superstitious mortals. Nor were they content with making themselves utterly miserable in this life. They added to their present terror ghastly pictures of the future "crammed with all manner of evil things." Plutarch had no sympathy with Lucretius' radical method of eradicating the disease of "religion," but he admitted the accuracy of Lucretius' diagnosis.

Many persons in that ancient world deplored the distressing conditions into which man had been brought through his credulity, and they attempted solutions of the problem less drastic than that offered by Lucretius. The more educated classes had gradually outgrown the primitive conception of objective reality which deified and dreaded the crude forces of nature. A developing sense of mental supremacy gave men a feeling of superiority over nature. It was now subject to them; they analyzed its powers, they read the story of its life, and they interpreted its significance in terms of their own intellectual attainments. In short, they became philosophers, and so reared a world of thought to transcend the world of sense. Having arisen above the objective world of sense, man no longer shared his ancestors' fear of nature nor did he picture the deities in terms of its arbitrary forces. He might

nevertheless continue to be religious, even in the original sense of the word, for out of his own idealistic thinking he could construct a new deific imagery which placed his gods in the secret depths of the world, or outside of it, and thus enabled him still to think them worthy of his worship and capable of answering his petitions. Indeed, he might believe that his ability to rise to the heights of intellectual attainment had been insured through divine help; he attained to this wonderful knowledge of God because he was himself in some sense divine. Here we have religionist and philosopher in one.

Lucretius was familiar with this way of thinking. It was essentially this type of solution which the Platonic philosophers of his day were offering for the religious problems of the Greco-Roman world. But their remedy was not proving eminently successful, for, in the first place, only the philosopher could attain to their ideal—those who were being saved were necessarily few in number. And, secondly, this solution did not relieve the common man from the burdens of religion, since all rites were to be scrupulously observed in traditional fashion. Plutarch, in his criticism of Epicureanism, states the Platonic view sympathetically. He divides humanity into three classes: First, there are the criminals, who will inevitably dread the gods and look to the future with terror; but it is well that religion should inculcate these fears for the sake of the public good. Secondly, there are large numbers of people whose thought of gods mingles fear and pleasure. They are sufficiently fearful to observe the rites of religion carefully, and so their fear results in the end to their advantage; but they also derive great pleasure from attending upon the ceremonies of worship, feeling themselves in the presence of wise and friendly powers. Lastly, there is a small group of true philosophers who have lost the last vestiges of fear, knowing that God is the author of nothing but goodness.¹ On the other hand, Lucretius, and the Epicureans generally, sought to deliver, not the favored few, but all humanity, from the terrors of religion. In this they were more sincere, so they felt, than their Platonic opponents, and the practical advantages which the latter would

¹ Plutarch *Contra Epic. beat.*, 21 f.

gain by allowing the populace to remain deluded the Epicureans would conserve by supplying a new criterion for conduct. They would be honest at all hazards, implicitly abiding by the consequences of their honesty and giving to all men an equal opportunity of obtaining the highest good in life.

Another phase of Greco-Roman philosophy also estimated religion in terms of man's mental supremacy, but it did not assign to its intellectual gods a transcendental position. The force which drives the universe and regulates the affairs of men was not thought to be something from without, but was held to be a latent power within matter. Man was intelligent because he shared in an especial measure this ultimate world-intelligence. Yet he was also "religious," for he worshiped and received help from this permeating divine force. He might even come to terms with traditional superstition, since by means of allegorical interpretation he could read his own meaning into the traditional concepts. If, for example, he did not believe the myth about the binding and liberation of Zeus, he might still talk as if he did, because he meant by "binding and liberating" that the order of the world rested upon the balance of the elements—and so on through the whole range of mythology *ad infinitum*. This was Stoic teaching, and Stoicism was a most vigorous rival of Epicureanism in Lucretius' day. While these systems had much in common, there were two features of Stoicism to which the Epicurean was strenuously opposed. He could not tolerate the allegorical device for playing fast and loose with traditional mythology, and he objected to the doctrine of an inexorable necessity—a thing which the Stoic, to be sure, praised as a divine providence, but which seemed to the Epicurean a disastrous denial of man's free-will.

Having compared Lucretius' attitude on "religion" with other attitudes prevalent in his world, we may now proceed to note more particularly the constructive elements in his system. His poem is mainly concerned with "physics," but he reproduces with remarkable accuracy traditional Epicurean views, and so we may easily fill out from our knowledge of that school's tenets such features as may be vague or missing in Lucretius' exposition.

Whether or not we are to credit Lucretius with possessing "religion" is merely a question of terminology. He would not

have laid any claim to being religious in the popular sense of the word, but if a truly religious man is not simply one who unthinkingly observes stated rites, but rather one who, true to his own conscience and with all sincerity, strives to teach men how they may realize the best and noblest ends of existence, Lucretius must be classed among the most religious men of that age. In this sense of the word he attaches real "religious" worth to his philosophy. His one purpose is to release mankind from the terrors of popular superstition, substituting for these false notions a proper understanding of the nature of things and thereby rendering all men truly happy and intelligent, and capable of realizing to the full the highest ends of their being. A high estimate of the practical value of philosophy was characteristic of the whole Epicurean school, which traced its teaching on this subject back to its founder, who was reported to have said that "you must become a slave to philosophy if you would gain true freedom," that "by love of philosophy every troublesome and painful desire is destroyed," and that "vain is the discourse of that philosopher by which no human suffering is healed." Lucretius was manifestly in full accord with these sentiments and sought to convince Memmius—for whose instruction he composed his verses—that this teaching offered men the only sure way of attaining the *summum bonum* of their existence. This was the all-sufficient and only means by which they could be "saved."

This Epicurean "religion," if we may call it such, was constructed on the basis of immediate contact with reality. Accepting the world of sense at its face value, Lucretius aimed to effect an absolutely natural interpretation of life's values; and in doing this he accurately represented the school to which he belonged. Hence the evaluation of experience was not phrased in terms of man's relation to the activity of supposed supernatural agencies but in terms of his own conduct. Since the interests of all men were taken into account, it was necessary to select a standard of value that could be applied with equal fitness in the case of every individual. This criterion was found in the universal experience of pain and pleasure, the two opposite poles of universal desire. Hence pleasure was made the supreme good and pain the supreme evil.

But pleasure was not identified with mere sensuality. The highest pleasures were mental, though a body free from pain was an important secondary factor. Nor was one to seek merely immediate happiness; all choices were to be made with reference to ultimate consequences. As Epicurus expressed it:

We do not choose every pleasure, but there are times when we pass by many pleasures since their consequences would bring us inconvenience; and we choose many pains rather than pleasures when a greater pleasure ultimately follows the endurance of pain. Every pleasure is good by nature, but not every pleasure is to be chosen; also every pain is an evil but not every pain is to be always avoided.¹

Epicurus distinguishes three classes of pleasures. To the first belong all those which are both natural and necessary, such as eating when one is hungry; those which are natural but not really necessary, such as varieties of foods, form a second class; and to the third belong pleasures which are neither natural nor necessary, as, for instance, the desire of receiving praise. The wise man will abhor pleasures of the third class, he will indulge in those of the second only on occasion and will school himself to rise above them, but the first he will enjoy to the full. In fact, it is his supreme duty to live true to the demands of unperverted nature. "With a loaf of barley-bread and water," said Epicurus, "I am ready to dispute the prize of happiness even with Zeus."²

Although the Epicurean philosophy thus started with a valuation of real life, still it had its speculative side, as the poem of Lucretius amply demonstrates. Explicit answers were given to the two standard queries of the philosopher, namely, How do we know anything? and What do we know? By making the physical senses the absolutely final test of reality the Epicureans greatly simplified the problem of epistemology. Every sensation was assumed to have its corresponding reality in fact, and difference of opinion among different persons was not due to the activity of some supersensuous rational processes but to the fusion or distortion of the images of things in the course of transmission from the object to the sentient part of man's soul. Consequently the idealistic philosopher's contention, that true knowledge could

¹ Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 63.

² Usener, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

be acquired only by a process of mental reaction upon the data of sense perception, could be dismissed without further ado; and the religionist's idea, that the most important items of knowledge were to be acquired through the art of divination, the experience of ecstasy, the consultation of sacred books, and other forms of revelation, could also be ignored, since the Epicurean world-view allowed no place for revelation of any sort. By a simple mechanical process of nature's own creating man acquired all attainable knowledge through the exercise of the physical senses. The laws of reasoning, as expounded in the "logic" of the contemporary schools, were largely ignored, yet some simple rules were laid down for determining what inferences were to be drawn from certain observations and whether a particular sensation was the result of a true image or of a distorted one. The important thing about a sensation was that it should be distinct, for then we may suppose that it was caused by the impact of an image which had retained its integrity in the course of transmission, while vague sensations are likely to result from distorted and mixed images. So the pre-notion (*πρόληψις*), or intuition, of which so much was made by the Epicureans, when very distinct may safely be assumed to correspond with actual reality. Thus sensation is the ultimate epistemological unit, all reasoning is secondary, since it is founded upon sensation, and revelation as a means of acquiring knowledge is to be absolutely rejected.

What, then, do we actually know? Regarding nature, our knowledge is complete and final. The Epicurean believed that he had penetrated into the utmost recesses of the universe and had discovered the laws by which all things came into being. The hypothesis about atoms and the void, as we have observed above in noting the content of Lucretius' poem, furnished the solution of the whole ontological problem. Matter itself being eternal, there can be no question raised regarding its origin, and one who knows how matter acts understands all the mysteries of the universe. In the words of Lucretius, we "clearly perceive the whole nature of things, its shape and frame."¹ We know how the world came into being, the stages of development through which it has

¹ i. 949 f.

passed, the way in which the arts of civilization have arisen, the laws which govern all nature's forces, and the full course which the future evolution of the world will follow. All these answers are given in terms of the eternity of matter and the supremacy of natural law.

Man takes his place in this scheme simply as one unit in the whole. No exceptional ontological theory is needed to account either for his present constitution or for his future career. He is composed solely of material atoms, and his creation is the result of a perfectly normal phase of atomic activity. Even his superior intelligence is accounted for in an entirely natural way. His sentient powers, his volitional faculty, and his entire mental life are due to atomic fusions and interactions. Both the body and the quadri-partite soul which animates it are simply agglomerations of atoms, which combine to form an organism, which maintain this relationship during the period of the organism's life, and which are at last disseminated, once more falling back into the boundless atomic sea. Thus man's career ends as it began; his origin, his temporal existence, and his ultimate dissolution are all clearly perceived by one who understands nature's orderly procedure.

A third form of being, the gods, are also an integral part of this eternal material order. At first sight one might suppose that there was no room for gods in the Epicurean system, but they are there in infinite numbers. They do not, however, have anything to do with our world, but dwell in eternal serenity in the interstices between the innumerable worlds which compose the universe. As Lucretius pursues his divine philosophy,

the walls of the world part asunder, I see things in operation throughout the whole void. The divinity of the gods is revealed and their tranquil abodes which neither winds do shake, nor clouds drench with rains, nor snow, congealed by sharp frosts, harms with hoary fall. An ever-cloudless ether o'ercanopies them, and they laugh with light shed largely round. Nature too supplies all their wants and nothing ever impairs their peace of mind."¹

The gods were the concrete embodiment of the Epicureans' ideal man. They were free from all care, perfectly happy, and enjoyed perpetually a life of delightful fellowship with one another.

¹ iii. 16-24.

Moreover, they were immortal, although they were composed of atomic particles subject to the uniform law governing all nature. Their immortality was not due to uniqueness of constitution but to the conditions under which they lived. They were, indeed, composed of the finest kind of atoms, but they existed in human form and probably would have suffered dissolution had not their environment been so congenial as to provide no contrary forces whose action would cause the disintegration of their bodies. Were they to mingle in the affairs of our world it would mean the loss of their happiness and their temporal ruin—they would no longer be “gods.” It was essential to the very idea of gods, according to the Epicurean philosophy, that they should be absolutely free from any entangling relations with our world, or with any other environment in which matter was subject to the same sort of friction and conflict. Hence they must dwell in the calm spaces which intervene between the innumerable whirling worlds.

If the gods are thus removed from the world, how does man know of their existence? This difficulty is met by the doctrine of the “pre-notion.” Belief in divine beings is found to be a universal phenomenon and to be very “distinct,” therefore it must be the result of actual physical sensation. That is, atomic images of the gods must have penetrated to the sentient part of every human soul in order to produce this universal conviction. In the language of Lucretius, these images emanate from the holy body of the gods as heralds of their divine form entering into the minds of men.¹ In these gods the Epicureans found real significance, and so made them objects of worship. They were not to be feared, nor did the worshiper hope to procure their interference on his behalf, but they constituted for him that ideal form of being which he revered supremely and strove in a measure to realize in his own life. While criticizing popular notions of deity and affirming that they were merely human idealizations of men’s fears of the powers of nature, the Epicurean deified his own ideals, thus furnishing another example of man’s disposition to make his gods in his own image.

Epicureanism, which was from the outset practical in its emphasis, had many attractive features, and ministered to many

¹ vi. 76 f.

immediate needs of that age. There is a genuinely altruistic note in its continually expressed desire to help humanity to a saner, happier view of life. For example, Diogenes of Oenoanda, when he is growing too old to continue the active work of teaching, inscribes an epitome of his philosophy on the walls of the market-place in order that his words may instruct posterity:

If it were one or two or three or four or five or six or as many as you like of such, but not too many, who were in evil plight, I might have visited each individually and tendered them the best advice as far as in me lay. But the vast majority of men suffer from the plague of false opinions and the number of victims increases—for in mutual emulation they catch the contagion one from another, like sheep. Moreover, it is right to succor those who shall come after us, for they too belong to us, though as yet unborn; and it is also a dictate of humanity to help the strangers who sojourn among us. Since, then, the succor of an inscribed writing reaches a greater number, I wish to make use of this portico to exhibit in a public place the remedy which brings salvation. For thus I banish the vain terrors which hold us in subjection, eradicating some pains altogether and confining such as are due to nature within very moderate bounds and reducing them to the smallest dimensions.¹

The practical side of the Epicurean movement is seen again in its exponents' manner of life. Although commonly called a school of philosophy, they were primarily a company of persons banded together by attachment to a rule of life rather than to a system of abstract speculation. Foremost in their consideration was love for the brethren, and they were united in their loyalty to a personal founder, who was admired more for his message of deliverance than for the formulation of an elaborate philosophical system. They held regular monthly love feasts and exercised the greatest of care for the needy individuals connected with their community. Furthermore, there was an attractive stability about their school due to the unquestioned supremacy assigned to the teachings of their founder. They gave his instructions a position of canonical sanctity and often prided themselves on reading no other literature except that produced by him or by his genuine successors. But perhaps the feature of their teaching which made the strongest appeal was their open repudiation of traditional mythology and their merciless condemnation of the superstitious practices and beliefs inculcated by popular religion.

¹ Cited by Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, p. 310.

In several respects the Epicureans responded to the same needs which Christians later recognized and sought to meet. In some instances the two movements were not dissimilar, but Epicureanism lacked Christianity's other-worldly outlook. Christianity proposed, not only to deliver men from the terrors of paganism, giving them the blessings of a new brotherhood while still upon earth, but it offered them the assurance of a blessed immortality. Hence its stronger appeal. Yet the real significance of Epicureanism should not be ignored. Its salutary effect is attested by various writers, even of opposing schools. The Stoic Seneca calls the rules of Epicurus "virtuous and right," and Lucian praises Epicureans and Christians alike for their vigorous opposition to superstition. When the charlatan Alexander was exposed by an Epicurean he publicly burned a copy of Epicurus' *Catechism*, the most sacred portion of the Epicurean bible. In recounting the incident Lucian remarks:

The fellow had no conception of the blessings conferred by that book upon its readers, of the peace, tranquillity, and independence of mind it produces, of the protection it gives against terrors, phantoms, and marvels, vain hopes and inordinate desires, of the judgment and candor that it fosters, or of its true purging of the spirit, not with torches and squills and such rubbish, but with right reason, truth, and frankness.¹

Such was the boon which the advocates of this teaching sought to confer upon needy humanity in that age.

¹ *Alex.*, 47 (Oxford tr.).

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

EZRA-NEHEMIAH

The basis of all true exegesis and historical construction is a sound text. Textual criticism is therefore always of primary significance where the received text is not reliable. If it fails to do its work, the rest fails too, the exegesis is spoiled, the historical construction worthless. This is certainly true in the books of Ezra-Nehemiah. The most recent commentator, Professor Loring W. Batten,¹ the translator of Guthe's edition of the text in the *Polychrome Bible*, recognizes this: "Many of the critical theories of both the older and newer writers are dependent on the corrupt MT. A reconstruction of these theories is only possible in the light of a thoroughgoing criticism of the text. This needs to go much farther than Guthe's, in Haupt's *SBOT*." So Batten sets out with much diligence and painstaking care to recover the original Hebrew text. He reaches remarkable results. If they can be maintained they are of far-reaching importance for the exegesis as well as for the historical reconstruction of that difficult period in Hebrew history. Let us carefully test Batten's textual criticism, especially in such sections where they represent his own original contributions.

For truly effective textual reconstruction it is necessary to subject the versions to a rigorous criticism before using them as an aid for the recovery of the original Hebrew text. Even the most valuable versions may lead us astray, if we forget this caution. Batten is quite right in emphasizing the importance of the Esdras text, but he is not critical in his use of it.

As an example take his reconstruction of Ezra 3:3 on the basis of Esdras codex B: "For there were gathered unto them some of the peoples of the lands and they *were well disposed towards* [κατωρθώθησαν] the altar and they *helped* them [καρίσχουσαν]," etc. This is a remarkable text giving as it does information directly opposed to that which we get from the other texts. And of course it would be of great historical value if it were tenable. But the B text of Esdras cannot be legitimately translated in this way. Neither κατωρθώθησαν nor καρίσχουσαν bear the

¹ *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah*. (International Critical Commentary.) New York: Scribner, 1913.

meaning assigned to them. And even if they did, the restored Hebrew **עָזַר** = "they were well disposed toward" is not idiomatic, and **עָזַר** never means "help" in the sense of aiding one in some work. Impossible as these observations make the reconstruction, they are not the special point I have in mind, which is the critical use of the versions. *Esdras has here a conflate text!* The first reading is *καὶ ἐπισυνήχθησαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν τῆς γῆς* = **בְּאִים עֲלֵיהֶם מֵעַמֵּי הָאָרֶץ**, the second *ὅτι ἐν ἑσθρᾷ ἦσαν αὐτοῖς κατέσχεσαν αὐτοὺς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς* = **כִּי בְּאִיבָה עֲלֵיהֶם . כָּל עַמֵּי הָאָרֶץ**. The words *κατέσχεσαν αὐτοὺς* in heavy type are a variant rendering of **בְּאִים עֲלֵיהֶם**, so that the second reading is itself conflate, **בְּאִיבָה עֲלֵיהֶם בְּאִים עֲלֵיהֶם**, as is shown by the position of *κατέσχεσαν* without *αὐτοὺς* in codex L after *τῆς*. These are thus various attempts to get the clause **כִּי בְּאִים עֲלֵיהֶם מֵעַמֵּי הָאָרֶץ** (this is the best reading) into the text; with what (little) success a comparison of the translations of codices A and B of *Esdras* shows. In reality the clause is not original at all, as not only internal evidence, though this alone would be sufficient, but also its omission in codex B of *Ezra* show. Its absence in B cannot be due in this case to scribal carelessness. With the breaking down of Batten's textual reconstruction of *Ezra* 3:3 the basis for his historical construction has vanished (see pp. 24, 109).

Another example is Batten's restoration of *Ezra* 3:8-10. He bases it again on *Esdras*. There are two dates given in *Esdras*, and Batten concludes that one refers to the time of the foundation, the other to the "erecting" of the temple. In reality we have here again a doublet in the *Esdras* text:

and in the second year when he had	on the first day of the second month
come [to the temple of God,] to	of the second year, when they had
Jerusalem, in the second month.	come to Judah and Jerusalem.

There is, of course, no difference in the two dates, for the special date, "on the first day" or "new Moon's day of the second month," is simply another translation of the same Hebrew original, often the only correct one when the day of the month is not otherwise defined. Batten recognizes that "to the temple of God" is a gloss. The recognition of the doublet should therefore have been simple. But there is another doublet in *Esd.* 5:55 and 5:56:

55 and they laid the foundation	56 and the [builders] built (<i>ψικοδόμησαν</i>)
(<i>ἐθεμελίωσαν</i>) of the temple of God	the temple of Yahweh.

Batten does not see that they are doublets and lays stress on the difference of "laying the foundation" and "building," or "erecting." Unfortunately, the distinction will not hold good as far as the underlying Hebrew is concerned, for Esdras translates יָסַד by ψικοδόμητο in 5:52 (Ezra 3:6), ἐγέρσει in 5:59 (Ezra 3:11), οικοδόμην in 5:60 (Ezra 3:12). In other words there is no reason why ψικοδόμησαν in 5:56 should not represent יָסַדוּ , as in Ezra 3:10. The distinction which Batten makes between the laying of the foundation and the building of the temple is therefore untenable.

But leaving aside these observations and adopting for a moment Batten's restoration, we are told that in the second year of Darius, in the sixth month (on this date see below), the foundation was laid by Zerubbabel, Joshua, and their brethren, the priests and the Levites and the other exiles, and on the first day of the second month of the second year of the coming to Judah and Jerusalem they put the Levites from twenty years old upward at the work on the house of Yahweh. Does this mean that Zerubbabel, Joshua, and all the priests and Levites and the other returned exiles laid the foundation in the sixth month of the second year of Darius, and that eight months later (see pp. 106 f.) the work was committed to the Levites who took entire charge of it? That appears to be Batten's idea (see pp. 120 f. where he omits the builders in vs. 10 and makes the Levites the builders). But it seems to me most improbable, even for the Chronicler, who inserted "the builders" in order to escape such a construction. One reason why Batten did not recognize the two dates of Esdras as variant readings is his belief that the original text of the first must be restored to: "in the second year of Darius in the sixth month." But if this is the original text we should surely expect a similar form of date in the second, i.e., "on the first day of the second month of the third year of Darius," rather than "of the second year of their coming to Judah and Jerusalem," if there was a second date in the original text at all. There is much to be said for Batten's conjectural restoration of the date in 3:8. The fact that Esdras^L has ἐπὶ Δαρείου is important but not decisive, for a copyist might have inserted it; the previous story in Esdras had taken place under Darius. The testimony of Haggai and Zechariah is more important. We know that the foundation of the temple actually was laid in the second year of Darius. In Ezra 3:8 we have a conflate reading, as the variant reading of Esdras shows as well as a literal translation of the Hebrew phrase, "of their coming to the house of God, to Jerusalem"—"to the house of God" and "to Jerusalem" are parallels. It is by no means impossible

that the original text read, "in the second year of Darius," לדריוש for לירושלם. This date was changed to the present readings, and the impression was produced that the laying of the foundation took place under Cyrus. Batten's change of דשני, "second," to דשטי, "sixth," based on Haggai naturally falls in with the reading "Darius"; the reading "second" was due to the reading "first month" in Esd. 5:52. If this restoration of the original date should prove correct as is quite possible, it is a pity that Batten should have spoiled his discovery by failing to recognize that the present text in Esd. 5:55 is a doublet of 5:54, and by giving us such an unfortunate restoration of Ezra 3:8-10 in other respects. For the straightening out of that textual tangle he has done little aside from the date. Space forbids going into this matter more fully.

Batten trusts the Esdras text too much and does not allow for textual corruption, conflation, and free translation. In Ezra 3:3 he says, "Esd. here offers a quite different text. . . . It is doubtful if this is any improvement" (p. 125). On the preceding page he says of this same Esdras text, "That makes very good sense and paves the way for the following clause, 'therefore' (not 'for'). . . ." In reality the underlying text is not different and the Greek γάρ does not mean "therefore" but "for"! On this last clause Batten says, "Esd. shows a different text," but wherein it differs he does not say. In 3:12b he says (p. 124), "The rest of the passage also is quite different in Esd., καὶ πολλοὶ διὰ σαλπύγγων καὶ χαρὰ μεγάλη τῇ φωνῇ," but this corresponds exactly to the Hebrew. From his remark on 3:11 it may be surmised that it is the trumpets that seem to him to point to a different text. "It may be that Esd. preserves a note of an original story when it says, 'all the people blew the trumpets and shouted.' The whole population participated, making the demonstration more democratic than MT suggests" (p. 122). But an examination of Esd. 5:59-62 (=Ezra 3:11-13) shows that Esdras translated דרירע by "blowing the trumpet" and תרועה by "trumpets."

3:11:	תרועה גדולה	דרירע	Esd. 5:59: ἐσάλπισαν καὶ ἐβόησαν φωνῇ μεγάλῃ
3:12:	בתרועה		Esd. 5:61: διὰ σαλπύγγων
3:13:	תרועה		Esd. 5:62: τῶν σαλπύγγων
3:13:	מריעים תרועה גדולה		Esd. 5:62: ἦν ὁ σαλπίζων μεγάλως.

On Ezra 6:12 Batten says, "Esd. here offers a simpler and better text." But the only difference, aside from κύριος for אלהים, is ἐπικέκληται for שכן. How far this simplifies and betters the text is difficult to see.

Moreover the statement, "the Deut. phrase is more accurately given than in MT" (p. 148) should have been exactly the reverse. This manner of seeing in Esdras a "better text" or a "radically different text," when in reality it is not different nor better, is characteristic of Batten. See further his treatment, e.g., of Ezra 3:5; 6:13. Of course, some of these passages are not of prime importance for the historical reconstruction, but others are. And the serious part is that Batten's whole textual criticism is impaired by it. Sometimes he sees a point as, e.g., in Ezra 3:8; 7:11; Neh. 2:8, but its value is spoiled in the process.

In textual criticism as well as in exegesis strict accuracy in the observation of the usage and meaning of words is necessary, else the critic may construct the text, the exegesis, and the history wrongly. Batten argues, e.g., on Ezra 10:15 that "the construction עמדו על, 'stood against,' fits in finely with this idea; but we find עמד used in opposite senses in two successive verses. It is plain, therefore, that if this is the right meaning the two verses are not from the same hand. To express this meaning the author would have used a common and unmistakable word, קום." Batten has overlooked here that in 10:14 עמד is used with ל, in 10:15 with על, which makes just as much difference in Hebrew as in English. The same author can write "stand for" in one sentence and "stand against" in the next sentence, without feeling under obligation to use, e.g., "oppose" in the second sentence. The unfortunate consequence is that Batten proposes in all seriousness to follow the manifestly inferior reading of $\epsilon\kappa\ \mu\epsilon\tau'\ \epsilon\mu\sigma\iota$ = עמדתי for עמדו, and on the strength of it to regard it as a genuine fragment of the Ezra memoirs, which "then becomes of great significance" (p. 346).

Another example is in Ezra 5:6, 7. Batten's principal argument for his reconstruction is that פתגמא means "answer," as in vs. 11. But in 5:11 it gets this meaning from the verb דרתי בינה (cf. vs. 5), while in the other passages, Ezra 4:17; 6:11; Dan. 3:16; 4:14, it does not have the meaning "answer." (In Ezra 4:17 it might mean "answer," but the usual meaning "word" is at least as good.) The question is, could the satrap send a פתגמא to the king? Besides Dan. 3:16; 4:14, the very passage to which Batten appeals, 5:11, shows that the term is used in the sense of "word."

If textual criticism had no influence on exegesis or on historical construction the matter would not be so serious. But Batten himself has pointed out its great importance. An examination of Batten's treatment of the Cyrus' edict will show this even more clearly. Batten

believes that the Cyrus edict in 1:2-4 is not the work of the Chronicler but an authentic document. He shares the common opinion that there is another version of this edict in 6:3-5. Since the two versions differ materially, one or both must be wrong. On internal evidence the Aramaic version in 6:3-5 is rejected and the Hebrew in 1:2-4 accepted. Now the common opinion that we have two versions of the same edict in chap. 1 and chap. 6 does not represent the facts correctly, because chap. 1 gives a formal public edict which was proclaimed all through the kingdom, while chap. 6 gives a memorandum of an official action which was to serve as direction for the royal officials. These are two entirely different things, the one a public edict, the other an order in council. However much they may differ they need not necessarily exclude each other. They may both be genuine as far as this point is concerned. Each must therefore be subjected to scrutiny. Batten is convinced that the text of the edict is not correctly preserved, so he restores it with the help of the Greek versions. If his restoration represents "the original form, many of the objections urged against the edict are removed, although the emendations were not made with that end in view" (p. 64). But in vs. 3 the insertion of לָכֵן, "therefore," simply on the basis of the particle *οὖν* in Esdras^{BAL}, which is evidently merely due to the Greek translator's feeling of the need of a connective particle; the emendation of בכם, "among you," to בִּיחָר, "chooses," even though all the authorities adduced¹ have בכם; the substitution of הַשֹּׁכֵן, "who dwells" for אִשֶּׁר, "who," after הָאֱלֹהִים, "God," because Esdras^{BAL} translates the relative clause freely by *ὁ κατασκηνώσας*, as it well might do—all these emendations will hardly commend themselves, irrespective even of the un-Hebraic character of the resultant sentence, מִי לָכֵן יִהְיֶה אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל and the unwarranted substitution of יִהְיֶה אֱלֹהֵי עַמּוֹ for הַשֹּׁכֵן בִּירוּשָׁלַם. Esdras^L is Batten's basis for reconstructing vs. 4. But Esdras is manifestly a free translation. Esdras' translation of עַם הַמְּדַבֵּר by *σὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς κατ' εὐχὰς προστεθειμένοις* neither represents a different text nor a priestly amplification, but is a free translation, justified by the context. But suppose Esdras were literal. Esdras^{BA} reads *ὅσοι οὖν κατὰ [τοὺς B] τόπους οἰκοῦσιν βοηθεύωσαν αὐτῷ οἱ ἐν τῇ τόπῳ αὐτοῦ*, which, retranslated into Hebrew, would be כָּל הַיֹּשֵׁב בַּמְּקוֹמֹת יִשְׁאֹדְרוּ אִנְשֵׁי מְקוֹם, that is, Esdras

¹ Even 3 Esd. with its free translation *si quis est ex genere VESTRO* witnesses to it. The reading of *ὁ δὲ προθυμεῖτο τοῦ πορευθῆναι*, on which Batten's emendation is based, does not presuppose an equivalent in the Hebrew original but is simply the translator's rounding out of the relative sentence, which to him seemed incomplete.

omits the clause **אשר הוא גר שם**, and instead of **הנשא** reads **הישיב**. Esdras¹ differs only by inserting **προβυμείσθωσαν τῷ κυρίῳ**, which carried with it the omission of the following **αἱ**. Far from being an original part of the Esdras text, the very structure of the sentence shows that this is an insertion, a variant rendering of **הנדה לביה ד'**; its original form **προβυμῆθωσιν** was corrected to **προβυμείσθωσαν** when it was inserted after **βοηθείωσαν**. We should beware therefore of regarding it as a part of the original text. In the first half of the verse Esdras omits the relative clause, "where he sojourns," and gets rid of the perplexing **הנשא** by reading **הישיב**. But the resultant text cannot be original either, "for all who dwell in the places" requires a definition of the places, such as the Hebrew gives, and moreover the text, "all that dwell in the places, let the men of his place support him," is impossible. Batten, to be sure, omits "the men of his place," but without any external authority whatever, just as he omits "goods and animals" in the second part of the verse. **הנשא** is indeed perplexing, for we expect here from the second part of the verse a special reference to those who are too poor to undertake the journey to Palestine and therefore need assistance. Unless **הנשא** is used here with the special meaning of one who had actually escaped the catastrophe in 586 B.C. and was therefore now old and presumably not self-supporting, we might perhaps think that originally **הפניש**, "poor, impoverished," stood there. Batten's textual restoration of the Cyrus edict in chap. 1 is thus to be rejected at every single point.

Now let us turn to the memorandum of the order in council in 6:3-5. Batten regards it as non-authentic. He omits the building specifications of the temple in 6:3, 4. But what can be his reasons for this? If the measures conflict with other historical facts—though nothing is said of the dimensions of the new temple in Ezra 3:12; Hag. 2:3—that does not necessarily argue against the genuineness of this portion, for the figures might either be incorrectly preserved or have differed actually. There is no reason why Cyrus may not have given such specifications in an order in council. Batten probably felt that such specifications were out of place in a public edict; that may be, but this memorandum contains an order in council and not an edict which was proclaimed all through his kingdom. But in any case, why should Batten omit the section of the particulars about the temple, including the payment of the expenses by the government, when he does not regard the memorandum as authentic but as a late composition? Is there external authority for the omission of parts of it? On p. 60 he argues from these

portions for the unhistorical character of the edict. On p. 144 he omits these very portions and then speaks of his restored text as "the original decree." And indeed he goes so far as to argue that the authorization of the restoration of the sacred vessels which according to his restoration was part of the decree of chap. 6 was also part of the decree in chap. 1 (see also the summary of 1:1-4 on p. 55 where this is mentioned, though it is not in the text of the decree). Does Batten think that "the original decree" underlies 6:3-5 as he has restored it? It would almost seem so, but it cannot be, for he assures us that the writer of Ezra 4:24b to 6:18 "was doubtless ignorant of other sources, and could hardly have been familiar with official documents" (p. 21). Strangely enough the very portion that Batten regards as part of the decree, the restoration of the temple vessels, 6:5—and which, to argue in his manner, was not contained in the other version of the decree in chap. 1—is shown by his own elaborate presentation of the textual facts on p. 143 to be an addition made by someone from 5:14, 15, as the last clause demonstrates. Batten is able to come to the other conclusion only by omitting that tell-tale clause in 6:5.

But the memorandum is only a part of an Aramaic source which Batten regards as historically worthless. His reasons for his distrust of the Aramaic document are: first, that according to the reliable testimony of Haggai and Zechariah Zerubbabel laid the foundations of the temple under Darius and not Sheshbazzar under Cyrus as in Ezra 5:16. I prefer to state the objection thus rather than as Batten himself does when he writes, "The most serious difficulty is the inconsistency with Esd. 4:62 f. that Zerubbabel came to Jerusalem in the reign of Darius carrying with him permission to rebuild the temple" (p. 20). This statement complicates matters by bringing in Batten's ideas about Esd. 4:62 f., which are based on Torrey's untenable assertion that Esd. 4:47-56, 62—5:6 is an original part of the Chronicler's narrative. This point deserves a special investigation the results of which I expect to submit at some other time. It is true that Haggai's and Zechariah's testimony that the foundations of the temple were laid in the reign of Darius is unimpeachable. But let us try to understand the situation in which Zerubbabel *et al* were placed in Ezra, chap. 5. The Persian satrap visited Jerusalem in the second year of Darius I. Zerubbabel and Joshua had begun to build the temple. Tattenai demands to know their authorization for this. Did Darius give it? No, Cyrus! Why then was it not carried out under Cyrus? The answer of the Jews is diplomatic (not wholly truthful). The building was authorized by

Cyrus and was begun directly by Sheshbazzar, and it has been building ever since! This is nothing new, but merely the continuation of a building begun long ago! If the Jews had said to the satrap, Cyrus commanded the building of this temple long ago, but it is only now that we have begun to fulfil Cyrus' decree, they would have ruined their case at the very outset. The objection that the writer would surely have indicated that this was a diplomatic answer is to my mind unwarranted. Why does Batten never even mention this explanation?

The second reason, "the silence of Haggai and Zechariah about interference from any source whatever" (p. 20), is removed by the simple reference to Zech. 4:6-10. Why should Zechariah think it necessary to speak of the mountains of difficulties and assure Zerubbabel that he shall after all be enabled to complete the work which he had begun, unless there actually was interference from some source?

The third argument, that in Ezra 4:1-3, "the Samaritans desired to aid the Jews in building and there is in that story no note of any opposition," is possible only because Batten separates 4:4, 5 from 4:1-5 and because of his remarkable textual reconstruction of Ezra 3:3. After Rothstein in his *Juden und Samaritaner* (1908) had showed the close relation between Ezra 4:1-6 and Hag. 2:10-14 such reasoning should have been impossible. That the opposition of the Samaritans was *purely* political is in view of Hag. 2:10-14 and Ezra 4:1-3 to say the least unlikely. Did they take the rebuff administered to them by Zerubbabel so lightly?

I must bring this review to a close. It is too long as it is. Others will take up other aspects of the commentary into which so much hard, patient, and painstaking work has gone. I thought it wisest to investigate the foundations and to test primarily Batten's own original contributions, i.e., especially Ezra, chaps. 1-6, where, as he himself says, his results show "the greatest divergence from the conclusions of other students" (p. 32).

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THE PROPHET AND HIS PROBLEMS¹

The most conspicuous result of modern criticism, from the religious point of view, is the new interest it has lent to prophecy, as the really creative influence in the onward movement of faith. This interest con-

¹ *The Prophet and His Problems*. By J. M. Powis Smith. New York: Scribner, 1914. xi+244 pages. \$1.25.

tinues unabated. The last few years have witnessed the emergence of quite an extensive library on the prophets and their problems. Among recent students in this field Professor Smith occupies a foremost place. If we mistake not, he will ere long enrich Old Testament scholarship with a comprehensive treatment of the subject, as illumined by the newer light. His present purpose is more modest. By a series of "illustrative sections" he seeks to give the general reader a true appreciation of the marvelous story of the prophets, that they may be stimulated to read the story more fully for themselves. And certainly the study of these "sections" does whet the appetite. Under Dr. Smith's skilful guidance we are brought continually into touch with vital issues. We feel how pure a light that of prophecy was, how genuine and deep was the prophets' sense of God, and how much they can still contribute to the solution of life's problems if we read their words aright.

Though Dr. Smith makes no pretension here of writing for the expert, he shows the master's hand at every turn, and is not afraid to strike out paths of his own, where the current treatment of prophecy seems to lead but to culs-de-sac. This healthy independence is evident from the first chapter, which deals with "Semitic Prophets." In certain circles it has become almost an axiom that Hebrew prophecy is a borrowed light from Canaan. Dr. Smith throws his gaze over a much wider field, and traces the workings of the spirit of prophecy through various parts of the Semitic world—Babylonia, Egypt, and Syria—leading to the conclusion that "Semites all alike apparently possessed the original endowment of the prophetic spirit," though it was in Israel that "this spirit yielded its choicest fruit" (p. 34). The three following chapters—on "Primitive Hebrew Prophets," "False Prophets," and "Prediction"—elucidate the true idea of prophecy. In three further "illustrative sections" Dr. Smith reviews the prophetic attitude to home, state, and the individual respectively, while in a closing chapter he unveils the heart of the prophets' religion. Of these chapters the most original is that on "A Prophet's Marriage," where he breaks a lance with the now prevailing interpretation of Hosea, chaps. 1-3, and reads the tragic story in the most literal sense, as the prophet's marriage with a woman whom he knew to be a harlot. Even those of us who are repelled by such a reading must pay deference to Dr. Smith's fresh and forceful treatment of the theme. When he passes from such controversial questions to follow the growing light of prophecy as it expands itself over both national and individual life, we accompany him with cordial sympathy. The very essence of prophecy was moral and religious progress. The prophetic religion "was

made in the full light of world-history. It grew as the mind of Israel grew. It laid hold upon the great world-movements of the time and claimed them for itself and for its God" (p. 231). And the same spirit dwells among ourselves, leading us into all truth. "The world-view of today is separated from that of the prophets [of Israel] by centuries of study and experience." Thus "he who would slavishly seek to imitate them would totally misunderstand their spirit. It is for the modern prophet rather to face the facts of life with open eye, to read the message of God to the age as it is revealed in those facts and processes [which history and science reveal], and to surrender himself in the full assurance of faith to the task of declaring and interpreting that message to his fellow-men. So will prophecy live again and religion once more become a quickening power upon the minds of men" (p. 233).

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THE EVOLUTION OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY¹

The title of this valuable and interesting volume is misleading. Instead of "The Evolution of Early Christianity" it should be called "The Environment of Early Christianity," for it is with the latter subject that the author chiefly deals, and his account of the development of Christianity, so far as he treats the matter at all, is fragmentary and incidental. That the book is misnamed, however, does not impair its value. As a matter of fact it contains an excellent picture of the world, particularly the religious world, into which Christianity was born, and it thus serves a very useful purpose. The author is entirely right in regarding the study of that world as a matter of fundamental importance for the student of Christian history. Without a knowledge of it one must go altogether astray in trying to understand the origin and development of Christianity and in interpreting its historical significance. The author is right also in thinking it worth while to gather up and present in brief and orderly fashion some of the principal results of the new lines of study which have been carried on by many scholars with extraordinary vigor for a number of years past. A book of this kind is bound to be widely useful to students, and its extensive and well-selected bibliographies give it a double value. The field with which it deals is vast

¹ *The Evolution of Early Christianity. A Genetic Study of First Century Christianity in Relation to Its Religious Environment.* By Shirley Jackson Case. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1914. ix+385 pages. \$2.00.

and bristles with complicated and difficult problems. A summary account of it such as this will constitute a very helpful guide, especially for those unfamiliar with German. And more than that, the attention which it invites to what is for many a wholly unexplored territory will inevitably prove beneficial.

To turn to matters of detail—the first chapter, on “The Developmental Character of Christianity,” though, like parts of the sixth chapter, it contains some things that might fairly have been taken for granted in these days and suggest that the author had a somewhat benighted public in mind, is yet in the main sound, particularly in its repudiation of the common notion that there is such a thing as essential Christianity, or an unchanging essence of Christianity, and in its insistence upon a larger recognition than has been usual among older scholars of the influence of environment upon the evolution of Christian faith and life.

Though it has nothing to do with the subject of the book as a whole, I cannot avoid calling attention in passing to a reference in this chapter to Ritschl as following Schleiermacher “in defining religion as man’s sense of dependence upon God” (p. 17). As a matter of fact, Ritschl’s conception of religion was wholly unlike Schleiermacher’s and represented an altogether different interest and tendency.

In chap. iii the account of Alexander’s life and work seems unnecessarily full, as does the account of the antecedents of emperor-worship in chap. vii, while at the same time more might profitably have been said about the bearing of the latter upon the development of the Christian church. In both these chapters the author seems to have forgotten temporarily that his book has to do with the ancient world, not for its own sake, but because it constituted the scene of early Christianity.

On the other hand the sketch in chap. iv of contemporary Judaism and of the primitive Christians’ relations to it contains little or nothing that is irrelevant and is excellent in every way. The author is entirely right in this connection in emphasizing the too often neglected fact that there were many other missionaries to the Gentiles besides Paul. Without a recognition of their work it is quite impossible to understand much of the Christianity of the early church.

Chap. ix, on “Hellenistic Religions of Redemption,” is particularly good and the description of the mystery-religions and related phenomena is clear and accurate. The following passage is perhaps worth quoting, as illustrating an aspect of the religious situation which proved of considerable importance for the evolution of the Christian religion:

At an early stage of development man attained confidence in the power of nature to survive the shock of winter’s death. He did not base his assurance

on the uniformity of nature's law, as we do, but such uniformity was practically as substantial a thing for his faith as that dogma is for our science. This faith was personified in the form of a dying and reviving God, which was the ancient way of talking about what we term the succession of the seasons. The young deity died and the mother-goddess, source of all life, lamenting his decease, refused to sustain life until he was restored. Thus summer followed winter, and winter, summer. In Hellenistic times this type of religion still made a strong appeal, although it had taken a new turn. Not crops and herds and social groups, but the welfare of the individual soul was now uppermost. Men looked to the deity which formerly guaranteed the perpetuity of nature's life to give the individual a similar assurance. Thus a god which existed first as a redeemer of vegetation became a redeemer of souls.

As in earlier times man sought to ally himself with the forces of nature in order to obtain their aid, so now his aim was to unite himself to this savior-deity. To accomplish this end various means were employed, including pictorial representations of the redeemer-deity's career, rites of purification by which one became worthy of approaching the god, or other ceremonies designed to effect union between the deity and the worshiper. Some of these rites were crude survivals from the earlier stage of nature-worship, while others breathed a noble spirit of purity and devotion. In any case, the religious impulses were fundamentally the same, although the methods employed for attaining the common goal naturally varied with the education and personality of the worshiper [p. 324].

Chap. viii, on "The Religious Significance of Philosophical Speculation," deals with a more familiar subject, whose importance for an understanding of Christian thought has always been recognized. It is worth while, however, to have it treated in the larger and more varied setting of a book like this.

Paul's interpretation of Christianity is admirably presented in the last chapter of the book, entitled "The Triumph of Christianity," though the reference to his doctrine of Christ's redeeming work, on p. 346, leaves much to be desired, and the statement, on p. 352, that it was man "and not the Spirit, who took the initiative and with whom the ultimate responsibility rested," is hardly true to Paul's overmastering sense of divine initiative and control. In general, however, the emphasis is put in the right place and the realistic character of the apostle's conception of redemption is justly made prominent. The author is also undoubtedly correct in recognizing Paul's sacramentarianism and in calling attention to its resemblance to similar tendencies in ethnic cults. To quote from p. 349:

In giving baptism and the Lord's Supper this sacramental turn, Paul was pursuing a tendency already prevalent in the religious world of his day. In

more primitive times rites of ablution and eating were given a crass magical significance, as when the worshipers of Dionysus devoured the sacred victim raw, believing that they were thereby actually eating the god. In the Graeco-Roman world of the first century A.D. these cruder notions had given place to ideas more refined but none the less sacramentally realistic. When symbolic food took the place of the divine animal, and the form of the deity was accordingly "spiritualized," the union which the ordinance effected between the believer and his god was no less realistic—so far as the absorption of actually divine essence was concerned—than had been the case in earlier times. So with Paul the Spirit-Christ entity, the possession of which constitutes one a Christian, is made available for everyone on the fundamental condition of faith, is realized in experiential fulness on the occasion of baptism when the convert formally "puts on Christ," and is constantly renewed or strengthened through regular participation in the memorial celebration called the Lord's Supper.

Once more, the following paragraphs from the close of the book give a capital summary of the multiform appeal which was made by Christianity and to which it owed its ultimate triumph:

It became a many-sided movement, laying hold upon a wide range of vital interests within the Graeco-Roman world. It came to include, usually in a heightened degree, many religious values which its competitors had been seeking to cultivate before the Christian preachers appeared upon the scene. Being itself of oriental origin it readily assumed many of the features which had made oriental mystery-cults and speculations attractive to many persons in the Roman empire. It was pre-eminently a religion of redemption, with a Savior whose figure was more real and whose credentials appeared stronger than those of any mythical dying and rising divinity.

When occasion required, the Christian Savior was readily made the center of a type of speculation capable of appealing to the most vigorous religious thinking of the time. While this new religion was emphatically a faith for the individual soul, it also satisfied the group-consciousness by assembling a new community to constitute the kingdom of God on earth. Its early adherents and missionaries belonged to the masses, consequently it was a vital movement from the start and spread widely with the shifting currents of syncretistic life. To the individual who felt himself drifting hopelessly on this boundless sea, Christianity offered very definite religious guidance. It gave an assurance of salvation for the immortal soul, it appealed to the imagination and emotions, in its sacred rites it answered the current longing for realism, it satisfied intellectual demands as they arose, it awakened conscience by its insistence upon rewards and punishments, it sounded a strong ethical note, and in its doctrine of the one true God it gave men a sufficiently large conception of Deity to meet the needs of an enlarging world and an imperialistic age [p. 368 ff.].

It is to be hoped that the anticipations raised by the title of Professor Case's book will be met in a second volume from his pen to which the present may serve as an introduction, and in which the development of early Christianity in the light of contemporary religious ideas and practices may be the principal theme. For such a book there is ample room. A great deal of work has been done by many scholars upon various matters of detail, and many early Christian practices and beliefs are now understood as they never were before, but there is need of renewed study, in the light of our larger knowledge of the ancient world, of the Christian movement as a whole and particularly of the entire complex of primitive Christian ideas. The present book is to be welcomed especially because it calls attention to this need.

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SOURCE BOOKS FOR THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

The History of Religions Commission of the Royal Society of Sciences at Göttingen has undertaken the publication of a series of texts from the sources. Franke's present contribution to this series, a translation of Suttas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 21, 26, 27, of the *Dīghanikāya*,¹ is an important addition to our knowledge of the language and content of the Pāli Tipiṭaka. The translation is excellent beyond criticism, and the very full notes show the most careful and conscientious scholarship.

In his introduction Franke tries to prove that the *Dīghanikāya* is not, as Buddhist tradition claims, a collection of the speeches of Buddha made immediately after his death but "ein einheitlich abgefasstes schriftstellerisches Werk" with the "Heilsweg-Schema als Mittelpunkt." In the Suttas emphasis is laid on the fact that the Way to Salvation was preached by a Tathāgata; concrete examples of Tathāgatas are given and Buddha is named as such a Tathāgata. The reiteration of this point in the Suttas themselves shows that the Suttas are not a collection of the speeches of Buddha himself although they may be ultimately based on such speeches. The long list of parallel passages collected by Franke and the stereotyped phraseology of the Suttas lend weight to this argument. In the main I agree emphatically with Franke's conclusions, but he pushes his theory to extremes. Why must we assume a single author? Plurality of authorship and the readaptation of older material

¹ *Dīghanikāya. Das Buch der langen Texte des buddhistischen Kanons in Auswahl.* Translated by Otto Franke. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1913. lxxix+360 pages. M. 14.

to a later viewpoint is possible and even probable. Franke is much too derogatory toward "the stupid scribblers" who are responsible for the stereotyped phraseology of the Suttas in their present form.

In discussing the authority of the Buddhist tradition Franke continues the same negative line of argument maintained in *JPTS* (1908), pp. 1-80. The evidence is as yet too fragmentary and contradictory to warrant dogmatism. Here Franke is much too skeptical and his criticism is too purely negative. Even if the Suttas in their present form are considerably later than Buddha, they may have preserved in a distorted way many elements of good historical tradition.

Twenty pages are devoted to a crushing criticism of Neumann's translation of the *Dīgha*. Careless work based on presuming ignorance warrants severe criticism but Franke shows almost too much animosity. The "der hier nicht einmal mit Namen genannt werden soll" of p. 179 might well have been spared.

With Franke's arguments against Garbe and his theory of a unified Sāṃkhya system earlier than Buddha (p. 22, n. 2, and p. 317) I fully agree. All recent investigations tend to show that the Darṣanas as definite, unified systems grew up in schools and that the crystallization took place not in the pre-Christian but in the post-Christian period. There is no sufficient reason for considering that the Sāṃkhya system is an exception. The older point of view which assumes that the philosophical Sūtras are contemporaneous with the Sūtras of the Veda makes it necessary to believe that Hindu logic with all its complicated terminology sprang almost at once to perfection like Athene fully armed from the head of Zeus. That loose Sāṃkhya and Vedantic elements are prior to or contemporaneous with Buddha is not to be questioned, but that the Sāṃkhya existed as a fully developed system at that time or that the Vedānta, using the word to mean Advāita in its strict sense, is to be found in the Upanishads seems impossible. As yet there has been no satisfactory treatment of Indian philosophy from the historical and genetic point of view. So too all the treatments of Buddhism have been too hasty and based on insufficient material. All our books on Buddhism are destined soon to be superseded. No book gives any adequate description of Buddhism from this same historical and genetic point of view. For the most part our books paint Buddhism on the flat background of the Pāli Tipitaka which represents the interpretation of one sect. Perspective is lacking.

With Franke's conception of the meaning of Nirvāna in primitive Buddhism (p. 38, n. 5) I fully concur. Whatever the word meant to

later Buddhist thinkers, who in characteristic Indian fashion demanded a rationalistic and metaphysical background for the pragmatic ethics preached by Buddha, to Buddha himself and to the early Buddhists Nirvāna was merely the *summum bonum*, a state of passionlessness and peace to be reached even in this life. What happened after death was to Buddha a matter not tending to edification and not connected with religion.

Franke's treatment of the peyyālas is much better than that of Rhys Davids. From Franke's translation one can see exactly how much is repeated. Rhys Davids abbreviates and omits.

The collection of material in the appendices on the words Tathāgata, Arahāt, Bhikkhu, Samāṇa, and Saṃkhāra is linguistically important and valuable.

Admirable indexes of words, names, and subjects complete the book.

In another volume of this same series Hillebrandt¹ gives a translation, in whole or in part, of some 139 hymns of the Rig Veda. The hymns chosen form a fairly representative group and include all those of special literary interest. Comparatively few of the hymns to Agni and to Soma are chosen, hardly enough to give an adequate idea of the more ritualistic, technical, and hieratic aspects of Vedic worship. The notes, though good as far as they go, are not full enough to show the great linguistic difficulties of the text and the uncertainties of translation.

In stating the point of view from which the translation is made Hillebrandt says that the effort to interpret the Rig Veda from later commentaries and from the classical literature has failed; that it can no longer be regarded as a monument of Indo-European antiquity, and that the later ritualistic literature has little in common with the ritual of the Rig Veda. To this we must agree. The Rig Veda stands by itself and must be interpreted largely from itself. Yet comparative philology, the commentaries, and the later ritual are not to be discarded entirely. Each may yield help in unexpected places.

Adhering to ideas propounded in his *Vedische Mythologie* Hillebrandt looks to countries outside of India, to Arachosia and other parts of Central Asia, for the interpretation of many proper names (cf. Vorwort, pp. vi and 50). Although Hillebrandt does not go to the impossible extremes of Brunnhofer's theories about the composition of the Rig Veda yet the statements on p. 50 are made with altogether too little reserve.

¹*Lieder des Rigveda*. Translated by Alfred Hillebrandt. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1913. xii+152 pages. M. 5.

His suggestion of the possibility of a connection of the Kaṇva family with the Aryan tribe assumed, on the basis of the inscriptions found at Boghazkeui, to have been located in Armenia in the 15th century B.C. is very hazardous. As yet the Boghazkeui evidence means nothing for the interpretation of the Rig Veda. The transcription of the names themselves is still uncertain and even if the transcription be correct the names may not be Aryan. We know as yet too little of the Hittite and Mittanian languages and name elements. The words may contain perfectly good Hittite or Mittanian elements. Only when we know the Hittite and Mittanian languages thoroughly will we have the right to be dogmatic. Altogether too much has been built on a very weak foundation by Semitic scholars. The names have not yet been subjected to any rigorous philological criticism. Hillebrandt might have referred to at least a few of the many contradictory articles in which the Boghazkeui and the Tell el-Amarna names have been discussed.

In his treatment of the so-called Ākhyāna or dialogue hymns Hillebrandt follows a weakly conciliatory method. Some hymns he treats as dramas, others as dialogues with omitted prose. In spite of the articles of Oldenberg, von Schroeder, Winternitz, Sieg, and Hertel I am unconvinced of the validity of either theory. It seems to me that we have in these hymns, not a prototype of the drama or of the mixed style in prose and verse found later in the Jātakas and the Pañcatantra but a prototype of the epic. They may be rude ballads. They require nothing but a detailed knowledge of the story to make them perfectly intelligible.

Here too as in his *Vedische Mythologie* Hillebrandt assigns to the moon too great a place in Vedic mythology. Varuṇa, Br̥haspati, Apāṁ Napāt, and Soma are all to be connected with a moon ritual. It may be so, but too little reserve is shown in the statement of his own theory.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF PENANCE

The study of the origins of penance is fundamental in the study of the church, whether that be considered divinely founded or as the creation of man in the effort to satisfy his highest need. Closely involved with this study are a number of other important questions, such as the standards of conduct of the Christian group, the enforcement of these standards, authority in the group, the development of the clergy as a ruling class, the growth of the power of the keys—in fact, the very

essence of the character of the Christian group. But the point of view just sketched is not that which has governed the study of the subject up to the present time, nor has it been held by Professor D'Ales in the work now under discussion.¹ He, as well as previous writers, has not viewed the subject in its most general bearings. The church has been regarded as divinely founded rather than as a product of social evolution, subject to laws which govern all social change. The institution of penance is looked on as forming a part of a divine, foreordained scheme rather than as a result of group effort to preserve its integrity in the midst of a hostile social environment. The result has been the study of the subject from a somewhat too narrow point of view. The Catholics have been concerned with showing the existence of its characteristic features in primitive Christianity, the Protestants with demonstrating their absence and accounting for their development later. Yet both sets of scholars employ the historical method and their results tend increasingly to approximate each other.

The common position accepted by both Protestants and Catholics up to the time of D'Ales is somewhat as follows: Up to the time of Callistus the three chief sins were held to be unforgivable; Callistus was the first to bring about a moderation of this severity by absolving the faults of the flesh; thirty years later Pope Cornelius took a new step in the way of indulgence by reconciling the apostates guilty of having sacrificed to idols during the Decian persecution; finally, at an epoch difficult to define, but still later, homicide was in its turn erased from the list of unforgivable sins. Hence the moderation of primitive rigor followed a regular progression. To Callistus belongs a preponderant part in this change, since in daring first of all to absolve those guilty of immorality, he opened the breach by which all the later ameliorations passed. By the Protestants this change is explained by a preceding change in dogma, namely, the development of the keys theory. This theory gradually dawned on the consciousness of the hierarchy and led it to claim the power of forgiving sins committed after baptism. Such a development the Catholics deny. They claim that the church had always had knowledge of unlimited power to forgive sins conferred on it by Christ, but that for reasons of prudence it believed it necessary to refrain from the exercise of this power until in the course of the third century certain conditions arose which led it to depart from its ancient reserve.

¹ *L'Édit de Calliste. Étude sur les origines de la pénitence chrétienne* (Bibliothèque de théologie historique, publiée sous la direction des professeurs de théologie à l'Institut Catholique de Paris). By A. D'Ales. Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1913. vi+484 pages.

Into this subject D'Ales was led, as he himself states in his introduction, by two previous studies in the same field. These were: *La théologie de Tertullien*, 1905, and *La théologie de Saint Hippolyte*, 1906. During this work there seems gradually to have formed in his mind the notion that the interpretations of the edict of Callistus were not in harmony with the laws of social development. These interpretations implied a much more abrupt and sudden change in institutions than can ordinarily be made by any piece of legislation. To the development of his ideas on this subject a particular relation seems to have been held by certain conclusions to which his work on Tertullian pointed. These conclusions were: (1) that the notion of sin unforgivable by the church (idolatry, homicide, adultery) is not to be found in the writings of Tertullian before he turns Montanist; (2) on the contrary, they represent Montanist thought, and appear in the *De pudicitia* for the first time; (3) that here, too, first appears the idea that there is a distinction between reconciliation with the church and with God; (4) that Tertullian denies to the hierarchy wholly authority over all sins, believing in the Holy Spirit, speaking through prophets as the authority in the church, and in the church as an "assembly of saints." In the light of these conclusions, Tertullian rather than Callistus began to appear as the innovator. Hence came an impulse to verify these suggestions by reviewing the whole development of penance up to this point. The general problem lay in his mind as follows: Did the initiative, taken about 220 by Pope Callistus, on the subject of penitential discipline have the character of a profound revolution, or was it an incident of only moderate consequence, which owes to the notice of certain polemicists a place in the record much superior to the influence which it exerted?

By this problem and these suggestions the general nature of D'Ales' contentions and conclusions are already foreshadowed. In the first place, he is led to conclude that the edict appears to him, not as an extraordinary outburst of Christian vigor, but rather as a shoot hardly more perceptible than many another in the perpetual flow of life that mounts in the secular trunk of the church. The whole position, of which the exaggerated importance of the edict formed a part, appears to him false. The notion of unforgivable sins, upon which this structure rests, he cannot find in the record. On the contrary, he is convinced that "Christian tradition deposes with a perfect clearness in favor of pardon offered by God for all sins without exception, whatever might be their number and gravity." Furthermore, contrary to the Protestant position, he finds that "the Church has always claimed the superintendence of this pardon." In other words, the power of the keys is not a

dogma gradually evolved and, toward the end of the second century, put forward by the hierarchy. In opposition to other Catholic scholars, D'Ales alleges that not only does the church claim this right to exercise the power of the keys, but she actually exercised it in the two centuries preceding the pontificate of Callistus.

These contentions are the fruits, in the first place, of the author's knowledge of Tertullian's work and that of Hippolytus. From these men he extracts evidence that throws light on the second century. This light he adds to by gleaning from the second-century writers themselves evidence that bears on the question. His analysis of *Hermas* is worth a special mention. It was *Hermas'* purpose, D'Ales concludes, to write a pastoral guide, and his passages on penance are to be explained by this purpose; *Hermas*, D'Ales holds, is not self-contradictory, nor does he reveal the presence of two opposed parties, but as a pastor he has a different teaching for different groups of Christians. He varies his teaching to secure the maximum effect. To the catechumens he says: no forgiveness for sins after baptism; to baptized Christians who have sinned: you can be forgiven now, if penitent, but never again. This same method, D'Ales claimed, is followed in similar works by Justin and by other Christian fathers.

By a synthesis of his various contentions and conclusions D'Ales' constructive position can be discerned and may be stated as follows: The church was an assembly of holy ones, struggling toward perfection, but all members were having slips of some kind and many were having rather bad ones. These slips in the case of the baptized ones were met by the exercise of pardon to all who were willing to do penance. This pardon was signified by reconciliation with the church. The machinery of this operation does not appear during the first and second centuries with any clearness, yet the action of the clergy in the matter is implicit in ecclesiastical reconciliation. Up to the time of Callistus the policy of the church in relation to the three gravest classes of sins wavered. The general principles of the possibility of pardon for all sins and the power of the church to pardon were held fast, yet the conservative and liberal elements, universally present in all human assemblies, differed as to the use of this power. The frequency of sins of immorality, combined with the difficulty of refusing pardon to the genuine penitent, worked in favor of the more liberal party. The evidence points to a fairly widespread practice, current during the second century, of granting reconciliation to the gravest sinners, though perhaps not until at the point of death. The gradual growth of this tendency is marked by

the whole action of Callistus, of which his edict is only a part. The effect of the edict was in the nature of giving the force of written law to what was a steadily developing custom. The same may be said of the final decisions, taken in the middle of the third century in regard to the *lapsed*. They involved no new principle, but resulted in a more definite and controlling statement of policy. As one passes into the fourth century the policy of the church becomes defined with increasing clearness and appears as steadily inclined to greater and greater moderation in its demands of penance from the sinner. In the third century also the ministration of the clergy comes definitely into the light, as does also the practice of private confession, viewed by the author as an integral part of the whole institutional development.

As for the significance of D'Ales' work, it clearly must be reckoned with in any thoroughgoing study of the subject, for it takes its place along with the studies of Harnack, Funck, and others. Rich in suggestion, it brings out more clearly the actual character of the evolution of the institution than has heretofore been done. It is chiefly to be criticized for the atmosphere in which the whole study has been made. This is still largely the old sectarian one which devotes itself to trying to find out whether penance was instituted by Christ and to what extent it is to be found in primitive Christianity. There is no question of considering the institution in the light of general social phenomena, that is, as a feature of group life and as discharging special functions in that connection.

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THE REFORMATION IN GERMANY¹

In a brief foreword the author seeks to justify this new attempt to retell an oft-told story. The chief justification he finds in the fact that the economic interpretation of history has not, hitherto, been applied to this period; that hence the story has been told inadequately. The main purpose of this volume is, therefore, to present an economic interpretation of the German Reformation. Further justification the author finds "in the modern scientific method of studying history, with its emphasis on original research, its multiplication of documents, . . . its flood of monographs," which "tends to issue in mean and sordid collection of mere fact and to make the writing of history a lost art." He believes

¹ *The Reformation in Germany*. By Henry C. Vedder. New York: Macmillan, 1914. xlix+466 pages.

the time has come for the telling of the larger story once more in the light of newly discovered facts. He purposes, therefore, to give us an interesting, literary, logical, and comprehensive account of the German Reformation, based upon contemporary documents as well as upon the contributions of modern scholarship. The author evidently intended to produce a work, not merely of a popular, compilatory character, but one which would also be a credit to his scholarship.

An introduction of nearly forty pages contains a compact summary of the conditions in Europe, and particularly in Germany, at the beginning of the sixteenth century. A short discussion of the Renaissance in general and of German Humanism in particular is followed by a brief consideration of political, social, and economic, as well as religious, conditions characteristic of Germany at the outbreak of the religious revolt. In sixteen chapters, beginning with "The Making of Martin Luther" and closing with "The Peace of Augsburg," we are given an account of the more important, well-known events of the German Reformation which is, in the main, accurate, well-connected, and not uninteresting. The author is to be congratulated for the compact and remarkably well-proportioned character of his treatment of the period as well as for his well-chosen chapter headings. To the text has been appended English translations of Luther's Ninety-five Theses, of Tetzel's first and second series of theses concerning indulgences, of Luther's "Appeal to a General Council," of the "Decree of Worms," of Luther's pamphlet "Against the Murdering and Robbing Bands of the Peasants," of the "Protest at Speyer," and of the "Peace of Augsburg." Although partial or complete translations of some of these documents have appeared in earlier publications, yet, in bringing together these older and additional new translations and in making them conveniently accessible to English readers, Professor Vedder has performed a useful service, particularly for the general public outside our universities.

The volume under review bears evidence that its author has endeavored to keep himself free from personal bias, and the effort has not been made without a large measure of success. However, one could cite several instances to prove that his endeavor has not been altogether successful. The discussion of the character of Erasmus is eminently fair. The attitude of the author toward other German humanists—Reuchlin, Wimpheling, von Hutten, and even Melanchthon—seems to the reviewer less just. Moreover, the treatment of Luther, revealing as it does considerable familiarity with the great reformer's writings, is in the main admirable. In fact, just because of the author's close

acquaintance with the sources, the treatment of Luther furnishes one of the few excellences of Professor Vedder's volume. Yet, even here, the author is not able wholly to conceal his personal antipathy toward Luther, which crops out occasionally and leaves with the reader a general impression of the central figure of the German Reformation not altogether just. Again, the attitude of the author toward the Anabaptists, as well as toward their foes, seems to the critic to betray his religious or, perhaps, political bias.

Professor Vedder claims to be no adherent of the "great-man theory of history," and seeks to set over against the influence of the individual the greater importance of political, economic, and similar forces in human history. Nevertheless, although admitting the difficulty of bringing cities and princes with their rival interests into a firmly united league, he holds Luther to be "the one impassable obstacle to Protestant unity" (p. 316). Numerous other statements, similarly characteristic of the "great-man theory," might be cited, which must convince the reader that, however much our author may be theoretically opposed to the theory, he is still strongly under its influence. Possibly, however, these extravagant statements may be merely indications of the triumph of the author's rhetorical impulse over his reason or better judgment. Indeed, it is quite evident that the desire to be rhetorical—to state things in a striking manner—has led the author to make assertions which are decidedly misleading and which do not express accurately his real opinion or conviction.

In all probability Professor Vedder has intentionally avoided all reference to many unsettled problems which have arisen as a result of recent research, i.e. (to give but a single illustration), the influence of the Roman Law upon the Peasants' Revolt. Again, one is surprised to find no comment upon, or even mention of, the many important, recent, secondary works in the author's field. Moreover, if Professor Vedder has made use of these contributions, his discussion affords no evidence of the fact. Such omissions may indicate merely that the author did not intend his history to be scholarly, in the sense in which that word is understood by historians today; yet all serious students must regard such omissions as an unfortunate defect in the volume under consideration. The student of today will not tolerate the dogmatic, *ex cathedra* method of writing history. He demands the evidence or authority by which a writer justifies his opinions or assertions.

The main purpose of Professor Vedder's volume, we have been told, is to present an economic interpretation of the German Reformation.

Here we must seek for the author's real contribution or service, if he has any to offer. Wherein consists this correction and completion of our knowledge of the Reformation which the foreword promises?

A few pages of the introduction repeat the oft-told story of the growth of trade and of industry in Germany, of the rise of a capitalist class, of ecclesiastical restrictions on capitalistic enterprises, and of the pecuniary exactions of the church. "By thus diminishing capital and opposing credit," the author asserts, "the church was the chief obstacle in the way of commercial and capitalistic evolution." Except for one or two incidental references to princely confiscation of ecclesiastical property, we find no further mention of the economic forces in the Reformation until we reach the final chapter of the volume. Here we discover a repetition in other words of the ideas already stated in the introduction. Then follow references to the confiscation of monastic property by the cities, to industrial competition of the monasteries with the craft-guilds, and finally the author's conclusion that the Reformation was a triumph of the *bourgeoisie*—a result of the successful assertion of economic self-interest.

But, we ask, what is the author's authority for such statements? One looks in vain for documentary evidence. Not even a single secondary authority is cited to support his assertions. Others, as is well known, have long suspected to be true that which our author asserts so confidently, so dogmatically, to be true. More cautious than Professor Vedder, they dared not make assertions which they could not substantiate by proofs. The fact is that the indispensable preliminary research—the toilsome reading of original documents, the laborious, intensive study of the economic conditions in the several German principalities and city-states, the careful weighing of evidence—that work which our author seems to regard so scornfully—has not yet been done. Such research as has been applied to pre-Reformation economic conditions has revealed the fact (evidently unknown to Professor Vedder) that the church had not only ceased to oppose the profitable investment of capital, but had even officially approved it, long before the Reformation. In practice, moreover, the church had been both borrowing and loaning money at interest more than a century previous to the Lutheran revolt. Furthermore, had our author devoted the necessary study to the subject he could have learned that most of the great capitalists, like the Fugger, were not the opponents of the church, but, on the contrary, were among its most staunch defenders. In most instances the great capitalists or merchant aristocrats who had ruled

the German cities had to be set aside or forced into submission before the Reformation could be triumphant. With regard to the competition of the monasteries with the craft-guilds, there exist a few monographs or local studies which Professor Vedder might have cited in support of his assertion (but did not do so), yet these studies are much too restricted in their scope to justify the generalization which our author has not hesitated to make without even this inadequate confirmatory evidence.

The critic's task would be incomplete did he not call attention to a number of errors contained in Professor Vedder's book which cannot be regarded as mere misprints. On p. 4, for instance, Erfurt, at the time of Luther's entrance into the monastery, is described as having a population of over *sixty* thousand. Several local studies concerning the population statistics of German cities, which have appeared during the last thirty years, make it certain that Erfurt's population in 1500 could hardly have exceeded *six* thousand. Attention should also be called to the fact that, in every instance, "Lueneburg" is spelled "Lueneberg" (pp. 279, 292, 302, 314, 323, and Index, p. 457); "Mecklenberg" is printed for "Mecklenburg" (p. 279, and Index, p. 459); "Regensberg" for "Regensburg" (pp. 363, 364); and "Naumberg" for "Naumburg" (pp. 149, 363, 374, and Index, p. 460).

Professor Vedder's book is eminently readable, yet, in the opinion of the critic, its literary qualities would never win for it a high place in our historical literature, even if it were not marred by such defects as have been enumerated in the foregoing paragraphs.

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THE PROBLEMS OF MODERN THEOLOGY

There are evidences on every hand that we are entering upon a period of fruitful constructive work in the realm of doctrinal theology. Men are coming generally to recognize that we may turn aside from the discussion of theories of "authority," and may interpret Christianity as a great spiritual movement, possessing the affections of men in such a way as to be a reality with which we must reckon. The number of books dealing with Christianity in this friendly and free spirit of constructive interpretation is gratifying. The present review will consider some recent publications of this nature.

Professor James Ten Broeke speaks as a philosopher who is cordially interested in the wholesome interpretation of Christianity. His carefully

written and scholarly book¹ is intended to give historical evidence for his contention that the dissatisfaction with traditional theology which is so widespread is due to the fact that this theology is expressed in philosophical interpretations which fail to do justice to the experienced facts of Christianity. He believes that modern philosophy is much better fitted than ancient speculation to support the fundamental beliefs of Christian men. He contends that the materials are at hand for a new and convincing theology. In support of the above thesis he presents his argument in three parts: The first section of his book deals with "The Origin and Development of Christian Theology"; the second is entitled "A New Philosophy as the Constructive Basis of a New Theology"; and the third discusses "Contemporary Thought as a Constructive Basis for Theology."

The first portion is a valuable, clear, and suggestive outline of the development of Greek religious thinking prior to the rise of Christianity and during the first three centuries of Christian history. The author's purpose to show the superiority of modern over ancient philosophy as a means of interpreting Christian thought justifies the large space devoted to the process by which Christian doctrine developed into Greek theology. At the same time, one feels that Professor Ten Broeke is much more at home in dealing with the familiar epistemological and cosmological aspects of this movement than he is in his interpretation of Christianity as a religious movement. His own personal faith expresses itself repeatedly in the contention that real Christianity is to be found in the religious consciousness of Jesus. All Christians are, according to Ten Broeke, "trying to reproduce in thought and thereby create in themselves Jesus' own consciousness of personal relation to the Father, which is the principle of Christianity, because it was the controlling norm of the consciousness of Jesus" (p. 58). An essentially modern religious aspiration is here assumed to be the central fact of early Christianity. This assumption makes "real" Christianity appear to a large degree alien in spirit to the theological conceptions which were being developed. Ten Broeke is constantly reading his modern Christian faith into ancient expressions. For example, to say that "Athanasius was moved to go back to the Christ, *even to the consciousness of Jesus*" (p. 114; italics mine) does not indicate the real nature of Athanasius' conception of Christianity. This essentially unhistorical conception of the nature of early Christianity makes it possible for Ten Broeke to conclude that the

¹ *A Constructive Basis for Theology*. By James Ten Broeke. London and New York: Macmillan, 1914. ix+400 pages. \$3.00.

Greek theology was an inadequate means of expressing Christian belief as he interprets that belief. The strong influence of Harnack is evident throughout this portion, although Ten Broeke is not epistemologically in sympathy with the Ritschlian school.

A similar defect in historical interpretation is found in the exposition of Protestantism. The "principle" of the Reformation is phrased as follows: "It was the return to the consciousness of Jesus in relation to the Father, and the assertion of true spiritual freedom on the part of the individual and the religious community" (p. 125). Again, "It [the Reformation] was the substitution of individual personalities as centers of value and experience in place of an absolute external authority of any sort" (p. 139). Statements like these make fundamental the attitude of protest against the authority of the church, and assume that the Reformation was logically a repudiation of external authority of every kind. As a matter of fact, underlying all Reformation religion is the belief in an objective divine provision for man's salvation, by acceptance of which alone man can be saved. This is so constantly taken for granted by the Reformers that no apology for it is felt to be necessary. To picture the religious aspirations of the Reformers in terms of modern freedom means the depreciation of certain elements which were of primary importance to them. This view makes it possible to argue that doctrines which we today feel to be unacceptable were mere accidental aspects of Protestantism, and that we can bring out the "principle" of Protestantism more adequately in terms of modern philosophy.

The second portion of the book is a valuable contribution, largely because it deals with modern ideals and is not subjected to any modernizing apologetic. It gathers together the essentials of modern religious thinking in great detail and with admirable faithfulness to the sources. It represents the best kind of accurate historical exposition. Kant's interpretation of religion in terms of ethical will, the Hegelian interpretation in terms of knowledge, and the interpretations in terms of feeling given by Schleiermacher and the Ritschlian school are all clearly and discriminatingly expounded. The approach to the problems of religious interpretation through an analysis of experience and the consequent close linking of experience to the reality of the object interpreted by experience furnish a suggestive and valuable introduction to the main task which the author essays in the third portion of the book.

In this constructive part the implications of social psychology are first set forth, according to which religion is seen to be the quest for a

great Companion, a quest in which the individual is socially bound up with the achievements of the past and the aspirations and activities of his fellow-men. Religious need has socially created a "supernatural world," which is just as real as any other "world" which enters into the thinking of men and forms the basis for action. For the interpretation of this supernatural world we may use modern philosophy, which, whether in the form of absolute idealism, or theism, or idealistic pluralism, justifies the attempt to affirm the reality of a personal God. Ten Broeke himself apparently favors a type of absolute idealism which permits a certain theistic emphasis in order to avoid the appearance of pantheism. But his main purpose seems to be to bring the various types of modern thinking into the field, in order to show how rich is the philosophical material upon which the modern theologian may draw.

In the concrete application of this philosophic material to the problems of belief in the chapter entitled "Some Christian Doctrines and Modern Thought" the author announces his intention to state the "practical" content of Jesus' religious ideals (thus using the norm of Jesus' self-consciousness to determine the content of Christianity), and then to see whether modern philosophy justifies us in affirming this content. But after dealing positively with the filial consciousness of Jesus in relation to God, he takes up questions which perplex the modern mind, such as miracles, answers to prayer, the doctrine of the Trinity, the problem of evil, the problem of freedom, the problem of immortality, etc. Now these were not "problems" at all to Jesus. His consciousness furnishes affirmations, indeed, but not affirmations which definitely meet modern critical inquiries. Ten Broeke here is at a disadvantage because of his non-historical conception of the nature of Christianity. He recognizes varying and conflicting views on these problems in modern Christian thought, but he does not successfully relate "beliefs" to the social religious situation out of which they grew. In his philosophical apologetic his treatment is so eclectic as to disappoint those who look for a consistent "constructive" basis for theology. He repudiates pluralism when discussing the doctrine of God, for he desires a world-order certainly controlled by moral reason. But when he comes to the problem of miracles, he appeals to the Bergsonian conception of free cosmic forces, in order to make place for new and exceptional events. The final chapter on "The Scope and Method of Theology" is singularly inconclusive to one who looks for clear guidance. Ten Broeke simply surveys the many conflicting methods which are in vogue, and suggests that each one starts from some aspect of Christian experience

and that each has some vital contribution to make to the development of theology.

The constructive basis for theology therefore turns out to be after all the attitude of trust in the freedom of the inquiring religious spirit, and a hopeful conclusion that modern idealistic philosophy gives abundant justification to the task of theologizing in terms of the personal relation of man to a personal God. Perhaps this catholic and general view is all that can be said on the subject at present. To the reviewer, however, it seems that if Ten Broeke could have embodied a really historical appreciation of Christianity in his work he would have found the opportunity to do something better than to take over, ready-made, certain beliefs and support these by an eclectic use of modern philosophy. We fail to realize the full significance of the historical continuity of Christian thinking if we view the modern task as the rejuvenating of certain "normative" beliefs by substituting new philosophy for ancient. We are actually in the process of working out a Christianity which shall meet and answer the religious needs of our own age. Modern philosophy is not an extraneous aid. It is itself part of the process of religious development. At several points Ten Broeke seems to have caught a glimpse of this conception of Christianity as a living historical movement. If his admirable historical survey in Part II had been followed by an analysis of the actual process of Christian thinking in its present development he could have related modern philosophy much more "constructively" to theology.

Quite different in spirit is the defense of Christian faith furnished by Professor Ihmels in a collection of seven addresses which were given at different times, and are now collected in one volume.¹ Ihmels feels that faith really needs no support from philosophy. It is strong enough to make good its own affirmations, if it only concentrates attention on the actual sources of its strength. The distinctive feature of Christianity is its revelation. When this revelation is clearly perceived the soul knows with perfect assurance that salvation is possible. Ihmels' theological point of view is succinctly and persuasively stated in three of the addresses: "Wie bewahren wir das Erbe der Reformation und machen es für die Gegenwart fruchtbar?"; "Das Christentum und die Religionsgeschichte"; and "Aufgabe und Bedeutung der Dogmatik." Christian faith rests on the Bible as revelation. The Bible differs from all other literature in that it depicts a *Heilsgeschichte*. This culminates in the

¹ *Aus der Kirche; ihren Lehren und Leben*. Von Ludwig Ihmels. Leipzig: Deichert, 1914. iv+203 pages. M. 4.

life of Jesus and the gospel of salvation connected with him. In this redemptive history God is seeking men. In all other religious literature men are seeking God. Thus the Christian may have an absolute certainty where other religious men may only seek and hope. Involved in this interpretation of biblical history is the affirmation of the essentially supernatural source of our faith. The position of the *religionsgeschichtliche* school is criticized because it destroys the possibility of belief in the absoluteness of our Christian revelation. Theology must undertake to defend and to expound the content of faith as an attitude of absolute assurance. Theology deals with *the* truth, not with a quest for truth. But, in the last analysis, "it is only in a personal religious experience that certainty can be attained concerning the possibility and the actuality of the Supernatural."

This method of Ihmels, staking all as he does ultimately on the subjective convictions of the man who has the right kind of "faith," doubtless seems admirable to those who share Ihmels' particular faith. So far as others are concerned, however, it seems like the hopeless isolation of theology from any possibility of real scientific criticism. Its scientific value consists in its unequivocal clearness in analyzing the content and the mental processes of this particular kind of religious attitude.

Professor Herbert A. Youtz, of Auburn Theological Seminary, has published a stimulating and valuable book dealing with the fundamental problem of theological method.¹ As the author states, certain portions of the book were prepared originally as addresses and as articles in theological journals. But since the addresses represent a unified point of view, the addition of a couple of chapters enabled the author to present his fundamental message in consistent and consecutive form.

Professor Youtz sees that religious faith is now struggling to be big enough to dominate our modern world. The current method of meeting the situation is to attempt to read new and more elastic meanings into the traditional formulae. "To galvanize an old conception into life is a pedagogical feat which wins more applause than the reconstruction of the conception" (p. 10). Professor Youtz would have us realize that vital and forceful religious beliefs must come from the ability to interpret the modern world directly in terms of the activity of the living God. This interpretation of modern life is the task of theology, rather than the mere perpetuation of the "faith once delivered." The body of the book is devoted to a discussion of what this new conception of the task

¹ *The Enlarging Conception of God*. By Herbert Alden Youtz. New York: Macmillan, 1914. x+199 pages. \$1.25.

of theology involves. We can only mention briefly the salient points in the author's program.

First of all, we must recognize the fundamental fact of evolution. It is no longer possible to treat the life of man in terms of static achievements. The older theology, just because it does perpetuate this static point of view, is unfitted to meet the needs of today. The consequence of this evolutionary point of view is the elimination of that quest for finalities and absolutes which is characteristic of the older theological method. "The 'absolute certainty,' in the sense meant, has disappeared with the other absolutes of the older method. Religion has no arbitrary external standard of certainty. With all other true sciences theology comes back to the tests of intelligence and the verification of experience" (p. 63). Such a test demands that we try to get back of familiar words and phrases to the real facts of life which find expression in these words and phrases. The deadening effect of disputations about abstract concepts is clearly and effectively shown. The consequences of adopting this method of theologizing are unflinchingly followed in a suggestive discussion of the attitude which must be assumed toward the church and its traditions, toward the Bible, and toward Christ. These all are to be taken primarily as historically conditioned facts, which bring to us spiritual values interpreted in relation to specific historical conditions of living and thinking. We are to seek in them an inspiring spirit rather than finished doctrinal statements. They cannot be substitutes for theological thinking on our part. They best serve us when they inspire us to do our own thinking in terms of the problems and the resources of our own age. The moral significance of the abandonment of reliance on external authority is set forth with rare discernment in a chapter entitled "The Peril of a Safe Theology." The concluding chapter is a sermon, delivered before the students of the seminary, attempting to show how the values of revelation are more vitally discerned by seeking to understand the religious life of the human Jesus than by a theory of the nature of Christ which removes him essentially from the realm of human problems.

The book ought to be of great service in stimulating confidence in a theological method which is suited to take its place beside the methods of other branches which enjoy the scientific respect of our age. The author's felicitous literary style gives to his discussion unusual charm. His fearless spirit of freedom is combined with great tact in avoiding offensive criticisms of orthodoxy. The concluding sermon, which the author calls a "laboratory" exposition of his method, is

couched in such phraseology that it might readily leave considerable perplexity in the minds of the hearers. In form it is an attempt to maintain a religious assurance based on the theological conception of the *revelation of God in Christ*; but its method of analysis would lead logically to a valuation of the *religious experience of Jesus*. But the book as a whole is a refreshing and stimulating contribution to the progress of theological inquiry.

From a very different point of view the editor of the much-discussed *Foundations* publishes an examination of the serious problems confronting theological thinkers today.¹ Unlike Ten Broeke and Youtz, who view the problems of religion entirely from the point of view of free individualism, Streeter is concerned to defend Christianity as an ecclesiastically organized form of society. The aim of the book is to indicate the lines along which men may work for the ultimate unification of Christianity. In the first chapter the effort is made to state the essentials of Christianity in vital rather than doctrinal form. Love to God and man, discipleship to Jesus, obedience to the will of God as the pathway to theological conviction, the reality of divine grace, and the assurance of forgiveness and of immortality are the practical realities of Christianity. The Christian may maintain a practical positive attitude toward all these without committing himself to any specific philosophical or doctrinal conclusions. Recognizing thus the vital and somewhat fluid character of real Christianity, the author in successive chapters considers the problems of reunion. He generously recognizes that every denomination possesses real Christianity, with, of course, certain peculiar emphases and certain polemic denials. He emphatically repudiates the conception of coercive authority, by which the freedom of any branch of Christianity is to be curtailed. He points out that Christianity in any of its forms is the product of an evolution, and that this evolution is destined to continue and to change the feelings and the doctrines of every denomination. The way is open for a definite movement toward a charitable and just recognition of the positive rights of all denominations, and the gradual grouping of minor subdivisions into larger federations, until an all-embracing federation of all denominations willing to recognize freedom is possible. The essential spirit of the Anglican church, he believes, is comprehensive and charitable. It, unlike the Roman church, will therefore do its utmost to further the spirit and the practical organization of church unity.

¹ *Restatement and Reunion: A Study in First Principles*. By Burnett Hillman Streeter. London: Macmillan, 1914. xxii+194 pages. 2s. 6d.

The broad and generous spirit of the book is a heartening symptom of modern thought. Whether so tenacious a clinging to the necessity of authority (even if authority be spiritually interpreted) is entirely compatible with the spirit of trust in the free outcome of human development is a serious question. For example, Mr. Streeter's method of allegorizing and reinterpreting the phrases of the ancient creeds is precisely that attempt to "galvanize an old conception into life" which to a man of Professor Youtz's temper seems to involve the failure to reach the deepest spiritual meanings of Christianity. But such a spirit of open-mindedness as is revealed in this book is particularly gratifying when it comes from a representative of a church which has a reputation for exclusiveness.

Professor Bacon, of the Yale School of Religion, has published the lectures which he delivered on the E. T. Earl Foundation, at Berkeley, California, in 1912.¹ He speaks as a historian, bringing the historian's tests to bear on certain modern proposals for the reconstruction of our Christianity. He devotes his attention to two such proposals, which represent opposite poles of religious interpretation. On the one hand is ex-President Eliot's suggestion that we shall abandon the mystical and ecclesiastical elements of traditional Christianity and return to the ethical precepts of Jesus himself. On the other hand is the argument that it is precisely the mystical mythology of traditional Christianity which is of religious value. To disengage this from historical entanglement with the historical Jesus and to use it freely without attempting to make Jesus sponsor for it is regarded as the next step in the development of Christianity.

As against the proposal to return to the pure ethical gospel of Jesus, Professor Bacon points out that the historian must recognize the fact that *Christianity* did not begin until the disciples interpreted the person of Christ in such a way as to give them confidence in his power to dominate the future and to give his followers the victory. Moreover, all the records which we have concerning Jesus were written under the domination of some form of this christological faith. To attempt to strip this off would not give us original Christianity at all. On the contrary, it would lead us back of Christianity to Judaism. The historian is compelled to insist that the mystical and christological elements are essential to Christianity from the first. The gospel *about* Jesus is no less essential than the gospel *of* Jesus. But as against the proposal to eliminate the historical reference to Jesus from the doctrine of mystical redemption,

¹ *Christianity Old and New*. By Benjamin W. Bacon. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914. ix+169 pages. \$1.00.

Professor Bacon holds that this also is forbidden by the demands of historical accuracy. For, granting that the Christology of Peter or that of Paul contains imaginative interpretative elements, it is nevertheless evident that the impress of a mighty personality gave content to the ethical and religious ideals of this Christology. Historical accuracy, then, as well as the demands of religion, compel us to continue to express our Christian faith in terms of the confession that Jesus is the Christ. We may and must put into the content of the term "Christ" what is demanded by our own understanding of the religious significance of Jesus; but in so doing we shall only be carrying on the process of Christian interpretation which has been active from the early days of Christianity.

In a supplementary chapter Professor Bacon attempts to indicate how the historian may take the representations of Jesus furnished respectively by Paul, by Mark, and by "Q," and by combining the emphases here found may gain a reliable portrait of the "historical Jesus, dimly and yet truly and surely seen through the transfiguring haze of love and adoration." Here we find combined the ethical and the mystical aspects of religion in such a way as to make Jesus the completely satisfactory revelation of the satisfaction of religious needs.

The survey is valuable and suggestive. Its contention that we need not surrender the mystical side of New Testament faith is one more evidence of the steadily increasing reaction against the Ritschlian interpretation of the beginnings of Christianity. Whether full justice can be done to Christianity within the limits of Professor Bacon's attempt to locate in the historical Jesus all the essentials of that religion is another question. That it is within the province of historical research to "establish forever" the thesis that the ideal of Jesus is "ultimate" (pp. 67 and 70) would be questioned by some; as would the confident appeal to "Q" as a certainly discernible source of exceptional historical reliability. But that historical research makes it imperative to broaden our conception of the scope of Christianity beyond the severely ethical boundaries of Ritschlian or popular "liberal" interpretation is certain. Professor Bacon's study is a distinct aid to the formulation of this broader conception.

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BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT

DAHSE, JOHANNES. *Wie erklärt sich der gegenwärtige Zustand der Genesis?*

Giessen: Töpelmann, 1913. 20 pages. Pf. 40.

New hypotheses for the explanation of the composite character of the Pentateuch are no longer a novelty. Dahse finds the different documents, though not identical with the Wellhausen hypothesis, as products or insertions of writers whom he would designate with a new set of formulae: "Theol." (=theological compiler), "Lit." (=liturgical compiler=Ezra), "Proph. 1 and 2" (=prophetical compiler), and "Gr." (=Grundstock=basal text). These would indicate more nearly the material content of the documents than the terms in common use.

I. M. P.

ROBINSON, H. W. *The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament*. (Studies in Theology.) New York: Scribner, 1913. 245 pages. 75 cents.

The permanent value of the Old Testament is a problem which is not easily solved. Its distinctive religious ideas are evident only to the most careful reader and student. Within nine chapters the author of the present work lays down what he conceives to be its chief religious ideas. These are specified as religion, God, man, approach of God to man, approach of man to God, problems of sin and suffering, and the hope of the nation. The discussions are lucid, concise, and as comprehensive as the compass of the volume will allow. The views are modern and sane. The sources, or material used, are the latest in biblical thought. One commendable feature is the abundance of scriptural quotation and citation in proof of the affirmations in the discussions. There is nothing new to scholars in the book, but its publication in this form is fully justified by the purpose of the entire series to which it belongs—"Studies in Theology"—viz., to present to laymen a simple yet comprehensive statement of fundamental theological problems.

I. M. P.

KING, EDWARD G. *The Poem of Job*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. xii+116 pages. 5s. net.

Job furnishes an unlimited field for study. Its poetical character, the peculiarities of the Hebrew and Septuagint texts, and its problem have commanded the interest of scholars for centuries. *The Poem of Job* is an attempt to translate this ancient book into the meter of the original on the basis of the principles laid down in the author's *Early Religious Poetry of the Hebrews*. The English language well lends itself to this rhythm, as seen in some of the beauty of the Revised Version, e.g., Job 3:19:

"The smáll and gréat are thére;
And the sérvant is frée from his máster."

The rhythm depends, as in Hebrew, not on the number of syllables, but on the beat of the accent.

The author has consulted the Septuagint and Vulgate and also made use of such notes as commended themselves to his judgment in Kittel's *Biblia Hebraica*. In the framework of the poem he has attributed to Zophar a third speech, not so indicated in the text. This embraces Job 27:7-10, 13-23; and chap. 28. His translations are

often very happy and make this poem much easier and plainer reading than either the Authorized or Revised versions.

I. M. P.

COOKE, GEORGE A. *The Book of Judges and Ruth*. (Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.) Cambridge: University Press, 1913. xlii+204; xvii+22 pages. 2s. 6d. net.

Textbooks and commentaries are short-lived. *The Book of Judges* in this series, using the Authorized Version, was prepared by Rev. J. J. Lias and issued in 1890. Professor Cooke employs as the printed text the British edition of the Revised Version. A comparison of these two editions shows us how much valuable literature on this book has appeared since 1890. The successor of the late Professor Driver has done a careful piece of work. His treatment is rather conservative, as seen especially in his discussion of the Samson narratives. He has made use of the critical and archaeological material of recent years and given us a valuable popular commentary.

I. M. P.

HOLMES, S. *Joshua: The Hebrew and Greek Texts*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. 80 pages. 7s. net.

The text of Joshua has been treated by a number of scholars in recent years, but no exhaustive handling of it has appeared since that of Hollenburg in 1876. His conclusions favored the superiority in a few passages of the LXX, but on the whole gave the palm to the Massoretic Text. Ten years later, Dillmann, in his commentary on Joshua, while affirming the value of the LXX, nevertheless expressed the opinion that it had been much overestimated. Holmes dissents from Dillmann's conclusions, and maintains the superiority of the LXX. He examines Dillmann's series of *entschieden fehlerhaft* passages, which he (Dillmann) contends represented deliberate alterations by the LXX, and finds serious objection to the position. The author's careful, critical work commends his results to the scholar who shall henceforth attempt to present an exegesis of this sixth book of the Hexateuch.

I. M. P.

CANNON, W. W. *The Song of Songs: Edited as a Dramatic Poem*. Cambridge: University Press, 1913. viii+158 pages. 7s. 6d.

Scholars have puzzled for centuries over the meaning of the Song of Songs. The last half-century has seen many theories of its interpretation. Our author resolved to put some of the most plausible to the test. In the very beginning he maintains the unity of the poem, but does not find it a drama prepared for the stage. It is, however, a dramatic poem. He then examines the traditional theory and the Syrian wedding theory and finds them both failing to answer the requirements. The real principles on which it is to be explained are: (1) "to interpret the work as a whole, using every part to explain every other part, and taking careful note of repetitions and variations of phrase; (2) to interpret the work as it stands, and not, in the desire to maintain a theory, to make it into something else by conjectural emendation; (3) to interpret with as much simplicity as possible and to avoid elaborate and far-fetched theories based on slight indications; (4) to interpret without regard to metrical theories." The author has applied his principles with great care, and makes the poem a beautiful dramatic representation of true love under the most trying circumstances. His

analysis of the poem is especially to be noted and examined. He indicates, with fine discrimination, the *dramatis personae* of the poem, at the head of each separate division. The translation is made with full knowledge of the original text, and is generally happy.

But when the author says the poem dates from 914 to 902 B.C. he does not take sufficient account of the facts of the language. The ground that Tirzah is mentioned is rather a small basis for the early date, while the many Aramaic peculiarities point distinctly to a late date. Four excursuses on the text of the Song of Songs are especially valuable for the exegete of this rather troublesome poem.

I. M. P.

WELCH, ADAM C. *The Story of Joseph*. 125 pages; VAUGHAN, JOHN. *A Mirror of the Soul*. 142 pages; AKED, CHARLES F. *The Divine Drama of Job*. 144 pages. (The Short Course Series. Edited by REV. JOHN ADAMS.) New York: Scribner. 60 cents net per vol.

Long-drawn-out expositions and sermons have had their day. Many ministers and most laymen will not read them. Their mere verbosity has been their death. Teachers, preachers, and readers want conciseness, perspicuity, and brevity. The "Short Course Series" has these characteristics. An entire theme is disposed of in seven or eight chapters, covering less than 150 pages of delightful print.

The Story of Joseph is a series of sermons which use as their themes eight central ideas in the life of that character. They are not so much expositions of the life of Joseph as they are applications of fundamental principles to the everyday life of our times. At the end we know little more about Joseph as a factor in the life of ancient Egypt or as an ancestor of Israel, but we see in his own life some ideals realized that should inspire us in the twentieth century. The treatment is homiletical rather than expository, and breathes the spirit of the pulpit.

A Mirror of the Soul reflects a study of the Psalter. The author fills his chapters with quotations from such writers as one finds cited in Prothero's *The Psalms in Human Life*. The chapters, too, abound in citations from the Psalms themselves, arrayed under such themes as "communion with God," "the grace of meditation," "the face of nature," "the oil of gladness," and "the beauty of holiness." These somewhat sermonic subjects are expanded into discussions of the superb value of the Psalter, supported by citations here and there of verses that illustrate the point. The total impression upon the reader is the fact that the Psalter is the richest literary source of spiritual truth available for the human soul.

The Divine Drama of Job is a presentation in eight discourses of the problems of the book. The author writes vigorously and states the case without reserve. There is little doubt as to his meaning, except possibly in his theological treatment of "Satan in Literature and in Life." He has used the best authorities and does not hesitate to put his opinions into the strongest terms. His characterization of the personages in the poem are practically those of Davidson in his "Cambridge Bible" commentary. There is more exposition and less homiletics in this volume than in the two already noticed. The reader who peruses this little volume will follow a virile writer.

Each of the three books is supplied with a supplementary note which mentions a few of the most helpful works on the theme of the volume.

I. M. P.

NEW TESTAMENT AND PATRISTICS

BURRAGE, CHAMPLIN. *Nazareth and the Beginnings of Christianity. A New View Based upon Philological Evidence.* Oxford: Horace Hart, 1914. 68 pages. 3s. 6d.

The point of this essay is a little difficult to catch. The author maintains, with great oratorical emphasis, that the earliest Christians were called Nazarenes and later Ebionites, and that ecclesiastical writers were mistaken in calling them heretics. From their residence around Pella, he decides that Nazareth must be sought to the east of the Jordan, and that this district (not a city) is meant in Matt. 2:23. By an equation "Nazarene" = "Nazirite," he finds that Matt. 2:23 refers to Judg. 13:5, a not impossible conjecture. He also announces that "Nazarites" and "Essenes" were convertible terms, and that Paul knew and quoted the Gospel of the Hebrews or its tradition. Lengthy appendices contain a useful collection of passages bearing on his argument, although more critical texts might have been employed. The general impression given by the monograph is that its author is not fully acquainted with modern literature on the New Testament, an impression that is not improved when the writer calls certain readings "unnoticed."

B. S. E.

BURNSIDE, W. F. *The Gospel according to St. Luke.* Cambridge: University Press, 1913. xxxvi+272 pages. 3s. net.

This volume is sufficiently characterized by the words of the preface, "I have endeavored to make the notes as brief as possible and to keep notes upon grammar and language in a strictly subordinate position. . . . I have used Dr. A. Wright's edition of St. Luke and Dr. Plummer's commentary as the basis of my work." The readers presupposed are older schoolboys, interested only in classical syntax and so well grounded in Greek as to be able to read the Gospel merely for edification. Unfortunately, very few schools in the United States contain such pupils.

B. S. E.

PARRY, R. ST. JOHN. *Romans* (Cambridge Greek Testament). Cambridge: University Press, 1912. xlix+243 pages. 3s. 6d.

JAMES, MONTAGUE RHODES. *2nd Peter and Jude* (Cambridge Greek Testament). Cambridge: University Press, 1912. lix+45 pages. 2s. 6d.

Mr. Parry has written a commentary on *Romans* that strikes the reader as in the main a condensation of Sanday and Headlam, although there are various evidences of independent judgment. Doubt may arise, however, as to the value of a commentary of this sort in giving to younger students much idea of the problems that *Romans* discusses; less detail in the notes and a broader discussion of Pauline theology in the introduction would have been an improvement. And in a semi-popular work of this kind it is curious to find the excellent popular commentaries of Gore, Garvie, and Jülicher omitted from the bibliography. Dr. James has done better popularizing work in his volume, which is provided with an excellent introduction. But great awkwardness is created by taking *2nd Peter* first, although its dependence on *Jude* is fully recognized. And the book contains no bibliography at all.

B. S. E.

DEBRUNNER, ALBERT. *Friedrich Blass's Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch*. Vierte, völlig neugearbeitete Auflage. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1913. xvi+346 pages. M. 8.

The need of a revision of Blass's *Grammatik* has long been badly felt, as the third edition (1911) was a mere reprint of the second (1902), and this revision has now been carried out by Dr. Debrunner with extreme thoroughness. The first impression of a reader, indeed, on taking up the new edition is that an entirely new book has been produced, for its externals are completely altered, and the alteration will be welcomed enthusiastically, as the old "Blass" was a positive miracle of bad printing. A slightly larger page is now used, with much handsomer type (gothic instead of roman). The old interminable paragraphs, unbroken into shorter sections and containing little to catch the eye, have disappeared and in their place are short, crisp sections (496 against 82 of the old edition), with prominent headings, and with all subdivisions clearly accented through a liberal use of black type. In the body of these paragraphs only one or two passages in illustration of the principles discussed are given, additional illustrations now being placed in separate paragraphs and in finer print. Consequently rapid reference, a thing impossible in the older editions, is now made easy.

For the most part the text is based on that of the older edition, but the rewriting has been thorough, even where only minor stylistic matters are involved, but much has been gained in conciseness of expression. The major changes are rearrangements in order that are often extensive, and a considerable addition of further illustrative passages, but even yet there are not enough citations of the papyri. The only omission of any consequence is that of Blass's peculiar theory of prose-rhythm, while actual reversals of former positions are naturally very rare, although a few occur (e.g., § 331). Part I, of course, has undergone the greatest revision, thanks to the evidence of the papyri (which are here drawn on liberally), and has been thoroughly rearranged with little regard to the order of the old edition.

Unfortunately, the index of texts is still woefully incomplete, despite some enlargement, and there are still no indices to non-ecclesiastical passages or to the papyri. Nor is any table given to show the relation of the sections of the new editions to those of the old. This lack is very grave.

B. S. E.

MUNTZ, W. S. *Rome, St. Paul and the Early Church*. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co., 1913. xvi+227 pages. \$1.40.

A rather discursive and disjointed treatment of the influence of Roman law on the teaching and phraseology of Paul and on the development of the church. The author does not maintain that Paul was familiar with the "profoundest technicalities of Roman law" or that the "most careful examination of these references will unfold new truths." His purpose is to illuminate some obscure Pauline passages by examining them in the light of Roman law.

As the volume was printed in 1913, it occasions surprise to read the confession that Deissmann's *Light from the Ancient East*, which appeared in 1910, could be used only in a limited way. The discussion of *διαθήκη* also indicates that a few studies of this problem have been overlooked. At times the reader is a little bewildered. The preface, for example, states that there is a difference between the gospel of Jesus and the teaching of Paul and regards the view of Jesus as inadequate. The Greeks are described as employing *διαθήκη* for testamentary dispositions, and yet *διαθήκη* in the

sense of will is found only in the New Testament. All of this information is furnished within the limits of a single page. It is amusing to find Ramsay twice upheld in the text only to be rejected in the footnotes (pp. 73, 165).

C. H. M.

RAMSAY, SIR W. M. *The Teaching of Paul in Terms of the Present Day.* New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913. xi+450 pages. 12s.

The Deems Lectures delivered in New York University, 1910. Illness delayed the revision and expansion of this series of studies on the great pioneer missionary. Deissmann's *Paulus*, published in the meantime, provoked special consideration. With much of the material of these lectures we have long been familiar. Previous books and monographs of the author are copiously cited. A casual count yielded some fifty references to over fifteen former productions. The files of the *Expositor* contain many of the sections of this volume, sometimes with little modification, e.g., Secs. I, IV, V, IX, XLVIII in *Expositor*, Eighth Series, Vol. II, L, LI, LIV in *Expositor*, Eighth Series, Vol. V.

Ramsay has been criticized for setting "his clear eye, his powers of picturesque description, and his great learning at the service of a method which seeks to extract from the sources more than is really in them." This last study is not free from this defect. In dealing with the question as to whether "to believe" signifies conversion, a negative verdict is rendered, because the word "astonished" of Acts 13:12 is found in Luke 4:32. And evidently the people of Capernaum did not become Christians! But we are not informed that the decisive word "to believe" of the Acts' passage is not found in the Gospel narrative. His theory enables him to deprive Paul of the few converts at Athens granted him by the author of Acts. On p. 352 there is another instance of this same frailty: "'Two full years' does not necessarily imply twenty-four months."

An English indorsement of the American revisers is worth recording. "I shall generally cite the American Revision, which appears to me superior to the English Revision. Many years ago I was struck with the fact that, when I tested a number of the cases in which the American preference is indicated at the end of the English Revised Version, the American reading proved better than the English."

C. H. M.

HEADLAM, ARTHUR C. *St. Paul and Christianity.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. xiv+214 pages. \$1.25 net.

A brief, conservative, well-articulated exposition of the Pauline theology in relation to its origin, its content, and its influence on the history of Christianity.

Some of the postulates of the author should be mentioned. The critical view of the Pauline literature and thought is rejected with practically no discussion. Thirteen epistles are accepted as genuine. Ephesians is regarded as representing "more than Romans the deepest thought of the apostle." Hellenic influences never penetrated beneath the surface of his thought. "St. Paul was at heart a Jew and Pharisee. His mind had been formed in the rabbinical schools, and Pharisaism had been developed on lines antagonistic to Hellenism and Hellenistic Judaism." Moreover, the differences between the two parties in the primitive church were not fundamental; on all principal issues Paul and the primitive apostles agreed. And the eschatological strain in Paul was only one of many.

The bulk of the volume is devoted to an analysis of Paul's thought. The final chapter closes with a rapid sketch of its influence on Christianity. No Pauline influence is discoverable in the Synoptic Gospels. Johannine theology is not a developed Paulinism. The apostle's importance for Christianity was twofold. He transmitted elements which he owed to his rabbinical training, such as justification, Christ the second Adam, doctrine of the origin of sin and death, predestination, election—elements "not shared by any of his contemporaries; and they did not become part of traditional Christianity." The other contribution was due to the reality of the apostle's Christianity and is associated with such words as "faith," "discipleship," and "love." "This faith taught him what was meant by the life in Christ: through it he grasped the transitoriness of the law; through this faith . . . he had grasped the universality of the gospel; and . . . had conceived the great conception of the church . . . which was in a sense the culminating point of his teaching."

C. H. M.

LITHGOW, R. M. *The Parabolic Gospel; or Christ's Parables, a Sequence and a Synthesis*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914. xiv+196 pages.

The author thinks it a defect in previous interpretation that it has not recognized any synthesis of doctrine in the parables. By arranging them in chronological order he discovers that they are "an ever advancing and most logical setting forth of the whole nature and scope of that gospel of God's grace, which found its full embodiment in the divine revelation and redeeming work of Jesus Christ." This is a large claim, hardly substantiated by the contents of this volume.

S. J. C.

HARNACK, ADOLF. *Ist die Rede des Paulus in Athen ein ursprünglicher Bestandteil der Apostelgeschichte?—Judentum und Judenchristentum in Justins Dialog mit Trypho. Nebst einer Collation der Pariser Handschrift 450.* (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, 39, 1.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913. 98 pages. M. 3.

Against Norden's view, set forth in *Agnostos Theos*, that Paul's address at Athens is a second-century interpolation influenced by the account of Apollonius in Athens, Harnack strongly argues that it is an integral part of Acts. In a second essay, Harnack points out the value of Justin's *Dialog* for the study of Judaism and Jewish Christianity. Justin's strange reticence about Paul is a problem for Harnack, who suggests that Justin could not adopt Paul's attitude toward Judaism and was perhaps also somewhat averse to quoting him in a controversy with a Jew and at a time when the followers of Marcion were claiming Paul as peculiarly their own. Justin's information on the Jewish sects (Sadducees, Genists, Merists, Galileans, Hellenians, Pharisees, and Baptists) and about Jewish interpretation and learning, and messianic expectations, is important and probably trustworthy. Much may also be learned of the relations of Jewish and gentile Christians and their contrasting views of the Law and the person of Christ, whom Jewish Christians viewed simply as a chosen man, rejecting the "higher" Christology.

For the appended collation of the Paris manuscript of Justin's *Dialog*, in which Harnack undertakes to supplement definitively the report Otto has given of its readings, several necessary modifications have already been pointed out in this *Journal* (XVII,

411-16). To this list may now be added the following, which are of at least as much importance as some that Harnack notes, e.g., *οὐκ* for *οὐκ*:

Otto, p. 382, 9: A (Paris. 450) reads *παρακεκαλυμένα*; 402, 1: A reads *μετονόμασται*; 402, 2: A reads *μετονομάσθη*; 412, 15: A reads *ὁτοιούτ*; 422, 22: A reads *πεπιστεύκαμεν*; 424, 8: A reads *δι'ἀκρόσει*; 438, 26: A reads *προσηλῆτους*; 444, 25: A reads *οὕτως*: Otto credits it with *οὕτω* ("vulgo, *οὕτω*"); 446, 28: A reads *γεννημένους*; 466, 18, 19: A reads *προστελέμνται*; 470, 14: A corr. has added *ς* to *μέχρι*; 472, 11: A reads *αἰγύπου*; 484, 16: A reads *πολλῶ*.

A close study of the manuscript would doubtless reveal other particulars to be added to Harnack's list. The necessity of noting every trifle in an important manuscript is well known to all workers in manuscripts, for these minute points are often the most telling clues to manuscript relationships.

E. J. G.

STÄHLIN, OTTO. *Die christliche griechische Litteratur*. (Sonder-Abdruck aus Wilhelm von Christ's Griechischer Litteraturgeschichte, 5. Auflage, II Band, 2. Hälfte. Neubearbeitet von Wilhelm Schmid und Otto Stählin.) Munich: Beck, 1914. 907-1246 pages.

Stählin's history of Christian literature covers the period from the first century to the sixth, from the apostle Paul to Proclus and Hesychius. To cover this vast literature in 340 pages, including considerable bibliographies and copious notes, necessitates a very concise treatment of each document dealt with. The Gospel of Mark is allowed two short pages, the Letter to the Ephesians the same. Within these narrow limits, however, it must be confessed that Stählin has produced a work remarkable for its compactness and inclusiveness. Recent critical opinion in all lands is on the whole fairly presented. The bibliographies are excellent, the conclusions generally clear and discriminating. The treatment is rather closer and more minute than in Jordan's useful book, but without the rest of the second volume the reader is often annoyed at the absence of an index.

The date 92-101 for Clement's episcopate (p. 973) occasions surprise in view of Harnack's determination of 88-97 as his probable period of office. Hermas should of course replace Clement on p. 1065, n. 3. The list of Thecla versions (p. 1006) is incomplete; here Stählin seems to have followed Holzhey too closely. The list of Hermas fragments (p. 1067) should include Oxyrhynchus Papyri 1172. American work on the synoptic problem is unknown to Stählin, though he aims in general at including American and English work along with continental. His book is very useful, but if it is to circulate alone it would be much more so if provided with an adequate index.

E. J. G.

CHARLES, R. H. *Fragments of a Zadokite Work*. Translated from the Cambridge Hebrew Text, and Edited with Introduction, Notes, and Indexes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912. xvii+42 pages. 5s.

This important Jewish document from the first century B.C. was first published, in the original Hebrew, by Dr. S. Schechter in 1910 (*Fragments of a Zadokite Work*, edited from Hebrew MSS in the Cairo Genizah Collection now in the possession of the University Library, Cambridge, and provided with an English translation, introduction, and notes). In making the gift of the two manuscripts (one of the tenth century,

the other of eleventh and twelfth centuries A.D.) to the Cambridge University Library, Dr. Schechter provided that for five years no one should be allowed to consult them; the purpose presumably being that his publication of the work might within five years sell sufficiently to pay for the cost of its production. Dr. Charles was therefore unable to produce his own text of the document from the MSS themselves, and he charges that Schechter's reproduction of the text is "carelessly done" (p. xvii). He holds that scholars were entitled to receive in Schechter's *editio princeps* a facsimile of the older MS, which consisted of only eighteen pages. As the restriction expires this year, a new edition directly from the MSS may be expected at once from Dr. Charles.

The present monograph on the Zadokite Work was a preprint from, and is now incorporated in, the great two-volume edition by Charles of the *Old Testament Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha* (II, 785-834). No changes have been made in the material except that the Preface has been omitted, and unfortunately also the Index of Passages from the Scriptures and Other Ancient Books Directly Connected or Closely Parallel with the Text. Charles's English translation is his own, not that of Schechter's edition, and is worked out with the full assistance of numerous articles and reviews of the Work which appeared promptly after Dr. Schechter's publication. Of these the most important after Schechter's was by Lévi, "Un écrit sadducéen antérieur à la ruine du Temple" (*Revue des études juives*, LXI [1911], 161-205).

The essential point of Schechter's hypothesis is that the Fragments of a Zadokite Work do not make us acquainted with any standard phase of Judaism in the New Testament period, but only with a heretical sect of Jews that was small and insignificant.

Dr. Charles proposes a quite different view, and is confident of its correctness. The Zadokite sect, from which this writing came *ca.* 18-8 B.C., arose about 175 B.C. among the priests of the Jews in Palestine. They were a reforming party of the priests, opposed to the Hellenizing party which had developed so much strength by the time of Antiochus IV. This conservative, patriotic, devout party of the priests did not, however, succeed with the reform of the priesthood they attempted. They withdrew, either voluntarily or by compulsion, to Damascus, but later they returned and carried on their reform movement in Palestine. Here they came into conflict with the Pharisees, who are severely attacked in the Fragments; for the Zadokites were adherents of the written Scriptures, rejecting the oral tradition and therewith the authority of the Pharisees. As priests, also, the Zadokites claimed superior rights of teaching and judging the Jewish people. Further, the Zadokites were more intensely ethical and religious than either Pharisees or Sadducees. As to doctrine, they were much like the Pharisees, for they shared their theological and eschatological beliefs—they were ardent Messianists, and valued the apocalyptic writings.

Indeed, Charles thinks that the Zadokites were precursors of the Christians, having more in common than any other Jewish party with the religious faith and the ethical ideal of Jesus and his followers. He thinks we may explain the disappearance of the Zadokites from Jewish history and literature by the assumption that they became Christians, and so lost their identity as an earlier sect. If Dr. Charles's hypothesis should prove the true one, we are in possession of important new facts concerning the religious life of the Jewish priests in the period when Christianity was evolving out of first-century Judaism.

C. W. V.

LICHTENSTEIN, J. *Commentar zum Matthäus-Evangelium*. Nach der Neubearbeitung des Verfassers herausgegeben von PROFESSOR H. LAIBLE und PAUL LEVERTOFF. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913. 143 pages. M. 2.50.

This book is a rare specimen, a modern Jewish Christian's translation of the Gospel of Matthew into Hebrew, together with a brief commentary on the translated text. The form in which it now appears, as No. 4 of the publications of the Institutum Delitzschianum, at Leipzig, is a second edition, thoroughly revised by the author and published after his death by Laible and Levertoff. The chief value of the volume lies in the parallels from Jewish writings, talmuds, targums, and Midrash, copiously adduced on every page. Its tendency is exhibited on the one hand by the fact that it breathes throughout an earnest missionary spirit, on the other by the very conservative attitude of the author in regard to such matters as the virgin birth, fulfilment of prophecy, etc. Nevertheless, the exegetical notes show acquaintance with such modern literature as Dalman's *Worte Jesu*.

M. S.

KENT, C. F. *The Life and Teachings of Jesus, according to the Earliest Records*. New York: Scribner, 1913. 337 pages. \$1.25.

Professor Kent thinks it desirable to find a substitute for the complex and laborious method of using a harmony of the Gospels for the study of the life and the teaching of Jesus. The particular feature of his book is the presentation of such a substitute. He has arranged and condensed the gospel narratives into a single continuous account of Jesus' ministry. The material used is chiefly taken from Mark and from the discourse sections of Matthew and Luke. Little is introduced from the Gospel of John, except in the last chapter on "Jesus the Savior of Mankind," where the christological teaching of the book is summed up. The author has constantly to choose between the parallel accounts of incidents and teachings in two or three of the Gospels; he has also to decide from time to time what synoptic material he will omit as not belonging to "the oldest records imbedded in the four New Testament Gospels." But the reader is not sufficiently informed as to the process employed, as to the criteria by which the author determines what is original with Jesus and what is to be regarded as modification, accretion, or supplementation of the Apostolic age. Besides, one might surely have expected to find in the book an index of Scripture passages, showing just what material had been introduced from each Gospel, and the particular page on which it appears and receives exposition.

Two mechanical features of the book are objectionable. The first is the absence of regular division and chapter numbers. High roman numerals are used in this book consecutive with Old Testament passages similarly arranged and enumerated in the four volumes of the "Historical Bible" series which precede the present one. Such a system of notation is intelligible, but so far as this life of Jesus is concerned it is to the last degree impracticable and irritating, for the high roman numerals are clumsy, slow to read, and confusing to use in referring to the chapters of the book. The second defect is the glaring disproportion between the large black-face type in which the gospel passages are given and the very small type in which the body of the book is printed.

The contents of the book are well arranged. The material from the Gospels is presented in an English translation that seems to be based upon the Revised Version, and yet is reworked by the author into a more modern style. The manner of exposi-

tion is simple, straightforward, and attractive. There is some critical discussion, as of the miracles, on pp. 97-108, where the author concludes: "Thrown into the crucible of historical criticism, the great majority of the gospel miracles emerge unscathed"; and of the resurrection, on pp. 298-310, where he bespeaks a hearing for the view that these appearances were "inner spiritual experiences." But the author does not enter upon the treatment of the newer fundamental historical questions with which New Testament scholars are now engaged. The book represents in general the commonly accepted conservative views of the life and teaching of Jesus, for the practical purpose (one may perhaps judge) of making the work available for use in Sunday-school and Y.M.C.A. classes (see p. vi, last paragraph). Doubtless also it is intended for college courses in Bible-study, and is the kind of book some instructors will use. Yet it is too brief, simple, superficial, and non-critical for a thorough historical study of the life and teaching of Jesus; the point of view, the principles of investigation and interpretation, the genetic and comparative method which belong to the scientific study of history, come slowly to be applied to the historical study of the Bible, even in the colleges where other history and literature are scientifically taught.

C. W. V.

LESTER, CHARLES S. *The Historic Jesus: A Study of the Synoptic Gospels*. New York: Putnam, 1912. 426 pages. \$2.50.

Mr. Lester feels that the most important of all religious questions are those which center in the life and teaching of Jesus. He finds the gospel figure of Jesus overlaid with mythology and dogmatic fictions, and he seeks to recover the real Jesus of history back of these theological interpretations of his person and work. When this is accomplished, he holds that Jesus will "be recognized as the permanent source of the moral power of the world" (p. vii).

The author does not claim to be a first-hand scholar in dealing with the fundamental historical, psychological, and philosophical problems. He has, however, given studious attention to the recent literature of the subject, and has introduced us to the books from which he has learned most (see the list on pp. 415-17). His major interest, as one readily sees, is with respect to the supernatural element in the Gospels, which in his judgment must be wholly set aside as beyond the historical facts of Jesus' career. The critical process for obtaining this result consists in an entire disregard of the Fourth Gospel, and a sifted use of the material contained in the Synoptics. He has chosen Wellhausen's commentary on Mark as his specific guide. This leads Mr. Lester to deal more with the events of Jesus' life than with his teaching. In fact, he feels that the teaching of Jesus, as it is contained in the Synoptic Gospels, is pretty much as Jesus himself gave it, with the exception of the claim to messiahship and the theological interpretation of his death. But the events of his life reported by the Gospels are in need of rigid investigation.

Mr. Lester's judgment goes with the radical school in almost every case with which he deals. The Gospels were written late—Mark *ca.* 67 A.D., Luke by an unknown author *ca.* 100 A.D., Matthew by an unknown author *ca.* 120 A.D.; the last preceded by an Aramaic gospel bearing the name of Matthew, written in Judea *ca.* 75 A.D. The chronology of the ministry is not worked out fully, but the public life is thought to have occupied at least three years, beginning in 29 A.D. and ending with the crucifixion, in 32 A.D.; the latter a date that has almost no advocates. The Gospel of Mark, although more historical regarding Jesus than Luke and Matthew, is nevertheless an

apologetical writing specifically designed to inculcate christological doctrine. Jesus did not claim to be the Messiah; his message was a simple, plain message of religion and morality, set in the apocalyptic framework of current Jewish messianism. "All his efforts were in the direction of making as many as possible believe so entirely that the kingdom was really coming as to alter their lives to correspond with its ideals, and so be found worthy of citizenship when it should come" (p. 96).

But shortly after his death his followers began "to preach a totally different gospel, the burden of which was that he was the Messiah" (p. 77). In this way the gospel *about* Jesus came to usurp the gospel *of* Jesus, and has maintained this supremacy until today, engendering "the rival ecclesiasticisms, the ponderous and discordant theologies, together with the wars, persecutions, and fanaticisms which have so often disfigured the face of Christendom, and have prevented the gospel of Jesus from doing its beneficent work among men" (p. 77).

The differentiation of the Jesus of history from the Christ of faith, with which this author is concerned, is one of the large tasks of New Testament scholarship. Mr. Lester's contribution to the discussion will promote study and consideration of the critical problems of the Gospels. He says he has written the book "especially for intelligent laymen," and to them it may be recommended—not necessarily for the acceptance of its views, but for a straight, vigorous, sincere grappling with some fundamental historical questions.

C. W. V.

HARRIS, J. RENDEL. *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon*. Published from the Syriac Version. 2d ed., revised and enlarged. Cambridge: University Press, 1911. xxxvii+156+53 pages.

This second edition of Harris' work followed in eighteen months upon the first. The literature of the subject even in that short time became extensive (see the list on pp. ix-xii). Harris deals with this mass of opinion in his inimitably fair, appreciative, and discriminating way.

Reviewing the various hypotheses, he does not find himself persuaded to change from the view announced in his first edition, but considers the questions still open and awaits new light. This second edition differs from the first chiefly by having this thirty-page summary of the discussion. Some slight changes have been made in the text and introduction. Harris' work still stands as the leading monograph on the Odes.

C. W. V.

CHURCH HISTORY

MUSS-ARNOLT, WILLIAM. *The Book of Common Prayer among the Nations of the World*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1914. xxi+473 pages. \$3.00.

In this handsome volume Dr. Muss-Arnolt has undertaken to give a complete list of all printed translations of the Prayer Book, and, as far as can be judged by a non-specialist (in a field where specialists are very few), the task has been performed with entire thoroughness. Some 200 translations are noticed, grouped under 7 linguistic divisions and 72 subdivisions, representing in all over 120 languages. The bibliographic descriptions are irreproachable in their fulness, although a purist in such

matters might prefer the use of centimeters for dimensions. Short biographies of the translators are given, with an account of the printers of the earlier editions, and in each case the account of the translation is prefaced with a brief narrative of the missionary work that led up to it. The work is, consequently, an important contribution, both to general bibliography and to the history of Anglican missions.

As far as available tests show the collations are generally very accurate, but perfection seems to be unattainable in a work that involves so much unusual material. So on p. 428 (Whutana Book) after "Saviour," read a comma for the stroke given; on p. 34 (Psalter title), read a period for the comma after "versus," and (below) insert a period after "Vautrollerius." At the bottom of p. 157, in the Hebrew transliteration, read "mashlāḥ" for "mashj." The Mexican Book of 1901, described on p. 98, is very much enlarged from that of 1894 and contains 312 pages. The description of the Christ Church service books on p. 35 should be supplemented to give an account of later editions. The Hawaiian Book of 1883 was published in two editions, with slightly different title-pages (p. 290). A collation of the Gaelic Book of 1818 would have been desirable, as its title is quite different from that of the reprint of 1895, given on p. 86.

B. S. E.

BEET, W. ERNEST. *The Medieval Papacy and Other Essays*. London: Charles H. Kelly, 1914. xvi+334 pages. 3s. 6d.

In this volume Dr. Beet makes no claim, as in his works on earlier phases of the same subject, to original research. He has here given us a series of light, sketchy essays, with very little of originality and freshness of presentation to justify their appearance before the public. His *Early Roman Episcopate* was at least based on sources, though lamentably out of touch, as is also this present volume, with current secondary work. It is really hard to see any justification for the offering of this book to the public; doubtless the author finds a motive for its publication in the clientèle already built up by his earlier works.

C. H. W.

HEUSSI, KARL. *Kompendium der Kirchengeschichte*. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1913. xxx+613 pages. M. 9.

The first edition of the first part of Heussi's *Kompendium* appeared toward the end of 1907. The present volume, marking the end of the third edition, appeared toward the end of 1912. This volume is the product of a thorough revision; especially in the sections on the early church has new matter been inserted, old matter elided, and other portions compressed. While in this way the text has been brought up to date and improved, the essential character of the book has remained unchanged.

Heussi's *Kompendium* remains, as it was at first, really fitted for beginners in church history; or at least, we may say, more nearly adapted to beginners than are most of the other volumes on church history written in German. Heussi's book is simple, clear, luminous. Its periodization, particularly, is excellent. On the bibliographical side, the Heussi does not compare with the Krueger, nor does it aim to do so. It purposely avoids giving sectional bibliographies and topical bibliographies; nevertheless, it is preceded by a general sketch, up to date and useful, of the literature applicable to the whole field. And, indeed, "useful" is the adjective to apply to the whole volume. It is one that every scholar will be glad to have at his hand.

C. H. W.

MORIN, GERMAIN. *L'Idéal monastique et la vie chrétienne des premiers jours.*

Oxford: Parker and Son, 1914. 227 pages. 2s. net.

This little volume is rather a manual for religious devotion than a volume for historical instruction. Developed toward the end of the nineteenth century, in the effort to instruct and inspire a group of modern Benedictines, its emphasis is on the "monastic ideal," while there is but scant information given upon the life of the early Christians. The author's method is to take a brief passage from Acts, describing the life of the Christian group at Jerusalem, and then to show how the particular characteristics, revealed by the passage, have been taken up into monasticism and perpetuated by it. Perhaps its greatest value for the student of church history is as a document on "monasticism."

C. H. W.

GRAPIN, ÉMILE. *Eusèbe Histoire Ecclésiastique. Livres IX-X. Sur les Martyrs de Palestine.* Texte grec et traduction française avec un index général des deux ouvrages. [Textes et documents pour l'étude historique du Christianisme, publiés sous la direction de Hippolyte Hemmer et Paul Lejay.] Paris: Auguste Picard, 1913. lxxxvi+541 pages.

This handy, useful work constitutes the third and concluding volume of Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History* published in this series. Besides the text and translation of the concluding books of the *History* and the work *On the Martyrs of Palestine*, the book contains a useful introduction, helpful notes with more or less bibliographical information, and a very complete index. The introduction (86 pages) touches on the process of composition of the *History*, reviewing with some dissent Schwartz's latest opinions, the Greek tradition of history writing, and editions and translations of the *History*. The translation of Cousin is reviewed at some length with the purpose of showing the manner in which he softened many of the passages in the original because of his wish to make Eusebius more acceptable to modern readers. This volume completes a useful, annotated edition of Eusebius, with much information on the author and his method of writing.

C. H. W.

KNOFF, RUDOLPH. *Ausgewählte Märtyrerakten.* Zweite neubearbeitete Auflage. (Sammlung ausgewählter kirchen- und dogmengeschichtlicher Quellenchriften, II, 2.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 114 pages. M. 2.50.

The second edition of Knopf's useful collection of early acts of martyrdom differs little from the first. The bibliographies are improved by the inclusion of some new titles and it is now possible to include the newly discovered Greek text of the *Martyrdom of Agape and Her Companions*, of which the first edition presented only a version. Good bibliographies follow the several texts, but there are no introductions nor does the editor state what period his collection is meant to cover. One finds that the martyrdoms included range in date from Polycarp to the time of Diocletian. The indices would be more convenient if the numbers by which they refer to the several documents of the collection had been carried in the page headings; with documents from ten to fifteen pages in length, as some of these are, and numbered only at the beginning, the use of the indices is needlessly embarrassed. The details of printing are not always accurate, but the collection is, on the whole, useful and trustworthy.

E. J. G.

DÖRFLER, PETER. *Die Anfänge der Heiligenverehrung nach den römischen Inschriften und Bildwerken*. (Veröffentlichungen aus dem kirchenhistorischen Seminar München, IV. Reihe, No. 2.) München: Verlag der J. J. Leutnerschen Buchhandlung (E. Stahl), 1913. 209 pages.

The conclusions of Dr. Dörfler's careful study point in general to a later dating of the origins of martyr-worship than is usually the case. In this connection he claims that certain of De Rossi's and Wilpert's conclusions must be revised. For Rome, his conclusion is that before the middle of the third century no worship of the martyrs had become associated with their graves. This conclusion, derived from a study of all the monumental evidence, is held to be corroborated by that of the liturgy and the Acts of the Martyrs. He maintains that it was not till toward the end of the third century that in inscriptions the title of *martyr* was occasionally added. With regard to cult words, Dr. Dörfler emphasizes *dominus* or *κύριος* as being the first applied in a cult sense to the martyrs. The earliest inscriptional example of its use he dates from the end of the third century or the beginning of the fourth century. The term *sanctus* appearing later, passes, like *dominus*, from an expression with a courtly connotation to one with a solemn, religious sense, and then into one with a technical cult sense. When first used it was placed before *martyr*; later it supplants *martyr*, which is removed to back of the name: *Sancto Vitali martyri*. It was not until sometime in the course of the fifth century that *sanctus* won the victory as a technical term for the dead who had become objects of a cult.

As to the basis of saint-worship, this Dr. Dörfler finds in the belief, universally held in the Roman Empire, that continuity of life between members of a social group is not broken by death. Particularly is the custom of praying for one another to be kept up, but with this difference: the prayers of the dead, particularly the innocent or pious dead, are deemed more effective because of their nearness to Christ and God. Quite logically the Christians placed an extraordinary confidence in the intercessions of martyrs, so that they became an object of interest, not only to their immediate family, as in the case of ordinary persons, but to the whole community. Hence it came about (1) that the martyrs were mentioned in the church service; (2) that the community kept intact by yearly feasts their social connection with them; in short, that the martyrs were taken up into the church cult. By the end of the third century the martyrs had come to be looked on as helpers in every necessity of life, here and hereafter; also the belief in the magic power of the martyr's body and relics was strongly in evidence, as well as practically all the other addenda of the saint-worship of the Middle Ages.

C. H. W.

DOCTRINAL

GURNHILL, J. *The Spiritual Philosophy, as Affording a Key to the Solution of Some of the Problems of Evolution*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914. xi+167 pages. \$2.25 net.

The vague term "spiritual philosophy" is defined as an endeavor by reflection upon the order of nature and the religious experience of man to gain a satisfactory theory of the origin, destiny, and meaning of the world. This is set over against a materialistic and mechanical philosophy. Apparently the author is not an expert

in any of the subjects which come under discussion, and he will convince those only who are already in agreement with him. To the reader at home in modern thought, the book, while right in purpose, will seem fragmentary, disconnected, remote, and the temptation will be strong to turn instead to some of the works to which reference is made in the text. Such books have, however, a value for theologically timid thinkers and for those who have come to feel that a half-way house is the end of the way; it may lead them to resume their journey under more competent leadership.

C. A. B.

WHITE, DOUGLAS. *Forgiveness and Suffering*. Cambridge: University Press, 1913. xi+133 pages. 3s. net.

The author explains that this book was written in the interest of a new point of view at which he has arrived but has not seen described elsewhere—atonement by self-revelation. In the sufferings of Jesus, God suffers as direct result of sin, and having suffered is ready to forgive. The point of view is, however, not new, but has been characteristic of all who have followed in the path indicated by Robertson and Bushnell.

C. A. B.

SCHUMACHER, HEINRICH. *Christus in seiner Präexistenz und Kenose nach Phil. 2: 5-8*. I. Teil, Historische Untersuchung. Rome: Verlag des paepstl. Bibelinstituts, 1914. xxxi+236 pages. L. 4. 50.

In this exhaustive history of the interpretation of one of the most perplexing texts of the New Testament, Dr. Schumacher shows in the first part of his book what meaning has been given to *ἀπαγάγους* in the Greek, Latin, and Syriac Fathers, in later and in most recent writers, and in the second part, following the same track, the meaning which has been assigned to the other significant words of this passage. An appended table presents the results of his inquiry as this has centered in three words: *ὑπάρχω*, etc., which has been interpreted as referring to pre-existence, or to the earthly life; *μορφή* as divine nature or presupposing this, or as the divine attributes where deity is either implied or expressed, or else as having no relation to the deity; *ἀπαγάγους*, etc., as either emphasizing the God-likeness of Christ or as explaining this by various hypotheses and theories. Almost all Roman Catholic and the major portion of orthodox Protestant exegetes have held that this passage teaches the pre-existence of Christ, yet from this interpretation Luther, Calvin, Erasmus, Grotius, and others have deviated. Since the beginning of the eighteenth century a radical anthropocentric position is taken by many scholars who content themselves with a purely earthly life or at most an ideal pre-existence of Christ, in which deity completely disappears. The author provides an extremely valuable aid to scholars in an exhaustive bibliography both of exegetical works and of New Testament texts. This book will take its place alongside of Bunsen's *Die Lehre von der Kenose* and Fritsch's *Philipp. 2: 5-8*, and will henceforth be indispensable to those who would acquaint themselves with the history of this baffling text. It is to be followed by an exegetical treatise for which this presentation has prepared the way.

C. A. B.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT

- Elmslie, W. A. L., and Skinner, John (editors). *Isaiah*, xl-lxvi. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. xxxiii+137 pages. 1s. 6d.
- Peters, John P. *The Religion of the Hebrews*. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1914. xiv+502 pages. \$2.75.
- Ryle, Herbert E. *The Book of Genesis*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. lxxviii+477 pages. \$1.10.
- Skinner, John. *The Divine Names in Genesis*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. 203 pages. 6s.
- Smith, J. M. Powis. *The Prophet and His Problems*. New York: Scribner, 1914. xi+244 pages. \$1.25.
- Stearns, Wallace N. *A Hebrew Primer*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1914. 22 pages. \$0.25.
- Wehle, Theodore. *Origin and Meaning of the Old Testament*. New York: Fenno, 1914. 199 pages.

NEW TESTAMENT

- Anderson, Frederick L. *The Man of Nazareth*. New York: Macmillan, 1914. xi+226 pages. \$1.00.
- Case, Shirley Jackson. *The Evolution of Early Christianity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1914. vii+385 pages. \$2.25.
- Charles, R. H. *Religious Development between the Old and the New Testaments*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1914. v+256 pages. \$0.50.
- Lithgow, R. M. *The Parabolic Gospel*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914. xiii+196 pages.
- Mercati, Sylvius. *S. Ephraem Syri Opera*. Rome: Pontificii Instituti Biblici, 1915. xiv+231 pages.
- Morin, Germain. *L'Idéal monastique et la vie chrétienne des premiers jours*. Oxford: Parker & Son, 1914. 227 pages. 2s. net.
- Rall, Harris F. *New Testament History: A Study of the Beginnings of*

- Christianity*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1914. 314 pages. \$1.50.
- Scott, Ernest F. *The Beginnings of the Church*. New York: Scribner, 1914. ix+282 pages. \$1.50.
- Sharp, Douglas S. *Epictetus and the New Testament*. London: Charles H. Kelly, 1914. 158 pages. 2s. 6d.
- Stearns, Wallace N. *A Greek Primer*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1914. 26 pages. \$0.25.
- Stoeckius, Herman. *Ottaviano Cesare*. Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1914. 79 pages.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Bailey, Margaret Lewis. *Milton and Jacob Boehme: A Study of German Mysticism in Seventeenth-Century England*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1914. vii+200 pages.
- Barry, David. *The Absolution of Rici-divi and of Occasionarii*. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, 1914. 72 pages.
- Beet, William Ernest. *The Medieval Papacy*. London: Charles H. Kelly, 1914. xvi+334 pages. 3s. 6d. net.
- Burnichon, Joseph. *La Compagnie de Jésus en France. Historie d'un siècle, 1814-1914*. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1914. xlviii+568 pages.
- Clayton, H. J. *Studies in the Roman Controversy*. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co., 1914. vii+146 pages. \$1.00.
- Fonck, Leopoldus (editor). *Documenta ad Pontificiam Commissionem de re Biblica Spectantia*. Rome: Pontificii Instituti Biblici, 1915. 47 pages.
- McKim, Randolph. *Romanism in the Light of History*. New York: Putnam, 1914. vii+277 pages. \$1.25.
- Mearns, James. *The Canticles of the Christian Church Eastern and Western in Early Medieval Times*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. viii+105 pages. 6s.
- Schairer, Phil. I. *Das religiöse Volksleben am Ausgang des Mittelalters*

nach Augsburger Quellen. Leipzig: Teubner, 1914. vii+36 pages. M. 4.

DOCTRINAL

Begbie, Harold. *The Proof of God*. New York and Chicago: Revell, 1914. 159 pages. \$0.75.

Brown, William Adams. *Modern Theology and the Preaching of the Gospel*. New York: Scribner, 1914. viii+274 pages. \$1.25.

Coats, R. H. *The Christian Life*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 164 pages. 6d. net.

Keyser, C. J. *Science and Religion: The Rational and the Super-Rational*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914. 75 pages. \$0.75.

MacGregor, William M. *Christian Freedom*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. xii+428 pages. \$1.50.

Morrison, Charles C. *The Meaning of Baptism*. Chicago: Disciples Publication Society, 1914. 222 pages.

Thompson, T. *The Offices of Baptism and Confirmation*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. x+223 pages. 6s.

Wilkinson, William Cleaver. *Paul and the Revolt against Him*. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1914. viii+258 pages. \$1.00.

Wright, W. Arter. *The Problem of Atonement*. Columbus, Ohio: S. F. Harriman, 1914. 291 pages. \$1.00.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

Deimel, Antonius (editor). *Pantheon Babylonicum*. Rome: Pontificii Instituti Biblici, 1915. xvi+264 pages.

Frazer, J. G. *Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion*. Part IV. Adonis: Attis: Osiris, Vol. II. New York: Macmillan, 1914. x+321 pages. \$6.00.

Moore, George F. *Metempsychosis*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1914. 84 pages.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Garvie, Alfred E. *The Joy of Finding*. (The Short Course Series.) New York: Scribner, 1914. v+137 pages. \$0.60.

Horne, Charles S. *The Romance of Preaching*. New York: Revell, 1914. 302 pages. \$1.25.

Hoyt, Arthur S. *Vital Elements of Preaching*. New York: Macmillan, 1914. ix+326 pages. \$1.50.

Johnson, Franklin Winslow. *The Problems of Boyhood*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1914. xxv+130 pages.

Kelley, William Valentine. *A Pilgrim of the Infinite*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1914. 84 pages. \$0.50.

Lucas, Francis C. *Spiritual Interpretations: The Commandments, The Beatitudes, Words*. New York: York Publishing Company, 1914. 63 pages.

Mains, George P. *Christianity and the New Age*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1914. xi+364 pages. \$1.50.

Newton, Joseph F. *What Have the Saints to Teach Us?* New York: Revell, 1914. 93 pages. \$0.50.

Rutherford, James. *The Seer's House and Other Sermons*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914. 343 pages.

Thomas, W. H. Griffith. *The Prayers of St. Paul*. (The Short Course Series.) New York: Scribner, 1914. vii+141 pages. \$0.60.

Warfield, Benjamin B. *The Saviour of the World*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. viii+270 pages. \$1.25.

Zenos, Andrew C. *The Son of Man*. (The Short Course Series.) New York: Scribner, 1914. v+137 pages. \$0.60.

MISCELLANEOUS

Clark, Francis E. *The Holy Land of Asia Minor*. New York: Scribner, 1914. xx+154 pages. \$1.00.

Conn, Herbert W. *Social Heredity and Social Evolution*. New York: Abingdon Press. vi+348 pages. \$1.50.

Drake, Durant. *Problems of Conduct*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914. xiii+455 pages. \$1.75.

Griggs, Henry S. *The Book of Truth*. Brooklyn, N.Y.: Henry S. Griggs Co., 1914. 284 pages. \$3.00.

Ray, Charles Walker. *Fallacies and Vagaries of Misinterpretation*. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1914. 216 pages. \$1.00.

Williams, Edward H. *The Question of Alcohol*. New York: The Goodhue Company, 1914. 127 pages.

Wilson, Henry B. *The Revival of the Gift of Healing*. Milwaukee: Young Churchman Co., 1914. 78 pages. \$0.60.

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JEWISH INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

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Ignatius of Antioch, writing to the Philadelphian church about 115 A.D., maintains that "it is better to hear Christianity from a man who is circumcised, than Judaism from one uncircumcised." So near the times of the apostles, most of the churches' older leaders were still men who, like Timothy, had known the Holy Scriptures from childhood, because born and brought up in the Jewish faith. It was inevitable, accordingly, that competency to teach "the Scriptures" (by which was meant exclusively the Old Testament) should be almost confined to men who owed their training to the synagogue. Polycarp, who deprecated his own lack of training in the sacred writings (*Ad Phil.*, xii, 1), was probably somewhat exceptional in this, and in 115 Polycarp was one of the younger bishops. In point of fact gentile interpretation of the Jewish scriptures suffers even today from lack of the true perspective. Do his best, the outsider cannot enter into the spirit of Judaism, and understand its ideas in their continuous unfolding through the ages, as can the genuine son of Abraham after both flesh and spirit. Indeed, at any period of the church the advantages of the Christian teacher who comes to his office with all the training of the rabbi are so obvious that we have no difficulty in indorsing the doctrine that it is well to "hear Christianity from a man who is circumcised." Our first canonical evangelist, himself apparently a converted rabbi,

expresses this ideal by declaring the scribe made a disciple to the Kingdom of Heaven to be "like unto a man that is a householder, which bringeth forth out of his treasure things new and old."

It is less easy to imagine who the obnoxious gentile teachers could be who according to Ignatius were teaching "Judaism." In all probability they were theosophists of the type of those who in Paul's life-time were "making spoil" of the Colossians by their "philosophy and vain deceit, after the rudiments [στοιχεῖα] of the world, and not after Christ," making distinctions of meats and drinks, feast days, new moons, and Sabbath days, and subjecting themselves to ordinances as "a worship of angels." If so, Judaism too had small liking for its gentile propagandists. It preferred then as now its own interpreters; and he who would have a fair and worthy estimate of the older faith must do it this justice. He must not be wholly content to "hear Judaism from men uncircumcised."

By a similar standard of measurement converts from Judaism will take no very high rank. Our own generation may occasionally see an Edersheim converted from the orthodoxy of the synagogue to that of the Scotch Presbyterian kirk, and may continue to draw "rabbinic parallels" from many successive editions of his *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah* and similar works. This may seem to put us, so far, in the same favorable position as the Apostolic age, with its many leaders of Jewish birth. Unfortunately neither the doctrine from which, nor the doctrine to which the conversion is made reflects the Apostolic age unchanged. Moreover, that which the convert's coreligionists most need to know is just that which the convert puts farthest behind him, viz., sympathetic appreciation of the strong points of his former faith. We should not value very highly interpretations of Christianity by apostates to Islam or Buddhism, and it should not surprise us if the synagogue puts no higher estimate on interpretations of Judaism by those who have forsaken it. Even the interpretations given in the Gospel of Mark and the Epistle to the Romans are not to be taken as if written from the cool and impartial viewpoint of the historian of religion. Polemics "against the Jews" from Justin and Tertullian down, including those of converts to Christianity, are the least helpful of all interpretations of the mother faith.

Greater is the service of the splendid succession of Christian Hebraists beginning with Origen and Jerome, and reviving after the Renaissance with Reuchlin. The later line begins with the publication in 1658 of John Lightfoot's *Horae Hebraicae et Talmudicae*, Lightfoot's work being supplemented and enlarged by Schoettgen in 1753. From that period to Canon Taylor of Cambridge, Strack of Berlin, and Dalman of Jerusalem, the church has no lack of great names to prove it mindful of the need of interpreting its own faith through the literature of the parent religion.

Yet here too a completely objective and historical method has been slow in manifesting itself. We might choose among the works of typical Christian Hebraists, as nearest to our present theme, Wünsche's well-known *Neue Beiträge zur Erläuterung der Evangelien aus Talmud und Midrash* (1878). The book is typical. It is justly characterized by a Jewish writer as "the most complete collection of parallel passages of Talmud and New Testament since the works of Lightfoot and Schoettgen." A similar purpose is pursued by the English scholar R. T. Herford in *Jesus Christ in Talmud and Midrash* (1903). Such labors, however, do not greatly advance the cause of mutual understanding. "Collections of parallel passages" were commendable as a beginning. They may long continue to serve those whose expectation of comparative religion is that the comparison shall be more or less odious to opponents. But for a generation which has begun to think in terms of the history of religion (*Religionsgeschichte*) such cabinet specimens are mere *dissecta membra*, incapable of conveying any notion of the great and still living mother faith, until restored to their true organic relation. The "atomistic method" must be transcended.

And the work of the Christian Hebraists has already been transcended by that of Christian historians of Judaism. Ferdinand Weber's *Lehren des Talmud quellenmässig, systematisch und gemeinverständlich dargestellt*, published by Franz Delitzsch in 1880, after the author's death, with the subtitle *System der altsynagogalen Palästinischen Theologie*, hardly justifies its claim to present a "system." It leaves wide gaps between the later doctrines of the synagogue and their sources in Old Testament literature. Still, uncritical as the book was, it marked a beginning in the direction of

religio-historical treatment. But the real roots of modern religio-historical interpretations of Judaism lie elsewhere, viz., in the interest of Christian scholars in Jewish religious development from the Maccabean period to the war of Hadrian, considered as the historical background of Christianity. This is the field in which Prideaux's *Connection* (1720) long stood almost unrivaled. It has of late been richly cultivated, but principally piecemeal. Thus among special doctrines, the Jewish messianic hope has been treated by James Drummond and V. H. Stanton; the doctrine of sin and the evil impulse, by F. R. Tennant and F. C. Porter. "Eschatology Jewish and Christian" has been the special inquiry of Baldensperger and Volz in German, and of R. H. Charles in England. A still broader phase of divergence in doctrine between the two religions receives the attention of Oesterley and Box, Oesterley's *Jewish Doctrine of Mediation* (1910) continuing with more of the historical spirit and in broader scope the work of Wuensche¹ and Dalman.²

Such partial studies are subordinate to the general problem taken up in the great history of Schürer.³ It becomes more specifically a problem of the history of religion in the work of C. H. Toy⁴ in our own country, and in Germany is carried to a splendid height of comprehensive scholarship by Bousset in his *Religion des Judenthums in Zeitalter Jesu Christi*, 1903. In Bousset's work we may say that Christian scholarship has done its best to interpret Judaism from the standpoint of the historian of religion.

Meantime a broad basis is being laid for further appreciation of Judaism, both Hebrew and Hellenistic, in the time of Christ by modern translations of the post-canonical literature. Such are the great editions of Kautzsch in Germany, and of R. H. Charles in England, of *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha*. Scholars, moreover,

¹ *Die Leiden des Messias in ihrer Uebereinstimmung mit der Lehre des alten Testaments und der Aussprüchen der Rabbinen*, 1870.

² *Jesaia 53, das Prophetenwort vom Sühnleiden des Gottesknechts, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Jüdischen Literatur*, 1914.³

³ *History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, 1891.

⁴ *Judaism and Christianity*, 1891. Compare the same author's "What Christianity Owes to Judaism" in *N.Y. State Conference of Religions*, ser. VI, 1, February 1908.

are soon to receive a new and critical text of the Septuagint from the University of Cambridge. New impetus is thus sure to be given to researches in this domain of the history of religion. Thanks largely to the work of the *Religionsgeschichtlicher*, we may count on ever-larger capacity on both sides to see and appreciate inherited doctrines in the long perspective of religious development.

But the spirit of catholicity born of historical study has not been confined to students owing allegiance to the Christian faith. Its greatest triumphs have been exhibited in the synagogue, where there was greatest reason for a heritage of bitterness. And the outstanding writings are those of two men whose devotion to Judaism is not merely academic, but is witnessed to by philanthropic service of world-wide effect. Judaism here sets the example to followers of Christ, an example not easy to surpass.

Since the time of the Epistle to the Hebrews comparisons of Christianity with Judaism have been common, whose object was to confirm the Christian in his conviction of the superiority of his own religion. Few indeed have been those in which the writer addressed his coreligionists with exhortations based on the merits of contemporary Judaism, and warnings against an ill-founded assumption of superiority. If the example now set is to be emulated, Christian Hebraists must cease to limit themselves to the study of Judaism before the separation. They must learn to appreciate sympathetically that branch of the elder stock which since the days of the New Testament has been in violent opposition to the church. And having learned the point of view of the synagogue, they must return to the interpretation of the Judaism of the first century prepared to apply to it the standards of the Talmudist as well as the standards of the Christian theologian.

Meantime we are called upon to note how our two typical representatives of modern Judaism have been impelled, by a combination of the scientific spirit with the spirit of practical philanthropy, to commend to their fellow-Jews the religious values of the New Testament.

The name of Montefiore recalls at once to every lover of his kind some of the most serviceable benefactions among the many educational philanthropies of men of Jewish race. Nor has the

literary activity of Claude Goldsmid Montefiore, founder and editor of the *Jewish Quarterly Review* and author of many contributions to theological thought, been at the expense of the inherited family devotion to good works. It is a coincidence not unworthy of mention that the name which must be placed side by side with his—that of Moritz Friedländer—has similar associations from his position as secretary and agent of the great educational philanthropy of Baron de Hirsch.

Montefiore and Friedländer have both attempted the favorable interpretation of Christianity to their coreligionists. Both aim to promote reciprocal sympathy and appreciation between synagogue and church, but especially to commend what they consider the vital religious values of Christianity to the emulation of the modern Jew. Both (but especially Friedländer) are trained scholars and theologians, and both are to be classed as “liberals,” though within the limits of this general agreement the difference is about the widest that could be conceived. To Montefiore the legalistic development of Judaism characteristic of Palestine and of Jews of Semitic speech in New Testament times, and having as its distinctive institutions and agencies the synagogue, the scribe, and the brotherhood of Pharisaic *chaberim*, represents the true line of growth. He has little of the mystic about him, and does not feel that Judaism is the poorer for the disappearance of the sacrificial system and the ideas it shadowed forth. Ethical theism is the proper goal of the religious instinct, and “liberal” Christianity of the Unitarian type, and “liberal” Judaism are too essentially alike in their approach to this ideal to stand religiously aloof. The Christianity which he interprets to the synagogue is of this “liberal” type, and he naturally anticipates equally sympathetic treatment of liberal Judaism.

The tone and spirit of the books in which Montefiore’s irenic task is taken up are almost beyond praise. The manner is that of a consummate courtesy, the matter shows the insight of scholarship coupled with the rarer quality of sympathetic catholicity. But Montefiore protests, and protests with all the energy his sincere modesty and unaffected courtesy will allow, against what he deems the travesty of Judaism current among Christian writers since the

days of the New Testament. Those who know the commonplaces of Christian polemic against "rabbinic" teaching will realize how large an element of justice enters into this protest. The representation of the synoptic writers, and still more of Paul, that the Torah as inculcated by the scribes and practiced by the Pharisees was felt by the ordinary Jew of the first century as a burdensome yoke, Montefiore regards as a complete inversion of the fact. To the typical Jew of the time the Law was his crown, his glory, his delight. The scribes and Pharisees, so far from taking an attitude of superiority and self-righteousness, were in the highest degree men of the people, distinguished almost as much by their poverty and humility as by their learning. The synagogue comes nearer than almost any other human institution to the ideals of absolute democracy, and when Judaism after the overthrow of Herod's temple took the course of the synagogue schools of Jamnia and Tiberias, concentrating its vitality by turning in upon itself in the study and practice of its unique religious inheritance, it followed the true and normal line of progress. The hard conditions of the time led indeed to narrow and mechanical modes of interpretation, and to an unfortunate isolation of the orthodox Jewish mind from gentile culture. But the general line of advance from the religion of the great prophets and teachers of righteousness, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, down to the humanitarian ethics of the modern synagogue, and the paternal theism of Reform-Jewish theology is in substance unbroken. The line of continuity of Hebrew thought passes thus (according to Montefiore) with but slight disturbance at the separation of Christianity by way of Hillel and Akiba to the mediaeval rabbis and the modern liberal synagogue. One only wonders whence the bitter hostility between Jesus and the scribes and Pharisees. If the situation was as Montefiore conceived it, why was not Jesus himself both scribe and Pharisee? Why is his whole career depicted as that of a champion of the outcast element of the social body against an oligarchy intrenched in synagogue and temple? Why after the crucifixion does so large a fraction of the Jewish people break away in revolt against leaders whose teachings and methods were not essentially different from those of the Nazarene, and adopt the rite of initiation by baptism into a

new Israel known by his name, and founding its hope of salvation on "the grace of the Lord Jesus"?

Montefiore's interpretation of Christianity is that of a literary critic. It is natural that he should resort to the form of a commentary on the Synoptic Gospels to set it forth, and that he should supplement the commentary with a volume of Jowett Lectures on *The Religious Teaching of Jesus* (1910). As a broad-minded scholar, a pupil of Jowett in the classics, endowed with unusual capacity for sympathetic appreciation of religious values in faiths outside his own, Montefiore could not fail to appreciate the beauty of Jesus' message and character; nor could he fail to recognize the religious vitality of Christianity. Not unnaturally he attributes this vitality to the ethical teachings of Jesus and the pathos of his martyrdom rather than to the symbol of the cross and the doctrine of the atonement. He therefore makes it his task to interpret to the synagogue this moral and religious teaching of Jesus, which to him is equivalent to "the best which the rabbis have taught" disencumbered of the mass of trivialities of the Talmud. For the clear and simple beauty of this teaching Montefiore has an admiration as sincere as his reverence for the moral grandeur of the Teacher. Jesus is to him the last and greatest of the prophets. The reduction, in the Sermon on the Mount, of the whole faith and duty of the genuine Israelite to a few principles of exquisite truth and beauty regarding man's relation to his heavenly Father wins Montefiore's regard no less than the blameless devotion of the Teacher's life.

For this noble interpretation church as well as synagogue has reason to be profoundly grateful. Its strength lies precisely where one would anticipate, from the author's character and training, that it would lie. An irenic spirit combined with liberal culture is a good equipment for him whose task is to be to prove to the synagogue that Jesus has taught more simply and beautifully the substance of what is also to be found in the records of its own faith, and to the church that its conceptions of Judaism are largely perverted by ignorance and fanaticism. The reader of these two volumes, whether Jew or Christian, cannot fail to think better than before of both religions. Montefiore does not profess to have

the Talmudic learning of his friend and colleague Abrahams. But he understands the spirit of liberal Judaism, and to the average reader he makes a better commentator on the Gospels through the application of this very general knowledge than would many a Talmudist over-burdened with his wealth of parallels.

Of the spirit which animates the commentary one can best judge by a few lines from the opening paragraphs of its introduction:

Of Jewish exposition of the Gospels there has been little. Endless Christian commentaries exist, written from many different points of view, with great learning and splendid patience, but Jewish commentaries can hardly be said to exist at all. Jewish scholars have usually taken up an attitude toward the New Testament, and more especially toward the Gospels, which does not lend itself to impartiality. It has not been a very fruitful and light-giving attitude. A main effort has been to show that to the various admittedly admirable sayings of Jesus reported in the Gospels there are excellent parallels in the Old Testament or the rabbinical writings. An atomistic treatment has usually been adopted. The teaching of Jesus has not been much discussed and appraised as a whole. And where it has been so discussed, the line has been rather to depreciate or to cheapen. Jewish writers have either looked for parallels or for defects.

Of the study given to his subject from the Christian side it is but fair to say that Montefiore has used to full advantage the best of recent critics and interpreters. Loisy has most frequently directed his thought; but he has also made thorough use of Holtzmann and both the Weiss's, Wellhausen and Klostermann, as well as leading English authorities.

Montefiore does not claim to be an original investigator in the synoptic problem, nor a resolver of knotty points in Greek exegesis. But he has transcended the "atomistic method" which he deprecates. At least he has done so—if we may so express it—in one dimension. The life and teaching of Jesus are brought into co-ordination with Judaism *conceived as in continuous development along the line of the Palestinian synagogue*. And this is well so far as it goes. The very fact of this attempt to enrich the religious inheritance of the synagogue by that which from this point of view would seem to be an overflow from its own earlier and fresher stream is proof of religious vitality. Liberal denominations of Christians have already felt the *rapprochement* with the Reformed

synagogue. Such an interpretation of the life and teaching of Jesus as Montefiore's cannot fail to promote this fellowship to the advantage of both sides. There are few more splendid chapters in the history of religion than the struggle of Judaism for ethical monotheism from the Maccabean martyrs down to our own time, nor is there a more rewarding key to the religious consciousness of Jesus than that which Akiba and many another Jewish martyr affords us in giving up life itself "for the unity." We remember that to Jesus also the first and great commandment is the *Shem'a* the undivided allegiance of the soul to the one Father in heaven. It is when Montefiore deals with the larger problem of the history of religion involved in his more recent work *Judaism and St. Paul* (1914) that his weaker side appears. His scheme of religious development has no room for the work of the great Apostle to the Gentiles. Paul's sense of moral evil and the weakness of humanity led to his setting Christianity over against Judaism as emancipation from the bondage of legalism into the freedom of a relation of grace. His sense of the transcendence of God inclined him to the tendencies of Hellenistic Wisdom in his cosmology, and to the apocalyptic eschatology, popular, as we know, among the Jewish masses in his time but frowned on by the rabbis. Above all does Paul's sense of sin and of the moral transcendence of God make him dissatisfied with the synagogue doctrine of repentance. Of course, repentance will obtain forgiveness; but what obtains "the grace of repentance"? To Paul Jesus' work is supremely that of a mediator. He was delivered up for our trespasses. He was raised for our justification, viz., that he might "make intercession for us." But Montefiore does not find a doctrine of mediation in genuine Judaism. Paul is therefore, to him something inexplicable save by importations from without. Only as a Hellenistic Jew of the Diaspora can he be accounted for. "Paul's pre-Christian religion was poorer, colder, less satisfying, and more pessimistic than rabbinic Judaism."¹ Yet Paul himself certainly considered himself a typical Pharisee, and somehow or other great multitudes of Jews of his own generation labored under the same sense of dissatisfaction with Pharisaism. To a very considerable

¹ *Judaism and St. Paul*, p. 126.

element of the poorer classes in Palestine, and to immense numbers of Jews of the Dispersion the legalistic processes of exact definition in vogue among scribes and Pharisees were robbing their ancient faith of some of its most vital elements. These masses of non-Pharisaic Jews, and still greater masses of Hellenists and proselytes felt these closer and closer definitions of the yoke of the Law as a burdensome restraint, and turned to Christianity for relief from it.

As with his interpretation of Jesus, Montefiore has not failed to apply in many ways his faculty of sympathetic appreciation; but the field is one in which he is much less at home. It requires the insight of a student of the history of religion to see what elements of the older faith were working along other channels than that relatively narrow one which issues in the talmudic teaching. One must survey the whole domain of Judaism since the Persian period and appreciate developments in the Diaspora in contact with Greek thought as entitled just as truly to represent the real religious genius of Israel as the inbreeding of the Palestinian synagogue. Such a historian of religion is Friedländer. And Friedländer is as completely the champion of Hellenistic Judaism with its broader interpretation of Mosaism, its keener missionary spirit, its more universalistic ideal, as Montefiore of the Judaism of scribe and Pharisee.

Of the many volumes in which Friedländer develops his theory of the development of religious thought in the Judaism of New Testament times, perhaps the most significant is entitled *Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judenthums im Zeitalter Jesu* (1905). Here on the one side are discussed the developments of "Palestinian Judaism," classified under the heads: "The Apocalyptic Movement," "Religious Movements among the People of the Land (*am ha-'aretz*)," "Essenism," and "*Minuth*" (Jewish heresy). On the other side Hellenistic Judaism is described in its development at Alexandria as the legitimate outgrowth of the religion of Moses and the prophets. After a discussion of the Greco-Jewish literature in its motives and objects follows a chapter devoted to the Therapeutae (Jewish monasticism), setting this movement in comparison with Palestinian Essenism, and a chapter on the Sibylline "Wisdom" compared with apocalypse. The concluding chapters

present, respectively, "Jesus" and "Paul" as standing for the larger line of development, the true succession of the religious genius of Judaism in Palestine and the Greek-speaking world, respectively.

For to Friedländer the legalistic development of Judaism by scribe and Pharisee was a narrowing reaction. The movements he studies in Palestine and the Diaspora, respectively, exhibit to his mind coincident general tendencies. The apocalyptic literature is a Palestinian counterpart of the Hellenistic Wisdom in its humanitarian ethics, its universalistic ideals, and its cosmology of intermediate beings. The ascetic monasticism of the Therapeutae finds its counterpart among the Essenes, but above all the Isaian ideals of Israel as the Witness to the nations, the Light to lighten the Gentiles, the missionary calling of Israel, and the messianic hope as depicted in the great Songs of the Servant, he finds taken up by the Diaspora and neglected by the scribes. It is this which makes him award to Hellenistic Judaism the title to be the true heir to Israel's religious ideals. Not that in the bitter struggle against forcible Hellenization Chasidim and Pharisees did not fight an indispensable fight, but that the intensive struggle eclipsed the ideal of extension.

Thus talmudic Judaism in measuring all the history of Israel's religious past by its own standards is guilty of a fatal narrow-mindedness. Jesus in carrying to the "people of the land" a simple gospel of the forgiveness of sins, after the warning protest of the Baptist against national self-righteousness, was a truer successor to the prophets and the Chasidim, than the "painted" Pharisees into whose hands Alexandra delivered over, as far as she could, the development of the national institutions. Paul in giving new standing to the mediation doctrines of Hellenistic Wisdom, and interpreting the messianic idea in a universalistic sense, is not only doing justice to Deutero-Isaiah but is vindicating the claim of the Greek speaking Jew to be "also a son of Abraham."

Only with the second-century apologists and church Fathers does the process of expansion cease, according to Friedländer, to have a just claim to be a legitimate development of Judaism. Up to Justin the doctrine of the unity of God is no more threatened in the leading Christian writers than in Philo. The tritheism of the

catholic creeds is a gradual development from polemic with the synagogue.

Friedländer lacks the sweet reasonableness of Montefiore's style. His onslaughts on the scribes and Pharisees as the belittlers of Judaism, hiding "the light of the Gentiles" under their petty bushel, have almost the vehemence of the Gospels. He is an ardent champion of the Galilean *'am ha-'aretz*, and makes us feel as if he sympathized quite too much with Akiba in the days when the great rabbi had himself been an *'am ha-'aretz*, and "would have rushed upon a scribe like a mule to bite him" had he had opportunity. There is a splendid grasp of the subject from the broad viewpoint of the historian of religion, and a wonderfully sympathetic and appreciative familiarity with the Hellenistic Jewish literature from Septuagint to Philo. But Friedländer cannot help writing as an advocate, and one discounts something from representations that are too partisan.

Nevertheless, of the two interpretations every student of the history of religion in the Greco-Roman civilization must feel that it is that of Friedländer which does amplest justice to the subject. It is hard that Palestinian Judaism should be reproached with losing the missionary spirit and forgetting the universalistic ideal of the messianic hope, when the loss of the great body of its gentile adherents to the growing church was a misfortune due to the necessity it was under of defending its own life. In Alexandria Judaism enjoyed the favor of the Ptolemies and could develop its propaganda in peaceful accommodation to the broadening spirit of Greek philosophy. In Palestine it was forced into the bitterest struggle against Hellenism, and only preserved its separate identity by intensest particularism. Legalism was a means of self-preservation for the Palestinian synagogue. If the Pharisee incurred the hatred of the *'am ha-'aretz* by his attitude of: "Touch me not, lest thou shouldst pollute me in the place where I stand,"¹ this is but the obverse of a splendid heroism willing to undergo a thousand martyrdoms in defense of "the unity." And yet the real reason why Christianity inherited the great Isaian succession was because with all its faults it did preserve to the world a larger measure of the great germinant ideas of Hebrew monotheism than talmudic Judaism.

¹ Assumpt. Mos. 7:10 (7-30 A.D.). Cf. Büchler, *Der galiläische 'Am ha-'aretz*.

But the historian of religion is not an apologist. His comparisons are not made in the interest of possible superiorities. Even were there such a disposition on the part of the modern Christian, it would be put to shame by the great theodicy of Paul, in Rom. chaps. 9-11. For Paul the natural branches and the branches of the wild olive both have their part in the pedagogy of God, and the modern historian of religion must confess to something of the same sympathy as Paul's. He cannot afford not to trace with sympathetic interest that line of development which leads down from the Maccabean revolt to the war of Hadrian, and the stiffening of Jewish orthodoxy after the great crisis of the first century. To judge of Judaism as a whole from this line of development would be like judging the Christianity of pre-Reformation days from the standpoint only of Loyola and the Catholic reaction of the seventeenth century. The church Fathers are indeed wrong in their specific accusations against the leaders of the synagogue of cutting out from scripture passages which favored Christian doctrine. But evidences abound of the truth of the charge if we take it to mean the systematic elimination of those elements of the religious literature and belief of the Jewish laity which were suspected of leading to *minuth* or Christianity. There was a definite and systematic screwing up of the pegs of scriptural orthodoxy. The process began long before the Christian era with the battle against the encroachments of Hellenism. It received a tremendous impetus at the overthrow of the temple and the formation of the schools of the *Tannaim* in the period of Akiba. Its aim was the preservation of the purity of Jewish ethical monotheism. Its method was legalism, concentration of thought and action upon the written Torah. We can sympathize with it at the same time that we recognize that in the effort to purge itself of all *minuth*, all tendencies to *Epikouros*, to Greek liberalism, to Christianity, the synagogue of the founders of talmudic Judaism eliminated some of the most vital and fruitful elements of prophetic Mosaism.

As the two Jewish interpreters of Christianity to the synagogue in our time have set the example in a spirit of marvelous superiority to inherited predilection, so we may seek sympathetically to interpret Judaism. Much is to be learned from Montefiore, especially in the dissipation of the cloud of misrepresentation of

the scribe and Pharisee derived from exclusive dependence on New Testament polemic and apologetic. But we shall do well to make allowance also for the excluded elements of pre-talmudic Judaism.

In his noble chapter on "The Views of Jesus" Montefiore states it as only "possible" that "with the conception of the Messiah, as the prophets and tradition had framed it, there mingled in his [Jesus'] mind and heart that other prophetic conception of the Servant of the Lord, who was only to pass through humiliation and lowliness and sacrifice to his throne and his glory." Perhaps it is not strange that this messianic ideal is admitted only as a possibility by Montefiore. For it scarcely appears in synoptic literature. It belongs to the epistolary literature, the gospel preached about Jesus. But the fact that he is welcomed as the fulfiller of this ideal of Israel as the Lord's Servant to enlighten and justify the Gentiles, his Witness both missionary and martyr, confirms the evidence from other sources that this calling of Israel was then far more vividly alive than in the synagogue of later times. Indeed, it is when we read some thoroughly historical exposition of Judaism from the inside, such as Schechters' *Studies in Judaism*, or his *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, that we begin to realize how large the element is, even in rabbinic Judaism, of which Christian theology might say: This is now bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh.

Nowhere do we come so close to the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount as in the rabbinic distinction of works of "loving kindness" (*chasiduth*) from ordinary "righteousness."¹ Nowhere do we so get at the principle of solidarity which underlies Jesus' self-consecration in his martyr death "for the forgiveness of sins" as in the doctrine of *zachuth* or "justification through intercession."² It is natural that the abuse of the principle should be rigidly guarded against by the rabbis, especially after the defection of those who looked for the forgiveness of sins through the *zachuth* of Jesus' blood and intercession. But one cannot read the New Testament in the light of this standard interpretation of rabbinic theology, and not realize that the contention is true which Christian Hebraists such as Dalman and Oesterley have urged against less broad-minded advocates of rabbinic teaching, that the suffering of the

¹ See chap. xiii in his *Aspects*, on "The Law of Holiness and the Law of Goodness."

² *Ibid.*, chap. xii, on "Imputed Righteousness and Imputed Sin."

martyr-witness of Isa., chap. 53, who poured out his life as an offering for sin and made intercession for transgressors, was not a conception alien to the Judaism of Jesus' time.

Of course it is to be understood that the Servant is Israel, that the author of the Isaian Songs so intends it, and was so understood. The application to Jesus is simply on the universal principle that the Messiah has the titles of Israel: "Beloved," "Just One," "Elect," "Only-begotten," etc., by virtue of his representative function, inasmuch as he leads Israel to the fulfilment of its mission. But when we are led out into the larger apprehension of what Israel was, comprehensively considered, in the Greek period and under the guidance of a competent *Religionsgeschichtlicher* trace the development of the Deutero-Isaian ideal in the Wisdom literature and in Christianity, it will become apparent that not everything that comes down from the Judaism of post-exilic times is adequately presented in the teaching of the synagogue.

To interpret Christianity in its essence is to interpret the doctrine of the Cross and Resurrection. Judaism holds the key to this interpretation also. But not the Judaism which fiercely reacted against it as undermining the righteousness of the Law—or at least not this Judaism alone. It is that larger Judaism into which we enter when following back the many divergent streams we meet it in its first contacts and combinations with Greek religion and philosophy which must furnish it. If there be any parallel in Jewish literature which beyond others may seem to interpret this central thought of the gospel, it is in that Alexandrian sermon or panegyric of the Maccabean martyrs which goes under the name of Fourth Maccabees, and whose nearest analogue in the New Testament is the Epistle to the Hebrews. Here we find the martyrs doing as Jesus does at the farewell supper with his disciples. They pray *that their blood may atone* for their people, and the preacher conceives them as *interceding in the presence of God* for Israel.

Judaism in the larger aspect, as the history of religion is unfolding it to us, can do more than furnish instructive parallels to the ethics of Jesus. It can reveal to us the starting-point of that more vital element of the gospel, that Jesus "was delivered up for our transgressions, and was raised for our justification."

RELIGION AND WAR IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD

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Christianity arose in a distinctly martial environment. Palestine had been conquered by all the great world-powers of antiquity. Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, Macedonia, and Rome had each in turn subjugated the Hebrew people, who time and again resorted to arms in the hope of throwing off the foreign yoke. In New Testament times the memory of the Maccabean uprising was still cherished by Jewish loyalists, and fresh outbursts of national enthusiasm, such as brought about the fall of Jerusalem in the year 70 A.D. and the revolt of Barcochba under Hadrian, were always imminent.

Christians outside Palestine were also surrounded by an atmosphere of militarism. Alexander the Great, and his successors and their descendants, established throughout the East a monarchical type of government maintained by force of arms. Even the free Greek cities, always jealous of their autonomy, were often compelled to defend their independence by fighting or to place themselves under the protection of some powerful neighboring prince. Likewise the Romans, notwithstanding their native republican instincts, yielded to the pressure of the monarchical ideal and permitted their government to pass into the hands of an emperor whose supremacy depended upon the number of legions he could command. The early Christians soon found themselves located at various places about the Mediterranean, but everywhere the Roman soldier was in evidence and militarism was a dominant factor in daily life. To be sure, outside Palestine Christians were rarely if ever brought into immediate contact with actual military operations, but the life and thinking of their world was everywhere permeated with martial imagery and ideals.

In that ancient world the only other phenomenon comparable in importance and general interest with that of war was religion.

Many religious heritages from antiquity were preserved in Graeco-Roman times, notwithstanding the deterioration which various national faiths inevitably suffered under the cosmopolitan conditions established by Alexander and perpetuated by the Romans. Although these earlier religions, with a few exceptions, soon lost much of their national character, they often maintained their hold upon the populace. In fact, when freed from national limitations the ancient cults frequently took on new life. They both extended their territory and added to their adherents as a result of the fusion of different peoples in the complex life of the new world. In this way Semitic cults, originally confined mainly to Syria and Mesopotamia, invaded Asia Minor, Egypt, Greece, Italy, and Spain; Egyptian deities gained a footing all about the shores of the Mediterranean; the gods of Greece forsook their Hellenic isolation and became at home among the "barbarians"; deities from remote regions of Asia Minor, like Phrygia, Galatia, and Pontus, became widely known and revered; from distant Persia Mithraism spread throughout the Roman world and became for a time the chief religion in the empire; and finally Christianity, originally an obscure Palestinian cult, outdistanced its many rivals and obtained permanent official recognition at Rome.

The special prominence of both militarism and religion in this ancient world at once suggests a study of the mutual relationship between these two phenomena. From this broader outlook we may ascertain more accurately the relative positions of the war-ideal and the religious ideal in those early days, and more particularly among the early Christians. It may also be of interest to note the solutions then proposed for the problem of war, which has continued to be one of the most baffling items of human experience in all ages. Three main questions are suggested: (1) To what extent did militarism seek and use religious sanctions? (2) How far were the ideals and imagery of war employed by religion to give content or expression to its own life? (3) What interpretation was placed upon war as an actual factor in human experience? For the sake of definiteness the present discussion will not come down beyond the close of the New Testament period.

I

All wars are usually holy wars, from the belligerent's own point of view. When men deliberately hazard their lives in behalf of a cause they naturally believe they are doing God's service. Whether this loyalty is phrased in the conventional language of religion, or in the more secular terminology of patriotism, does not greatly matter. In either case the attitude is essentially the same, since the cause is automatically endowed with the highest and holiest sanctions. This may not be the case with the mercenary or with the unwilling conscript, but as most wars are either national or party strifes each combatant affirms, and truly believes, that he is fighting on behalf of the deity; and the deity, in turn, is expected to insure victory. This prevalent feeling is ultimately an inheritance from primitive tribalism when political well-being was regarded as the special concern of a tutelary god whose highest attribute was physical force.

In Graeco-Roman times this same disposition was widely prevalent. The promoters of war sought diligently, and usually sincerely, to obtain the highest possible religious sanctions for all military activities. Alexander had set the example in the East. At the very outset he took elaborate pains to insure the divine favor for his military expedition against the Persians.¹ Before embarking on the voyage across the Hellespont he erected altars to Athena and Hercules. While crossing he sacrificed a bull to Poseidon and the Nereids, and poured a libation from a golden goblet into the sea. On disembarking he erected an altar to Zeus, as well as to Athena and Hercules. He then went to Ilium and performed further religious ceremonies to the Trojan Athena, depositing his own panoply as a votive offering in the temple in exchange for some consecrated relics of the Trojan War which were carried before him into battle. Throughout his career he retained a very deferential attitude toward religion, being "strictly observant of his duty to the deity."² These statements may not always be true to actual fact, but they represent popular opinion from a comparatively early date and so attest the current belief

¹ See Arrian *Anabasis* i. 11.

² *Ibid.* vii. 28.

of Hellenistic times that a brilliant military expedition has fitting religious accompaniments.

A still more striking evidence of the desire to furnish militarism with religious sanctions is seen in the deification of the warrior-king. In this also Alexander was a model for Hellenistic thinking. According to Plutarch,¹ Alexander regarded himself as the agent of heaven chosen to mediate the blessings of civilization to the barbarians. Several authorities speak of the current belief that he was descended from deity. Numerous oracles are reputed to have indicated this fact during his lifetime, and after his death he was almost immediately apotheosized. One of his most self-controlled biographers, Arrian,² concedes that an individual who was so pre-eminently successful and famous, and so wholly unlike other mortals, can hardly have come into existence without the aid of the deity. Thus both the military undertakings of Alexander and the warrior-prince himself were supplied with substantial religious credentials.

His immediate successors soon clothed themselves with the same sort of authority. They not only assiduously inculcated the notion of Alexander's divine personality, but also made similar affirmations regarding themselves. Ptolemy I and his wife were not given supreme religious honors until after their death, but the second Ptolemy attained to this distinction during his lifetime. Henceforth the Egyptian rulers regularly supplemented their political dignity with divine credentials. Not only were they believed to be descended from some god, but they were the actual incarnation of deity and so were explicitly styled "God." The Seleucid rulers enjoyed similar honors, bearing such titles as "Zeus Victor," "Apollo Savior," "God Manifest," "God Victor," "Manifest Dionysus," and the like. These names were not merely self-bestowed decorations. Behind them stood a very definite religious organization designed to inculcate the notion that the absolute monarch, the stability of whose empire depended in reality upon the strength of his armies, ruled by divine right.

The Romans were less ready than were the Orientals to trust their national fortunes to a deified war-lord, yet their whole national

¹ *Fortune or Virtue of Alex.* i. 6.

² *Anabasis* vii. 30.

life was bound up most closely with religious observances. Rome believed that it had been destined from the first to exercise military supremacy over the whole world. Romulus, the legendary founder of the city, was said to have been the son of the war-god Mars. The city had been built at the instance of the gods whose will had been communicated to Romulus by vultures, and as these birds were accustomed to blood and prey the circumstances were thought to presage a brilliant military career for the new foundation.¹ Tradition also reported that early in history the manner of declaring and conducting war had been put upon a religious basis;² and the camp had its sacred precinct whither the unfortunate might flee for protection, since blood could not be shed in that place without defiling the altars of the gods.³ The religious scrupulosity with which the Romans conducted the affairs of state is too well known to need restatement. As Appian Claudius says, protesting against those who were disposed to neglect the sacred rites, "Who does not know that this city was built by auspices and that all things were conducted by auspices during war and peace both at home and abroad?"⁴

Foreign deities were also called in to support the Roman armies. One of the most familiar illustrations of this procedure was the introduction of the Cybele-cult into Rome in the year 204 B.C. The Carthaginian invasion was threatening, a severe plague had devastated the army, and numerous showers of stones had led the authorities to consult the Sibylline books. The answer directed that the invasion of Italy by a foreign foe could be successfully met if the Idaean Mother (Cybele) were brought to Rome. At this moment ambassadors who had been sent to Delphi to sacrifice to Apollo returned with encouraging news to the effect that the oracle had predicted victory for the Romans. The prediction, so it was assumed, would find fulfilment through following the advice of the Sibyl, and accordingly the cult of the Phrygian goddess was introduced with much solemnity.⁵ Thus two foreign deities, Apollo and Cybele, were now thought to sanction and support the Roman cause.

¹ Florus i. 1.² Tacitus *Annals* i. 39.³ Livy i. 32.⁴ Livy vi. 41.⁵ *Ibid.* xxix. 10 f.

Since the army sought the help of the gods, the sanctities of religion were to be respected by the soldiery. Livy (xxix. 8 f.) narrates that the Romans, on gaining the ascendancy in the territory of the Locrians, violated the temples and went to the extreme of even carrying off the treasures of Proserpine. Pyrrhus had committed the same crime, but on being punished by the loss of his fleet he returned the sacred money and made a costly expiatory offering. The crime of the Romans was also attended with calamity. Those who had violated the temple were subsequently seized by a spirit of madness causing them to turn on each other with the fury of enemies intent upon mutual annihilation. Soldiers and officers alike joined in the bloody riot and were killed or mutilated in large numbers. Such was the punishment which overtook those who exercised their military prerogatives of violence and rapine in places made sacred by religion.

Similarly Polybius (*Histories* iv. 67) charges those militarists who disregard religious sanctities with violating the fundamental principles underlying all human existence. He says of the Aetolians, who invaded Epirus and demolished the sanctuary at Dodona, that they "had no regard for the laws of peace or war, but in the one as well as in the other acted in defiance of the customs and principles of mankind."

The practical way in which the Roman authorities made religion serve the interests of the state is attested by a paragraph from Polybius' *Histories* vi. 56:

But the most important difference for the better which the Roman commonwealth appears to me to display is in their religious beliefs. For I conceive that what in other nations is looked upon as a reproach, I mean a scrupulous fear of the gods, is the very thing which keeps the Roman commonwealth together. To such an extraordinary height is this carried among them, both in private and public business, that nothing could exceed it. Many people might think this unaccountable; but in my opinion their object is to use it as a check upon the common people. If it were possible to form a state wholly of philosophers, such a custom would perhaps be unnecessary. But seeing that every multitude is fickle, and full of lawless desires, unreasoning anger, and violent passion, the only resource is to keep them in check by mysterious terrors and scenic effects of this sort. Wherefore, to my mind, the ancients were not acting without purpose or at random, when they brought in among the vulgar those opinions about the gods, and the belief in the punishments

in Hades. Much rather do I think that men nowadays are acting rashly and foolishly in rejecting them. This is the reason why, apart from anything else, Greek statesmen, if entrusted with a single talent, though protected by ten checking-clerks, as many seals, and twice as many witnesses, cannot be induced to keep faith; whereas among the Romans, in their magistracies and embassies, men have the handling of a great amount of money, and yet from pure respect to their oath keep their faith intact.¹

At a later date, and more especially in the East, the idea of the emperor's divine origin and authority was employed, in much the same way as by Alexander and his followers, to place militarism upon a religious basis. The Greeks were profuse in their gratitude to the Romans for help in throwing off the Macedonian yoke, and Roman generals like Flamininus, Pompey, and Julius Caesar were hailed as divine deliverers. In the imperial period this reverence became an important factor in the maintenance of Roman rule in the East. The cult of the living emperor, who was associated with the goddess Roma, was established at various places with an official priesthood and an appropriate temple. In Rome itself the emperors, out of deference to the popular prejudice against monarchy, were slower to employ this type of religious sanction. But in the East they freely availed themselves of these credentials, encouraging the building of temples in their honor and accepting the most extravagant laudatory epithets.² Thus both the Macedonians and the Romans followed the example of the other great world-powers of antiquity, giving militarism a full quota of divine sanctions.

Much the same thing was true of smaller groups included within the domains of the Macedonians and the Romans. The Syrian, Eunus, who led the slave war in Sicily in the year 134 B.C., claimed inspiration from the Syrian goddess by whose command he called his fellow-slaves to arms in the name of liberty. But the Jews furnished the most illustrious example of the religious revolutionist. The Maccabean uprising against the Seleucids, and several revolts of more or less magnitude against the Romans, were all conducted

¹ *The Histories of Polybius*, translated by E. Shuckburgh (New York, 1889), I, 505 f.

² For particulars see S. J. Case, *The Evolution of Early Christianity* (Chicago, 1914), pp. 211 ff.

under the conviction that God approved the enterprise and would crown the rebels' arms with victory. Although Christians refused to participate in these military activities of their Jewish kinsmen, we are not to infer that Christians therefore would deny religious sanctions to all military endeavors. On the contrary, they looked for an early demonstration of God's own military supremacy when all the armies of the Romans, since they really belonged to Satan, would be overwhelmingly defeated by the hosts of heaven.

II

National faiths naturally make extensive use of military imagery and ideals in defining the content of religion. But neither the Macedonians nor the Romans had a full-fledged national religion which might have been superimposed upon the vanquished. In fact, it was not the policy of either of these conquerors to abolish the religions of subjugated peoples. Yet the establishment of world-empire did demand a change of emphasis in many of the older cults. Since the national ideal of former times gradually vanished with the absorption of the smaller states into one vast world-empire, religion necessarily became more strongly individualistic. But the abandonment of nationalism did not mean that religion was no longer affected by militarism. Just so long as the latter remained an ever-present factor in human experience, did it continue to be influential in the religious domain.

When nationalism gave place to individualism, fealty to the monarch supplanted the older notion of devotion to the nation, and religion very soon felt the effect of this change of emphasis. In earlier times the national patriot fought primarily for his country; now his first obligation was to his king, who was the divinely appointed guardian of his country's weal. Side by side with this new individualism there went also a new cosmopolitanism which further relieved the individual of any sense of immediate personal responsibility for the welfare of society. He was now simply an atom in a vast cosmic mechanism too great for him to understand, or to question with impunity. He must either find his life's satisfactions in blind submission to a monarchically administered order of present existence, or else he must seek a

way of escape from the present world to new and other-worldly realms of bliss.

The former of these tendencies found its most common expression in worship of the ruler. The mighty prince whose invincible armies brought peace and prosperity to his subjects had a tremendous influence upon the religion of his admirers. They revered him as their savior, they made their god in his image, and they rendered him their worship. A citation from the birthday decree of Augustus, issued about the year 9 B.C., will serve to illustrate the sentiments behind this type of religion:

Since Providence, which orders all our life introducing esteem and distinction, adorned our life most perfectly by granting us Augustus, whom she filled with virtue for the benefit of mankind—sending him to be a savior for us as well as for our descendants, bringing all wars to an end and setting up all things in order—when Caesar appeared he fulfilled the hopes of those who pointed forward to him, not only excelling previous benefactors, but leaving to future generations no hope of surpassing him. The birthday of the god [Augustus] was for the world the beginning of the good tidings [gospels] because of him.

Similar language, typical of many such remains, is found in the inscription from Halicarnassus:

Now the eternal and immortal power of all nature bestowed benefactions in superabundance upon men, granting to our own good fortune Caesar Augustus, father of his own native land, Rome divine. He also is patrimonial Zeus and savior of the common race of mankind, all of whose prayers Providence has not only fulfilled but even surpassed; for earth and sea have peace, cities flourish well governed, harmonious, and prosperous, the course of all good things has reached a climax and all mankind has been filled with good hopes for the future and good cheer for the present.

Remarkable as was the influence of the victorious war-lord upon religion within the Graeco-Roman world, many persons were not content with this merely terrestrial hope. Like Seneca, they were often dissatisfied if not disgusted by the tyranny of imperial rule, and believed death to be the only sure means of attaining real liberty.¹ Consequently various religions which guaranteed the believer a blessed immortality took on new life in the Mediterranean world. Yet even these mystery-cults did not escape the

¹ *On Benefits*, vi. 19.

dominant influence of the military régime. Mithraism was distinctly a soldiers' religion, but its influence did not become at all extensive in the period with which we are at present concerned. The older cults, however, show distinctly the effects of a martial environment. The devotees thought in military terminology, although dwelling more especially upon the benefits of peace or even tacitly protesting against the exaltation of violence. The oath of initiation (*sacramentum*) into the mysteries of Bacchus—if Livy (xxxix. 15) is correctly informed—was modeled after that taken by the soldier; and the initiate into the mysteries of Isis now counted himself to be enrolled in a "holy militia."¹ The hero-gods of the mystery-cults, as they appear in the legends of Graeco-Roman times, are often portrayed in the likeness of the world-conquering Alexander. But they warred only for the benefit of mankind, their chief object being to bestow gifts upon mortals.

Dionysus, for example, journeyed through the world even to India, teaching men the culture of the vine together with other arts of civilization, and after overcoming various enemies he was at last rewarded with divine honors.² The deities and heroes connected with the Eleusinian mysteries—Demeter, Kore, Triptolemus—performed similar functions. Isis and Osiris were credited with even greater trials and conquests in their militant mission prior to joining the ranks triumphant. Osiris was born "Lord of all," but his chief ambition was to teach mankind cultivation of the soil, to give them laws, and to instruct them in religion. He traveled over all the earth taming warlike men with persuasive words and music and song. Yet he and Isis, with whom he was most closely associated, engaged in fierce conflict with deific enemies; but finally, having completed their labors, they were exalted in triumph to heaven. This idea is brought out very clearly in Plutarch's *Isis and Osiris*, chap. xvii:

But the avenger of Osiris, his sister and wife [Isis] who extinguished and put a stop to the madness and fury of Typhon, did not forget the contests and struggles she had gone through, nor yet her own wanderings, nor did she suffer oblivion and silence to envelop her many deeds of wisdom and many

¹ Apuleius *Metamorphoses* xi. 15.

² Diodorus I. xv. 6-8; Pausanias, x. 29; Lucian *Dialogues of the Dead* xiv.

feats of courage, but by intermingling with the most sacred ceremonies images, hints and representations of her sufferings of yore, she consecrated at one and the same time both lessons of piety and consolation in suffering for men and women when overtaken by misfortune. And she, together with Osiris, having been translated from the rank of good demons up to that of gods, by means of their virtue (as later was done with Hercules and Bacchus) receive not inappropriately the united honors of gods and demons everywhere both in the regions above earth and in those under ground, possessing the supreme power.¹

Even the philosophers, who often protested against war, frequently used martial imagery in a semi-religious manner. Seneca (*Ep.* cvii. 9) remarked that God should be obeyed cheerfully, for it was a poor soldier who whiningly followed his emperor. Epictetus admonished his hearers to swear the military oath of allegiance to God as the soldier did to Caesar, for the true Stoic was a willing recruit in the service of Zeus.² In this teaching the Stoics were following the example of Socrates who saw in his God-given task of defending the truth a resemblance to military duty imposed by earthly rulers.³ There was less religious fervor behind the phrase "soldiers of *εὐμαρτέμῃ*"; and the frequent *militia Veneris* of the poets is not of importance in the present connection.⁴

The influence of militarism upon Jewish religion was especially pronounced. This was due to the fact that the Jews, at least in Palestine, still held tenaciously to their national ideals even in Graeco-Roman times. The faith of the Hebrews had been sorely tried by God's failure to give them the national supremacy for which they had believed themselves destined. But as time passed, and no earthly prince seemed able to restore the glories of David and Solomon, a new faith reared itself above the débris of their shattered hopes. The new régime would not be a product of earth but a gift from heaven. The Messiah would not arise from among the children of men; he would be the heavenly Son of Man coming with power to set up a new kingdom of righteousness upon a miraculously renovated earth. This event would constitute the greatest military

¹ *Plutarch's Morals: Theosophical Essays*, translated by C. W. King (London, 1882), p. 22.

² Epictetus *Discourses* I. xiv. 2; III. xxiv. 6.

³ Plato *Apology* 28E.

⁴ Cf. Ovid *Amours* i. 9.

triumph of all ages. God in person, or through the agency of the Messiah, would utterly annihilate all his enemies.

While this type of belief may have been fairly common among Palestinian Jews in New Testament times, there were some who wished to make a more immediate appeal to force, believing that if they took the initiative God would intervene in their behalf. Religion for them was closely associated with present as well as with future militancy. On various occasions they interpreted religious duty in terms of actual revolution. Any affront to their religious scruples—or, what meant the same thing, to their national pride—was thought to justify violent retaliatory action in which they willingly sacrificed their lives in defense of their convictions. These Zealots, as they were called, are said by Josephus to have appeared as a distinct sect at the time when the government of Judaea was placed in the hands of a Roman procurator in the year 6 A.D. But the Zealots introduced no essentially new principle into Jewish thinking, so far as concerned the rights of religion to express itself not only in the phraseology but in the actual conduct of war. The Zealot and the “passivist” were really agreed on the general principle, but they differed on the question of expediency. The former would exercise his military rights at once, while the latter would wait for God to take the initiative.

The early Christians were “passivists” in their attitude toward both the Jewish and the Roman state. They paid the temple tax imposed by the Jewish authorities (Matt. 17:24 ff.), as well as the tribute money collected by the Romans (Matt. 22:17 ff.; Mark 12:14 ff.; Luke 20:22 ff.; Rom. 13:7), though they felt themselves quite superior to either of these powers. Furthermore, their unlimited confidence in God’s management of the universe, and their firm belief that in the near future he would suddenly intervene to right all evils, relieved them from any personal responsibility for the solution of political or social problems. They refused to join the Jewish revolutionists, evil though they believed the Roman government in the last analysis to be. This attitude meant an interpretation of the messianic hope quite different from that of the Zealots, for it implied that all worldly dominion under the present order of existence—even that which Jewish loyalists were

fighting to attain—was inherently evil. To acquire any sort of kingdom within the present world-order would be to bow down to Satan, hence the indifference of the Christian toward politics. He could justify his view by recalling the incident in Jesus' temptation, where the kingdoms of the earth were assumed to be the property of Satan (Matt. 4:8 f.; Luke 4:6 ff.). But since it seemed to be God's wish that the evil one should be temporarily in the ascendancy, Christians would not only submit to the present order but would emphasize their submission by yielding twice as much as was demanded—they would go two miles instead of one, they would offer the other cheek when smitten on the one, and they would give their cloak to him who forcibly took their tunic (Matt. 5:39 f.; Luke 6:29 f.).

Apparently it was not always easy to persuade all Christians to emulate this ideal. Even in so small a matter as the adjustment of local disputes between members of the church at Corinth a belligerent spirit had manifested itself. This was sharply condemned by Paul who reminded the Corinthians that they might well suffer injustice temporarily since all their troubles would soon be adjusted in the final judgment when they, indeed, would be elevated to the position of judge even over angels (I Cor. 6:3, 7). Submission to the authority of the state was also inculcated by different Christian teachers. The readers of I Peter were encouraged to obey the rulers, remembering that Jesus, confident in the righteousness of God, had submitted even to reviling and death at the hands of these earthly authorities (I Pet. 2:13-17, 23). Paul admonished the Romans to be subject to the powers which God had ordained for the present protection of society (Rom. 13:1-7). A similar note was sounded in Titus 3:1-3 and in Clement of Rome's Epistle to the Corinthians, chaps. 60 f. In later times the attitude toward the state authorities was far less friendly, but there never was any serious disposition to resist the state by force.

Although the Christians were "passivists" with reference to the existing political order, they were far from being "pacifists" when it came to defining the content of Christian thinking. For this purpose they used freely both the imagery and the language of

militarism. One of the most notable of such examples from the New Testament is Eph. 6:10-18, in which believers are exhorted to arm themselves with a complete equipment for the mighty warfare which is being waged between the powers of darkness and the followers of Christ. Paul, in his controversy with the Corinthians, declares that he is armed with powerful spiritual weapons which he will employ to raze the strongholds of his enemies' pride (II Cor. 10:3-6). Christians are "soldiers" equipped with the armor of righteousness, they are entitled to a soldier's pay for service rendered if they choose to demand it, and they are prepared to suffer any hardships their general may command (e.g., Rom. 6:13 f., 23; 13:12; I Cor. 9:7; II Cor. 6:7; 11:8; Phil. 2:25; I Thess. 5:8; Philem., vs. 2; I Tim. 1:18; II Tim. 2:3 f.).

The military ideal was employed even more extensively in describing the redemptive work of the Messiah. The new religious movement inaugurated by him was called a "kingdom," and the process by which it was to be consummated was a unique display of military prowess on the part of its king. While upon earth his royal claims had been set at naught, but a day would come when he would appear in the glory of his Father with the holy angels and slay his enemies with the breath of his mouth (Mark 8:38; II Thess. 2:8). The early Christians awaited the coming of "the Day" with eager confidence, longing for the appearing of their warrior-prince accoutered in the panoply of heaven and leading the angelic hosts to victory in behalf of righteousness. Thus both the career of the believer and the activity of his Lord were expressed in terms of the military ideal—an ideal still preserved in such popular hymns as "Onward Christian Soldiers" and "The Son of God Goes Forth to War."

In general the religions of the Graeco-Roman world usually emulated some form of the military ideal. Yet apart from occasional extremists, like Eunus among the Sicilian slaves and the Zealots in Palestine, the influence of militarism did not often come to expression in actual violence undertaken in the name of religion. Whether religion itself is to be credited with exercising a voluntary restraint in this respect, or whether the watchfulness and stability of the Roman rule is to be chiefly thanked, would in some cases be

difficult to say. It was not long, however, before conditions changed and religion availed itself of the assistance of the army in its propaganda. Christianity ultimately attained to this favored position, but not until after the period to which our present study belongs.

III

War, as a concrete factor in human experience, has rarely been popular. Not until it clothes itself in the garments of patriotism, or affects to champion some moral or spiritual ideal, does it acquire a semblance of respectability. Even then it is sometimes suspected of being a wolf in sheep's clothing—perhaps a Satan masquerading as an angel of light. At least, as an item in actual human experience, it can hardly hope for any higher encomium than to be adjudged a necessary evil. Its benefits have at times been highly praised, but these have usually been discovered *ex post facto*, and their integrity has been guarded by a discreet silence about accompanying evils. Furthermore, under these circumstances little if any account has been taken of the more fundamental question as to whether even greater benefits could not and ought not to have been procured by pacific agencies.

The Graeco-Roman world was not unique in this respect. It is very true that the actual fact of war was viewed with repugnance by many persons. Poets like Tibullus (i. 3) and Virgil (*Eclog.* iv) lamented the degeneracy of their age, when under the rule of Jupiter "slaughter and swords were incessant"; and they longed for the coming of a new day—the return of Saturn's rule—when a new king should appear "under whom first the iron age shall cease and the golden age over all the world arise." The same sort of longing was reflected in the popular praise of the ruler who was hailed as "savior" because he was thought to mediate the blessings of peace to his subjects. It was in this spirit that Augustus' birthday was rated equal to the beginning of all creation, since it "gave another aspect to the whole world which would truly have perished utterly had not Caesar, the common good fortune of all men, been born."

As to the desirability of eliminating war, there apparently was practical unanimity of opinion. But the final attainment of this

ideal was often felt to be a long way off, and there probably was not a little skepticism regarding the possibility of its attainment. For the most part, people who gave the subject any reflective consideration whatever tried to discover the real causes which produced war and to estimate it from an ethical or political point of view. The chief questions they asked were: (1) By what means can the evil be reduced to the smallest possible dimensions, if it cannot indeed be entirely eliminated? (2) What are the causes, just or otherwise, which lead to war? and (3) What justifications can be offered in its behalf on those occasions when it appears to be inevitable? Some typical answers given to these questions in Graeco-Roman times may prove interesting.

The point of view of a statesman and moralist, who interpreted life from the postulates of the Platonic philosophy, is revealed in Cicero. In his *Offices* (i. 11 and 23) he says there are two ways in which a dispute may be settled. It may be amicably decided on the basis of a full discussion, or the disputants may resort to arms. The former method is the normal one for men to employ, and the latter is characteristic of beasts. Only when all amicable means fail is man justified in resorting to force, and even then the controlling motive should be a desire to bring about peace and safety for all concerned as soon as possible. Again, in his *Commonwealth* (iii. 37), he affirms his conviction that all wars should proceed from a proper motive and only after a pacific settlement of difficulties is found to be absolutely impossible. In this connection he draws a distinction between the duty of the individual and that of the state, imposing upon the latter a greater obligation to preserve its own existence intact. The state is assumed to be a superior form of existence which belongs in a higher category than the individual and the preservation and protection of which is more important. The individual may regard death as a legitimate means of escape from trouble, but the state must be so constituted as to live forever—the *Roman* state, of course, Cicero means. Should it fall into decay the catastrophe could be compared only to the final wreck of the universe. Hence, “since Rome has acquired possession of the world by war, it must employ force to keep the universe from collapsing.” Yet Rome ultimately fell without wrecking the universe, and the hope it had cherished of attaining

permanent peace by force of arms proved a delusion. In fact, the fate of the Roman Empire might be taken to indicate that they who live by the sword shall one day perish by the sword.

Plutarch of Chaeronea—Platonist, *littérateur*, and ardent admirer of Hellenism—in his treatise on the *Fortune or Virtue of Alexander* (i. 4–6) unstintedly praises the great Macedonian conqueror for bestowing the gifts of civilization upon the subjugated peoples of the Orient. On this ground Alexander's military activity—and, incidentally, war in general when properly authenticated—is fully justified. Alexander's expedition is said to have been prompted by a desire to civilize wild and barbarous rulers, and to establish cultured Greek cities among rude and unpolished peoples. Good government, peace, and civilization followed him; Homer, Euripides, and Sophocles now became known to the conquered peoples, "who would never have been civilized had they never been conquered." But those who fled before the victorious Alexander, escaping his forcibly conferred blessings, remained in a state of unrelieved misery. Since he was performing the will of heaven by conducting the civilizing propaganda, and since he was thereby really bestowing benefits upon mortals, he was fully justified in using force to accomplish his purpose. The end amply justified the means. Hence those whom he could not win by persuasion he subdued by armies, laboring that he might bring all peoples under the dominion of the divine Hellenic *Kultur*. It goes without saying that the man who expounded this philosophy of war was a partisan Philhellene.

The Epicureans are said to have treated somewhat slightly those national and patriotic ideals by which men like Cicero and Plutarch sought to justify the phenomenon of war. The Epicureans refused, for example, to recognize anything especially praiseworthy in the Greek hero Epaminondas whose brilliant military career had raised Thebes to a position of supremacy over Sparta. It was allowed that he had a few good qualities, but the Epicureans nicknamed him "iron bowels" and asked why he wanted to devastate the Peloponnesus with war instead of remaining peacefully at home.¹ This way of speaking must have seemed almost sacrilegious to Plutarch, who reports the tradition. Lucretius,

¹ Usener, *Epicurea* (Leipzig, 1887), p. 329.

who represents Roman Epicureanism, also protests against war. In the introduction to his poem on the *Nature of Things* he appeals to Venus, whose name he uses metaphorically to personify all the vital forces of nature, to stop the ravages of war upon both land and sea.

The Stoics were still more incisive in their criticism of the war-ideal. The earlier representatives of this school apparently tried to harmonize the fact of war with their faith in divine Providence. Zeno and Chrysippus are said to have believed that God used war as a means of preventing the earth from becoming overpopulated.¹ But as this is the report of one of their critics, it may be that Zeno had really intended to point out that belligerency was wont to accompany, or to be engendered by, colonizing activity and commercial jealousies. War was the result when "cities, overcharged with too many citizens, send forth colonies into foreign territory and make war against other peoples." Possibly Cleanthes had some such thing in mind when he referred, in his well-known *Hymn*, to the evil deeds which wicked men wrought upon earth and sea, thus making it necessary for God to bring order out of disorder.

Among the later Stoics, Seneca is especially severe in his arraignment of militarism. He ridicules the folly of those martial activities by which human beings establish tribal boundaries and fight for control of territory. Would ants, he sarcastically asks, if they ever should become endowed with human intelligence, apportion the threshing-floor into many provinces? In his opinion, the laudation of nationalism and militancy is mainly a cloak to shield pride and greed of gold. In writing of the winds (*Natural Questions* V. xviii. 4 ff.) he says that God did not intend them to be used for military advantage:

His object was not that we might man our fleet with armed soldiers to seize every quarter of the main, and that we might go in search of foes either in or beyond the sea. What frenzy goads us on, and matches us in strife for our mutual destruction? We spread the sails to the winds to go in quest of war, and we run risks of sea for the sake of meeting risks of battle! . . . Why do we press whole nations into arms? Why do we enrol armies to marshal their lines amid the billows? Why do we disquiet the seas? The land, I suppose, is not wide enough to compass our death! . . . But what can one

¹ Plutarch *The Contradictions of the Stoics* 22 f.

call it but plain insanity actually to carry destruction in your train, to rush in anger against men you never saw, to lay waste without provocation all that comes in your path, and, after the fashion of wild beasts, to kill a man you do not hate? We are worse than beasts, for they bite only in retaliation, or from hunger; but we, utterly lavish of our own and others' blood, harass the seas by the vessels we launch, entrust our safety to the waves, and pray for favoring winds, counting it our good fortune to be borne in safety to the wars! To what lengths have our crimes hurried us criminals? Is it not enough to vent one's madness within one's own sphere? Your stupid king of Persia must cross into Greece, filling it with an army with which he has failed to conquer it. Your Alexander, leaving behind Bactria and India, must needs seek to learn what lies beyond the great sea, and will chafe that there is any point beyond which he cannot go. Crassus in like manner will fall a prey to the Parthians through his lust for gold. He will not dread the imprecations of the tribune who calls him back, nor the storms of the tedious sea, nor the lightning by Euphrates that foretold destruction, nor the resistance of heaven itself. Through the wrath of man and God alike gold shall be sought.¹

The Stoic Musonius Rufus was also opposed to war, and so loyal was he to his convictions that he proclaimed his views both in season and out of season. When the civil strife was raging between Vitellius and Vespasian he visited the camp and attempted to harangue the soldiers. Tacitus (*History* iii. 81) says he lauded the blessings of peace and protested against the calamities of war. But his audience did not appreciate his efforts. He was derided by some, others treated him with disgust, still others raised violent opposition, and Musonius barely escaped alive. Such was the treatment accorded the reformer, himself a Roman knight, who inveighed against the existing order—or rather disorder—of things.

The religionists of the period did not devote themselves to the solution of the problem of war with the same practical seriousness as did the politician or philosopher. Much of the religion of that day was less concerned with the renovation of society than with the isolation of a select group of persons who were being prepared for a future life of blessedness in another world. Escape from war was ardently desired, and it was criticized for its inhumanity and wickedness, but no religion of the time—pagan, Jewish, or Christian—made any serious efforts at actually establishing upon earth a

¹ Translation by J. Clarke, *Physical Science in the Time of Nero* (London, 1910), pp. 213 ff.

practically workable social and political order for all humanity in which war would be eliminated. To be sure, the pagan mysteries lauded the ideal of peace, and Christianity inculcated, as did Stoicism, the doctrine of human brotherhood and the supremacy of love, even love for one's enemies. But this ideal course of conduct was set forth, in the case of Christianity, more especially as the goal of attainment within the community of believers. It would insure them an ultimate reward and would prevent them from encroaching upon the rights of God with respect to the execution of vengeance (Matt. 5:44 ff.; Luke 6:27 ff.; Rom. 12:17, 19 f.). It was perfectly natural that Christians in the first century, relatively few as they were in numbers and uninfluential politically and socially, should not consider seriously the possibility of reconstructing the main fabric of society in accordance with their lofty ethical ideals for individual conduct. Still more impossible was it for them to engage in this undertaking, since they believed that the present order was soon to perish utterly by the hand of God. The task of applying this Christian ideal in a more permanent and extensive system of earthly relationships, or of constructing new ideals to meet new situations, remained to be worked out by future generations.

While the Graeco-Roman world can scarcely be said to have reached any final solution of the problem of war, its treatment of this subject is both interesting and suggestive. Following a very natural impulse, it provided war with substantial religious sanctions and it fortified religion with numerous martial attributes. The Stoic analysis of the causes of war is particularly penetrating. Commercial aggressiveness backed by armies and navies, national pride in the acquisition of foreign territory, the spirit of adventure and craving for glory—these undoubtedly were important factors in stimulating military activities, particularly among the Romans. With the Macedonians the situation was slightly different, in that the individual war-lord played a more important rôle. His personal ambitions were not, however, different in kind from the main incentives behind war in general. As the wars of that age were attended with both good and evil consequences, it was possible for men like Cicero and Plutarch, dwelling chiefly upon items that

could be regarded as beneficial, to see in the phenomenon an instrument of good government as well as an agency for the preservation and spread of culture. The less favorable judgment, proceeding from the conviction that the evils of war were too great to warrant its justification at all, had more difficulty in showing that the function which war served could actually be preformed by pacific agencies. It must be admitted that the case of these critics was far stronger on its negative than on its positive side. But we are not to conclude that their ideal was absolutely impracticable, merely because they did not succeed in making it actually effective in their own world.

PROTESTANT POLEMIC AGAINST ROMAN CATHOLICISM

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This is an irenic age. Earnest men are inquiring why the unhappy divisions of Christianity should persist. Many are praying that the church may become in fact the one holy catholic church. The temper of the times may enable us to review more calmly the debate which has been carried on between Protestant and Catholic for the last four hundred years. The debate indeed is not yet closed. Various periodicals on both sides seem determined to keep it alive. Yet we may hope that bitterness of feeling is diminishing and that the majority of thoughtful men can rise above it.

Let us recognize at the outset that the difference in point of view is serious. History is seen by both parties in a light colored by the prejudgment of each. Take the following description of the Middle Ages by a Roman Catholic writer:

Ages of highest grace to men: when all Europe was Catholic; when vast temples were seen to rise in every place of human concourse to give glory to God and to exalt men's souls to sanctity; when houses of holy peace and order were found amidst the woods and desolate mountains, on the banks of placid lakes as well as on solitary rocks in the ocean; ages of sanctity which witnessed a Bede, an Alcuin, a Francis, and crowds which followed them as they did Christ; ages of vast and beneficent intelligence in which it pleased the Holy Spirit to display the power of the seven gifts in the lives of an Anselm, a Thomas of Aquinum, and the saintly flock whose steps a cloister guarded; ages of the highest civil virtue; ages of the noblest art; ages of poetry; ages of more than mortal heroism.

Such is the picture drawn by an ardent defender of the Roman church. And the author does not leave us in doubt as to the reason for all this perfection. The reason is that the church occupied her rightful place in human society: "The whole type and

form of life were Christian, though its detail may have been often broken and disordered."

In opposition to this we might easily draw from Protestant writers a description of the Middle Ages every detail of which would contradict the one we have just read. These were the ages of ignorance and superstition; ages of civil disorder; ages of violence and oppression; ages of apostasy from the gospel of Christ; ages when the Scriptures were unknown to the believer; ages when the intellect occupied itself in barren discussion; ages when the church was so corrupt that it might aptly be called (in the language of one of the leading Protestant creeds) a synagogue of Satan, and when the Bishop of Rome by his arrogance showed himself to be the Antichrist, the Man of Sin and Son of Perdition against whom the New Testament utters its warning. The whole type and form of life (says the Protestant polemic) was heathen rather than Christian.

It is easy to say that the prejudgment of the Roman Catholic is due altogether to education. Brought up to believe that the church is the institution divinely ordained to secure his eternal salvation, he is able to shut his eyes to her shortcomings. But this theory fails to account for all the facts. The convinced Protestant every now and then receives a shock when one of his own brethren, brought up in the traditional opposition to Romanism, becomes a convert to the faith that he once abhorred. The attractiveness of the Roman ideal is exerted not alone on those brought up in that communion, but reaches out to thoughtful and devout minds outside her borders. At times the number of converts to the Roman church is so considerable as to alarm the leaders of Protestantism, and the result is renewed zeal in combating the Catholic claims. A striking illustration may be found in the last century when the Tractarian movement called attention anew to the attractiveness of the Roman system. In alarm at the defections from Protestantism, prominent men in England organized a Society for Promoting the Principles of the Reformation. The method was to republish the more important of earlier controversial works. The most extensive of these was the *Preservative from Popery* first published by Edmund Gibson, bishop of London, in the

seventeenth century. In the reprint it fills eighteen octavo volumes, and a supplement from other sources added eight more. Not content with this the society republished also Andrew Willett's *Synopsis Papismi* in ten volumes. This Protestant arsenal therefore consisted of thirty-six volumes of argument, and one wonders how the church could survive so formidable an attack.

One reason why the attack failed of its full effect is doubtless the changed temper of the times. The feeling with which the questions at issue were approached in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cannot be better shown than by citing the title-page of Willett's work. It runs as follows:

Synopsis Papismi, that is, a general View of Papistry wherein the whole Mystery of Iniquity and Sum of Anti-Christian Doctrine is set forth which is maintained this Day by the Synagogue of Rome against the Church of Christ. Together with an Antithesis of the true Christian Faith, and an Antidotum of Counterpoison out of Scripture against the Whore of Babylon's filthy Cup of Abominations, confuted by Scripture, Fathers, Councils, Imperial Constitutions, Pontifical Decrees, their own Writers and our Martyrs and the Consent of all Christian Churches in the World. Divided into five Books or Centuries, that is, so many Hundreds of Popish Heresies and Errors.

It need scarcely be said that the temper of the writer is not adapted to gain him a hearing at the present day. Even more drastic examples might be quoted from early writers, and that the Catholic attacks upon Protestantism were no milder in tone is well known. With these, however, we are not now concerned. As Protestants we are concerned to estimate the validity of the Protestant argument. According to Willett this argument includes no less than five hundred separate heads or specifications. It is impossible here to consider this multitude of details. But we may notice the five groups into which they naturally fall. If I see correctly they may be classed as political, theological, ecclesiastical, ethical, and religious (in the proper sense of the word). The lines between the different groups may not always be easy to draw, but these heads will at least serve as guides.

The question of most importance in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the political. It is easy to show from Roman Catholic writers that the Pope claims to be supreme over all earthly monarchs. As ruler of the kingdom of God and the

Vice-regent of Christ he is universal sovereign, and he has the right to insist on the subordination of Christian princes. This claim is in our day of no practical importance, because the actual sovereignty of the Pope is confined to the Vatican and its gardens. But when the Pope undertook to excommunicate Queen Elizabeth and to release her subjects from their allegiance the question was a burning one. In the same way the claim of the church that ecclesiastical persons are to be judged by the church courts and not by the civil magistrate is no longer a live issue. But when the church courts insisted on their jurisdiction, and the inquisition tried, tortured, and convicted, not only priests, but laymen, for heresy and witchcraft the issue was brought close home to all thinking men. At the present day the whole series of arguments on these points makes no impression because the danger of aggression is so remote. The Pope may claim to be king of kings, but no American supposes that our President will be deposed because he is a heretic; and the allegiance of American Catholics to the church does not (to common observation) interfere with the performance of their duties to the state. In some countries Catholicism and democracy may seem hereditary enemies; here we have not found them to be so.

The theological arguments are more numerous than the political. The fundamental question, which was forced upon Luther at the beginning of his career as reformer, was the question of the seat of authority. He chose to abide by Scripture, whereas the church clung to tradition. The church insists indeed upon Scripture *and* tradition, but in fact this means Scripture interpreted by tradition, and this makes tradition the final arbiter. The long discussion about the extent of the Canon, the authentic text, the right of the people to read the Bible, need not detain us here. A large part of it has lost interest for two reasons: First, we have discovered the true nature of the Scriptures and of tradition, and we know that neither one is what the Fathers took it to be; and in the second place we lay less stress upon correctness of intellectual faith as essential to religion. Yet I think that we should recognize the force which inheres in the Roman Catholic claim to possess certainty. Men, or at least some men, crave an infallible teacher. The variations of Protestantism, of which Bossuet made so much, bewilder the man in

search of truth. In distinction from the various systems which Protestant theologians put forward, the Catholic asserts that his church has kept the deposit of faith once for all delivered to the saints. It was this claim of possessing the truth, put forward by the Catholic church with sincerity of conviction, which impressed so fine a mind as that of John Henry Newman. A later example is Robert Hugh Benson, son of an archbishop of Canterbury, who was an ordained minister of the Church of England. What troubled him was that he found no unanimity of teaching in the Anglican communion. And he did find it in the Roman church. His words are: "In all that concerns the salvation of souls the church must know her own mind and must teach clearly and constantly." And after some years of experience in the Roman church he declares that to return from the Catholic church to the Anglican would be the exchange of certitude for doubt, of faith for agnosticism, of substance for shadow, of brilliant light for somber gloom, of historical world-wide fact for unhistorical provincial theory (*Confessions of a Convert*, p. 142). Elsewhere he speaks of the impression of logical completeness and consistency made by Catholic doctrine, even when preached by a high Anglican. For the first time, he says, after hearing it thus preached, "Christian doctrine presented itself to me as an orderly scheme. I saw now how things fitted into one another, how the sacraments followed inevitably from the incarnation, how body and spirit were alike met in the mercy of God." I think we should recognize the power which this logical consistency of teaching puts into the hands of the Roman church.

This leads up to the third group of arguments—those which concern themselves with the church as an institution. The Roman church claims to be the true church because of its unity, and because of its continuity. Here we have an issue that must be called serious. There can be no disputing the fact that the Roman church as an organization has existed from the very early times, a claim that Protestant churches cannot make. Even the Babylonian captivity of the popes does not invalidate the continuity of ecclesiastical establishment. In details the Roman claims may be disputed: It is a question whether Peter was ever bishop of Rome;

the succession of early bishops is still in doubt; whether the powers given to Peter by Christ were transferred to his successors no one can say with authority. Yet when all is said the continuity of the organization and the succession of ordained ministers stands firm for at least sixteen centuries. Against this Protestants urge the corruptions of the church, and it is of course easy to show that the simplicity of the New Testament has been departed from by the papal system. But here the theory of development comes in as it was wrought out by Newman. If the church is a living organism we must allow it to grow. And if the Roman church is not the church of the New Testament, no more is the Lutheran, or the Baptist, or the Presbyterian. Our historic sense tells us that the Reformers were mistaken in thinking that they could revive the primitive church in its purity. Moreover, the corruptions laid to the charge of the Roman church have been exaggerated by Protestant writers. A just estimate of the Middle Ages affirms that if they had not all the virtues which Roman Catholics claim for them, they had not, on the other hand, all the vices which Protestants have laid to their charge. And what there was of good in them was largely due to the church.

This polemic therefore will not much move men of our time. Those who seek a great historic institution with which to ally themselves will say that if there is any true church it is here. Nor will the terrible pictures drawn of the wickedness of some of the popes deter them. It is indeed incongruous to assert that a man of the character of Alexander VI, or of Leo X, is intrusted with the duty of infallibly defining the doctrines of the church. But the reply is obvious; first, the character of the minister does not invalidate the sacrament; why then should the personal character of the pope invalidate his *ex cathedra* definitions? In the second place it will be pointed out that these popes did not as a matter of fact issue any erroneous definitions of doctrine. The argument from the character of the popes therefore loses much of its force. This is evidenced by the fact that Roman Catholic writers admit many of the alleged damaging facts, and still hold to the church. The latest instance that has come under my notice is the little volume published in the Home University Library, by Dr. William

Barry. He says quite frankly that in the papacy of the fifteenth century the religious and moral point of view was ignored. Of the period from 1471 to 1527 he says that it is a deplorable episode which witnessed the degradation of the papacy into a mere Italian principedom, while its sacred prerogatives were employed as reasons of state with scandal to present and after ages. What this shows is that the Protestant polemic, based on such scandalous conditions, does not secure the end sought, if that end be to invalidate the Catholic theory of the church.

To my mind the ecclesiastical or, as we may say, the historical argument, if it is to have much force, must be recast according to modern ideas. The theory of development as defended by Newman makes a distinct impression on people who live in an era when evolution is in the air. The theory is that the church as a living organism must develop in doctrine and institutions and not remain bound by the rudimentary elements given in the Gospels. But recent study of the history of religions shows that the development of religions has not usually been the organic unfolding of the principles with which they start. The impressive fact in the history of religions is syncretism. Great religious leaders have started as revolutionists, endeavoring to make a clean sweep of traditional rites and ceremonies. But the rites and ceremonies avenge themselves by coming back after a little and taking their old place. Thus the alleged evolution proves to be an amalgamation of various elements, and the law of progress does not mean letting the organization hold onto all that has come into it, but at intervals the renewal of the purifying process with which the founder began his career. The things which the Catholic church sanctions—worship of saints, veneration of relics, flagellation, fasting, exorcism, emphasis of the efficacy of the *opus operatum*—these are not the organic development of the principles enunciated by Jesus and the apostles, but survivals from paganism, really foreign matter which has been received into the body of the church, and from which it ought to be freed if it is to have a healthy growth. Whether this argument will make much impression on the man who is tempted to go into the Catholic church I do not know, but I think the point is well worth emphasizing.

We come then to ethical differences. The recognition of a double standard of living, according to which the monastic life is the really religious life, is the point of attack. Here again it is probable that argument will make little impression. Asceticism is one of the manifestations of the religious impulse in all the principal religions of the world. The desire to be wholly devoted to God, and to prove the devotion by extraordinary acts of renunciation and self-denial appeals powerfully to some minds. The mystic seeks absorption in meditation to the utter disregard of all bodily conditions of comfort and even of decency. Evidence is the establishment of monastic orders in the English church, and the enrolment in them of many earnest souls. Mr. Benson, to whom I have already alluded, tells of his experience when, before he became a Catholic, he sought religious satisfaction in an Anglican brotherhood. He describes the life in the Community of the Resurrection as follows:

Our life ran on very simple and practical lines. We rose about a quarter past six and went at once to the chapel for morning prayer with the Psalms of Prime and the Communion service. At eight we breakfasted; at a quarter to nine we said Terce and made a meditation. Until ten minutes past one we worked in the library or in our rooms. Then after Sext and Intercessions we dined. In the afternoon we took exercise, walking or gardening. At half-past four we said None and had tea. We worked again until seven when we sang Evensong. We supped at the half-hour and after a little recreation and work for an hour or two we said Compline at a quarter to ten and went to our rooms. On Saturday morning a chapter was held at which all kneeling made a public confession of external breaches of the rule.

This is the life of which the author says that it is impossible to describe the happiness which he enjoyed in it. It is evident therefore that for some minds a real need is met by this monastic observance. The Protestant polemic is directed against it because it is contrary to Scripture, which denounces teachers who forbid to marry and who command to abstain from meats. It is easy for the Catholic however to say that these denunciations were directed against *heathen* asceticism, and that the church itself has hallowed its monks and nuns. The Catholic moreover is able to point to Jesus' command to the rich young man to sell all that he has, and come and follow him.

That the New Testament writers were moved by contempt of the world is too obvious to be insisted upon. The historian finds this attitude explicable enough in view of the eschatological expectations which were rife in the early church. But the layman who accepts the authority of the Bible sees the inconsistency of those who profess to follow Christ and yet cling pertinaciously, often ostentatiously, to riches, ease, and pleasure. The truly religious soul finds delight in self-surrender. It sings: "Love so amazing, so divine, demands my soul, my life, my all." And this is brought home to Protestant believers as well as to Catholic by the ordinances of the church. The act of joining the church is interpreted by the minister as an act of self-surrender to the Savior. But too often it seems as if the single episode of public profession were all that the Lord requires. Once enlisted in the organization the convert lives much the same life that he lived before. It is not to be wondered at that the sensitive temperament finds this a meager testimony, and longs for some more complete dedication to the object of its love. This more complete dedication is attained, in idea at least, by the monk who literally renounces the world to serve Christ.

The strength of the monastic ideal is manifest to anyone who thus studies the religious experience of the individual, not in Christianity alone but in all the more advanced religions. Moreover, it is probable that the double standard of ethics which has been so much criticized by Protestant writers is based on one of those fundamental concepts which run through the whole course of religious development. The thing I have in mind is the sharp distinction between sacred and profane which is at the basis of the most primitive religious rites with which we are acquainted, and which persists into the most advanced stages. All mankind recognizes this distinction and finds it rational to mark off the boundary lines which divide the two spheres. The Catholic church makes the line plain by its many acts of consecration. So far as these are applied to material things, like holy water, anointing oil, consecrated candles, they do not now concern us. When they are applied to persons they make a distinct appeal to the religious consciousness. The act of self-surrender is responded to by the

church in the rite of consecration, testimony that the self-surrender is graciously accepted by the Lord to whom it is made. The truly consecrated person is thus lifted out of the sphere of the common, and brought into the region of the divine. If this consecration is to be complete it must stamp the person who receives it with an indelible character, and this is visibly set forth in the life, separate and apart from the world, the life of the monk or nun.

The Protestant replies with the New Testament declaration: What God has cleansed that call not thou common. He affirms that the old wall of separation between sacred and profane is broken down; at least, that all true believers are lifted into the consecrated sphere. All God's people are priests and devotees. He finds the exhortation: Let each man abide in the calling wherein he was called, and he believes that it emphasizes the duty of serving God in any and every station of life. The vocation to be a devoted and devout carpenter or merchant is (he says) more genuine than the vocation of the monk or nun. Protestantism has therefore emphasized the virtues of industry and thrift, often showing aloofness from the world by frugality and the avoidance of dissipation, but laying slight emphasis on the contemplative and mystical side of religion. *Laborare est orare*, it says. But one is tempted to reply: That depends; it is possible to carry on one's secular business in the spirit of complete devotion, so that the life is in the view of the Master a truly religious life. But how rarely is this done! To live in the world and yet not be of the world is much more difficult than to renounce the world and live the life apart. The man who prays: Lead us not into temptation, may feel that in consistency he should flee temptation, seeking refuge in the cloister.

What I am here trying to do is to show the force, or lack of force, of the average Protestant polemic. If Catholic practice makes this appeal to fundamental religious conceptions it is not likely that argument against it will have much effect. The staple argument is of course drawn from the instances of corruption which the historian of the monastic orders discovers. The facts are undeniable even if they have often been overstated. Taking the vow has not in all cases protected the devotee from the temptations common to man.

Not infrequently the monasteries have become houses of ignoble sloth. In some instances they have sheltered flagrant immorality. Their reformation has been called for at intervals. All this may be conceded, and yet the reply will hold good—that the abuse of a good institution does not discredit the institution itself. In a country like ours the accusation of corruption loses its force, because we observe the lives of devotees and find them to be exemplary, unselfish, and diligent in works of charity.

The appeal which the ascetic life makes to men of our day is attractively set forth in a little book entitled *The Revival of the Religious Life* by Rev. Paul B. Bull, member of the same Community of the Resurrection in which Father Benson found so much satisfaction. He says:

Our Lord Jesus Christ set before his followers a twofold ideal. For thirty years of his life he lived at home teaching us that we must learn to consecrate the natural life. . . . Obedience to parents, love of mother, the dignity of labor, the hallowing of social intercourse, the sanctity of the marriage, the consecration of pleasure, the redemptive power of sympathy with suffering—in all these he teaches us how to consecrate the natural life. But the world must be redeemed, the kingdom of God must be founded, and forsaking mother and home and all things, he calls some to follow him in abandoning all for the love of God, and the salvation of the world. Some are to remain in the world, leavening society by consecrating every detail of family, social, and natural life. Others are to claim freedom from worldly hindrances in order that they may wait without distraction on the Lord.

And again:

The ideal of the Church is a vast brotherhood of men beneath the fatherhood of God. But amidst all the petty distinctions and grievous separations of our complicated life it is hard for the Church to realize her ideal. In order that this ideal may not perish, God has enshrined it in the Religious Life, in which the world can see a partial and imperfect realization of the family of the Sons of God. The soul who enters the Religious Life embraces the Cross and, flinging away all the vain and silly distinctions of the corrupt worldly life, remembers only its divine birth. God still calls by the touch of his electing love many a virgin and many a beloved disciple to make a home for the widow and orphan, the lonely and the poor, a home where the love of God reigns supreme, and where the passion for souls is unrestrained by the claims of kindred of the flesh.

Whether in fact two ideals are not here confused is a question which the thoughtful reader is likely to raise. Is the monastic ideal

that of service to one's fellowmen? Or is it that of fleeing the world in order to enjoy uninterrupted communion with God? Historically, of course, it is well known that the latter aim has ruled in the monastic orders. Thus the author himself says of St. Benedict:

The one aim of his rule is to help his monks to *be* good, not to *do* good. Personal holiness is the main thing at which they aim. History records the amazing fruitfulness of this order in every department of human activity. But all this is accidental, a by-product. The one essential aim was personal holiness in obedience to our Lord's command: "Be ye therefore perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect."

Perhaps the most effective criticism of the monastic ideal might be made from the point of view of one who maintains that there is no such thing as *being* good without *doing* good. Be that as it may, the passages quoted show the strong attraction which the ideal has for many truly religious minds. The attractiveness of the ideal does not necessarily blind men to the dangers which beset the religious orders, as is made evident by the writer from whom I am quoting. His severe criticism of the Jesuits may be cited here:

The causes of decay are manifold. The exaltation of the superior into the place of Christ and his position as a lifelong autocrat which makes reform difficult, the depression of the members through failure to reverence personality, the inrush of the spirit of the world, the entire independence of the religious orders from episcopal control, and their consequent separation from the general life of the Church, in order that they may become mere instruments of Papal supremacy; and as a consequence of this the abandonment of their final end, the glory of God, for a secondary end, the welfare of the Church, the gradual change of motive from a will to goodness to a will to power with the inevitable development of corporate pride and ambition.

Have not these tendencies been operative in all the monastic orders almost, if not quite, with the uniformity of a natural law?

The double standard of perfection, however, is not the only point of attack in the region of ethics. If I mistake not, the whole ethical theory of the church is at variance with the best scientific ethics of today. The Catholic ideal is that the perfect moral character is a matter of discipline. The monk or nun is a member of a society with fixed rules which must be implicitly obeyed. The individual is under the eye of a superior, and submission is the fundamental virtue. The lay member of the church is under a

pastor to whom confession must be made, of sins of heart as well as sins of life, and whose penance must be carried out with humility and without question. The officers of the church are under the same obligation to a confessor, and the whole membership of this great organization is thus drilled into conformity to the ideal of character which the church has elaborated through centuries of reflection and practice. Now if the true life is built up in independence of external authority, if the *summum bonum*, as is held by many teachers, is moral autonomy, then the Catholic system is wrong from the ground up. And yet there can be no doubt that tender consciences, puzzled by the conflict of duties, weary of trying to decide what is right for themselves, find relief in consulting a director who has made a special study of moral theology, and who has, or at least claims to have, the power to bind and loose which Jesus gave to the officers of his church. The evidence again is found among high-church Anglicans, and I will quote further testimony from Benson. Just before his ordination as priest he says (Anglican priest, be it noticed):

I made with my father's consent a full confession of my whole life before a clergyman. He was extraordinarily kind and skilful, though he gave me a penance which would occupy me half an hour every day until I came to him again three months later. And the joy which followed that confession was simply indescribable.

Now the objection which is made to the elaborate and often prurient books of moral theology, those books which instruct the priest how to question his confessors and which must often raise as many evil thoughts as they put to rest, can have little effect with one who has the experience described by Benson. It is unnecessary to go into all the topics which come under this head, such as the use of indulgences and the theory of the treasury of good works at the disposition of the church, which treasury enables her to forgive sins. The use of indulgences has been reformed since the days of Luther, and the theory of the treasury of good works is not of practical importance to the layman. What he wants to know is that the ordained ministers of Christ have power to pronounce absolution, and this power the Roman Catholic priest both claims and exercises.

I have already intimated that this ethical system attracts some minds, and perhaps we cannot make any impression on such by argument. It is fair, however, to point out that there are distinct dangers in a system which puts the conscience of one man in the keeping of another—dangers to the superior, rather than to the subordinate. In this country the influence of the hierarchy in politics shows the effect of the theory of obedience, and while we laugh at the fears of some that the Pope may at some time be proclaimed supreme ruler of the United States, yet the apparent alliance of the church with machine politics has at times been bad in its results in cities and states, if not in the country at large.

At another point it is fair to attack the Roman system. Like other ritualistic systems the emphasis laid on merely formal acts confuses the moral judgment. The church commands abstinence from flesh meat on Fridays and during Lent. Disobedience to this command is in the judgment of the church as really a sin as theft or violence. It must be confessed, and penance must be done for it. It must be clear that here is a confusion which will weaken the moral sense, and lead to exaggerated scrupulousness on one hand, and to bluntness of conscience as to the weightier matters of life and conduct on the other. Careful ethical instruction on the part of Protestant ministers would make this clear to those who are tempted to adopt the Roman Catholic system.

Finally, we come to the distinctly religious topics of worship and the sacraments. Here the Protestant is sure of his ground. The adoration of images, the invocation of saints and angels, most of all, the extravagant reverence paid the Virgin Mary, is to him in direct contravention of the Decalogue. Yet even here the objection is not so forcible as we think, and to some minds it does not appeal at all. Benson says that even from the Anglican point of view the only hope of touching and holding the lives of those who live under the pressure and stress of our cities lies in what may be called the materialization of religion, and he explains this to mean the supplying of acts and images on which religious emotion may concentrate itself—extreme definiteness seems necessary, and that not only in the bright and impressive adjuncts of worship, but in the modes in which individual approach to God is made.

Men's clubs, furious visiting, children's pantomimes, and general activity and fervor certainly have their place and function; but unless the individual understands how and where he may pay his penitence and adoration, not merely as member of a congregation, but as an unique soul which God has made and redeemed, piety can never be more than vague and diffusive.

The historic fact is that the church has yielded to a demand on the part of her converts for something tangible to which to pay their worship, and the most earnest polemic will not reach those to whom this hunger for visible symbols is a part of their soul-longing.

This brings us to consider the public service, including the sacraments. On the question of the sacraments there has been furious debate, first, whether they are two or seven. The decision depends on the acceptance of Scripture or tradition as the ultimate arbiter. The matter is, therefore, we may say of subordinate importance. As to divine service, however, including the purpose of the sacraments there is a radical difference of opinion which is not likely to be overcome by argument. To the Protestant the service reaches its culmination in the sermon; song and prayer are often called "opening exercises." The reason is that to the Protestant the main object is the instruction of the congregation in the truth. With the Catholic the service culminates in the elevation of the host, and this is an act of sacrifice. It is made an act of sacrifice by the transubstantiation of the elements into the flesh and blood of Jesus. This miracle, which is essential to the consummation of the act of devotion, is performed by the priest in virtue of the formulae prescribed by tradition. Now the efficiency of a formula to accomplish a miracle depends upon the correct form of words. We have here a survival from the old Roman religion, according to which the formula loses its effect if it deviates from the exact wording handed down from earlier times. This accounts for the tenacity with which the service is kept in the Latin language. What is essential is not that the people should understand what is said, but that the officiating priest should use the prescribed ritual.

Now the very fact that the priest has possession of the formula is one reason why men are attracted to the service. What is

wanted is some assurance of salvation, and the realism of the Catholic view seems to offer more solid ground of assurance than the asseverations of a preacher, who often evidently gives only his personal view of some passage of Scripture or of some question of the day. A distinguished Roman Catholic once asked me what is the Protestant view of the sacraments. I replied they are a sign and a means of grace. His rejoinder was: "Then you must believe in original sin." The connection of thought was not quite clear to me at the time, but on reflection I found that he revealed the whole Catholic system. The fundamental fact is the corruption of the whole race, which makes it a *massa perditionis*. Now the church, by virtue of its divine commission, has a store of grace which it distributes by the sacraments. The original stain is literally washed away by the water of baptism. Actual sin committed after baptism is in like manner purged by penance and absolution, and assurance of this is given by the sacrifice of the mass. Even more realistically, not to say crassly, the matter is conceived when exorcism is brought into play, and the demon which possesses every unbaptized soul is driven out by the magic formula used by the priest. The consecration of holy water, and of the oil used in chrism and extreme unction, shows the same point of view, a survival of what Professor Moore calls the one inextirpable religion of the race. For those who are in the primitive stage of thinking the impression made by these magical rites cannot be counteracted by any rationalistic argument.

It is unnecessary to dwell here on the adjuncts of the public service which many persons find attractive. Great cathedrals, beautiful paintings, artistic music, richly embroidered vestments, and imposing processions have their appeal, though it is not always certain that the impression they make is religious. It is probably true in many cases that the aesthetic emotion is confused with the religious experience. The one who enjoys it does not stop to analyze the pleasurable sensation. All that he knows is that for the time being he is lifted out of the ordinary cares that vex his life, and it is easy for him to raise his heart on high. Men seek a quietive, an anodyne for the *Weltschmerz* with which our age seems especially afflicted, and they find it in this experience. And that

it is not merely an aesthetic excitement seems clear from the words of Newman, written when he was still a member of the Anglican church. Speaking of the Catholic church he said: "She alone, amid all the errors and the evils of her practical system, has given free scope to the feelings of awe, reverence, tenderness, devoutness, and other feelings which may be especially called Catholic." Evidently there is here something more than the craving for aesthetic enjoyment. The soul, longing for rest, hears the church say: "Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden and I will give you rest." In her bosom it finds or thinks it finds the resolution of its doubts, finds encouragement for the battle with sin, and guidance when uncertain of the right path. To those who have this experience it is not likely that the Protestant polemic against the infallibility of the Pope will have much effect. The question for the Protestant churches is whether they can successfully meet the religious needs which make the Catholic appeal so powerful.

The object of the present paper is accomplished if it has shown that in large part the traditional polemic of Protestantism is ineffectual. The plain inference is that we should carefully reconsider the whole subject of our relation to the great Roman communion. First of all we should give full faith and credit to the statement of Catholic writers that the aim which the church sets before itself is the salvation of men. This is our aim also, so that we can discuss our differences with sympathy and with some hope of mutual understanding. The differences indeed remain, and they are neither few nor small. But the debate which is still necessary can ignore a large part of the traditional five hundred topics and concentrate itself on those points which are fundamental to religion.

THE GOSPELS AND CONTEMPORARY BIOGRAPHIES—

Concluded

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The New Testament Gospels, viewed as literature and as records of historical facts about Jesus, find their closest ancient parallel in those writings of Plato and Xenophon which describe the personality, the teaching, and the career of Socrates. Dating the *Dialogues* of Plato and the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon at about 380–350 B.C., and the Gospels at about 70–100 A.D., a time interval of four hundred and fifty years separates the two groups of writings. For the present purpose, however, this interval is without significance, waiving the superficial and attending to the essential aspects of the comparison.

The work that Socrates did for Greek thought and life in the fifth century B.C. was strikingly parallel to the work that Jesus did for Jewish thought and life in the first century A.D. Each was representative of the highest conscientiousness, intelligence, aspiration, and purpose of his nation, each regarded himself as appointed by God to a special mission for the uplift of his people and as continually guided by God to its performance. There was not a little difference of form and manner between the two ministries, but they had a common function—to inaugurate a new standard of conduct, to replace the current morality with a superior type of moral thought and practice. Both Socrates and Jesus were lofty, strenuous, ethical idealists, bent upon converting and driving their nations to a higher ethics. Both pointed out the defects of the commonly accepted standard and the unideal conduct of the national teachers and leaders. Both held aloof from the institutions and classes of the social order, working in an unattached and single-handed way, reaching the public through a direct personal relationship and appeal. Their ministry was without charge. Each attached

to himself a number of close followers,¹ who absorbed his message and exhibited its proper influence. In due time—Socrates' ministry was long, for he lived to be about seventy years of age (†399 B.C.); Jesus' ministry was short, for his death came at about the age of thirty-five (†30 A.D.)—they found themselves in open conflict with the public authorities and met violent death at their hands. Each came to be viewed as the founder of a movement, which their disciples carried forward, organized, and expanded. Successive generations revered them, made use of their messages, and perpetuated their memory.

Plato and Xenophon, whose writings are the chief sources of available information about Socrates,² were immediate disciples of Socrates, attending upon his instruction for some years toward the close of his life. Plato was about twenty-eight years old and Xenophon about thirty-one, when Socrates was put to death in Athens at the age of seventy. Xenophon was away from the city on a military expedition (the *Anabasis* into Persia) at the time of the trial of Socrates in 399 B.C., but Plato was present at the proceedings against him. Plato was in full sympathy with Socrates on the tragic occasion, and shared at least in part his critical attitude toward the political leaders; so that on the condemnation of Socrates, it seemed best to Plato to turn aside from politics for which he had been preparing,³ and even to withdraw for a time from Athens itself.

Two motives seem to have prompted the production by Plato and Xenophon of the writings about Socrates: (1) to restore the reputation and rehabilitate the message and influence of Socrates, which had been seriously injured by his public condemnation and

¹ See Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, Part I, "Thales to Plato" (1914), pp. 151-53.

² Minor sources of information are the writings of Aristophanes, Aristotle, and Diogenes Laertius.

³ Burnet rightly remarks, "Fortunately he found something better to do" (p. 189). Plato took up philosophical teaching and writing. Otherwise we should have been without the *Dialogues*, and probably the knowledge and influence of Socrates would have been very much less than they were after 399 B.C. What Plato's political intelligence, idealism, and purpose were can be readily seen from his extensive dialogue, the *Republic*, pronounced by common consent the greatest of his works, and one of the greatest works of all time.

execution; (2) to give his teaching currency, development, and creative power in the fourth century, and so to carry forward the movement of ethical reconstruction which Socrates had begun in the fifth century B.C. Both motives operated conjointly, possibly with some difference of proportion and perspective, in the *Dialogues* of Plato and the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon.

For many years Socrates had been a renowned teacher at Athens. He had been independent, eccentric, critical, and disputatious, yet also picturesque, idealistic, well meaning, friendly, and useful. The comedians (especially Aristophanes in the *Clouds*) had burlesqued him, but no harm was intended; very likely this humorous treatment of him on the public stage increased the general interest in him. Socrates had served with some distinction in the military campaigns of the Peloponnesian War, 432-422 B.C. Still later he had a brief experience in public office, showing marked probity and determination. He had been sharply criticized and at times feared by the political leaders, yet until the end of his long life he had never been summoned to public trial. The wonder, however, may be that he escaped trouble for so many years, because his plain personal criticism of powerful statesmen and officials made him many enemies. Socrates inveighed against democratic control at Athens on the ground that it was untrained and incompetent leadership, undesirable, and dangerous to the common welfare. This latent, cumulative hostility to him became active in the last years of his life, with the shifting of Athenian politics, and was the real cause of his arrest, trial, conviction, and execution.¹ This event necessarily was destructive of his good name and influence. Public opinion, which had been mainly favorable to him, was disaffected. He had criticized, rebuked, and ridiculed the Sophists, the established and highly influential teachers of the day, who trained most of the statesmen and were loaded with honors and emoluments. The Sophists were now able to turn public opinion against Socrates and must have taken a malicious pleasure in the dethronement of the foremost ethical teacher and philosophical disputant of Greece.

¹ See especially Burnet, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-92; Grote, *History of Greece*, chap. lxviii.

Socrates had never been disposed to conciliate his foes—his individualism was extreme. Even in the trial itself, when death was the issue, he would not placate or defer to the judges in either his words or his attitude. He assumed himself superior to them, he took the opportunity to lecture them, he seemed at one moment to be indifferent and at another to challenge their decision. He was too great and proud a spirit to descend to the level of the popular Athenian tribunal, even when a conciliatory manner and word might have secured a vote in favor of his acquittal. The matter certainly went the worst way possible, and the ignominy that befell Socrates depleted his fame at once and for some years. But within a short generation the cloud of obscurity was passing over, and public appreciation of him was returning. His personality and message were quite too fine and valuable for permanent eclipse. Apologetic writings began to appear in his defense, showing his piety, his nobleness, his lofty ethical message, his surpassing ability as a teacher of youth, and his skill as a dialectical philosopher. The sentiment of the court was shown to have been nearly as strong for acquittal as for condemnation, and the animus political rather than moral or religious. These writings restored Socrates to prominence and influence in the public mind.

The foremost defenders and expounders of Socrates were Plato and Xenophon. Their Socratic writings produced a profound reaction, with a rehabilitation of his reputation and a new study of his message. A Socratic movement was organized by Plato and Aristotle that put the moral idealism and the dialectical method of the great teacher into a permanent place in Greek thought and life, whereby his influence dominated ancient philosophy and ethics till the Mediterranean civilization was submerged in the sixth century A.D.—a period of nearly a thousand years.

The parallel is obvious and close between the rise of the Socratic writings and the rise of the Gospels. They were similar in the motives that inspired them: to restore and upbuild the reputation and influence of one who had been put to death by the state as a dangerous person, but whose contribution to human welfare was quite too valuable to be lost. And they were similar in their contents: the preservation, in memorabilia form, of his more

significant sayings, deeds, and personal traits, since he had himself put neither his message nor his personality on record.

It is notable also that the historical criticism of the sources for ascertaining the life and teaching of Socrates proceeds in a like manner, and with a like diversity of results, as is the case with the historical criticism of the sources for ascertaining the life and teaching of Jesus. Opinion of the sources divides into three main positions: an extreme adverse view, an extreme literal view, and a discriminating intermediate view. Some critical scholars hold that the real Socrates cannot be recovered, being wholly submerged beneath the dramatized, idealized, and pragmatized Socrates of Plato and Xenophon. In the criticism of the Gospels this view corresponds with the view of those critical scholars who hold that the New Testament writings present no trustworthy account of the historical Jesus, but rather an apologetic and homiletical body of propagandist material that grew up in the early stage of the Christian movement, containing a poetic and theological creation of an ideal person and savior. On the other hand, some scholars understand that the accounts of Socrates in Plato and Xenophon report fully and accurately the real man; they use these sources of our knowledge of Socrates without criticism, in a literal way taking everything that is told about him and weaving it together without historical discrimination as the story of his life and work. In the interpretation of the Gospels the corresponding view is that they tell the whole story of Jesus quite as it was, so that one may use at their face value all the data given in Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, constructing from them by a mere process of compilation (a "Harmony of the Gospels") the true historical account of Jesus' career, message, and personality.¹

Against both of these extreme views, the adverse and the literal, one may confidently maintain a discriminating historical

¹ As respects the Gospels, there later arose a theological doctrine of special divine inspiration to explain their origin and thereby guarantee their truth. Church officialism, in its effort to establish for itself an absolute authority, predicated an infallible code of belief and practice. Because the Greek religion was not ecclesiastically organized and dogmatized, no similar doctrine seems to have been developed concerning the Socratic writings; although most highly valued and widely used, they were viewed as human documents, and Socrates was thought of only as a human being.

interpretation of the data of Socrates' life supplied by Plato and Xenophon. Their writings report with a good measure of fulness and accuracy the main facts of his deeds, his personality, and his teaching. The Socrates they present is essentially and distinctly the real Socrates of the fifth century B.C. in Athens; through them we actually know the founder of ethical philosophy, and the foremost intellectual figure of Greece preceding Plato himself. To be sure, there is much dramatization, idealization, and pragmatization, with much supplementation of his teaching in Plato's later *Dialogues* and in Xenophon's *Economist*. But the processes of historical and literary criticism enable us to distinguish in the main between the primary and the secondary elements of the accounts; not that all scholars are agreed as to which data are primary and which secondary, but that we are progressing toward the solution of the problem. A like statement can be made concerning the historical trustworthiness of the Gospel accounts of Jesus. A discriminating method with them does put us into possession of the real Jesus of the first century A.D. in Palestine; we can ascertain from their data the essential character, work, and message of the supreme ethical idealist, the founder of Christianity, and the foremost religious figure of Judaism. To be sure also the Gospels dramatize, idealize, and pragmatize Jesus, and the Fourth Gospel elaborately transmutes and supplements his message. But, as with the Socratic writings, so with the Gospels, we can distinguish by means of historical and literary criticism between the primary and the secondary elements of the accounts. We are not to be discouraged in the pursuit of the real Jesus by the fact that scholarly opinions respecting him are at present so diverse and so contested. The preliminary obstacle to a solution of the historical problem of the Gospels is theological: the traditional doctrine of an inspired inerrant Scripture, and the traditional doctrine of a supernatural soteriological Christ. Beyond this lies the specific historical process of interpretation, as in the case of the Socratic writings. This interpretation of the Gospels has been entered upon, and we are getting ahead with it—not rapidly perhaps, but hopefully.

It is about equally true of the Socratic writings and the Gospels that they present, not photographs, but portraits of their heroes.

The difference between the photograph and the portrait is considerable. Speaking in relative terms, the photograph pictures its subject externally, literally, and exactly; it gives not only the best points, but all the points; it shows the man as biology made him, rather than as appreciative persons visualize him or homiletical persons describe him. In comparison, the portrait pictures its subject at his finest state, with a glory surrounding him and (it may be) a halo on his head. It presents him for the public eye, in an ideal attitude, with his best traits prominent, and conveying his life message in the expression of his face. Only the famous (and the rich!) attain to portraiture, and the portrait tells those things which the public will wish to know or to think of its hero. The photograph is chiefly chronicling, the portrait is chiefly pedagogical.

Obviously Socrates and Jesus are presented as public heroes, as exemplary persons to be appreciated and imitated. The primary motive of putting them before the public in writings is to instruct and to inspire men in their type of living. The interpretation of them given by the authors will be such as the practical end requires. Acts, utterances, and characteristics that have inspirational and pedagogical value will be selected and presented in an effective way. The hero will be read into the later environment of which the writer is a part, and will be arrayed to function for this environment, however it may differ from the conditions in which his own life was set. We are not therefore to expect too much in the line of exact historical fact from our biographical accounts of Socrates and Jesus. The chief concern of their biographers was to accomplish practical results in the moral-religious sphere.

The time interval between the height of Socrates' ministry and the composition of the Socratic writings by Plato and Xenophon was approximately fifty years, or two generations. The climax of his work may be dated about 420 B.C., when he was at the age of fifty years (†399 B.C.). Our biographies of him were written somewhere within the period 380–350 B.C.; that is, forty to seventy years later. The interval of time between Jesus' ministry and the composition of the Gospels was also about fifty years, or two generations. His public work belonged to the years 28–30 A.D., and our

biographies of him were written at different points within the period 65-110 A.D. As regards the environment of the life in comparison with the environment of the biographical writings, the cases of Socrates and Jesus do not correspond. Plato wrote at Athens where Socrates had lived and worked; nor had there been any particular change in the conditions there. Xenophon probably wrote at Scillus, in Western Greece. But the Gospels were not written in Palestine where Jesus' work had been done; on the contrary, they were written in the gentile field for Gentiles, in a different language and amid essentially different conditions of thought and life. This change of environment surely occasioned much selection, adaptation, and supplementation of the original memorabilia of Jesus in order that the Palestinian Gospel might function as a world-religion. One notes especially the tendency of the Gospels to draw forth from Jesus' teaching a formal code of ethics, to build up around him a formal following and an ecclesiastical organization, and to invest his message and person with a mystical soteriological doctrine.

Scholars are not yet agreed as to whether Plato or Xenophon gives the more historical account of Socrates. The popular view for some time¹ has favored the account by Xenophon, regarding it as more objective, detailed, accurate, and practically useful. Critical opinion, however, tends to pronounce this preference a pragmatic one, arising more from a prevailing taste and judgment of usability than from a straight historical investigation of the sources.

Both Plato and Xenophon knew Socrates personally, for as young men between twenty and thirty years of age they were for several years under the direct instruction of Socrates toward the close of his life. Plato's was the longer association with Socrates, extending over eight or ten years; but Xenophon also had an abundance of time for acquainting himself with Socrates' personality and message. Plato was a writer of philosophy, Xenophon was a writer of history; from which facts one might expect Xenophon

¹ Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 127, states that the first writer to prefer the Socrates of the *Memorabilia* to the Platonic Socrates was apparently Brucker (1741), and that this opinion seems to reflect the current eighteenth century conception of what a philosopher should be, namely, a homilizing moralist rather than a critical thinker and dialectician.

would be the more objective and informing biographer of Socrates' life. But Plato had a greater mind than Xenophon's, and must then have been the better able to discern, appreciate, and communicate the essential Socrates. The Socratic writings distinctly show how two persons of different mental capacities, interests, and habits will differently apprehend the same person, and will report him according to the color and perspective of their own personal characteristics.

A great man is fortunate to have even one competent biographer. The greatness of many men has been doomed to obscurity by the lack of this. Certainly it was one of the remarkable events of history that Socrates should have had, not only one, but two great first-hand biographers.

Xenophon was one of the foremost ancient Greek historians.¹ His writings that have come down to us make four solid English volumes. The major works are the *Hellenica*, the *Anabasis*, and the *Cyropaedia*. Among the minor works are the four treatises which present Socrates—the *Memorabilia*, the *Apology*, the *Economist*, and the *Symposium*. The longest of these is the *Memorabilia*,² and for biographical material concerning Socrates this is also the most important of Xenophon's writings. The *Memorabilia* was produced twenty to thirty years after Socrates' death, therefore *ca.* 380–370 B.C. Its purpose was to defend Socrates against the defamation and misrepresentations of his enemies, and to revivify the spirit and teaching of Socrates for a generation too young to know him personally. As already noted, Xenophon had been for several years during his young manhood a direct disciple of Socrates, so that he was in possession of first-hand knowledge of his life and teaching. At several points in the *Memorabilia* he claims this immediate acquaintance with the facts, and the writing throughout purports to be a simple historical account of the personality, the method, and the message of Socrates. But Xenophon does not

¹ For a reduced valuation of his ability as a historical writer, see Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians* (1909), pp. 151–54.

² The four Socratic treatises together constitute Vol. III, Part 1, of the Dakyns edition, making 350 closely printed pages, of which the *Memorabilia* occupies a full half (182 pages).

at any point make a specific statement as to the sources he is using. We have therefore to estimate from the indirect evidence the accuracy of his picture of Socrates.

The other first-hand biographer of Socrates was Plato, the most renowned philosopher of the ancient world. For the eight or ten years preceding the death of Socrates, Plato had been much with him; it is certain that no one understood Socrates so well or learned so much from him. The young man eighteen to twenty-eight years of age, at the most impressionable period of his life and with a thirst for the widest knowledge, just absorbed the experience, philosophy, wisdom, method, and spirit of the elderly man who was the greatest character and teacher of the day. Xenophon was a superficial observer and narrator of Socrates, because mentally he was not so keen, profound, or original as Plato. Xenophon appreciated and described Socrates as a moral idealist and educator, with a kindly temper and a lofty message; but Plato became transformed into the mental likeness of Socrates—we may say he became a *new* Socrates, for the fourth century B.C., and in fact for all history, because his writings put Socrates into the possession of the ages.

Plato was not a weak personality leaning upon a stronger; he was a supremely great personality coming to full consciousness and power through the influence of his teacher. We cannot say that Socrates was greater than Plato, or Plato greater than Socrates. They were differently great, yet closely akin in their greatness. Plato established what Socrates founded and put Socrates on record. That was not a mere pedagogical and literary task: it required genius of the first order to recreate Socrates for a new generation. One's idea of a great man can be no larger than one's own mind; small men have small ideas even of great men. It requires a genius of commensurate stature to portray or interpret a genius. Plato went beyond Socrates in his metaphysical and ethical ideas, and he outranked Socrates in his literary gift. But he identifies himself with Socrates—their messages are inseparable, their minds and hearts are one. It is the judgment of the scholars that the earlier Dialogues contain more of Socrates and less of Plato; while the later Dialogues contain less of Socrates and more

of Plato. Still, the transition is gradual and obscure; it is never openly made or acknowledged. The *Dialogues* contain no explanation of Plato's relation to Socrates, or his use of him. Plato never appears in person, but makes Socrates always the spokesman of the message and the interlocutor of the conversations.

Plato wrote only philosophical works, and in Dialogue form.¹ His extant writings are massive; the standard English edition, by Jowett, is in five great volumes. The Dialogues of most importance for the biography of Socrates are the *Symposium*, the *Apology*, the *Crito*, the *Phaedo*; but much additional information and color may be gathered from other treatises also. The *Symposium* presents a scene from the height of Socrates' public career; the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo* narrate the trial, imprisonment, and death.² Plato wrote these earlier Dialogues about thirty years after Socrates' death, *ca.* 370 B.C. This is the same time assigned above to the *Memorabilia* by Xenophon; the two writers were contemporaneous. Evidence is not available for determining the exact dates or the exact sequence of the *Dialogues*. Opinion is divided as to whether Xenophon's Socratic writings preceded or followed these Socratic writings of Plato; a question of possible dependence one way or the other is involved, but cannot yet be decided. In any case, the time interval between the two sets of writings was brief—they belonged to the same generation, and nearly if not quite to the same years. Plato's purpose was also like that of Xenophon, apologetic and didactic, to restore the reputation and message of Socrates after the disrepute of the public trial and execution had worn itself out at Athens. Plato too had a first-hand knowledge of Socrates—probably even a fuller and better knowledge than Xenophon's.

Plato did not, however, write a formal biography of Socrates; he did not produce a work which narrated the events of Socrates'

¹ That is, in the form of direct conversation. The dramatis personae of a treatise are often several rather than only two; but the conversation generally proceeds as a dialogue between Socrates and one other person, the further persons appearing in the dialogue at different points. Compare the similar features of the Gospels, where the conversation is also direct, and the dramatis personae are often several, but Jesus is in the foreground and speaks to one or to another or to the group, e.g., Matt. 3:13-15; 8:2-13, 18-32; 9:1-26; 11:2-6; 12:1-14, 46-50; 14:15-33; 15:21-28; 16:1-28, etc.

² Compare in the Gospels the extent, prominence, and spirit of the Passion narratives.

life from youth to age, in a general chronological order. Plato's pages, it is true, contain numerous events of Socrates' public career and many personal traits of the man; but these, instead of being formally recounted, receive only incidental mention in the conversations between himself and his friends. Plato never interrupts the dialogue with statements of fact or explanation. The *Dialogues* are therefore differently constructed from the "Lives" of famous persons written somewhat later by Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius.¹ Plato's type of mind was philosophizing rather than narrating, his interest was not to recount facts but to create anew the ideas of Socrates in his pupils and friends. Certainly the biographical type of literature that became common later was more popular, more readable, more effective pedagogically than the difficult *Dialogues* of Plato which only the studious will attempt. Yet even Plato's *Dialogues*, packed as they are with abstruse, intricate, tenuous, and often ponderous discussion, are enlivened with dramatic features, personal characteristics, humor, and color touches which relieve the tedium of their dialectic.

And dialogue was, in historical fact, the manner of Socrates' teaching. He doubtless conveyed his message by dialectical conversations such as the earlier *Dialogues* of Plato and the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon contain. It was the new type of instruction and literature which belonged to the rise of philosophy in Greece. Conversations like these, with pupils and friends, was the habitual pedagogical method of Socrates in his public work. He was not an orator, not a rhetorician, not an instructor in the formal sense—he was rather an inquirer after the truth, and his colloquies ran usually in the interrogatory style. Socrates maintained that he

¹ Plutarch did not write a Life of Socrates, apparently choosing men of action in preference. Diogenes supplements Plutarch's *Lives of the Statesmen* by a series of *Lives of the Philosophers*. Among these latter is one of Socrates; in the English translation of Diogenes by Yonge it occupies twelve pages. The facts of Socrates' life, gathered out of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Plato's *Dialogues*, other Socratic writings and tradition, are here presented in concise statement and orderly arrangement, with various wise sayings and anecdotes of his career, and without any material in dialogue form. This illustrates the striking difference between the dialogue and the biography as literary forms. Formal biographical writing was very new in the fourth century B.C., and the "Life" of Socrates was not so presented by either Xenophon or Plato.

did not know what the truth was with regard to many problems of ethics and philosophy; therefore he must be always asking it from others who claimed, or assumed, or supposed that they knew. Day after day and year after year he conversed with one and another person, in search of the truth concerning wisdom, courage, love, justice, virtue, statesmanship, and the like. In the *Memorabilia* and in the earlier Dialogues we see the real Socratic method. In the later writings of Plato the dialogic style tends to become mere form; the material takes the character of long discourses by Socrates, actual conversation tends to disappear, and the function of the interlocutors becomes unimportant. This is also the case with Xenophon's *Economist* as compared with the *Memorabilia*.

Certainly we do not understand that either Plato or Xenophon has put on record the *ipsissima verba* of Socrates, although as early as the third century A.D. that idea was in vogue.¹ But this view is much nearer the truth than the opposite hypothesis, according to which the accounts of Socrates' teaching are wholly fictitious, the product of subsequent pragmatic imagination and literary activity. Socrates undoubtedly impressed his speech as well as his thought upon Plato, Xenophon, and other close followers. Speech and thought go together; and in the case of a genius, as Socrates was, the pupils would acquire the forms of expression along with the ideas themselves. One is to note that Socrates was a master of pedagogic style, even though that style was of oral rather than of written speech. Of course Plato and Xenophon had their own literary style, which is abundantly preserved to us in their voluminous extant writings. Their *memorabilia* of Socrates must be considered to be in their habitual style, as to both vocabulary and idiom. It does not appear that either of them was using sources that contained the exact words of Socrates spoken a generation or two earlier. But neither were their *memorabilia* mere reminiscences, a product of sheer memory attempting to span that stretch of some thirty years.

¹ Diogenes Laertius, in the "Life" of Socrates, says: "He [Xenophon] was the first person who took down conversations as they occurred, and published them among men, calling them *Memorabilia*" (Yonge's tr., p. 75).

It seems likely that Socrates' many followers and admirers had from the time of his public activity maintained a continuous transmission of his teachings, method, and spirit. He was a reality and an influence in Athens even after the day of his death in 399 B.C. Thirty years later there were still many who as youths had seen and heard him, and who had remained interested in his message and his moral-social objective. Some persons may have had notes of his teachings taken directly from him during the years of their immediate discipleship,¹ though Socrates' teaching was not of the sort to be formally dictated by him or copied by his pupils. The probable view seems to be that there was a large, good, and lively Socratic tradition for a full generation after his death; the contents of it were partly descriptive of the man, partly anecdotal, and partly well-preserved accounts of some of his most instructive conversations. Plato and Xenophon were not only first-hand disciples of Socrates, with personal memories of him and his teachings; but they were presumably also industrious collectors and students of memorabilia in the possession of others. Out of all these treasures which Socrates' adherents preserved, the *Dialogues* of Plato and the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon were produced.

We know more about Socrates from Plato than from Xenophon for two excellent reasons: first, because from Plato we have five volumes of Socratic writings while from Xenophon we have but one volume; second, because Plato better understood the sweep of Socrates' thought, the significance of his message, the quality of his analysis, the power of his dialectic, the temperament of his mind. Socrates was more than the wise, simple, friendly, moral instructor that Xenophon describes; he was also the intellectual inquirer, provocative disturber of mental and civic rest and assumption, the keen analyst and acute dialectician, mystic, and metaphysician, upsetting with trenchant irony and exasperating nonchalance the conceits and the fallacies of Athens' best-known men. He called himself the gadfly sent to stir up the body politic. This is the Socrates of Plato's *Dialogues* more than of Xenophon's *Mem-*

¹ Compare the elaborate transcriptions of Epictetus' teachings made by his pupil Arrian, from which alone we are now in possession of Epictetus' message, as he himself was not a writer.

orabilia. The latter is highly valuable so far as it goes, but it lacks some of the specific and determining characteristics of the greatest Athenian of the fifth century B.C. Xenophon's Socrates, great as he is, seems a more commonplace and platitudinous teacher of everyday morals, the hero of the people more than of the philosophers, relatively quiet and inoffensive, who would scarcely have aroused the animosity that brought him to trial and public execution. In his production of an apology for Socrates, Xenophon has passed over his chief offenses; and in his production of a manual of conduct from Socrates' teaching, he has passed over the intellectualistic phases of his work. Xenophon's pages read like selected memoirs of the man and his message designed for a conciliatory and homiletic purpose; in his first book he calls his material *Memorabilia* (*Ἀπομνημονεύματα*), a correct title. The occasions of the Socratic sayings are generally indicated, but without date, place, or other historical setting. One cannot from them construct an outline of Socrates' career, so as to fit the sayings into a chronological framework or trace his mental development and the stages of his work. Something more can be done in this direction with the added information supplied by Plato, but neither does Plato intend or make possible a formal biography of Socrates, as Diogenes Laertius' serious but not highly successful attempt shows.

The most recent effort to reconstruct the "Life" of Socrates from all trustworthy information available in the ancient writings has been made by Burnet,¹ one of the foremost authorities in ancient Greek literature and thought. His method of using the sources is a simple one: he gathers from the *Dialogues* of Plato all the biographical data and puts them together into a connected account.² With respect to the acts and characteristics of Socrates, this information from Plato is regarded as reliable. With respect to the teaching which Plato presents Socrates as giving, that, too, is in general authentic, in both content and form, except of course

¹ John Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, Part I, "Thales to Plato" (London, 1914), chap. viii.

² "It is possible to construct a biography of Socrates from the *Dialogues* of Plato and, on the face of it, they seem to present us with an intelligent and consistent account of the man and his ways" (p. 127).

that Plato is not reproducing the exact language of Socrates, and the historical setting given the Dialogues is often dramatic and literary rather than actual. The point is, that Plato does give us the real Socrates. And no other writer did so, for the Socrates of Xenophon, of Aristophanes, and of Aristotle fall short of a good historical representation of him.¹ Burnet thinks that Xenophon wrote the *Memorabilia* after Plato had written the earlier Dialogues, and in direct dependence upon them for much of his information about Socrates; also that Xenophon's apologetic and pedagogical purpose led him to present Socrates in an acceptable and usable interpretation that obscures and even in some cases misconstrues the actual facts.² Plato, therefore, is the one adequate and trustworthy biographer of Socrates; the accounts by others rank distinctly lower.

The valuation of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* must be discriminat-
ingly made. If it is secondary to, and in greater or less dependence
upon, the *Dialogues* of Plato, it is still true that it contains in the

¹ "It is quite impossible to get anything like a complete picture of Socrates from the *Memorabilia* alone, and so in practice every writer fills in the outline with as much of the Platonic Socrates as happens to suit his preconceived ideas of the man. In particular, the 'irony' of Socrates comes entirely from Plato. The Socrates of the *Memorabilia* has no doubts or difficulties of any kind. . . . The Platonic Socrates is actual enough, and he is the only Socrates we can hope to know well. . . . The only sound method, therefore, is to describe his life and opinions without, in the first instance, using any other source. Only when we have done that can we profitably go on to consider how far the Socrates we learn to know in this way will account for the slighter sketch of Xenophon" (pp. 127 f.).

² "It is not clear to me how far the *Memorabilia* can be regarded as independent testimony at all. In fact, it seems hardly possible to doubt that Xenophon got the greater part of his information about Socrates from the *Dialogues* of Plato. . . . The conclusion we are, in my opinion, forced to is that, while it is quite impossible to regard the Socrates of Aristophanes and the Socrates of Xenophon as the same person, there is no difficulty in regarding both as distorted images of the Socrates we know from Plato. The first is legitimately distorted for comic effect; the latter, not so legitimately for apologetic reasons. To avoid misunderstanding, I should say that I do not regard the *Dialogues* of Plato as records of actual conversations, though I think it probable that there are such imbedded in them. I also admit fully that the Platonic Socrates is Socrates as Plato saw him, and that his image may to some extent be transfigured by the memory of his martyrdom. The extent to which that has happened we cannot, of course, determine, but I do not believe it has seriously falsified the picture" (p. 149).

main the teaching of Socrates, in a form more simple, popular, and attractive than that of the Platonic writings. Xenophon's digest of the plain, concrete moral message of Socrates for the average man would very likely be more widely read among the people generally than the more elaborate, philosophical, and dialectical *Dialogues*.¹ Dakyns,² after a careful weighing of the whole evidence as to the historical character of the *Memorabilia*, decides that the work is not a historical account in the distinct, detailed sense, but a panegyric; at the same time, the author does not intentionally alter the historical facts in his pedagogical and literary task. He had either memoranda of Socrates' teaching or at least good memories of it from his own acquaintance and from others' acquaintance with Socrates. He produced this work independently of Plato's writings, and at a time earlier than their composition.³

A more favorable view of the *Memorabilia* is taken by Grote,⁴ who thinks that the Socrates of Xenophon and the Socrates of

¹ Bosanquet says: "It does not seem to me a dangerous assumption that on the whole the best ideas in the *Memorabilia* belong substantially to Socrates, just as it is easy to see that the details and arguments throughout belong in great measure to Xenophon" (*Internat. Jour. of Ethics*, 1905, p. 432).

² H. G. Dakyns, the translator of Xenophon's writings into English, under the title, *The Works of Xenophon* (London, 1890-97, 4 vols.).

³ "As to the design of the *Memorabilia*, I accept an ancient view [that of the greatest critic of the ancient world, Dionysius of Halicarnassus] that it is not primarily an historical account (still less is it a philosophical criticism); but in point of literary form . . . an apology which presently becomes a panegyric, setting forth the writer's conception of Socrates in opposition to current accounts, in which he feels that a certain side of the matter, of which he himself as a Socratic is entitled to speak, has been neglected. This other side of the matter he develops with no intentional untruthfulness of delineation, but what guides his hand as he draws the lines is the artistic or literary instinct of the man who is partly himself and partly a *vir Socraticus*. As to the composition, my notion is that Xenophon had either juvenile notes to depend on, or at any rate memories refreshed in conversation with friends (Socratic and other) which at a certain date were thrown into some sort of literary form, tentatively at first [possibly portions were orally delivered, a text was gradually formed, copies were circulated]. This was the nucleus of the complete work, which he kept working at on and off during his leisure at Scillus 387-371 B.C., till the final moment. As to the dates at which such a work was first begun or finally concluded, I think there is no evidence" (Dakyns, *The Works of Xenophon*, Vol. III, Part I, pp. xxii, xxiii).

⁴ Grote, *History of Greece*, chap. lxviii.

Plato are consistent. Xenophon presents Socrates as a homilist, but intimates that his method at other times was philosophical and dialectical; while Plato disregards the former aspect of Socrates' work, to present extensively the latter. Xenophon is interested in the practical teaching, Plato in the theoretical teaching, of Socrates. This view is in the direction of Burnet's view, but does not coincide with it, because Burnet does not think Socrates was the homilist that Xenophon makes him. Further, Burnet attributes a higher value to the biographical elements in Plato.

Jackson¹ also evaluates the *Memorabilia* more highly than Burnet does as a source for the historical knowledge of Socrates. He holds that we have in this and other Socratic writings of Xenophon records of Socrates' conversations; and that Xenophon was an excellent reporter of the teaching of Socrates because "he had no philosophical views of his own to develop, and no imagination to lead him astray." This, however, is not quite the case; we may see in Xenophon's other extensive writings that he was far from being a mere recorder of facts—he had a strong pedagogical impulse and his mind as well as his pen was active, as the *Cyropaedia* shows.² When Jackson says that "Plato, though he understood his master better, is a less trustworthy authority [than Xenophon], as he makes Socrates the mouthpiece of his own more advanced and even antagonistic doctrine," he seems to be thinking chiefly of the later Dialogues where the real Socrates tends to retire before the spokesman of Platonic ideas. No doubt Plato, in the period of his maturity, developed an extensive body of philosophical conceptions which find expression in his later Dialogues, and which were not specifically the teaching of Socrates or always consistent therewith; but to rank Xenophon above Plato as a biographer of Socrates seems out of line with the facts and will meet with much dissent among scholars at work upon this problem.

¹ Henry Jackson, art. "Socrates" in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed.

² Attention has been called above to the overrating of Xenophon's abilities as a historian, see Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, pp. 151 f. With regard to the *Cyropaedia*, one writer says: "A distinct moral purpose, to which literal truth is sacrificed, runs through the work."

Gomperz¹ holds a view akin to that of Burnet as to the high value of the biographical data in Plato's writings: we know Socrates chiefly from this source. "An artist of the first order, a painter of word portraits with scarce an equal, has presented us with a marvellously clear and vivid likeness of his revered friend." He gives us the real Socrates, a character consistent with itself and with all other accounts. Socrates is of course idealized, but the delineation is true to the essential features of his life. As respects the teaching attributed in the *Dialogues* to Socrates, Gomperz goes somewhat beyond Burnet in assigning to Plato, an original thinker of the first rank, much of the actual thought, rewriting Socrates' message with "a full and unrestricted liberty." Starting from the Socratic teaching, and in the earlier writings largely reproducing it, Plato elaborated and modified the ideas of Socrates into a system of philosophy quite his own. Nevertheless, we are able to recover from the Platonic *Dialogues* the substance, and not a little of the aim, method, and spirit of Socrates' teaching. With regard to Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Gomperz thinks Socrates is presented to us there with "much less artistic freedom, and yet not much more historical fidelity"; "that Xenophon's accounts of the discourses of Socrates do not always correspond with the truth may be proved to demonstration from the text of Xenophon himself."

A series of quotations, first from Plato's *Dialogues*, and second from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, will give some indication of the biographical information in our possession concerning Socrates, and admit of some comparison between the two sources; also, certain parallelisms will appear between the life and teaching of Socrates and the life and teaching of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels.

QUOTATIONS FROM PLATO'S DIALOGUES²

Socrates. In spite of the opinion of the many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, shall we insist on the truth . . . that injustice is always an evil and dishonor to him who acts unjustly? Shall we say so or not?

¹ Theodor Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, Bd. II (1902); Eng. tr. Vol. II (1905), pp. 59-65.

² The text used is that of Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, 3d ed., 1892.

Crito. Yes.

Soc. Then we must do no wrong?

Cr. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imagine; for we must injure no one at all?

Cr. Clearly not.

Soc. Again, Crito, may we do evil?

Cr. Surely not, Socrates.

Soc. And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality of the many—is that just or not?

Cr. Not just.

Soc. For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?

Cr. Very true.

Soc. Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to anyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of persons.¹

Soc. Leave me then, Crito, to fulfill the will of God, and to follow whither he leads.²

Soc. Is it likely that the soul, which is invisible, . . . and pure, and noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to go,³—that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, will be blown away and destroyed immediately on quitting the body, as the many say? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth rather is, that the soul . . . departs to the invisible world—to the divine and immortal and rational; thither arriving, she is secure of bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild passions and all other human ills, and forever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in company with the gods.⁴

Phaedo. Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend [Socrates]; concerning whom I may truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest and justest and best.⁵

Soc. Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly punished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to be made an example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers, and fear and become better. Those who are improved when they are punished by gods and

¹ *Crito* 49.

² *Ibid.* 54e.

³ This passage is from the last conversation of Socrates with his close friends, just before his execution.

⁴ *Phaedo* 80e, 81a.

⁵ *Ibid.* 118e.

men, are those whose sins are curable; and they are improved, as in this world so also in another, by pain and suffering; for there is no other way in which they can be delivered from evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as they are incurable, the time is passed at which they can receive any benefit. They get no good themselves, but others get good when they behold them enduring forever the most terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of their sins.¹

Soc. Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that I would make trial of the strength of his resolution [to study rhetoric with the famous sophist Protagoras]. So I examined him and put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you are going? and what will he make of you? . . . Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul? To me that appears to be his nature.

And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul?

Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body. . . . Those who carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail them to any customer who is in want of them, praise them all alike; though I should not wonder, O my friend, if many of them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul; and their customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them happens to be a physician of the soul. If, therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras.²

Alcibiades. I shall praise Socrates in a figure which will appear to him to be a caricature, and yet I speak, not to make fun of him, but only for the truth's sake. I say, that he is exactly like the busts of Silenus, which are set up in the statuaries' shop, holding pipes and flutes in their mouths; . . . you yourself will not deny, Socrates, that your face is like that of a satyr. . . . And are you not a flute-player? That you are, and a performer far more wonderful than Marsyas. He indeed with instruments used to charm the souls of men by the power of his breath, and the players of his music do so still. . . . But you produce the same effect with your words only, and do not require the flute; . . . the mere fragments of you and your words, even at secondhand, and however imperfectly repeated, amaze and possess the souls of every man, woman, and child who comes within the hearing of them. And if I were not afraid that you would think me hopelessly drunk, I would have sworn as well as spoken to the influence which they have always had and still have over me. . . . I observe that many others are affected in the same

¹ *Gorgias* 525b.

² *Protagoras* 311b, 313c.

manner. I have heard Pericles and other great orators, and I thought that they spoke well, but I never had any similar feeling; my soul was not stirred by them, nor was I angry at the thought of my own slavish state. But this Marsyas has often brought me to such a pass, that I have felt as if I could hardly endure the life which I am leading (this, Socrates, you will admit); and I am conscious that if I did not shut my ears against him, and fly as from the voice of the siren, my fate would be like that of others,—he would transfix me, and I should grow old sitting at his feet. For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the wants of my own soul, and busying myself with the concerns of the Athenians; therefore I hold my ears and tear myself away from him. And he is the only person who ever made me ashamed.

. . . . For I know that I cannot answer him or say that I ought not to do as he bids, but when I leave his presence the love of popularity gets the better of me. . . . [His words] are the only words which have a meaning in them, and also the most divine, abounding in fair images of virtue, and of the widest comprehension, or rather extending to the whole duty of a good and honorable man.¹

Alcib. He and I went on the expedition to Potidaea; there we messed together, and I had the opportunity of observing his extraordinary power of sustaining fatigue. His endurance was simply marvellous when, being cut off from our supplies, we were compelled to go without food—on such occasions, which often happen in time of war, he was superior not only to me but to everybody. . . . Socrates, with his bare feet on the ice and in his ordinary dress, marched better than the other soldiers who had shoes, and they looked daggers at him because he seemed to despise them. . . .

One morning he was thinking about something which he could not resolve; he would not give it up, but continued thinking from early dawn until noon—there he stood fixed in thought; and at noon attention was drawn to him, and the rumor ran through the wondering crowd that Socrates had been standing and thinking about something ever since the break of day. At last, in the evening after supper, some Ionians out of curiosity (I should explain that this occurred not in winter but in summer), brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and see whether he would stand all night. There he stood until the following morning.²

Soc. Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils,—no, nor the human race, as I believe,—and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day.³

¹ *Symposium* 215, 216, 222a.

² *Ibid.* 219e, 220.

³ *Republic* v. 473d.

Soc. Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty and sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death: for the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue.¹

Soc. My counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when . . . we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years.²

How you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accusers, I cannot tell; but I know that they almost made me forget who I was—so persuasively did they speak; and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. But of the many false words told by them, there was one which quite amazed me;—I mean when they said that you should be upon your guard and not allow yourselves to be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To say this, when they were certain to be detected as soon as I opened my lips and proved myself to be anything but a great speaker, did indeed appear to me to be most shameless—unless by the force of eloquence they meant the force of truth. . . . From me you shall hear the whole truth: not, however, delivered after their manner in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. . . . If I defend myself in my accustomed manner, and you hear me using the words which I have been in the habit of using in the agora, at the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere else, I would ask you not to be surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. For I am more than seventy years of age; and, appearing now for the first time in a court of law, I am quite a stranger to the language of the place. . . . Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good; but think only of the truth of my words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak truly and the judge decide justly.³

I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing. . . . And so I go about the world, obedient to the God, and search and make inquiry into the wisdom of anyone, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise, and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the God.⁴

¹ *Republic* x. 613a.

² *Apology* 17, 18a.

³ *Ibid.* x. 621e.

⁴ *Ibid.* 23a.

I proceed to interrogate and examine and cross-examine him, and if I think that he has no virtue in him, but only says that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less. And I shall repeat the same words to every one whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren. For know that this is the command of God; and I believe that no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul.¹

If I tell you that to do as you say would be a disobedience to the God, and therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, you will not believe that I am serious; and if I say again that daily to discourse about virtue, and of those other things about which you hear me examining myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you are still less likely to believe me. Yet I say what is true.²

If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, . . . that pilgrimage will be worth making. . . . Above all, I shall then be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also in the next; and I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is not. . . . In another world they do not put a man to death for asking questions: assuredly not. For besides being happier than we are, they will be immortal, if what is said is true.

Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know of a certainty, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that the time has arrived when it was better for me to die and be released from trouble. . . . The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die, and you to live. Which is better God only knows.³

QUOTATIONS FROM XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA.⁴

Socrates ever lived in the public eye; at early morning he was to be seen betaking himself to one of the promenades, or wrestling-grounds; at noon he would appear with the gathering crowds in the marketplace; and as day declined, wherever the largest throng might be encountered, there was he to be found, talking for the most part, while any one who chose might stop and listen.⁵

¹ *Apology* 29e, 30a.

² *Ibid.* 37e, 38a.

³ *Ibid.* 41c, 42a.

⁴ The text used is that of Dakyns, *The Works of Xenophon*, Vol. III, Part I (1897).

⁵ *Mem.* I. i. 10.

He himself never wearied of discussing human topics. What is piety? What is impiety? What is the beautiful? What the ugly? What the noble? What the base? What are meant by just and unjust? What by sobriety and madness? What by courage and cowardice? What is a state? What is a statesman? What is a ruler over men? What is a ruling character? and other like problems, the knowledge of which, as he put it, conferred a patent of nobility on the possessor, whereas those who lacked the knowledge might deservedly be stigmatized as slaves.¹

At one time Socrates was a member of the Council, he had taken the senatorial oath, and sworn "as a member of that house to act in conformity with the laws." It was thus he chanced to be President of the Popular Assembly, when that body was seized with a desire to put the nine generals . . . to death by a single inclusive vote. Whereupon, in spite of the bitter resentment of the people, and the menaces of several influential citizens, he refused to put the question, esteeming it of greater importance faithfully to abide by the oath which he had taken, than to gratify the people wrongfully, or to screen himself from the menaces of the mighty.²

With regard to the care bestowed by the gods upon men, his belief differed widely from that of the multitude.³ Whereas most people seem to imagine that the gods know in part, and are ignorant in part, Socrates believed firmly that the gods know all things—both the things that are said and the things that are done, and the things that are counseled in the silent chambers of the heart. Moreover, they are present everywhere, and bestow signs upon man concerning all the things of man.⁴

No less surprising to my mind is the belief that Socrates corrupted the young. This man, who . . . kept his appetites and passions under strict control, who was pre-eminently capable of enduring winter's cold and summer's heat, and every kind of toil, who was so schooled to curtail his needs that with the scantiest of means he never lacked sufficiency, . . . was he not rather the saving of many through the passion for virtue which he roused in them, and the hope he infused that through careful management of themselves they might grow to be truly beautiful and good,—not indeed that he ever undertook to be a teacher of virtue, but being evidently virtuous himself he made those who associated with him hope that by imitating they might at last resemble him.⁵

It is with the workings of the soul as with those of the body; want of exercise of the organ leads to inability of function, here bodily, there spiritual,

¹ *Mem.* I. i. 16.

² *Ibid.* I. i. 18.

³ His belief was so much higher than theirs.

⁴ *Ibid.* I. i. 19.

⁵ *Ibid.* I. ii. 3.

so that we can neither do the things that we should nor abstain from the things we should not.¹

Socrates was plainly a lover of the people, and indeed of all mankind. Though he had many ardent admirers among citizens and strangers alike, he never demanded any fee for his society from any one, but bestowed abundantly upon all alike of the riches of his soul. . . . Socrates gave a lifetime to the outpouring of his substance in the shape of the greatest benefits bestowed on all who cared to receive them. In other words, he made those who lived in his society better men, and sent them on their way rejoicing. To no other conclusion, therefore, can I come but that, being so good a man, Socrates was worthier to have received honor from the state than death.²

It may serve to illustrate the assertion that he benefited his associates partly by the display of his own virtue and partly by verbal discourse and argument, if I set down my various recollections³ on these heads. And first with regard to religion and the concerns of heaven. In conduct and language his behavior conformed to the rule: "Act according to the law and custom of your state, and you will act piously." . . . His formula of prayer was simple: "Give me that which is best for me," for, said he, the gods know best what good things are. . . . If with scant means he offered but small sacrifices, he believed that he was in no wise inferior to others who made frequent and large sacrifices from an ampler store. . . . His belief was that the joy of the gods is greater in proportion to the holiness of the giver.⁴

A belief is current, in accordance with views maintained concerning Socrates in speech and writing, and in either case conjecturally, that, however powerful he may have been in stimulating men to virtue as a theorist, he was incapable of acting as their guide himself. It would be well for those who adopt this view to weigh carefully not only what Socrates effected "by way of castigation" in cross-questioning those who conceived themselves to be possessed of all knowledge, but also his everyday conversation with those who spent their time in close intercourse with himself. Having done this, let them decide whether he was incapable of making his companions better.⁵

Antiphon [the Sophist] approaches Socrates in hope of drawing away his associates, and in their presence thus accosts him: Why, Socrates, I always thought it was expected of students of philosophy to grow in happiness daily; but you seem to have reaped other fruits from your philosophy. At any rate, you exist, I do not say live, in a style such as no slave serving under a master would put up with. Your meat and your drink are of the cheapest sort, and

¹ *Mem.* I. ii. 19.

² *Ibid.* I. ii. 59-62.

³ *Ἀπομνημονεύματα, Memorabilia.*

⁴ *Ibid.* I. iii. 1-3.

⁵ *Ibid.* I. iv. 1.

as to clothes, you cling to one wretched cloak which serves you for summer and winter alike; and so you go the whole year round, without shoes to your feet or a shirt to your back. Then again, you are not for taking or making money, the mere seeking of which is a pleasure, even as the possession of it adds to the sweetness and independence of existence. I do not know whether you follow the common rule of teachers, who try to fashion their pupils in imitation of themselves, and propose to mould the characters of your companions; but if you do, you ought to dub yourself professor of the art of wretchedness.

Thus challenged, Socrates replied: One thing to me is certain, Antiphon; you have conceived so vivid an idea of my life of misery that for yourself you would choose death sooner than live as I do. Suppose now we turn and consider what it is you find so hard in my life. Is it that he who takes payment must as a matter of contract finish the work for which he is paid; whereas I, who do not take it, lie under no constraint to discourse except with whom I choose? Do you despise my dietary on the ground that the food which I eat is less wholesome and less strengthening than yours? . . . And as to raiment—clothes, you know, are changed on account of cold or else of heat. . . . I, who am forever training myself to endure this, that, and the other thing which may befall the body, can brave all hardships more easily than yourself for instance, who perhaps are not so practiced. And to escape slavery to the belly or to sleep or to lechery, can you suggest more effective means than the possession of some more powerful attraction, some counter-charm which shall gladden not only in the using, but by the hope enkindled of its lasting usefulness? And yet this you do know: joy is not to him who feels that he is doing well in nothing—it belongs to one who is persuaded that things are progressing with him, be it tillage or the working of a vessel, or any of the thousand and one things on which a man may chance to be employed. To him it is given to rejoice as he reflects, "I am doing well." But is the pleasure derived from all these things put together half as joyous as the consciousness of becoming better oneself, of acquiring better and better friends? That, for my part, is the belief I continue to cherish.¹

When any one has been kindly treated, and has it in his power to requite [reciprocate] the kindness but neglects to do so, men call him ungrateful. . . . No matter who confers the kindness, friend or foe, the recipient should endeavor to requite it, failing which he is a wrongdoer. . . . In proportion to the greatness of the benefit conferred, the greater his misdoing who fails to requite the kindness.²

[Socrates is arguing with a younger brother to get him to love, win, and co-operate with his older brother. He urges the naturalness of brothers to love and help each other, the value of a brother, the way to win him by kind words and deeds, his duty to take the first step toward conciliation, to show

¹ *Mem.* I. vi. 1-9.

² *Ibid.* II. ii. 1, 2.

himself "a good, honest, brotherly man." At present you two [brothers] are in the condition of two hands formed by God to help each other, but which have let go their business, and have turned to hindering one another all they can. You are a pair of feet fashioned on the Divine plan to work together, but which have neglected this to trammel each other's gait. . . . In fashioning two brothers, God intends them (I think) to be of more benefit to one another than either two hands or two feet. . . . A pair of brothers, linked in amity, can work for each other's good, though seas divide them.¹

Seeds of love are implanted in man by nature. Men have need of one another, feel pity, help each other by united efforts, and in recognition of the fact show mutual gratitude. . . . Through all opposing barriers friendship steals her way and binds together the noble and good among mankind. Such is their virtue that they would rather possess scant means without injuring others than wield an empire won by war. In spite of hunger and thirst, they will share their meat and drink gladly. . . . It is theirs not merely to eschew all greed of riches; not merely to make a just and lawful distribution of wealth, but to supply what is lacking to the needs of one another. . . . As to envy, they will make a clean sweep and clearance of it: the good things which a man possesses shall be also the property of his friends, and the goods which they possess are to be looked upon as his.²

In whatsoever you desire to be esteemed good, endeavor to be good. For of all the virtues nameable among men, consider and you will find there is not one but may be increased by learning and practice.³

It is difficult to do anything without some mistake or other; and no less difficult, even if you were to succeed in doing it perfectly, to escape all unfriendly criticism. . . . You should avoid censorious persons, and attach yourself to the considerate and kindhearted. In all your affairs accept with a good grace what you can do, and decline what you feel you cannot do. Whatever it be, do it heart and soul, and make it your finest work. There lies the method at once to silence faultfinders and to minister help to your own difficulties. Life will flow smoothly, risks will be diminished, provision against old age secured.⁴

When someone asked him [Socrates] what he regarded as the best pursuit or noblest study for a man, he answered: "*Successful conduct.*" . . . "I consider fortune and conduct to be diametrically opposed. For instance, to succeed in some desirable course of action without seeking to do so, I hold to be good fortune; but to do a thing well by dint of learning and practice, that according to my creed is successful conduct, and those who make this the serious business of their life seem to me to do well." They are at once the best

¹ *Mem.* II. iii. 18, 19.

² *Ibid.* II. vi. 38.

³ *Ibid.* II. vi. 21-23.

⁴ *Ibid.* II. viii. 5, 6.

and the dearest in the sight of God (he went on to say) who for instance in husbandry do well the things of farming, or in the art of healing all that belongs to healing, or in statecraft the affairs of state; whereas the man who does nothing well—nor well in anything—is (he added) neither good for anything nor dear to God.¹

In all human history there are no two characters of greater significance and interest than Socrates and Jesus. In the field of ethics they are pre-eminent; each contributed in a primary way to the development of moral earnestness, moral thoughtfulness, and moral idealism. One belonged to the fifth century B.C. and the other to the first century A.D., one was a Greek and the other a Jew, but both belonged to the highest period of the Mediterranean civilization. One founded a permanent philosophy, the other a permanent religion. Both died martyrs to their missions. Socrates lived a long life, Jesus a short one; but both performed the tasks they set themselves of instructing and uplifting humanity. Both had disciples who appreciated them, learned from them, and after their death carried forward their work. The personal traits, the characteristic acts, the pedagogical methods, and the spoken message of both were kept in memory by their adherents, told to persons who became interested, and put into written form for wider use and preservation.

A comparison of the Socratic writings of Plato and Xenophon with the Gospels shows fundamental similarities, some close parallels, and many divergences.

The purpose of the two groups of biographical writings, as we have seen above, was in general the same: to restore the reputation of a great and good man who had been publicly executed and defamed by the state; to re-establish his influence as a supreme teacher in respect to right living and thinking; and to render available to all the message of truth and duty which each had made it his life-work to promulgate. The Socratic writings accomplished this purpose in a wonderful way for the Greek world; and the Gospels, more than four hundred years later, with a Jewish-Christian message to the Greek world, accomplished their purpose equally well. Until the first century A.D. Socrates' life and teaching were the

¹ *Mem.* III. ix. 14, 15.

greatest ethical force in the Mediterranean civilization; after the first century A.D. Christianity became the dominant moral-religious order.

We have commented also upon the fact that the time interval between the public ministries of Socrates and Jesus, and the composition of the biographical writings that put them on record, was approximately the same—an interval of two generations, forty to seventy years. We cannot date exactly the *Dialogues* of Plato or the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, any more than we can date exactly the four Gospels.

Two differences also have been noted between the Socratic writings and the Gospels: first, that the story of Socrates' life and teaching was written down in the same language in which it arose while the story of Jesus' life and teaching was written down in Greek but arose in the language of a Semitic people, the Aramaic; second, that the Socratic writings were composed in Greece for the very people among whom Socrates had done his work, while the Gospels were composed in foreign countries, for the gentile peoples, far from Palestine where Jesus' work had been done. These two differences of language and locality necessarily effected many minor differences in the character of the biographies; the translation of the Aramaic memorabilia of Jesus into Greek, and the adaptation of his Jewish life and teaching for use among Gentiles involved various transmutations of form and content. Further, the biographical data given by Plato and Xenophon are given in scattered, discursive form, while the biographical data in the Gospels are arranged in a general historical order, in a chronological framework.

In respect to quantity of material, the Socratic writings are several times longer than the Gospels. Perhaps it might therefore be expected that we should be enabled to know Socrates better than we know Jesus from a much briefer biographical literature. One is to observe, however, that the Gospels, though short compared with the *Dialogues* and the *Memorabilia*, are by no means scanty productions, especially in view of the fact that they are reporting a public ministry that occupied but one or two years; also, that the Gospels contain a simpler, more direct and less augmented account of Jesus, while Plato and Xenophon have greatly expanded

the message of Socrates to convey their own message as well. It does not appear that the Gospel writers had an individual philosophy and pedagogy, as was the case with the Socratic writers. When we differentiate in the *Dialogues* and the *Memorabilia* the materials which may be regarded as strictly biographical of Socrates, the quantity is not so much in excess of what the Gospels furnish as strictly biographical data of Jesus.

How accurate historically is the representation which the Socratic writings give of Socrates and the Gospels give of Jesus? We have seen that opinions differ remarkably. On the one side there are scholars who hold that the biographies in both cases are so fictitious and pragmatized that we cannot with any definiteness or certainty get back to their original heroes. On the other side there are scholars who take all reports concerning both Socrates and Jesus without historical criticism. Between these two extremes of opinion are various hypotheses as to the relative and the comparative trustworthiness of the accounts contained in the two groups of biographical writings.

The view here taken is one of the eclectic views, that it is possible for us to recover somewhat definitely and accurately the historical personages whose lives these biographers recount.

Socrates is to be known primarily from the earlier *Dialogues* of Plato, secondarily from the First Book of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. The items contained in these writings are by no means to be accepted as historical facts without careful investigation and critical judgment, neither are the teachings attributed to Socrates to be regarded as a transcription of his exact words or even of his exact ideas—in some cases they may be, in other cases they quite surely are not, while in the great majority of passages we are to think of Socrates' language and thought as freely reproduced. To recur to the terms used above, Plato and Xenophon give us a portrait rather than a photograph of Socrates; they idealize him, they select the facts about him and the teachings which will serve their didactic and apologetic purpose. But when we once understand the nature of their compositions, we can with considerable success extricate the biographical data, and so come to know the real Socrates.

Jesus is to be known primarily from the Synoptic Gospels. Among these the Gospel of Mark is the earliest, and by their authors it has been incorporated almost wholly into the two others; the Gospel of Mark is therefore the first main source of our knowledge of Jesus. The second main source is the non-Markan material common to the Gospel of Matthew and the Gospel of Luke—the material usually referred to as Q (or the Logia), a hypothetical document. The relative trustworthiness of these two sources for our information about Jesus cannot readily be determined, since by the terms of their differentiation they have no material in common. The Gospel of John has peculiar characteristics: it does not present a general account of Jesus' life and teaching, as is the case with the Synoptic Gospels, but a special doctrine of the person and work of Jesus as the Jewish Messiah (Christ) interpreted somewhat in the thought-forms of Hellenistic metaphysical theology, with reference to the Stoic and Alexandrian Logos speculation. With regard to the Gospels, as with regard to the Socratic writings, one may say that the items apparently biographical are by no means to be accepted as historical facts without careful investigation and critical judgment, neither are the teachings attributed to Jesus to be regarded as a transcription of his exact words or even of his exact ideas except where the evidence is strongly in that direction. Our efforts are not very successful to get back through the Greek translation to the Aramaic form of the Gospel memorabilia; the story and message of Jesus have certainly undergone selection, adaptation, and supplementation to meet the needs of the gentile-Christian mission; and there can be no doubt that the primitive Christian tradition, and the Gospels which came out of it, idealize Jesus with a didactic and apologetic purpose. Of Jesus, too, the picture is a portrait rather than a photograph. Yet it is not too much to affirm that the Gospels give us the main facts and the main teachings about Jesus. When we can detach ourselves sufficiently from current theology and homiletics to study and view Jesus quite historically, the real Jesus will come to view.

Do the biographical documents of Socrates and Jesus show parallelism? Some who rank Xenophon above Plato as a biographer of Socrates, regarding the *Memorabilia* as a highly accurate

account, say that the *Memorabilia* corresponds to Mark's Gospel, each furnishing the earliest and most trustworthy report of their respective subjects. But on Burnet's view, to which this paper inclines, Xenophon's writing is later than and secondary to Plato's *Dialogues*; hence this alleged parallelism does not exist. The earlier *Dialogues* of Plato, in their biographical material, correspond in a general way to the Gospel of Mark and the common non-Markan material (Q) in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. As these two Gospels, the first and the third, in their present form were later than the Gospel of Mark and the other common source or sources, a limited measure of parallelism may be said to obtain between the First Book of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, while the other books of the *Memorabilia*, and the later *Dialogues* of Plato, where Socrates is little more than a spokesman for the individual messages of the two writers, sustain a tenuous parallelism with the Gospel of John. But these correspondences cannot be pressed; if they exist, it is only in a general, slight, and superficial way.

The fact which most impresses one is, that revering, competent purposeful disciples of the two greatest teachers of the ancient world held tenaciously to the precious personality, example, and message of their heroes, perpetuated their memory and influence, developed and adapted their teaching for the subsequent generations, established what they had founded, conserved the moral values that Socrates and Jesus had created, and put into permanent motion their moral impulses and ideals. The achievement of the disciples in so continuing and developing the work of their masters was next in worth to that of Socrates and Jesus themselves; and to put them on record for all men in lofty biographical writings was to complete efficiently and gloriously the disciples' task.

MYSTIC KNOWLEDGE

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It is characteristic of mystics to claim for themselves a kind of knowledge or illumination different from ordinary sensuous or reasoned knowledge. It is, they insist, an indescribable experience, and therefore to be understood only by being felt. It cannot be communicated. It is another sort of consciousness, another sense, beyond the normal qualities of the self. It is held to be superior to all other forms of knowledge. By this avenue man is believed to have the surest and most adequate access to Reality, to God. The closest relation between this unique illumination and common experience is found in states of intense emotion. One writer states it thus:

It is a matter of experience that in our moments of deep emotion, transitory though they be, we plunge deeper into the reality of things than we can hope to do in hours of the most brilliant argument. At the touch of passion doors fly open which logic has battered on in vain: for passion rouses to activity not merely the mind, but the whole vitality of man. It is the lover, the poet, the mourner, the convert who shares for a moment the mystic's privilege of lifting that Veil of Isis which science handles so helplessly, leaving only her dirty finger-marks behind.

The uniqueness of this mystic knowledge is further emphasized by the fact that it is attained by no ordinary means. It does not lie at the end of a process of perception or of reasoning or of scientific experiment. For most mystics, it is regarded as something which requires the renunciation of these common methods. Such methods involve effort and lead to provisional and relative conclusions. They are bound by their premises and they point beyond their results to new problems. The mystic employs these common processes only in order to deny them, to transcend them. He seeks knowledge which is not relative or conditioned or partial. It cannot therefore be sensuous or inferential but must be immediate

and absolute. The means employed and sanctioned for achieving this end are, accordingly, those which eliminate perception and reasoning and all direct effort. Exercises in self-discipline are prescribed by which the natural desires and ideational processes are inhibited and eliminated. In the passive, receptive mood thus induced, after many efforts and defeats, the mystic sometimes attains the desired sense of union and peace. The psychological terms employed by the mystics and the descriptions given of their experiences betray the dominance of the older faulty psychology. Sense-perception is sharply marked off from judgment and reasoning. Thought, feeling, and will remain distinct, and beside these there exists the realm of illumination. Little account is taken of the influence of impulse and desire in relation to the higher functions of imagination and of organized habit. The consequence is an atomistic conception of the mental states, and a decidedly individualistic treatment of human beings. The mystic prizes the exclusive and private character of his experience. It is an affair between himself and God. No one else can share it. Only the most inadequate and feeble representations of it are possible. Other persons are urged to pursue the mystic way for themselves, but they must travel alone with the aid of the most meager directions. At best, it is an adventure. Each goes at his own risk because the way is indescribable and many fail to arrive after the most faithful effort. There is no rational sequence in the process of rising from the native impulses to the heights of mystic vision. If one ascends, it is by leaps and bounds, accompanied by intense anxiety and many falls. And if one arrives at the coveted goal it is an unintelligible achievement, always something to be cherished but nothing to be understood.

It is the purpose of this paper to inquire how the facts of mystic experience appear when viewed from the standpoint of functional psychology. It is obvious that there are such facts. The mystics constitute a long historical line and include many great names in philosophy and in practical affairs. They have done their utmost to convey some impression of their inner life. They have usually spoken in symbolic and mysterious terms, but no one may doubt that they had abundant and intense experiences. They themselves,

at least, attached to these experiences the utmost importance, and in many instances there are very real and significant results flowing from these experiences. Since, therefore, the facts cannot be ignored, it is incumbent on scientific psychology to understand and interpret them. If the older psychology left these facts among the ultimate mysteries, it is still the privilege of the newer psychology to make trial of the case in its own terms and methods.

There are certain features of the functional psychology which are particularly significant in their application to the phenomena of mysticism. We may briefly indicate these principles and then show how they aid in the reinterpretation of mystic knowledge. First, functional psychology seeks the original, moving impulses which give vitality to any form of experience. These dynamic, propulsive cravings of all sentient beings furnish the movement and projection, the zest and tang of life. They are the roots of desire, the deep springs of the will to live. All types of experience arise from such impulses directly or indirectly. When a highly wrought system of ideas or habits loses this vital quality, it is like an engine whose fires are dead, or like a corpse whose heart no longer throbs.

Secondly, the cognitive processes develop and function in the service of these impulses. The senses are called into being in the organism's struggle for existence. The biological series shows an increasing complexity of the organs, in their structure, flexibility, and adaptability, but their fundamental function remains the same—to assist in fulfilling the quest for life. There are enormous differences in human beings with reference to sense-perception, but these differences depend in large part upon the conditions under which the individuals live. The Blackfellow of Central Australia is able to detect footprints and follow on horseback a trail which a European cannot perceive after the closest inspection. In the same way the miller may test flour, and the merchant determine the quality of silk, by touch sensations which the ordinary man could not discriminate. The reason is that their welfare and happiness—their existence as millers and merchants—require such a development of sense-perceptions.

Thirdly, the reasoning processes stand in the same organic and necessary relation to the impulses and to sense-perception. A very considerable number of experimental psychologists have concluded from their experiments and observations that sensuous imagery of some kind and degree is present in all thinking. They do not allow that there is any "imageless thought." Abstruse reflection may employ word symbols rather than the concrete, detailed images of associative thought, but the use of words in that way does not denote the absence of imagery. This verbal imagery is still sensuous—visual, auditory, motor, etc. In this view, there is then no abstract thought, if by this is meant absolutely supra-sensuous thought. The highest intellectual processes take up into themselves, and cannot dispense with, the materials of the humbler type. The mighty concepts of pure thought are anchored in the visible, tangible sphere of sense-perception.

It is still more generally recognized that reason is dependent upon impulse and instinct. In a sense, man becomes rational through the operation of his instincts. The function of reason is not to displace impulse but to fulfil it, to illuminate it, to guide it. This view of reason is more obvious in connection with practical situations, for example, in the mental operations of a general disposing his troops for battle. His reflections are evidently stimulated by immediate and crucial instinctive demands, such as fear of death and disgrace, love of honor, and love of country. It is perhaps not so obvious that more subtle and abstract reflection, such as concerns itself with the fourth dimension of space, springs from instinctive needs, and yet the fact that inquiries of this kind possess so much attraction for some persons may be sufficient evidence of the presence here of curiosity, display of professional technique, aesthetic interest, and other powerful impulses. In any case, "pure reason" has been largely relegated to the refuse heap of meaningless terms. Reason as psychology knows it involves and is bound by indissoluble ties to every aspect of the mental life.

Fourthly, the development of the mind is a social process. Every person belongs to a social organism, much as the hand or the eye belongs to the body, or as a cell lives in protoplasm. One derives and shapes his whole nature much as he does his language.

Within the influences of custom, tradition, and social suggestion in numberless forms each one is molded. So dominating is this human, personal world of one's associations that it furnishes the medium through which "nature" and all forms of reality are approached and interpreted. The individual person possesses a social consciousness to the last degree. When he outwardly withdraws from his fellows, he carries them with him in his imagination. When he attempts to construct moral ideals in his inmost thought, he fashions them in terms of social values and probably in personal form. Even abstract, scientific thought, where the symbols are complicated and remote from common speech, carries its social reference and its personal quality.

In treating here of mystic knowledge these features of the psychological point of view will be employed. It will be assumed that all knowledge processes are dynamic and embody an impulsive quality, that they involve sensuous imagery, and that they are social in character.

What, then, is the impulse out of which the quest for mystic knowledge arises? What is the craving it seeks to satisfy? The answer is plain. The mystic craves a sense of the reality of the Absolute. He seeks to know God. He strives to attain communion with the Infinite. It is this desire which furnishes the energy and zest of his efforts. All of his reflections, all of his experiments, all of his disciplines pulse with this anxious interest. It becomes the supreme concern for which every other is surrendered. No self-denial, no physical torment, no task or burden is too great to be undertaken if it promises any clarification of vision or purification of heart to him who is possessed of the true mystic's desire to see God. The pages of the mystics are full of this longing.

The mystic is not so much troubled by the question of the existence or the reality of God. He accepts that as it is understood by his time and social *milieu*. His great passion is to *find* God, to ascend to his presence, to enter into communion with him. Occidental mysticism at least, from neo-Platonism on, has taken for granted the ontological validity of the idea of the Absolute. The most speculative mystics have scarcely done more with this problem than to restate and elaborate it. They have reiterated

the relativity of sensuous and rational knowledge, showing that every experience and every conclusion points onward to other facts and judgments. They have emphasized the demand to transcend this relativity and particularism in order to discover the totality. They have sought the One beyond the Many, the Whole above the Parts, the Changeless free from Change. The real object of their quest has not been the idea, or the proof of it, but the experience of the fact. Their interest in the demonstration of the divine existence has been chiefly to stimulate their energies to accomplish the act of union with the Divine. The most conspicuous fact about mystics as compared with others is not their speculative doctrines about God, but their method of reaching him. They have been impatient of the conventional forms and the organized systems of approach. To them there was an inner and an open way to the Absolute for every individual. The ritual and the ecclesiastical authority and the appointed creed were set at naught in comparison with the means of prayer and meditation and self-imposed discipline.

Another striking evidence that the impulse of mysticism drives toward an act, an experience, rather than an idea or a doctrine, is the fact that it flourishes greatly only in epochs and in circles where the idea of God is already well organized and dominant, but where there is a demand for more direct and satisfying conjunction with him. The Middle Ages were the times when Christian mysticism flowered, and those were the times of the great metaphysical systems. Speculative philosophy had rounded out a vast, well-articulated structure of logical thought. The great longing which the mystics felt was to make a practical demonstration of the possibility of a union of human nature with the ultimate Reality whose being seemed logically demonstrated. But wherever that system of speculative thought has been shattered by the Renaissance and by modern science, mysticism has been wanting. It is unable of itself to meet the intellectual need, for it is not primarily concerned with thinking. Interestingly enough, however, there are signs at the present time of a new awakening of mystical tendencies; and these tendencies are coincident with the projection of new constructions of speculative thought. After the long and

confusing period of the beginnings of the empirical sciences, dealing with the concrete details of natural phenomena, a day of new generalizations is dawning. We begin to read of law, evolution, nature, and life; of society, humanity, and the cosmos. Not many scientifically trained minds venture to employ the term God for these generalizations, but that is easily explained. That term was used in the prescientific era. It has some bad associations. The other words seem freer to express without incumbrance the general ideas now forming. Yet it is clear that they are symbols of reality in its larger aspects. They are comprehensive and serve somewhat as charts of the world for the imagination. And now that these vaster outlines are emerging from the chaotic facts and minutiae of the natural sciences, the old craving of mysticism reappears—the craving to secure a vital and satisfying relation with the supreme reality.

And here appears in the mystic's experience another tendency heightened above its ordinary form. Psychologists are only beginning to take account adequately of the fundamentally social character of consciousness. They have been absorbed with the psycho-physical organism and therefore with a predominantly individualistic psychology. It is becoming evident, however, that the mental life of man is essentially social. As a human being, that is, as a self-conscious, self-directing personality, the individual is dependent upon the social life of his group. He takes on the mental traits, the language, and the attitudes of that group literally "before he knows it." The objects of the physical world are mediated to him through the experience of others. He develops their attitudes toward food objects, delighting in some and rejecting others, according to the customs and tastes of his fellows. He perceives certain objects as dangerous and others as friendly. The values he thus attaches to things are largely predetermined. Now the living experience of all these "things" of the environment and of these values is mediated to him by the persons about him, by the members of his family and tribe. These persons are therefore the fashioning forces of his mental states. They are the ever-present, ever-watchful factors, conveying praise and blame, punishment and reward. This social, personal way of thinking

is essentially universal. To primitive people there is probably nothing impersonal. It is a commonplace that children personify everything they are interested in, or are concerned about. And it is well known that the imagination of the ordinary man is peopled with personal forms. He talks to his machine as well as to his horse. Experiments have shown how concrete and personal the imagery of most people is with reference to what are called abstractions, such as virtue and justice. The imagery of virtue for a visualizer is likely to be the representation of some living or historical person who is regarded as an embodiment of virtue. The image of justice is likely to be the picture of a noble woman holding a balance in her hand. For those whose imagery is predominantly auditory these ideas may be associated with persons speaking words, exhorting to virtue and justice. Motor images of persons struggling for the right will occur to those who think in terms of muscular reactions. It is an elementary fact of psychological observation that the great general ideas in which the temper and thought of an age are expressed tend to be hypostatized. That is, these ideas, such as Nature and Life, are credited with substantial reality and with personal form: they are anthropomorphized. They are freely depicted in poetry and in other forms of art. They are dramatized and vivified for the imagination and are thereby made potent over the emotions and the will. When such general ideas have been fairly accepted by society and are felt to be justified by their function in simplifying the complex body of detailed scientific facts, they enter into the subconscious and become available for mystical uses. But when these comprehensive concepts are honeycombed with doubt and are detached from the vital, ascendant interests of the times, then they are de-anthropomorphized and their reality is discredited. Concepts cannot generate mystical faith and satisfaction for any minds who regard them as decadent and sterile. So long as these larger ideas are virile and commanding, they are likely to be treated as personal and social and they become the objects of special devotion to those who are pronounced mystics. The mystic develops to an extreme degree what is experienced in lesser measure by other men. He is concerned to enter into vital relations with the reality

signified by the great universals. He does not feel the need of proving them but only of experiencing them. It is this immediate communion which attracts and fascinates the mystic. The supreme moment of his ecstasy is that of direct awareness, the living act of seizure and illumination.

There is great diversity in the descriptions of this social aspect of the mystic union. By many it is reported in quite natural, personal terms. Others employ negative and figurative expressions in their attempt to convey some impression of the wonder and intensity of the experience. Ruysbroeck says:

Illuminated men are caught up, above reason, into the domain of naked vision. There the Divine Unity dwells and calls. Hence their bare vision, cleansed and free, penetrates the activity of all created things, and pursues it to search it out even to its heights. And this bare vision is penetrated and impregnated by the Eternal Light, as the air is penetrated and impregnated by the sun. The naked will is transformed by the Eternal Love, as fire by fire. The naked spirit stands erect, it feels itself to be wrapped round, affirmed, and fixed by the formless immensity of God. Thus, far above reason, the created image is united by a threefold bond with its eternal type, the Source and Principle of its life.

One of the common and expressive symbols of mystic union is that of love and marriage. This metaphor is often couched in the most sensuous and passionate terms. Speaking in one of her milder moods, St. Theresa describes the marriage of God and the soul as follows:

Despite His infinite Majesty, He condescends to unite Himself so closely to a feeble creature, that, like those whom the sacrament of marriage has united in an irrevocable bond, He would never again be separated from her. After the spiritual betrothal it is not thus: more than once the lovers separate. In the spiritual marriage, on the contrary, the soul dwells always with God, in that centre which I have described.

The way in which the mystical experiences are expressed will obviously depend very largely upon the character of the general ideas employed. Where these ideas are most highly personified, as in theistic circles, the mystical union tends to be a conscious relationship. The self is not wholly merged and lost in God. But if the universal principle is more vague and less personal, identification with it may involve the suppression and smothering of self-

consciousness. In both extremes, however, there are evidences of auto-suggestion. It is only after repeated efforts that the mystical states are attained. The aspirant for them strives and struggles to eliminate the distractions which interfere with his concentration and narrowing of attention. If he proves to be a good subject, he finally attains success in entering into the mysterious state. To the observer of this process, the mystic sees visions, hears voices, finds Pure Being, in accordance with the general idea of Reality which he has cherished. It is a real experience to the subject of it, and it is not difficult to understand that it convinces him that he has entered into the mysteries of the Divine Existence. He cannot identify it with any ordinary experience. It surpasses the power of description and yet it carries conviction. It is something which he knows but cannot express in any intelligible terms. Consequently it is to him a form of knowledge above ordinary knowledge. He does not experience such visions of the Absolute in normal sense-perception, nor in normal reflective thinking, therefore he insists that he has been favored with supra-sensuous and supra-rational illumination. This is what he means by "mystic knowledge."

Modern psychology has afforded an explanation of this "knowledge" by the discovery of the nature of suggestion and of the processes involved in hypnotism. Professor Coe has carefully indicated the sources of mystical revelation in these terms. He observes:

No one will question that there is practically universal human aspiration after the good and after a systematizing or unification of our scattered and discordant lives. . . . Mystical confessions proceed, in general, from a homogeneous group of minds whose suggestibility is sufficient to give to ideas the force of present experience or intention. If, now, the formal conditions of trance and trance-like practices provide sensations or other mental modifications that easily suggest the goal of religious aspiration, the suggestible mind of the mystic will do the rest—the goal will be asserted as a present intuition.

He traces "the ideas of the mystic to some social tradition that he has imbibed," and shows that by auto-suggestion the mystic induces a state in which he attains an immediate and vital experience of the reality those ideas designate. By this means he

believes himself to have commerce with a larger world than normal sense or reason reveals. He gains from it the joyful and inspiring sense of being "at home" in the universe instead of being limited to merely "business relations" at the periphery of the world.

The practical interest and the active attitude of mysticism is seen also in the fact that in most cases this inner and intimate contact with the sum total of reality operates as an urgent and dynamic influence upon the subject of it. Many mystics express fine scorn toward the assumption that their ecstatic union with the Universal Principle is an end in itself. They regard it, rather, as an incentive to objective and practical tasks. St. Theresa exclaims: "In the design of God, this spiritual marriage is destined to no other purpose but the *incessant production of work, work!* And this, as I have already told you, is the best proof that the favors which we receive have come from God." Her own life, devoted to the difficult and arduous work of reforming a great religious order in Spain, is a proof of her own immense vitality and energy of will. The lives of St. Francis, Loyola, Catherine of Siena, and many others of similar enthusiasms abound with heroic deeds for which the necessary courage, initiative, and persistence are ascribed to their mystical experiences.

The discussion thus far may be summarized in a few sentences. It has dealt with mystic knowledge in terms of the impulse which leads to the quest for it. It has shown that the mystic craves vital and indubitable relations with absolute reality. But it has been indicated that the conception of reality is taken uncritically from the environing social tradition and is hypostatized. Then the means employed to reach that hypostatized conception are suggestion and hypnosis, which result, for those susceptible of it, in an emotional state of such intensity and immediacy as to carry conviction and a sense of contact with reality. Such a method seems to transcend ordinary knowledge, which is characterized as "dry and cold" and impotent to give possession of true being. This matter-of-fact knowledge seems to the mystic to be blind to the living, inner world. It deals only with the surface, with the crust and circumference of life, and is unable to penetrate into the warmth and mystery of the universe. The further question to be

considered is whether this difficulty is a necessary one or whether it rests upon some confusion and misinterpretation. Do the worlds of practical values and of scientific knowledge lie so far apart? Is there an impassable chasm between them? Can the mystic and the artist make their peace with the scientist and the logician?

Let us first look at the way in which each side has held aloof from the other. We have seen that the mystic, under the influence of the speculative traditions of society, has been seeking for two things which, almost by definition, have been outside of ordinary knowledge. One of these is the Infinite, conceived as outside of all relations to the finite. It is also designated as the Absolute or that which is in no way conditioned. It is a Whole without parts. The very definition of such an Infinite or Absolute identifies it with the Unknowable, since knowledge by means of the senses and reason implies relations, limits, conditions, and parts. All schools of philosophy, idealists and empiricists alike, are now agreed that such an Absolute is absolutely unknowable to the human mind. Different schools of thought may differ on other grounds in their attitude toward such an Absolute, but they are of one mind as to its unknowableness. The mystic has also given up the attempt to know such an Absolute but has insisted upon another way of finding it, that is, by a non-sensuous, non-rational experience. Now this is the second of the things, which by definition, lies outside of knowledge. Not only is the goal of his endeavor unintelligible but the method by which he proposes to reach it is non-intellectual. It, too, is a mystery. The mystic illumination cannot be scientifically nor systematically induced. The subject of it receives it passively. After doing his utmost to earn it, or achieve it, the greatest need is that he shall be passive and receptive. And when he has followed all possible directions he may fail to gain the vision; for the Reality he seeks is like the wind which "bloweth where it listeth" and is not governed by any known laws.

Modern psychologists agree with the mystic that this is not a rational process but they do not admit that it cannot be understood and induced. The study of it has shown that it is a process of hypnotism, and by deliberate experimentation it has been found possible to establish all of the phases of the mystical experience in

the hypnotized individual: "loss, in greater or less degree, of the sense of personality; an impression of being 'out of the body' and in a spiritual world; a sense of identification more or less complete with the object of one's thought or perception; an agreeable feeling-tone, which may have any degree of intensity, from mere general ease to ecstatic joy."

What recourse have we then? Does the choice lie between the irrational world of the mystic and the indifferent, mechanical world of science? Is it impossible to have the warmth and fascination of the one together with the sanity and practicability of the other in some homogeneous and self-consistent experience, without resort to the theory of a double nature in man and without regarding him as built on the separate compartment plan?

The answer to this question involves a reconsideration of the nature of knowledge, of its place and function in human life. For the most part those who have been devoted to the pursuits of knowledge in the fields of the natural sciences have been disposed to agree with the mystic that knowledge is quite passionless and entirely occupied with finite and relative realities. "Pure" science has prided itself on its disinterestedness, on its pursuit of truth for truth's sake. It has always spurned a commercial estimate of its value and not infrequently it has disdained any test of its practical utility. It has devoted itself to the observation and classification of facts, seemingly without emotion or will, like a kind of telescopic-microscopic eye without organic relation to any motor or neural structures beyond those necessary to its own mechanical adjustments. The typical devotee of such scientific knowledge has been represented in cartoons with an immense spectacled cranium crowning an emaciated, diminutive body requiring for its sustenance only an occasional tablet of predigested food! But the scientist has gone on his way confident of solving the great vital problems by rigorous logic and exact experiment. With his blow-pipe and scalpel, he has fearlessly challenged the mysteries and enigmas of existence. Science has been entirely ready to agree with mysticism that they could have nothing in common. In more than one instance these two, science and mysticism, have dwelt in the same human being and yet have kept their distance! But


generally the scientist and the mystic have remained apart and each has attempted to justify his isolation when challenged by the other.

The root difficulty in this opposition furnishes an interesting psychological problem. Perhaps a larger view of the experiences out of which both extremes arise may show that their separation is due to false views of each, and that rightly understood and developed man's normal experience would involve the one as well as the other without friction or inconsistency. The opposition is evidently that of the practical impulse over against the theoretical. The process of reflection and analysis checks overt activity for a time. Consciousness tends to flow out in motor adjustments. Every sense impression and every idea has normally a dynamic quality and impels to action. The thinking process, however, presents many ideas in consciousness and withholds them from immediate expression. It compares, weighs, and tests various images and inferences in imagination. It is a difficult and torturous performance. It is not "natural" to the ancestors of man, and occurs in very limited degree among primitive men. It is an art—one of the achievements of culture. The ability to anticipate needs or advantages, such as relate to the reforestation of a wasted timber country, requires a reference of impulses to a distant future and demands such a complex series of calculations and intermediate activities, that few minds are able to think it through. The natural man is pressed upon by immediate impulses, the insistence of which makes him impatient of the indirection necessary to represent vividly to himself a distant goal and patiently to work out in imagination the means for its attainment. What then must be the feeling of ordinary men, habituated to a life of action, when they are confronted with vast systems of reasoning, cast in strange technical terms, disdaining any appreciable relation to the practical affairs of human beings or to the satisfactions of the heart? This is undoubtedly the seat of the prejudice and aversion which the plain man has felt toward the higher education. "Culture" appears so useless and helpless in the brute struggle for existence. In so far as the mystic aspires to an active relation with the Infinite, rather than toward a rational understanding of it, he inclines to

discount the method of reasoning after the manner of the practical man.

But there is also another antagonism here. The mystic aspires to a state which is closely akin to aesthetic contemplation. It is a state of immediate satisfaction, of absorbed contemplation. It is a point of rapturous insight, where all opposition of contrasts and differences is lost in the blending of a faultless unity. Such an experience is its own justification. It does not wait upon proofs, or arguments. The scientific procedure, on the other hand, constantly looks to the analytical and inferential processes. It intrudes upon the state of feeling with a demand for facts and proofs. It interrupts the aesthetic devotions with an argument. It is not strange that the devotee is outraged by the logician. The devotee does not see how the logician can contribute to his piety, and the logician does not see how the devotee can ignore the contentions of logic.

To the psychologist the difficulty here lies in abstracting two "moments" from the total movement of experience and pitting them against each other. So long as reason is regarded as a distinct faculty, not in organic relation with the will and with feeling, it cannot escape the appearance of being alien and hostile to the active, emotional reactions. But it will also be bound to have its own champions, who cultivate knowledge for its own sake and circumscribe the world of respectability with the syllogism. These conflicts between idea and act disappear, however, when human experience is taken in its full scope. The normal development in the higher forms of human conduct is from impulse through ideation to action; and from the reflex effects of this action through further ideation to other action, and so on continually. The inhibition and deflection of the line representing this movement may be greatly prolonged at the stage of reflective analysis and deliberation. Thus in the line *ABC*, the point *B* may be raised indefinitely above the level of *AC*.



The altitude of *B* varies for different individuals and for different interests of a given individual. A person's impulse to secure food may, thanks to some favor of fortune, be able to obtain satisfaction quite directly without lifting the thought-line *B* to any perceptible degree. But the same man's desire to succeed in the invention of an aeroplane may carry him up through a maze of intellectual abstractions and calculations. Or his ambition to make discoveries in astronomy or botany may lead him into other labyrinths of ideas, observations, tentative experiments, and inferences. So elaborate and complex has our human life-circuit become that we cannot adequately represent it as the work of one man. Without enlarging upon other facts which this remark suggests, we may emphasize this: that the deliberative phase of human life, that is, scientific inquiry, has become so vast that it is necessary for individuals to specialize in various aspects of it and remain identified with it. The professional scientists, particularly those devoted to pure science, are of this class. They may not, as individuals, experience any immediate impulse in the direction of their task, for example, in determining the correctness or fallacies of the nebular hypothesis, but they are stimulated by professional considerations or by other indirect influences. On the other hand, those who are thus occupied with the intellectual problems seldom carry their conclusions over into action. Their results may be taken up and utilized by the practical men of the applied sciences, or, as in the case of a new form of food or medicine, the use of such expert knowledge may be extended directly to the masses of the people. In such a division of interests and labor, it is natural that scientific and reasoned knowledge should seem to lie quite apart from the impulses on the one side and from overt action on the other. But, as indicated above, this is an abstract and illusory view which may be overcome by observing the development of individual experience from impulse, through deliberation, to action. It may also be overcome by a historical survey of the natural sciences which reveals in so many instances their connection with navigation, agriculture, manufacture, transportation, disease, and the various arts of life. When viewed in its entire setting, in this way, knowledge is seen to be an integral part of the striving,

passionate life-process. It is the distinctly human means of meeting exigencies and emergencies in effecting adjustment to the environment or modification of the environment. This longer loop-line which man employs gets its vital current from the impulses and discharges it again in the motor responses of outward deeds. Without this vital current any body of knowledge is a sorry object. It is in "cold storage"; it is detached; it is barren. There can be no significant knowledge or "truth" which is not warm with the life of impulse and purpose. It must have tang and verve. It is the failure to recognize this fact which has made it easy for both scientists and mystics to renounce each other. The mystics have insisted on preserving the warmth and zest of the impulses and affections, and in order to do so have sought to take a more direct line to their goal. They have coveted an immediate intuition of reality for the practical purpose of confirming and directing the will in a patient and effective pursuit of spiritual interests while required to live in an alien world of sense and reason. Mysticism has rejected both the method and the proper end of scientific knowledge—the method of rational control and the end of practical adjustment to the natural world. It has craved relations with a supernatural world and by mistaking the functions of its own subconsciousness has believed itself successful. It has reveled in ecstasies and raptures, in visions and illuminations. It has kept open "the east windows of divine surprise." There is nothing dull or prosaic about the life of the great mystics. Everywhere there are marks of struggle and wrestling. Now groping in the dark night of the soul, now catching glimpses of the glories of the unitive life,

. . . . Ever and anon a trumpet sounds
From the hid battlements of Eternity,
Those shaken mists a space unsettle, then
Round the half-glimpsed turrets slowly wash again.

But rightly understood, these impulsive, passionate aspects of human experience should not be separated from the life of thought and reason. They belong to normal, vital human development. At the same time, impulse and passion may not safely go independently of reason. They need its control and guidance just as

it needs their fire and force. When this relation and balance are maintained, the concepts and hypotheses of science, its comprehensive general ideas and laws are not cold and remote. They carry the profoundest emotional and ideal values. To the modern mind this sense of reality is more profound in the tentative generalizations of the physical and social sciences than in the Absolutes and Universals of the older systems of Pure Thought. There are present here, in scientific concepts unseparated from impulse, the two most powerful elements of mysticism, the feeling of contact with actual reality and the sense of mystery, of the unfathomed. Whatever else is true of it, modern knowledge has clung to the facts. It has been empirical. Experiment has been its method. And thus it has kept its feet upon the rock of a real world. But it has also moved forward from the known to the unknown. Every problem solved has generated new problems. The great conception of development, movement, growth, has kept its vision open. The attitude of expectancy reigns in modern thought. So far from conceiving the world of reality as a closed system, limited to known facts and laws, science at its best regards the paths radiating from every particle of dust as open to the stars and reaching forward beyond all known points of light. The social sciences, relentlessly adhering to the actual experiences of human nature, confidently press forward to achieve utopias unparalleled in the dreams of any other age. The supreme reality of these sciences lies deep in the commonplace experiences of life, and not in the exceptional and miraculous. It is as accessible to all men as love is to the lover and joy to those who rejoice. What is thus attained is not the ancient "mystic knowledge," but a development of controlled and disciplined intelligence warm and vital with instinct, eagerly aspiring to fulfil man's deep and growing needs and to illuminate his pathway.

MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF AN ANTHROPOLOGIST

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In their recent work dealing with the natives of Australia,¹ Spencer and Gillen write:

However kind the white man may be, no sooner does the savage come into contact with him than the change in life, as regards both food and clothing, quite apart from the introduction of disease, serves rapidly to bring about deterioration. He is right enough so long as he remains in the surroundings to which he and his ancestors have been accustomed, but he seems to have great difficulty in adapting himself to new conditions.

When the white man forms a settlement, however small, the natives gather round, attracted at first by curiosity and then by the chance of securing cast-off clothing, food, tobacco, and knives. The young men under the new influences, and more especially those who may be employed at such work as cattle-mustering, become freed from the wholesome restraint of the old men. In the natural state of the tribe they have always been told, and have implicitly believed, that severe punishment will magically and inevitably follow any disobedience of rules laid down by their elders. They very quickly realize that this is not the case. The strict moral code, which is certainly enforced in their natural state, is very soon set aside and nothing is adopted in place of it.²

This may be but one phase of the contribution of civilization, yet it suggests that the missionary has before him a task involving more than merely religious problems. Hailmann's assurance that "Fair play, aided by a nascent spirit of Christianity and genuine philanthropy, emphasized in the [American] Indian his essential humanity and labored to lead him, for the sake of his own salvation, to a recognition of the fatherhood of God and to lift him into a condition that would render him worthy of being received as a full equal into the brotherhood of man" can carry little weight with anyone who is at all familiar with the treatment received by the

¹ *Across Australia*. Macmillan, 1912.

² Spencer and Gillen, *op. cit.*, I, 186-87; see also II, 301.

Indian at the hands of his so-called civilized brother.¹ This treatment has seldom redounded to the credit of the white man.²

The missionary then may well be on his guard in introducing the goods of civilization, lest he introduce at the same time some phases which are not good for the savage but so evil and destructive as to leave him not even his own life. Yet dear as life itself, almost, are the thoughts and sentiments which are second nature to us, the whole system of values which have grown up haphazard or by design in our lives and which depend for their maintenance and effectiveness upon a certain permanence in the conditions about us that are always changing. The life of the savage is rooted as is our own in associations and memories that are dear and valuable in so far as they are in keeping with his ideals and purposes.

The first step then of the missionary who aims at a maximum of good with a minimum of evil would seem to be to understand the savage with whom he works. Any understanding is but false, formal, and pretentious which attempts less than an acquaintance at first hand with his customs, traditions, beliefs, superstitions—in fact with every form of activity, mental, moral, social, and economic, that goes to make up the routine of his life and in a profound sense determine the trend of his interests and achievements. Dignity should not forbid what necessity demands, namely, a knowledge of the stories and traditions, learned not in the attitude of scoffer and iconoclast—which is to get only the empty form without the significant contents—but with sympathy and sincere interest, nor piqued by beliefs and customs that may shock one's finer nature to the core. If the missionary has the calm of his own assurance, and a patience that seeks first of all an adaptation to the needs of the people with whom he labors, he will not grow weary of waiting, for he will be laying surer foundations, he will be graciously insinuating himself into their lives

¹ See the article on "Education of the Indian," p. 3 in a volume entitled *Education in the United States*, edited by Nicholas Murray Butler.

² For another view of the treatment of the Indian by the white man who supplanted him, see Almon Wheeler Lauber, *Indian Slavery in Colonial Times within the Present Limits of the United States*, New York, 1913.

and confidences, whence his influence for good will be tenfold its possibility so long as he remains an outsider. The missionary who does not approach his people in this manner may expect to meet with little success in imbuing them with the spirit of the gospel. He may establish the forms of worship; he may have them learned in the law; but he will have failed to inspire the subtle spiritualizing force that is the secret of a living Christianity, the spirit which imparts life to the dry bones of dogma and ritual and creed. His example in this effort might well be Christ himself, who in the old days of Judaism rose majestically above all creeds to a life and ideal that knew no entanglement with the dogmas and conflicts that are beneath a striving for the divine.

Despite all his benevolent intentions the missionary who does not first of all learn of and from his people will with difficulty enter the sheepfold through the door as does a good shepherd. The most auspicious entry, one which does not place him in the light of a thief and destroyer but of a good shepherd—a prerequisite to success—is that which lies through the door that they themselves open. Who enters thus auspiciously will pursue the well-beaten paths of their social and psychic life as the hidden ways become revealed. He makes a positive advance in the mere negative achievement of not antagonizing them by a blatant declaration against their manner of life and ideals, leaving this effort for a later day when he can understand both the ideals and their champions and can actually, not formally, substitute his own ideals for theirs. The missionary who *lives* with the natives, and works with as well as for them, grows to understand them, gains their confidence, and is well on the way to overcoming an antagonism and lurking suspicion that is surely deep-rooted, though usually latent rather than patent. An ounce of influence at the center will yield more in actual results that count than a ton of energy expended on the periphery. Some missionaries seem concerned most of all with the periphery. If the missionary seeks sympathy with his own purposes and an understanding of his own aims, let him accord as liberally as he demands. The complaint of the Winnebago Indian, "We claim that you cannot find out anything by standing off at a distance and only talking about it," is a just

one. Indeed, Kipling's facetious injunction is not without its didactic value:

But first you must master their language, their dialect,
Proverbs, and songs,
Don't trust any clerk to interpret, when they come
With the tale of their wrongs.
Let them know that you know what they're saying,
Let them feel that you know what to say:
Yes, even when you want to go hunting,
Hear them out if it takes you all day.

A more urgent reason why civilization must be grafted onto the native life rather than supplant it suddenly is the fact that such sudden transformations usually mean the rapid death and disappearance of the people themselves as well as of their culture. Such has been the history of the natives of Australia, of Tasmania, of Africa, of the Americas, wherever civilization has done its work rapidly. In scarcely a single instance has this disappearance been the result of amalgamation, but rather of a quiet, less frequently a brutal, death at the hands of a too blatant civilization. If, for example, we look at the tribes of Eskimo extending from Greenland through the whole of North America westward to the shores of Siberia, we find that, with scarcely an exception, where no outside influence has been felt they retain their pristine vigor; while wherever the white man has had much to do with them, whether trader or missionary, there they have deteriorated both physically and morally, in many places being well on the way to a death as certain for the entire community as it is for any individual in it. To say that even so it were better they die than persist in the old life would be to justify by wholesale slaughter the death which is already being accomplished more slowly by means that are subtler but no less certain. Such a benevolent Christian philosophy—there are those who entertain it—would, applied at an earlier day, have justified the slaughter of every European barbarian including our Teutonic forebears.

Of the dire results of missionary enterprise conducted with a zeal that has no larger vision of the means necessary to the end, and with a self-contained ardor that defeats its own purpose, we

have already too many illustrations. The best of our missionaries are becoming aware of the bad results of such misdirected zeal when applied without proper insight into the life they seek to transform, and are urging an accommodation to the vital needs of the people. Says R. H. Mulligan:

Until the African attains the moral sentiment that makes the marriage bond sacred, it is better that there should be the bond of outright purchase and ownership rather than no marriage at all.

It is so with the whole body of custom. It expresses the inward life of the people. It contains such rudimentary morality as they know, or embodies a principle that is necessary for the preservation of society. It is on the level of the African's moral culture. It corresponds with his beliefs and has the consent of his mind. The foreigner may by sheer force change his outward condition, but unless there be also a corresponding inward change he does not respond to the new obligations, his moral responsibility is not equal to the new demands, and the result is moral degeneration followed inevitably by physical degeneration.

This very matter of the dowry illustrates the different method of the missionary and, I believe, the true principle of progress. Our early missionaries made no church laws against the dowry, but they faithfully preached the equality of woman and the higher idea of marriage; and as the Christians became imbued with this sentiment they themselves abolished the dowry within their own society. But they did it at the instance of a moral sentiment which made marriage more secure than ever. The inward preceded the outward change. The missionary does as much harm as anybody else when he adopts the easy methods of ruthless and indiscriminate assaults upon native customs and beliefs. It was not the Master's method.¹

Similar bad results, unanticipated as much as unintended by the benevolent Roman missionaries, have fallen to the lot of the Southern Massim of British New Guinea—to mention but one instance. By the custom of this tribe, an intrigue with a girl was a preliminary to marriage. This was certainly the case in the old days so that there would, in the ordinary course of events, be no particular tendency for boys and girls of the same totem to come together for any prolonged period. Now, under the partial influence of the teaching that all fornication is wrong, any boy will make love to any girl as occasion offers. . . . In the old days a youth might properly have intercourse with those girls whom he could marry, but this restriction was never very rigidly observed and it is certain that it is now frankly ignored, as the whole former system of life breaks down under the white man's influence.²

¹ *The Fetish Folk of West Africa.*

² Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea* (1909).

Formerly, in the island of Florida chiefs could protect their property by hiding any money and valuables in a certain place and putting their *tambu* or taboo upon it; "now," writes one of the greatest of English missionaries, "when the fear of *tambu* is gone, the young people search for these hoards and take what they find."¹ The merely human safeguards that civilization brings can be overcome in a way that the power of Melanesian and Polynesian taboo successfully defies.² The substitution of canned beef for buffalo herds had sad effect upon the religious and social as well as the economic life of the Plains tribes. "The bewilderment of the Indian resulting from the destruction of the buffalo will probably never be fully appreciated. His social religious customs, the outgrowth of centuries, were destroyed almost as with a single blow."³

In unsuspected and almost unforeseeable ways, the insinuations of a strange culture breaks down the old life; with its fall go the moral factors that have been the saving grace of the old culture. The missionary discourages the initiation rites through which the youths pass and thus unwittingly removes their respect for tribal laws, as well as deprives them of that impressive instruction in the right and wrong of social life which is a leading feature of many of these initiation ceremonies (as in Australia and the Torres Straits, for example). In southern Africa the grouping of the people into towns of straight streets, thus doing away with the old family inclosure, and consequently diminishing the family influences, is a great deterrent to native morality.⁴ On the north-west coast of America the substitution of the modern iron stove for the old open fireplace has had a particularly bad effect upon some of the people. The spirits of their ancestors came back to speak with and advise those who were living, always speaking to them through the crackling of the wood in the open fire. They

¹ Codrington, *The Melanesians*.

² See further on this topic J. G. Frazer, *Psyche's Task: A Discourse concerning the Influence of Superstition on the Growth of Institutions*, 2d ed., London, 1913.

³ On this point consult Mooney in the 14th Report, Part II; and Miss Fletcher and LaFlesche in the 27th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, especially, for the latter, p. 309.

⁴ See on this point the excellent pages of a Swiss missionary who knows his people well: Henri A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*.

do not enter the black iron stoves introduced by the whites. One potent restraining influence is gone in the household that has adopted these modern conveniences in which no manes reside.

Even in colonial days,

the occupancy of a region by the English always meant the speedy expulsion of the natives. The French, on the contrary, lived side by side with the red men, joining in their dances and simple amusements, and entering with fullest sympathy into their wild life, so that they were regarded rather as brethren of an allied tribe than as intruders of an alien race. This feeling is well indicated in the [Delaware] prophet's narrative [*ca.* 1762] where the Indians, while urged to discard everything that they have adopted from the whites, are yet to allow the French to remain among them, though exhorted to relentless war on the English. The difference received tragic exemplification at Michilimackinac a year later, when a handful of French traders looked on unarmed and unhurt while a crew of maddened savages were butchering, scalping, and drinking the blood of British soldiers.

As Lescarbot well said three centuries ago, when writing from New France (in 1612) with regard to the savages there:

You cannot all at once eradicate the deep-rooted customs and habits of any people, whoever they may be. The Apostles did not do it, neither was it done several centuries after them; witness the ceremonies of the candles on Candlemas, the processions of the Rogation-days, the bonfires of St. John the Baptist's day, the holy water, and many other traditions that we have in the church, which have been introduced for a laudable purpose—to convert to a good usage what had only been abused.

Protestants might observe with profit the good use which Romanists have made of this principle of taking over a people by taking over, if only for the time being, their customs and superstitions—or a part of them—giving a new orientation to native life without depriving the natives of all they hold sacred, fulfilling and not destroying the best that is in native life. To the anthropologist this best seems at least of such importance that no missionary can afford entirely to overlook and neglect it.

CRITICAL NOTES

A NOTE ON HOS. 4:2

The use of פָּרַץ here is difficult. Nowhere else is the word used absolutely, without any object or modifying element to indicate the scope or character of the action. Nor is פָּרַץ a word that naturally lends itself to absolute usage; it calls for closer definition from its context.

The Versions furnish little light upon the word. G translates *κέχυται ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*, which seems to indicate that the infinitive absolute construction characterizing the preceding part of the verse was departed from in G's text just as it is in *MT*.¹ The same thing is suggested by B's *inundaverunt*, and also by S's "they increase."

This unanimous testimony of the Versions is against the reading פָּרַץ, proposed by Marti,² and accepted by Nowack (in Kittel's

¹ It is, on the whole, doubtful whether G is here based upon *MT*. Vollers, in *ZAW*, III (1883), 245, pointed out that *ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς* represents פָּרַץ, read as פָּרַץ = באר. *κέχυται* is a second rendering, allowed to stand side by side with the first one. Stekhoven, *De Alexandr. Vertaling van het Dodekapropheton* (1887) accounts for the *ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς* as based upon a repetition of באר at the end of vs. 1. Now *χεῖν* is nowhere else used to render פָּרַץ. The closely related rendering *ἐκβλῆσαι*, in Prov. 3:10, is from another translator, and in the sense of "burst forth" is an adequate word for פָּרַץ in that passage. But it is a far cry from "break" to "pour." In Mic. 2:13, the rendering *διέκοψας* is used, showing a correct understanding of פָּרַץ. In Amos 4:3, פָּרַץ is either ignored by G or else totally misrepresented by the rendering *γυμναί*. In Amos 9:11, פָּרַץ is rendered by *τὰ πεπτωκότα αὐτῆς*, the same word being used for the preceding הִנֵּה. In Isa. 5:5, פָּרַץ is represented by *καθελῶ*; in 30:13, *τεῖχος* represents פָּרַץ; in 54:3, *ἐκπέσας* is reasonably satisfactory for פָּרַץ. In Ezek. 13:5, פָּרַץ is translated by *στερεώματι* and in 22:30, פָּרַץ is rendered by *δυσχερῶς*, neither of which shows any suggestion of an understanding of the meaning of the root. Finally, in Hos. 4:10, the translator shows his ignorance of this root by giving us *κατεσθῆναι* for פָּרַץ. These are all the occurrences of the root in the prophetic writings. In Mic. 2:13 alone is the correct meaning definitely seized. Hence *κέχυται* in Hos. 4:2 may represent G's guess at the sense of פָּרַץ. In that case, the corruption, if there be any, antedates the making of G. In any case, the reading פָּרַץ here proposed was certainly not before the translator, for he was thoroughly acquainted with this root and would not have rendered it by *κέχυται*, which is never employed for it elsewhere and is, moreover, a wholly unsuitable translation.

² Not פָּרַץ, as Marti writes it. Homer sometimes nods!

Biblia Hebraica), van Hoonacker, and Guthe (in Kautzsch's *Heilige Schrift*). Furthermore, if such a well-balanced text as this proposal produces, viz., three successive pairs of infinitives absolute coupled together by ׀, had ever stood here, it is hard to understand how the last pair came to be spoiled by the loss of its ׀ and the transformation of its second infinitive into a perfect, third person plural.

In view of these facts, a new conjecture may not be wholly gratuitous. May not the ׀ of ׀רצו be due to dittography? If so, we should have left the form ׀רצו = "they practice oppression." Hosea refers to the same type of wickedness again in 5:11; cf. Amos 4:1. The objection urged against ׀רצו, that it has no definite subject in the context, would hold against this conjectural reading also. But this difficulty is not a serious one. The verbal idea goes back through the preceding infinitives to the beginning of the verse and this is in close proximity to the ישיב הארץ of vs. 1, who are the ones guilty of all of these offenses.

Another objection to ׀רצו, on the ground that transitive verbs commonly assume the triliteral form in the Qal perfect third singular and third plural, is not without force. But the facts are such as to give the form ׀רצו a very fair chance of legitimacy. On the one hand, several intransitive verbs of ע"ע origin do not strictly adhere to the biliteral forms, e.g., בקק, סרר, צלל (I and II), שדח, and שמם. On the other hand, some transitive verbs do retain the biliteral forms in the Qal, e.g., רעי (Jer. 11:16—the equivalent of רצו), שדח (Ps. 49:15; 73:9), דק (Deut. 9:21; Exod. 32:20), קבד (Num. 23:8), סבד (Ps. 88:18; II Sam. 22:6), שדח (Ps. 17:9), שדח (Ps. 89:42), and דק (Gen. 33:11). ׀רצו itself does not occur elsewhere in the Qal, third person, either singular or plural.

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A SPURIOUS ACCOUNT OF HUSS'S JOURNEY TO CONSTANCE, TRIAL, AND DEATH

The book bearing the title, *The Infallibility of the Pope at the Council of Constance and J. Huss' Trial, Condemnation and Death in the Flames*,¹ came into my hands a year or more ago through Rev. H. Katt, a German

¹ *Die Unfehlbarkeit des Papstes auf dem Concil zu Constanz und Johannes Huss' Verhör, Verurtheilung und Feuertod (5. und 6. Juli 1415). Geschrieben von dem Concils-Mitglieder, POGIUS, Prior zu St. Niclasen. St. Louis, Mo., 1875.*

minister of Terre Haute. He wrote me saying that he had been reading Schaff's *Church History*, Vol. V, Part 2, and had found inaccuracies in the account of the last incidents in Huss's career. The alleged mistakes which he called to my attention were that not a dissenting voice was lifted up against the sentence of death and that the prediction concerning Luther made by Huss at the stake is spurious. He referred me to an old volume in his possession, whose data, as he gave them, startled me and sent me on a hunt to look up once more the sources of Huss's career. The result was that Mr. Katt kindly sent me the book and that I entered into correspondence with several of the leading Huss scholars abroad in regard to its true origin.

The book, according to Mr. Katt, issued at St. Louis in 1875, was published by Karl Daenzer, one of the editors of the *Anzeiger des Westen*, in its time an influential sheet but now discontinued, I believe. Daenzer was one of the men of 1848, from Baden, a learned man, who was associated closely with Karl Schurz and Praetorius. A monument to these three men has been erected already, or is soon to be erected at St. Louis.

The St. Louis edition, as I found out, is a copy of an edition issued at Reutlingen in 1846, which in turn pretended to be a reprint of an edition printed at Constance in 1523, the title-page bearing these words: "Erstmals gedruckt, 1523 zu Costnitz."

As the title indicates, the book was intended, so far as the St. Louis edition is concerned, to be a reply to the dogma of infallibility pronounced in 1870.

In brief the case and contents are as follows: The author, Pogius, a prior of St. Nicholas in Baden, in two letters addressed to his friend Leonardo Nikolai, gives an account of his journey with Huss from Prag to Constance and of Huss's trial there and his death. The first letter bears the date, November 3, 1414, the second, October 14, 1415. Huss died between these two dates, July 6, 1415. The letters are written in a vivid style, full of taking references to the customs of the day as well as to important personalities at Constance. Carrying a *salvus-conductus* from John XXIII, the prior journeyed to Prag, "that wretched nest of heretics," where he found Huss. Starting with him and his party he journeyed to Stuttgart, where they spent a week. When Pogius heard Huss preach and noticed the impression the preaching had on the hearers, he was led to exclaim that all were full of the Holy Ghost. Huss's fiery words rang out with the injunction, Love your neighbor as yourself and God above all. Pogius himself was converted and came to the conviction

that Huss was no more of a heretic than Christ himself. Duke Eberhard of Württemberg himself gave Huss his hand. The party started from Stuttgart November 2, 1414, and in due time reached Constance.

At Constance, Huss was seized November 25, 1414, and imprisoned. Like a promontory of rock resisting the ocean, so the Bohemian resisted the accusations against him. At his hearings, June 5 and 6, he was denied a copy of the Bible, but said, "What does it matter though you should burn all the Bibles in the world? Do I not know the whole Bible by memory except only the Books of the Chronicles?"

The prisoner refused all offers to flee. In prison he sang so beautifully the *Te Deum* that the keepers were influenced to petition for his release. All sorts of people pressed to see and hear the poor Bohemian. Six charges were presented against him. He denied the transmutation of the elements. He despised the doctrine of the infallibility of the pope and the worship of angels. He called indulgences a sin against the Holy Ghost. He rejected celibacy. He denied the duty of unconditional obedience to earthly superiors, and he rejected as null absolution granted by priests in mortal sin. He explained the words "This is my body" to mean, "This represents my body," "for it is against plain reason to believe that a piece of dough made up of meal and water should be changed into human flesh." Neither at Jerusalem nor at Nicea was any such doctrine promulgated. As for the infallible pope, the Scriptures say, "No one is perfect but God only." God is a spirit and the Father of all, and reveals himself directly to all who approach him.

Pogius reports the alleged defense of Huss at great length, and gives the actual number of votes cast, some of them being in favor of his innocence. The addresses of a number of the Fathers are given. Here are condensed statements which convey some idea of how Pogius in his own brain considered how matters went.

Köngel, the representative of the Archbishop of Mainz, said, "My master holds that every sheep which has erred away and will not return must be put out of the world. He is become a grain of wheat to be crushed. Do not pity him. Let him die."—The Archbishop of Cologne: "He who will not take warning must suffer the penalty. When both will not avail then the gallows must do its work."—The Archbishop of Rheims: "If God wants a new church order, let him give a miraculous sign. Let the Bohemian's star go out. I vote for death."—The Bishop of London: "Because he hath blasphemed the claims of St. Peter let him die."—The Bishop of Brixen: "Let the goose be roasted."—The Bishop of Basel: "'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' Let

him roast."—The Bishop of Paderborn: "Moses preached hope, Christ faith, and the pope obedience. The Bohemian will not obey. Let him therefore die."—The Bishop of Constance: "Six times has the sun made his yearly circuit since the last heretic was roasted here. If Huss is not cooked on the morrow, the people will cook us all in one pan."

Other bishops, after similar sententious remarks, voted for death. But a number gave their votes for Huss's freedom, such as the bishops of Chur, Salzburg, Passau, Freising, Eichstädt. With practical unanimity the delegates from France, Italy, and England voted for death but, most strange to say, Vincentius Ferrer of Spain voted "innocent," saying, "In the name of all that is holy, just, and merciful, and in the name of popular freedom, I cast my vote against the death penalty." Many voices arose in the cathedral against the Papist plot to put Huss out of the way, and in the confusion stools and chairs were broken to pieces. The old Bishop of Cleves, who had expired during the voting, was propped up on his chair that he might, though dead, be a witness to the decision of death.

The sentence followed. In the process of degradation the Bishop of London and the Archbishop of Rheims offered Huss an empty chalice, and the English prelate exclaimed, "O thou cursed Judas who hast forsaken the path of peace and taken counsel with the Jews, this cup we take from thee that thou mayest be deprived of all mercy. Cursed be the day of thy ordination. Wither like the figless tree which was cut down." As the prisoner passed out of the cathedral he saw Wyclif's writings and his own making food for the flames. At the stake he said, "Today you roast a poor goose [Huss] but a hundred years from now you will hear a swan singing [Luther.] Him you will not roast nor shall net entrap him."

These paragraphs give some idea of the contents of this literary invention. I wish they might also give an adequate idea of the spirited tone in which the letters are written.

Fraud is easily detected if our accredited authorities for Huss's journey to Constance and trial are to be trusted. These are Mladenowicz, as his manuscript is given in the *Monumenta Hussii*, in shorter form, and by Palacky in the *Documenta* in the fuller form; Huss's letters written from Constance and also the Acts of the Council as contained in Richental, Van der Hardt, Mansi, and Finke. To these must be added the words of Gerson and D'Ailly. Much given by Pogius conflicts squarely with the express statements of these authorities, and much of the matter

he gives seems plainly to be inconsistent with their silence. These are some of the flat contradictions or inconsistencies.

According to our authorities, Huss's route took him not through Stuttgart. The stages of his journey are marked with precision in Huss's letters and by Mladenowicz, who made the journey with Huss. Pogius gives a description of a meeting between Jerome and Huss at Constance but, while the other accounts do not absolutely preclude such a meeting, they have not a suggestion to indicate that it occurred.

More important, the six charges which Pogius cites as made against Huss are at variance with the list as we otherwise know it. First, Huss did not deny the worship of angels, his letters written from Constance being the proof. He nowhere rejects celibacy. He categorically repudiated the charge of holding to the remanence of the bread after the words of institution. So far as I recall, no passage in Huss's treatises against John XXIII's bull, calling for a crusade against Ladislaus, contains the assertion that an indulgence is a sin against the Holy Ghost.

It would seem that the use of the name Costnitz for Constance was not in vogue among Germans at the time the Council met. This mistake, as the two German Huss scholars to whom I shall presently refer indicate, shows the fraud on the face of it. Luther often used the word Costenz and this is the name given in the title of the German translation to four of Huss's letters published with a preface by Luther's hand Wittenberg, 1537.

The most interesting feature is the alleged vote which a number of German bishops gave in favor of Huss's innocence and in the interest of freedom of thought. This is most singular in view of the fact that Huss as is well known, incurred the mortal enmity, as he supposed, of the Germans by the part he took in the affairs of the University of Prag which led to the secession of the German masters and scholars in 1409. Of course, looked at from the date 1875, such a representation of the German vote is easily accounted for as showing that, as in the vote over papal infallibility, 1870, the German bishops were predominantly against that doctrine, so at Constance they were likewise.

The facts calculated to arouse suspicion that our heretofore accredited authorities on Huss are in some respects wrong are Pogius' apparently great familiarity with the customs of the fifteenth century and the personalities of Constance, as also the very name of the writer. Pogius looks very much like Poggio, the name of the representative of the Italian Renaissance who left us the graphic description of Jerome's trial and death (1416), contained in his letter addressed to Leonardo

Aretino. After searching in vain in Shepherd's *Life of Poggio*, written a hundred years ago, for any reference to this document, I was reassured that Poggio was a very different kind of a man from Poggius, the Niclasen monk. After a long search, I discovered a reference to the letters in Eiselein's *Begründeter Aufweis des Platzes auf welchem J. Huss und Hier. von Prag 1415, 1416 verbrannt wurden*, Constanz, 1847. This author declares the letters spurious, laying stress upon the use of the term Costnitz by a German writer as impossible in the fifteenth century.

I then wrote to Professor Loserth, of Graz, and Karl Müller, of Tübingen, the substance of whose replies I give.

Professor Loserth replied as follows:

I have received only today Eiselein's book from Prag and could not write to you sooner. As regards Huss you can be at rest. The pretended communication of Poggius is an up-and-down fraud ["ein ganz plumpes Machwerk"] intended to interest the world by making it appear that Poggio gave to a friend information of Huss's last days and death. Poggius' writing is from beginning to end an invention. The very inscription "Printed originally at Costnitz," is a lie. At that time, the Germans did not use Costnitz, which is Slavic, but Costenz or Constance. And besides, there are coarse errors in the book. There is nothing to add of note in the way of literature to my article "Huss in Herzog."

As Karl Müller was born in Swabia, a son of Prelat Müller of Stuttgart, and as Tübingen is near Reutlingen, I hoped he would be able to give the circumstances under which the letters were invented and printed. In this I was in part disappointed, as the distinguished historian's letter shows. He writes:

The account of Huss's death is from top to bottom an invention or falsification. About that there can be not the least doubt. The name Poggius is quite arbitrary. Who invented the account I do not know, but probably it was written by the author of the first edition of 1846. I have not seen that edition. Our library contains only a reprint, Berlin, 1873, which was prepared by the Hussite committee in view of Huss's approaching anniversary. The statement that the edition of 1846 was a reprint of an edition printed at Costnitz in 1523 is certainly a lie. At that time no soul in Germany used the form Costnitz. As to the cause behind the invention, for which you inquire, I can give no light. Without doubt the purpose was to set this and that circumstance of Huss's case aside. Why published at Reutlingen? If we follow Eiselein, the falsifier was a Würtemberger, but no name is suggested. In Reutlingen, between 1800 and 1860, many writers were reprinted.

It is well at this time, with the five hundredth anniversary of Huss's death in view, to be on our guard against this plausible piece of fiction.

It must seem strange that it should have been reprinted in Berlin so recently. The vote against Huss was without dissent. There was no advocacy on the part of German bishops or any others in favor of free inquiry at that remarkable assembly of Latin Christendom convened in Constance, which condemned Huss to the stake for holding the heretical articles of John Wyclif.

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NOTE TO PROFESSOR SCHAFF'S PAPER ON THE SPURIOUS TRACT ABOUT HUSS

Professor Schaff has conclusively shown that the tract he has examined is a fraud in so far as it purports to give authentic information about Huss. It seems to me, however, that it is not impossible that it was really first written and printed in 1523. If this were so, the purpose would be to draw a comparison between Luther and Huss. A well-known pamphlet of the time compares Christ's Passion with Luther's summons to Worms, and the parallel with Huss was on everyone's lips. All the errors for which Huss was condemned, according to this pamphlet, were among the charges brought against Luther. The use of the form "Costnitz" for "Constanz" seems unnatural in the nineteenth century, but was habitual in the sixteenth (cf. *Luthers Tischreden*, ed. Förstemann und Bindseil, IV, 337; *Luthers Predigten*, ed. Buchwald, 1905, p. 366). The individual judgments passed on Huss by the ecclesiastics seem remarkably like those censures which the holders of the same sees passed on Luther. The condemnation by the English prelate, for example, might well have suited Wolsey. It is notable that the Spanish bishop spoke for acquittal; this would seem to have been a compliment to the Spanish King Charles (or possibly one of his advisers) for keeping the safe-conduct inviolate. Finally Huss's prophecy of Luther given in this work is also found in the writings of the Reformer as early as 1531. In his *Glosse auf das vermeinte kaiserliche Edikt* (*Werke*, Weimar, XXXI, Part III, p. 387) he says: "Sanct Johannes Hus hat von mir geweissagt, da er aus dem gefengnis im Behemerland schrieb, Sie werden jetzt eine gans braten (denn Hus heisst eine gans). Aber über hundert jaren werden sie einen schwanen singen hören. Den sollen sie leiden." This alleged prophecy is a distortion of some words of Huss, with possibly a reminiscence of a saying

of Jerome of Prag. Huss wrote: "Et haec eadem veritas pro uno Ansero infirmo et debili multos falcones et aquilas, quae acie oculorum alias aves superant hac alte gratia Dei volitant et Christo Jesu alias aves rapiunt, qui illas corroborabit et omnes fideles suos confirmabit" (F. Palacky, *Documenta Magistri J. Hus*, Prag, 1869, Epistolae No. 17, p. 40). Jerome of Prag also said to his judges: "Appello ad celsissimum simul et aequissimum judicem Deum omnipotentem, ut coram eo centum annis revolutis respondeatis mihi." The question now is whether Luther derived the prophecy of himself directly from Huss or got it from some other source. As there is no evidence that he knew Huss's epistles at this time, as he did later, it is perhaps more probable that he had heard the prophecy from someone else, and, if so, a further presumption, though not a strong one, is raised in favor of the date 1523 for the composition of the tract. See further A. Hauffen, *Neue Fischart Studien*, 7te Ergänzungsheft zum Euporion, 1908, pp. 164 f.; *Untersuchungen z. germ. und rom. Philologie J. v. Kelle dargebracht*, 2. Teil, Prag, 1908, pp. 1-28.

PRESERVED SMITH

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

THE RELIGION OF THE HEBREWS

Dr. Peters' book on Hebrew religion¹ is the fifth volume of a most excellent series. The preceding volumes by Hopkins, Jastrow, Toy, and Chantepie de la Saussaye have established a high standard for admission. The new volume is entitled to its place among them. As the title of the series shows, the purpose of this volume is to present a history of Hebrew religion. The point of view, spirit, and method of the treatment of the subject are therefore historical throughout. Dr. Peters shows refreshing independence of judgment at many points where he does not hesitate to depart from prevailing views. For example, he discounts the Kenite hypothesis as to the origin of Yahwism and permits Moses to retain the authorship of the Decalogue. In this connection, he makes a brave attempt to vindicate the Mosaic origin of the Second Commandment. But he is content to let the equally difficult Tenth Commandment stand without defense. The contention that Moses was far in advance of his times is employed to justify attributing to Moses what the moral and spiritual consciousness of his age would not itself support. Even so, do lawgivers ever succeed in imposing upon a community any appreciable amount of law for which public sentiment is not ready? Is not law as such always *behind* the ideals of the most progressive men of any age?

The book is the product of much hard work and will repay careful study. It reveals sympathetic appreciation of the Hebrew religious experience and presents some phases of that experience in new light. If we venture upon a few criticisms here, it is but due to the belief that the book is well worthy of careful consideration. In general, it may be said that the book would have been improved by a larger application of the comparative method to the subject in hand. The Hebrew religion must be viewed in the light of its relations to contemporary Semitic civilization. For example, when the wide existence of the prophetic order is observed throughout Semitic and adjacent territory, it becomes less easy to maintain that the Hebrews borrowed their prophecy from the Canaanites. The rise and progress of messianic prophecy, in particular,

¹ *The Religion of the Hebrews*, by John Punnett Peters. [Handbooks on the History of Religions, edited by Morris Jastrow, Jr., Vol. V.] Boston: Ginn & Co., 1914. xii+502 pages. \$2.75.

ought not to be discussed with no reference to the fact of the presence of the same type of thought in Egypt centuries before its appearance among the Hebrews. The same consideration of the world outside of Israel would have kept Dr. Peters from describing the Israel of David's day as "the mightiest nation of the earth" (p. 129). It is by no means a foregone conclusion that Amos had the Assyrians in mind as the destined agents of Yahweh's wrath. The conditions of Amos' day in Western Asia were not such as to make it clear even to the most careful and keen observer that Assyria would master the Western world. As a matter of fact, Amos does not name the destroyer, and even Hosea, living somewhat later, vacillates in his judgment between Assyria and Egypt.

A similar, uncritical acceptance of prevailing views shows itself in the reiteration of the common interpretation of Hosea's marital experience, with no new evidence in support of it; again in the presentation of Isaiah as a preacher of the messianic hope and of the inviolability of Jerusalem; and also in the apparently unquestioning belief in the genuineness of the whole Book of Micah and of the whole of the Greek recension of Jeremiah. These are considerations of such importance in any history of Hebrew religion that, whatever conclusion be held regarding them, the grounds for that conclusion should be succinctly presented.

In closing our notice of this useful book, we add a few corrections for the second edition. On p. 156, line 4, read "Samuel" for "Saul." On p. 281, read "Cornill" for "Cornhill." On p. 360, at bottom, delete "and Nehemiah" (Nehemiah did not expel himself from Judah!). On p. 428, read "Weissbach," for "Neissbach." In the Bibliography, on p. 468, the two separate titles given to Smend represent one and the same book, the proper title of which is *Lehrbuch der alttestamentlichen Religionsgeschichte* (2d ed., Freiburg, 1899). The same thing has happened to R. H. Charles, on p. 477, where the fact of a second edition in 1914 should be noted. Budde's *Religion of Israel* (p. 468) should be cited also in its new German edition, 1914. On p. 469, for "Vigourony," read "Vigouroux." On p. 470, read "Kautzsch"; the last edition of Driver's *Introduction*, published in 1914, should have the preference over the 1897 edition; and read "Bertholet." On p. 471, in three citations read "Thomsen." On p. 474, Duhm's *Jesaja* should be cited in its third edition (1914); and the commentaries of Duhm and Cornill on Jeremiah ought to receive mention. On p. 475, read "I. Benzinger." On p. 476, the commentaries of Driver and Charles on Daniel should be inserted.

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EARLY CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF GENESIS

Professor Gronau attempts in a recent book¹ to prove the use of a Posidonian source in five treatises of Basil and Gregory of Nyssa² either belonging to, or closely associated with, a not unimportant class of Christian doctrinal literature, the commentaries on the creation story in Genesis. He has executed his task with the thoroughness that might have been expected of the author of his useful doctoral dissertation *De Basilio, Gregorio Nazianzeno Nyssenoque Platonis imitatoribus* (Göttingen, 1908)³ and displays a command of ancient sources and modern research that leaves little to be desired. The book would be extremely useful, if for nothing else, for its exhaustive collection of citations relating to the myriad subjects touched upon by the authors of Genesis commentaries.

But it decidedly has a further value than this. Professor Gronau has certainly demonstrated the copious use of Stoic material by Gregory and Basil, though without defining the limits of their borrowings and of course saying little of their other sources. It will not be surprising to students of later pagan and early Christian times, who have had to recognize the Stoics as authorities constantly quoted in those days upon the most varied topics of natural science, psychology, and theology, to find that Basil and Gregory drew much from them. But since the Stoics adopted as their own so many Platonic, Aristotelian, and even earlier doctrines, it is usually far harder to prove that the Stoic school is the immediate source than to fix upon the ultimate derivation of the author's thought. The best way to do this is to follow Professor Gronau's example and adduce plentiful Stoic parallels for all the ideas in question. The results are sometimes illuminating. For example, Professor Gronau's theory removes the embarrassment the present reviewer has felt concerning the relation of Basil to Plato. There is some resemblance between the *Hexaameron* and the *Timaeus*, but hardly enough, I have felt, to allow us to assume that Basil was attempting, as some have

¹ *Poseidonios und die jüdisch-christliche Genesisexegese*. By Karl Gronau. Leipzig: Teubner, 1914. viii+313 pages. M. 12.

² Basil *Hexaameron* and *Homily on the Text πρὸς ἑξ ἡμέρας*; Gregory *Hexaameron*, *De hominis opificio*, and *De anima et resurrectione*. I shall continue to use the old-fashioned name "Hexaameron" rather than "Hexahemeros," as Dr. Gronau writes it. Cf. Robbins, *The Hexaemeral Literature* (Chicago, 1912), p. 1, n. 2.

³ In *Poseidonios eine Quelle für Basils Hexahemeros* (Program, Braunschweig, 1912), Dr. Gronau foreshadowed his present work. This Program was praised by reviewers in the *Wochenschriften*.

said, to write a Christian *Timaeus*. Now if Basil was using a Stoic book founded on the *Timaeus*, the situation seems much clearer.

To say whether, beyond this, Professor Gronau has satisfactorily proved that Posidonius is the individual to whom Basil and Gregory are indebted is more difficult, involving as it does both individual judgments as to the worth of hundreds of parallel passages, and a knowledge of all that has appeared in the last forty years in German books, journals, programs, and dissertations upon the subject of Posidonian influence on Greek and Roman writers. It is but fair to say with regard to the results of the researches which he utilizes that it may still be considered debatable whether Posidonian influence extends as far as is claimed in every instance, so that, e.g., Philo, Chalcidius, or Lactantius may be freely quoted as mere exponents of Posidonianism. But though in some instances the individual arguments may not seem compelling, it must be admitted that Professor Gronau makes a good case for Posidonius. He makes good use of the known Posidonian portions of Cicero, and constantly employs the argument that the Stoic material borrowed by the Christian authors could in most cases find a place in a commentary on the *Timaeus*. This should certainly create a strong presumption in favor of Posidonius, the author of the best-known commentary, provided that it is at the same time made clear that the passage in question has a Stoic flavor. In at least one place, Professor Gronau seemingly neglects the employment of this mode of argument. On pp. 230 ff., he cites Greg. Nyss. *De an. et resurr.* 25B ff. and compares with it Cic. *Tusc. disp.* i. 68, etc. Now the Gregorian passage contains phrases with a decidedly Platonic ring (as, τὰ στοιχεῖα . . . διὰ τινος ἀρρήτου κοινωνίας συμπλέκεται), and as a whole probably goes back to an ultimate source in Plat. *Tim.* 47, the great encomium of sight. Furthermore, it might well be urged that Plato's coupling in this passage of the two notions of orderly movement in the universe and the same in the human mind could give the Stoic commentator ample opportunity to introduce the argument adopted by Gregory and Cicero to prove the soul's existence. Professor Gronau does not, however, mention *Tim.* 47 in this connection, in spite of its importance in the history of the design argument, though it should certainly come into consideration if there is any question of referring the Gregorian passage to a *Timaeus*-commentary as a source.

Discussing Basil's *Hexameron*, Professor Gronau traces Stoic, presumably Posidonian, influence in the scientific or semi-scientific details (chiefly illustrative and nonessential) relating to the earth, sun, moon,

astrology, upper and lower waters, plants, and animals.¹ His arguments are more convincing when he takes up the topics of man's erect stature and the advantage he possesses over the beasts in having hands, as well as questions of psychology, in dealing with Greg. *De hom. op.*, for here he can refer more frequently to Cicero, a well-known follower of Posidonius. The same is true of the sections on Greg. *De an. et resurr.* and Bas. *Homily on the Text πρόσχε σεαυτῷ*. In the case of Basil's *Hexameron* and Greg. *De hom. op.*, Professor Gronau believes that Posidonius' *Commentary on the Timaeus* is the probable source, since Stoic ideas are present and the topics discussed agree in the main with those of the *Timaeus*. The *De an. et resurr.* seems to have had a source similar to that of Cic. *Tusc. disp.* (p. 276), which Corssen believed to be Posidonius *περὶ ψυχῆς*; but it is not necessary to postulate a second Posidonian source for Gregory here, since the *Commentary on the Timaeus* may well have contained in abridged form the ideas of the other treatise, as part of the exegesis of the passages of the *Timaeus* which deal with the making of the human soul. The Posidonian book which Basil and Gregory used,² Professor Gronau concludes, was the same for all five treatises; though not so originally, it was complete in itself as they used it; it was founded primarily upon the famous *Commentary on the Timaeus*, but considerably expanded and modified. He points out that such commentaries, forming the basis of lectures, became in the course of time identified with the school and lost their character as separate literary works, and that students' compilations were often published, ungraced by an author's name. Some such relic of his school days, then, served Basil when he came to compose his treatises.

It is a matter of some regret that Professor Gronau devotes comparatively so little space to what I consider the most vital matter in which the Stoics influenced Christian exegetes of Genesis, namely, the *σπερματικὸς λόγος* doctrine. He has, too, in a few places, I think, failed to keep sufficiently in mind the fact that Basil and Gregory may reasonably be supposed to have taken some of their doctrines from the many Christian commentators who preceded them,³ though I heartily

¹ The Aristotelian matter in Basil discussed by Müllenhoff in *Hermes*, II, 252 ff., would thus come to Basil through the Stoic intermediary.

² He assumes that Gregory probably found among his brother's papers the very book in question (p. 293).

³ Perhaps this is the case with Basil's report of the common notion of the nature of the firmament (*Hex.* 61A; cf. Gronau, p. 76). Josephus preserves a similar view, and it was common enough in later Hexaemeral writings; see *The Hexaemeral Literature*, p. 50 and n. 3.

agree with him that it is not to be imagined that they drew only from Christian sources (pp. 301 ff.). As a minor criticism it may be added that there is no point in adducing the purely verbal parallel between Arist. *De. caelo* ii. 13 and Bas. *Hex.* 21C (p. 51), even though the note on the following page shows that Professor Gronau is not in error as to their interpretation. Stählin (*B. ph. W.*, xxxiii, 259) called attention to this in his review of Professor Gronau's preliminary monograph on Basil's sources.

The Genesis commentaries still offer a rich field for investigation and it is to be hoped that they may be the subject of other researches as able and painstaking as this.

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PART X OF THE DIATESSARICA

Dr. Abbott's impressive series of *Diatessarica* has reached a "constructive" stage. Nine volumes (besides an index volume) have been devoted to elaborate studies of special topics in the Gospels, and now finally Part X, to consist of five sections of a volume each, aims to unite the results thus far attained into an orderly exposition of the gospel narrative. Two¹ of these five volumes have appeared, of which the first states the principles of interpretation adopted, while the second applies these principles to the first fifteen verses of Mark and parallels—the conception of "parallels," however, being a wide one. All four Gospels are treated in detail, but the interest is chiefly in the Fourth; in fact, so great is the interest in the Fourth Gospel that the Synoptists seem to be studied chiefly for the light that they can throw upon this Gospel.

The principles of interpretation are, for the most part, those developed in the earlier volumes of the series. John aimed primarily at an interpretation of the Christian tradition for the needs of the church of his day, which was beset on all sides by Jewish and Judaistic conservatism, imperial suspicion, philosophic contempt, and nascent gnostic heresies. His personality is quite uncertain, but he was past question a Jew, who used in his interpretation all the expository methods that had been brought to a high stage of development by his countrymen. In part, these methods are to be learned from a study of the later books of the Old Testament (Dr. Abbott sets up the interesting proportion

¹ *The Fourfold Gospel*. By Edwin A. Abbott. Section I. *Introduction*. Cambridge: University Press, 1913. xvi+177 pages. 2s. 6d. Section II. *The Beginning*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. xxiii+456 pages. 12s. 6d.

John:Synoptists::Chronicles:Kings) but they are to be studied chiefly in the Talmud and the Targums, from which Dr. Abbott gives copious extracts in illustration. John possessed also, as was natural, a knowledge of Philonic allegory and used it rather freely, while to a lesser extent the methods of certain of the Greek writers were put under contribution. But as regards the tradition that was subjected to this interpretation, Dr. Abbott's position has undergone a considerable change. He now holds that John was in possession of information regarding the life and teaching of Jesus that was for the most part of high historical value, frequently, indeed, being more accurate than that of the Synoptists. On this John drew copiously. But he drew on it only to correct the official tradition of the church, which tradition consisted precisely of our present Synoptic Gospels, *verbatim et literalim*.

The emphasis with which Dr. Abbott states this last contention cannot be exaggerated: "We shall regard the Evangelist as having the three Synoptic Gospels open before him" (*Beginning*, p. xiv). John knew that Mark was the earliest of these Gospels and knew also that it was relatively the most reliable, so that he was disturbed by the fact that Matthew and Luke so frequently alter Mark's narrative. All of these alterations, Dr. Abbott contends, were noted by John with the minute scrupulosity of a modern student of the synoptic problem, and in the great majority of such cases John felt himself called on to come to the defense of Mark, either by corroborating or by explaining the passage that had repelled Matthew or Luke. So, e.g., the use of "spittle" in John 9:6 bears out its use in Mark 7:33, 8:23, although Matthew and Luke omit it. Such an explanation of Mark by John, Dr. Abbott calls a "Johannine intervention," and he maintains that in practically every case such an intervention can be found or a satisfactory reason for "non-intervention" assigned. Indeed, so convinced is he of the validity of the theory that he tells us (*Beginning*, p. xi) that he had planned originally to use the title "Johannine Interventions" in place of "The Fourfold Gospel."

These interventions, however, are usually far from palpable, and frequently they can be discovered only by a very liberal application of Philonic-rabbinical methods. So the "wild beasts" of Mark 1:13, which do not appear in Matthew or Luke, are allegorized into hostile human beings and then re-allegorized into "serpents," and so the corroboration of Mark is found in John 3:14 (*Beginning*, pp. 165-66). Nor need the "intervention" have at all the same context as the passage defended. This fact explains the remarkable production of a 306-page

commentary on fifteen verses of Mark, for in order to find the interventions, passages taken from the whole extent of John are examined.

At times, even, the connection traced degenerates into the purely fanciful ("The word *evangel* implies an *angel*, or '*messenger*.' Luke's Gospel deals largely with '*angels*.' John's Gospel does not" [*Beginning*, p. 10]), or the merely homiletic ("Prayers are angels. But tears, too, are angels" [p. 193]). With such exegetical and critical rules, it would seem that almost anything might be deduced from anything, and consequently this thesis of Dr. Abbott's fails to carry conviction. Indeed, the fundamental assumption is not established, for the only proof brought that John did actually know the Synoptists is of the same precarious character. There are, to be sure, as is well known, some indications that point to John's knowing Mark and some rather obscure phenomena that connect John with Luke. But from these to a literary use of the Synoptists by John is a very long step.

Proof of independent historic knowledge on the part of John is confined in the present volume to defending John's account of a preliminary Judean ministry. The arguments adduced are of varying value, but on the whole a very good case is made out.

The great value of the book, however, lies in the immense amount of detail offered for the interpretation of John. Recent writers on the Fourth Gospel have emphasized, and rightly, its affinities with other Hellenistic religious documents. Dr. Abbott has not ignored these affinities, but he declines to consider them predominant and in their place stresses the Jewish origin. In this he seems to be right, past question. His collection of rabbinical material is voluminous, and in this point alone his works acquire a unique value, although much that he brings will no doubt be thought irrelevant. The volumes are certainly not adapted to serve as a first introduction to the Johannine problem, but no student of the Gospels is so far advanced that he will not gain unending profit from the quiet, thorough scholarship and delicacy of spiritual insight that mark all of Dr. Abbott's discussions.

A somewhat elaborate appendix is formed by three essays¹ in *The Beginning*. The first of these argues that the word "Nazarene" as applied to Jesus was derived indeed from his origin from Nazareth, but that its use as a title for him and for the earliest Christians was influenced by the paranomasia *nēšer* = "branch" = "Messiah," and that the form "Nazoraean" is really derived from *nēšer*. A very interesting

¹ Published separately under the title *Miscellanea Evangelica* (I). Cambridge: University Press, 1913. viii+96 pages. 2s.

argument is developed. The second essay contends that the disciple "known to the high priest" of John 18:15-16 was Judas Iscariot, but the evidence adduced is unconvincing. The third essay is a rejoinder to Dom Connolly's critique² of *Diatessarica*, Part IX. Dr. Abbott continues to maintain a Hebraic origin for the Odes of Solomon. Like everything else about the Odes, this question will probably be argued indefinitely.

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DEMONOLOGY AND MAGIC

Six hundred Latin pages on *Demoniacs in the New Testament*¹ might be expected to contain the last word on the subject. Father Smit goes at his task with praiseworthy comprehensiveness of treatment, giving a historical résumé of the views of the Babylonians, Persians, and Greeks, of the Jews as seen in the Old Testament, the "Deuterocanonical" and "apocryphal" (=pseudepigraphic) books and rabbinic literature, and of the Christian church in all ages. He is able to quote much of the now extensive literature on demonology. Unfortunately his cursory historical treatment of the subject and his frankly dogmatic and apologetic exegesis nullify the scientific value his work might have had.

In Professor Montgomery's *Aramaic Incantation Texts*³ one steps into a different atmosphere. The author presents a scholarly edition and translation of some forty-two magical texts, with an exhaustive commentary and a full introduction, which contains such discussion of all other published texts of similar character as renders his work a complete account of the present state of knowledge in this field. With minor exceptions all the texts are prophylactics against demons inscribed on bowls found by the University of Pennsylvania expedition in the ruins of houses in Nippur and now preserved in the university museum. Judging from the strata in which the bowls were found, as well as from their language and paleography, Montgomery decides that they should

¹ *Journal of Theological Studies*, July, 1913, pp. 530-38.

² *De Daemoniacis in Historia Evangelica*. Dissertatio exegetico-apologetica quam exaravit Johannes Smit. Romae: Sumptibus Pontificii Instituti Biblici (Bretschneider), 1913. xxiv+590 pages.

³ *Aramaic Incantation Texts from Nippur*. By James A. Montgomery. University of Pennsylvania, The Museum, Publications of the Babylonian Section, Vol. III. Philadelphia, 1913. 326 pages+xli plates.

be dated somewhere about 600 A.D. Their unique value lies in the information they give as to the philological and religious history of a time and region from which we have almost no other contemporaneous documents.

Three forms of Aramaic are represented: (1) a dialect in square character, belonging to the family represented in the Talmud and denominated "rabbinic," (2) "the Syriac dialect, in a novel form of Estrangelo script," and (3) "the Mandaic dialect in its peculiar script." The Syriac alphabet is of special interest "as exhibiting an early form of Aramaic alphabet, of Palmyrene type, existing in Babylonia," perhaps "the script of the Harranian pagans, vulgarly known as the Sabians." Furthermore it resembles the alphabet of the Turkish Manichaean fragments from Turfan in Chinese Turkestan, and so is probably the alphabet in use in this, Mani's home country, in the third century.

The bowls afford a valuable illustration of the eclecticism of magic. Among the clients there are a few Hebrew names, many Jewish-Aramaic, one Greek, one Christian, and many Persian. At least three religions are represented—Jewish, Mandaean, and Pagan (why especially in the Syriac texts?). There are many close resemblances to Babylonian magic. In one case (No. 36) Šamaš, Sin, Bel, Nannai, and Nirig (Nergal) empower the sorcerer against the evil spirit. Judaism shows its hand in numerous references to Jahveh Sebaoth, Metatron, and angels, and to Old Testament characters and incidents, and Montgomery believes it has modified the very elaborate praxis of ancient Babylonian magic. Jewish prejudice against images has caused the omission of many of the figures used by the Babylonians, while the relative unimportance of temple ritual and the emphasis on God's all-potent "word" and reverence for his name have reduced the importance of ritual acts and increased the use of words of power. But are we sure there were no magical rites connected with the making or inscribing of the bowls? If the recipe book from which these charms were taken could be discovered, it might give a different emphasis. At any rate, Professor Montgomery is right in calling attention to the fact that in this as in other features these so-called Jewish texts have their closest affinities in the Egypto-Hellenistic magic. Persian elements are entirely wanting. The names, such as Hermes and Abraxas, the permutations of letters, and the manipulation of words familiar in the magical papyri and in the Kabala are all here. These Mesopotamian texts are but a deposit left by an eddy of the stream of superstition that flowed down into modern times. They are of special value, since they give a fixed

datable point between the magic of the papyri and the Talmud on the one hand and the Jewish cabalism and Christian magic of the Middle Ages on the other.

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THE ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES

In 1895 Foucart published under the title, *Recherche sur l'origine et la nature des mystères d'Éleusis*, a study which he has now enlarged.¹ While the writer has changed his opinion on certain minute points and developed some parts of his thesis in greater detail, he adheres to the main lines of his former statement, maintains the same standpoint, is content with the same method, and does not appear to have enlarged in any noticeable degree the material upon which his conclusions are based. M. Foucart's main thesis may be briefly stated. Egypt was the source whence was derived the earliest known form of the Eleusinian religion, as it was also the land whence the cultivation of cereals and the vine was transplanted to Greece and Attica; the earliest Eleusinian religion was agrarian, and its divine personages were merely known as *ὁ θεός* and *ἡ θεά*—titles attested by a fifth-century inscription and by later monuments. These names "The God" and "The Goddess" were only the reverent Greek expressions for Osiris and Isis, who soon became known by the more personal names of Dionysos and Demeter; the Eleusinian worship, agrarian at first, was organized as a mystery conveying the promise of salvation after death, at some time in the sixth century B.C. Dionysos and Demeter with her daughter Kore became the dominating personalities of the Eleusinia, the Attic Dionysos being distinct from the Thracian and the Theban, and reproducing exactly the double character of the Egyptian Osiris as a god of the living and the dead; as the Book of the Dead was placed in the Egyptian's grave to provide him safe guidance through the dangers of the lower world, so the object of the Eleusinian mysteries was to reveal to the initiate certain secrets and certain words of power whereby after death he might escape through the perils of the Inferno into the bliss of Elysium; for this purpose, in the Hall of the Mysteries, certain terrifying and beatific visions were presented to his eyes, and the clear-voiced hierophant recited to him certain formulae that for his soul's salvation were to be impressed on his memory; the culminating act of the mystic pageant, the revela-

¹ *Les Mystères d'Éleusis*. By Paul Foucart. Paris: Picard, 1914. 508 pages. Fr. 10.

tion to the eyes of the votary of a "cut cornstalk," was directly borrowed from the corn-ritual of Osiris.

Such is the outline of the religious-historical theory of the book. Besides this, there are many carefully detailed expositions of special matters of interest for the student of Eleusinian and Athenian ritual and religious organization. And in these, as in his work generally, we admire the minute diligence of the writer, the sanity and sobriety of his judgment, and the luminousness of exposition which we expect in the typical Frenchman. What we usually miss in M. Foucart, we miss here—breadth and depth of study, the power of self-criticism, the critical appreciation of texts and of textual evidence, the willingness to avail himself of the results of more modern research; and the absence of these qualities prevents us from regarding this work as one of authority; though at many points it will be useful to the student.

As regards his ethnologic conviction that early Eleusis borrowed from Egypt, we may regard this as *a priori* very probable. We may remember that not many years ago a statuette of Isis was found in an Eleusinian grave of the tenth century. But to clinch our belief we want *a posteriori* evidence much more precise and more pointed than that with which M. Foucart provides us. If we found at Eleusis or in the vicinity traces of Egyptian divine names or some divine badge of definitely Egyptian type, his theory would gain a solid foundation. At present such evidence is lacking. A more critical perception of true method in the study of comparative religion than M. Foucart possesses has fixed certain sure criteria by which we can decide that one community has borrowed a religion from another. Mere general resemblances are not sufficient. And M. Foucart fails to explain the important differences between Eleusinian and Egyptian cult on the theory that the former was an importation of the Isis-Osiris worship. Our earliest data for Eleusis are the figures Kore, Demeter, Plouton. In the Egyptian cult and cult-legend there is no one corresponding to Kore, and Plouton is singularly unlike Osiris. To find a true counterpart of the latter god at Eleusis, M. Foucart, uncritically using very late evidence, has to thrust Dionysos into a position of prominence at Eleusis which he never had, except perhaps toward the close of paganism. I have developed these objections in some detail in the third volume of my *Cults of the Greek States*; and nothing that M. Foucart has written in this new work appears to me to diminish their force.

The equipment with which this author works is too narrow. All "new aids to the classics" he entirely despises and rejects. Modern

anthropology is under his anathema. We can understand and sympathize with him; for the freaks of the amateur anthropologist, playing about among the classics, have excited the amused or the disgusted wonder of the scientifically trained. And M. Foucart's dogma that no magic is discoverable at Eleusis is mainly true. But when he goes farther on p. 125 and denies that there is any direct evidence for magic rites in Greece, we can only feel surprise at the insufficiency of his own study. And serious anthropology could have taught him certain lessons that would have been of value for many parts of his exposition; it might have taught him the real ritual value of *αἰσχρολογία*, the true significance of the Egyptian peasant's lament for the death of Osiris in the corn-field, the difference between magic and religion, the power of ritual to generate myth; and it would have saved him from such utterances as "le tabou est ni primitif ni universel" (p. 286). His denunciation of anthropology would, in fact, have had more weight if he had shown any knowledge of it. He objects equally to the comparative method, except as applied to Greece and Egypt. Those who object—with some reason—to its vagueness or inconclusiveness, usually endeavor to replace it with searching intensive study of a particular area. But, industrious as M. Foucart undoubtedly is, he has not applied such study to the whole of Greek religion; had he done so, he would not have been capable of saying, "Le principe des abstinences alimentaires est étranger aux cultes grecs" (p. 288), or "lorsqu'un sacrifice était offert aux divinités infernales, nul ne pouvait goûter aux chairs des victimes" (p. 375; he might read Ada Thomsen's article in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1909); he would not have imagined that only the Eleusinian ritual had rules of *ἀγνεία* (p. 229) or that only the Eleusinian religion promised happiness after death (p. 367).

Another serious defect in his equipment is his uncritical valuation of texts; he accepts reverently a scholast's note on Plato *Gorgias* 497 C, which is an ignorant farrago from various Christian sources confusing the Eleusinia with Phrygian rites, and he rejects with unwarranted skepticism a valuable scholiast-statement on Aristophanes *Frogs* 479, which flatly contradicts his own theory about Iacchos (p. 198). But only a judicious text-criticism saves a writer from being at the mercy of the useless and spurious and guides him to what is valuable and sound. It is very doubtful if we can interpret the text of Plato *Phaedo*, p. 108, c. 5: ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω, as containing any allusion to the scenes revealed in the Hall of the Mysteries (pp. 394-98); still less can we accept the spurious Platonic dialogue of

the Axiochus as evidence of Eleusinian things. M. Foucart has failed to detect the signs in it of Orphic influence, chiefly because he fails to understand the possible import of that momentous phrase in it: *ὄντι γνήτη τῶν θεῶν* (c. 13), which he renders inaccurately by "toi qui es un des fidèles des déesses" (p. 365). He refuses to allow to Orphism any influence at Eleusis, and rightly; yet in curious contradiction to this view, he uses Orphic texts—such as the gold-leaf inscriptions of Magna Graecia and Crete (p. 430)—and references to Orphic mysteries in early and late writers as direct evidence for the Eleusinian. But in spite of defective equipment and erroneous method, parts of the book, for instance, the paragraphs on the sacred families and functionaries, where he establishes some points of interest (chaps. vi, vii), are of value for the student. And we are indebted to M. Foucart for insisting that we should study the Eleusinian mysteries on the plane, not of primitive magic, but of higher religion.

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CONCERNING THE NATURE OF Gnosticism

In his *Introduction à l'étude du Gnosticisme* (Paris, 1903) M. de Faye instituted an inquiry, on entirely new lines, into the origin and value of the patristic accounts of Gnosticism. Many readers of the book must have wished, like the present reviewer, that he would follow up his preparatory studies, and develop their bearing on the larger problems. This he has at last done in the work before us,¹ which is easily the most important contribution to the subject since Bousset's *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*. Bousset maintains, it will be remembered, that the primitive Gnosticism must be sought in the anonymous systems—that its roots are traceable to Persian Dualism—that it was mainly pre-Christian, and never had more than a formal and accidental connection with Christianity. These views have been adopted, with various modifications, in most of the literature that has grown up in recent years around the mystery-religions. M. de Faye, however, arrives at different conclusions. Setting out from the position that the testimony of the controversialists is secondary in value to that of the gnostic writers themselves, he examines the surviving fragments of those writers, and shows that their interest was moral and religious rather than speculative. Ethical ideas

¹ *Gnostiques et Gnosticisme. Étude critique des documents du Gnosticisme chrétien aux II^e et III^e siècles.* By Eugène de Faye. Paris: Leroux, 1913. 476 pages.

have the first place in the teaching of Basilides. The mythology of Valentinus, when we get back to its original form, was consciously symbolical like that of Plato, and was merely the framework of a theory of redemption. Marcion's Gnosticism was essentially Christian and ethical, and moves within the sphere of purely biblical conceptions. These great masters in the middle of the second century were the earliest Gnostics, and the systems described in the *Philosophoumena* represent a later Gnosticism which arose out of their teaching by a process of crumbling down and recombination. In the Coptic writings which illustrate the latest phase of Gnosticism the dependence on Valentinus is plainly apparent; and even for this degenerate Gnosticism the practical religious interest is still central.

M. de Faye thus holds that a "primitive Gnosticism" is a chimera. About 130 A.D. appeared the true creators of Gnosticism, and they exhibit several distinct types of gnostic thought. They belonged to a common movement in so far as they all give prominence to the ideas of redemption, reunion with God, *gnosis* as the means of this reunion. But these ideas were not confined to one particular school. They were shared, to some extent, by all cultivated men of the time, and the founders of Gnosticism were simply Christian thinkers who sought to interpret Christianity in the light of the prevailing ideas. Their teaching won popularity because it appealed to intellectual men who were sincere Christians, but could not rest satisfied with an unreasoned dogmatism such as we find in the Apologists. Toward the end of the second century, however, Gnosticism underwent a transformation. The creative impulse died down, and new systems could form themselves only by the mutual infiltration of the older ones. At the same time, under the influence of the ritual and sacramental ideas now in vogue, the conception of *gnosis* as the means of redemption gave place to that of mystery. In the second century the sects have still the character of philosophical schools; in the third they have become fraternities of mystagogues.

Any adequate criticism of M. de Faye's thesis would involve a detailed analysis which would here be out of place. But there are several considerations of a more general nature which seem to throw doubt on its validity. In the first place, although the method of judging the gnostic thinkers by their own extant fragments is theoretically a sound one, it is likely in practice to prove fallacious. The fragments are so meager that the attempt to build conclusions on them can hardly result in anything but guesswork. One admires the skill with which M. de

Faye reconstructs the genuine teaching of Valentinus and Basilides from a few detached sentences, but the fabric is somewhat precarious at the best. Again, the mere fact that the anonymous systems are only known to us from writers of the third century is no proof of their late origin. It may well be that they represent the more ancient types of gnostic thought, surviving in obscure sects, and reasserting themselves in the decay of the larger movement. Their affinities with one or another of the oriental mythologies (as pointed out by Bousset and Reitzenstein) are too radical to be explained away as later borrowings. Once more, it may fairly be objected that so far as M. de Faye has proved his thesis he has only succeeded by defining Gnosticism in a restricted and arbitrary sense. He himself admits that the Gnostics, in their attempt to interpret Christianity, made use of ideas which they derived from alien sources; but does not this admission vitally affect the whole question? We have to deal with a form of Christianity which grew up in an age of syncretism, and which cannot be understood until we determine the nature and origin of the borrowed elements. By unduly narrowing the scope of his problem M. de Faye has evaded instead of solving many of its chief difficulties.

At the same time he has undoubtedly made some of the phases of the movement clearer and more intelligible than they have hitherto been. More than any previous investigator he has done justice to the religious motive that underlay the chaotic speculations of Gnosticism. He has thrown out suggestions of the utmost value for tracing its historical development, although his contention that it only arose about the year 130 can hardly be maintained. He has made us aware of the essentially Christian character of much of the gnostic thinking, and has helped us to understand how Gnosticism could be recognized for so long as a legitimate type of Christianity. Whatever judgment we may form of his main conclusions, we cannot but acknowledge that in many directions he has marked out possible paths in what has hitherto appeared a wilderness. His work is the more valuable as we are now coming to realize that Gnosticism was no mere aberration, interesting only to specialists in the darker regions of early church history, but is bound up with some of the central problems in the development of Christian thought.

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THE RELIGION OF THE VEDĀNTA¹

After an introduction of more than a hundred pages, treating of the literature, aims, study, and qualifications for the study of the Vedānta, as well as of the exoteric and esoteric Vedānta doctrine, the book, in five parts, reproduces and systematizes the theology or doctrine of Brahman, cosmology or the doctrine of the world, psychology or the doctrine of the soul, Samsāra, or the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul, and, lastly Moksha or the teaching of liberation.

Deussen thus sets forth the systematic teaching of the Vedānta, according to the poems of Çāṅkara, "Master of Southern India," with many rich treasures of the Upanishads added. The Upanishads are "mountain tarns," the Bhagavad Gītā "serene forest lake," the Sūtras "the deep reservoir"; and of course, Çāṅkara is the guardian of the sacred waters, who, by his Commentaries, has hemmed them about, and kept them from all impurities or "Time's jealousy." But the ancient waters are somewhat clogged by time, and their old courses are hidden and choked. Hence the need of Deussen's service to trace the old, holy streams, clearing the reservoir, making the primal waters of life potable for Western people. The task was enormous, and we should look on it with favor. But Deussen, as might be expected, from his book *The Elements of Metaphysics*, expounding his own system, supplies to "tarn" and "lake" and "reservoir," alien currents from Kant and Schopenhauer—who is passably oriental himself, however—as well as from himself and others, so that the reader must keep up the critical endeavor to distinguish the "lovely fountains and lakelets" of Deussen's own from "the pure waters of the everlasting snows" of the Upanishads. Deussen is such a devotee of the Vedānta that he does not seem to be able to give an objective and impartial interpretation of Western thinkers, and yet so saturated with the culture of the West that he cannot keep from coloring his oriental ontology and monism and pessimism with the this-worldliness of our pragmatic and unsacred secularity. But the two cannot be mixed. East is east and West is west, as may be seen from the fundamental thought of the Vedānta, the fundamental concept of the system, which declares all empirical, physical knowledge to be ignorance, and the opposing metaphysics of the Vedānta, proceeding beyond the world of experience, as alone knowledge.

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¹ *The System of the Vedānta According to Bādarāyana G. Brahma-Sūtras and Çāṅkara's Commentary.* By Paul Deussen. Authorized translation by Charles Johnson. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1912. xiii+513 pages. \$3.00.

THE ART OF PREACHING

Seldom does a really able preacher find time and occasion to tell his fellow-preachers what preaching means to him. In the last Yale Lectures Charles Silvester Horne found and used the time and the occasion.¹ The lectures proved to be his last message to ministers. Three days after their delivery he passed away. The lecturer was for ten years pastor of a church "in a fashionable section of the world's metropolis." He then assumed the leadership of Whitefield's Tabernacle, and here "close to the homes of the poor and to haunts of shame" he wrought for ten years in "the hardest kind of work." "He was honored with the chairmanship of the Congregational Union of England and Wales." "He was one of the favorite spokesmen of the Nonconformist conscience." He stood for Parliament and "in 1910 he was returned as Junior Member for Ipswich." Dr. Bridgman, from whose biographical sketch we have taken these notes, reminds us that at forty-nine years of age Silvester Horne had become "one of the remarkable religious leaders of the age."

There are eight lectures in all. The general subject for all, we are told, might have been "Keeping the world's soul alive." In the first lecture, "The Servant of the Spirit," the author contrasts the materialistic thought of the universe as a warehouse with the prophetic thought of the universe as a church, "every fragment of creation endowed with the preaching office." He insists: "The preacher can never be superseded; he has his roots in the nature of things." In succeeding chapters we are asked to think of some of the prophetic personalities, the preachers who have kept the world's soul alive. The second chapter deals with Moses, the first Hebrew prophet, who yet was instructed in all the learning of the Egyptians. The lecturer remarks: "Prophetic power in the pulpit does not specially attach to the preacher whose heart is full and his head empty." In the third chapter, after a fascinating characterization of John the Baptist, we are led into the Apostolic age, to the study of the early messengers and their messages of equality and immortality, and are urged to enter with the abandon of the primitive church, into the proclamation of these two messages. The fourth lecture discusses the two great preachers of the fourth century, Chrysostom and Athanasius. "Chrysostom I think knew men better, and Athanasius I think knew God better." Our author concludes that the prophet and orator of tomorrow must have intimate

¹ *The Romance of Preaching*. By Charles Silvester Horne. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.25.

acquaintance with God and man. In the fifth lecture we have a suggestive study of three preachers, "Rulers of the Peoples": Savonarola, "who preached so that his hearers were ready to fight and die for the faith," who "challenged the contemptuous dictum that 'states cannot be ruled by paternosters'"; Calvin the scholar, who was drawn from his retirement, not "by a sense of responsibility to a church, but by a sense of destiny to a city"; and John Knox, "who united to the statesmanship of Calvin the fiery eloquence of Savonarola," the preacher who ever preached "with a mighty application" and who instructs us not to be afraid of "unworthy frowns" or "the seducing smiles of fashion or wealth or rank."

The sixth lecture brings us to a study of preachers as "Founders of Freedom." With his characteristic sense of the fitness of things, the lecturer selects for special consideration Robinson, preacher to the Pilgrims. "Let it never be forgotten that modern America sprang out of the ideal relation between a pastor and a church; a man of God and a people of God." The study is really a plea for simplicity of pulpit speech, for earnestness of pulpit prayer, for the careful exploration of the wide, rich, unknown tracts of Scripture, and for the steadfast purpose on the part of the preacher to create a church in which all the Lord's people shall be prophets. In the seventh chapter the "Passion for Evangelism" is illustrated by two men of contrasted training and temper, John Wesley and Whitefield. These men used all the mighty forces of personality to evangelize "miners, puddlers, weavers." The thought of Whitefield in the full power of his eloquence makes the author "feel as if this is the one thing to pray for, that God will raise up a new race of genuine orators for the evangel, who without any unworthy artifices will shake men's souls and thrill their hearts."

In the last lecture on "The Romance of Preaching," Silvester Horne with unintentional but dramatic self-revelation bids his hearers remember the elements which give to preaching its romance, for example, "the mystery and wonder of the human spirit," "the wonder of conversion," "the new applications of Christ's teachings which will revive the interest of the people in Christianity to a surprising degree," the fact that "over this world of military camps, bristling frontiers and armored fleets there is being heard today with new insistence the ever-romantic strains of the angels' song of Peace and Good-will." The closing words linger in the memory long after one has laid down the book: "In the splendid certainty of inspiration which is the gift of God whose gifts are 'without repentance' may you accept your ministry at your Master's hands;

and living in the dignity and the glory of it, serve your generation, by the will of God, before you fall asleep!"

The diction of the lectures is superb, the movement of thought swift and strong. We seem to be borne along by the momentum of an advancing army. The author is one of "the knights of Christ" of whom he speaks.

The high soul burns on to light men's feet
Where death for noble ends makes dying sweet.

For many years Dr. Hoyt has been a successful teacher of preachers. His earlier books, *The Work of Preaching* and *The Preacher*, assure a welcome for his latest work.¹ The material of the book has already passed through the crucible of the classroom. It consists of lectures given "for three years to Senior classes at Auburn Seminary" and "at the University of Chicago in the summer of nineteen hundred and twelve."

Dr. Hoyt quotes from the *Life of Broadus* a word to this effect: "He interpreted people to themselves. He enabled them to know what they did know, and to feel what they had long felt." The writer does for us a like service. He does not tell us many new things. He helps us rather to know what we knew already and to feel what we had long felt. In these lectures to young preachers, he calls upon all preachers to measure up to the greatness of their calling.

After discriminating chapters on the present difficulties and opportunities of the ministry, Dr. Hoyt counsels us to learn the Secret of the Heart, to gain the Human Touch, to preach a Man's Gospel, to conquer the common ministerial temptations to "laziness" and "lying," to carelessness in money matters and in social relations. He would have us preach to our age, yet preach Christ the Eternal Contemporary. He would have us preach in the language of the age, yet in language of fitting simplicity, dignity, and strength. There is significant emphasis upon the Ministry of Comfort. It is easy for a minister to become a common scold, and the word of the distinguished scholar to John Watson deserves pondering: "Your best work in the pulpit has been to put heart into men for the coming week." There is a good discussion of the Children's Sermon, with illustrations from the preaching of some of the effective ministers of Scotland, England, and America. Dr. Hoyt appreciates the exceeding difficulty of preaching to children, but

¹ *Vital Elements of Preaching*. By Arthur S. Hoyt. New York: Macmillan, 1914. \$1.50.

believes that such preaching helps to give to all preaching the needed simplicity, vividness, and concreteness. He insists that if the children's sermon precedes the sermon to adults, the themes of the two sermons should harmonize, so that the entire service may be unified. He is inclined to think, however, that the average preacher may do his best pulpit work as he preaches the single sermon in which he holds clearly in mind the needs of the children as of the adults.

The book is enriched by illustrations from the author's wide reading and deep experience of life. The occasional repetitions of thought and phrase would seem better suited to the spoken lecture than to the written book.

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HAERING'S DOGMATICS

One is glad to see this publication, in English translation, of the theological system of the well-known Ritschlian theologian, Professor Theodor Haering, of Tübingen.¹ One notes the insistence, so characteristic of the school of Ritschl, that the basis of the religious knowledge on which systematic theology must be built is, on the subjective side, the consciousness of *value* received by those who have in faith responded to Jesus Christ as the historical revelation of God, and, on the objective side, this historical *revelation* which itself gives rise to Christian faith. "A truth of Christian faith must have immediate value for Christian experience"; but "it is not the subjective experience which furnishes the adequate ground of the truth, but the divine revelation, as it proves its reality to human need" (pp. 110, 111). "The believer does not regard what is valuable as real, because it is valuable for him, but because it meets him as real; . . . however, not as a reality which no one can deny—rather as one which only he can acknowledge who is willing to acknowledge its value personally" (p. 67).

In spite of these well-balanced statements, however, and notwithstanding the reiterated emphasis upon the fundamental facts of revelation, it must be said that, philosophically considered, Haering's system does not quite succeed in avoiding that Kantian absolute dualism of the experienced and the independently real which has made the possibility

¹ *The Christian Faith: A System of Dogmatics*. By Theodor Haering. Translated from the second (1912) German edition, by John Dickie and George Ferries. London, New York, and Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913. 2 vols. xi+487, xi+(952-487=) 465 pages. \$6.00.

of knowledge so persistent and yet so insoluble a problem. One symptom of this *epistemological* dualism (of the experienced which is not independently real, and the independently real which is not experienced) is the prominence given to the familiar Kantian *logical* dualism (of theoretical knowledge which is not adequate for practical needs, and practical knowledge which is not theoretically valid). Knowledge, which is of phenomena, the contents of actual and possible human experience, is incompetent in the realm of religion; it can never show that God exists, nor, if he exists, what he is. But while it cannot affirm, it cannot deny; faith is left absolutely free, so far as knowledge is concerned. Thus "real agnosticism," it is claimed, "can be a true ally of faith" (pp. 151-59, 244-49, 257).

As a result of this more or less successfully veiled religious agnosticism, theology cannot become what its name would imply, a science of the divine Reality, or God; it can only be the science of a particular sort of faith about that Reality (pp. 2, 249-52, etc.). And in spite of his oft-repeated emphasis upon the fundamental importance of "revelation," it would seem that, strictly speaking, Haering's philosophy leaves no room, really, for genuine *revelation*. That the divine Reality is ever immediately present within human conscious experience seems not to be intended in what is said of revelation. Mysticism, although acknowledged as a hopeful feature of "the modern consciousness," is not regarded as having knowledge value. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit within the church is interpreted ethically rather than metaphysically. And, while Haering has probably succeeded better than any others of the Ritschlians, unless it be Max Reischle, or the elder Ritschl himself, in defending his theological system against the charge (which all good Ritschlians resent) of "subjectivism," it is nevertheless true (as Luedemann, for instance, in his *Das Erkennen und die Werturteile*, has pointed out) that a vicious circle in this doctrine of revelation seems unavoidable. On the one hand, "it is only upon condition of trust that the revelation of our God . . . discloses itself," and on the other hand, it is revelation which gives rise to faith (pp. 241, 242, etc.). In short, revelation is the presence within human experience, e.g., in history, of some fact which impels us to believe in God's redemptive love, and which, believed in, does psychologically condition a redemptive ethical experience in us. On the ground, then, of its value for us, together with the rather ambiguous interpretation of the historical fact as "revelation," "religious knowledge" is claimed.

The point in criticism which we are here trying to make may seem an unimportant one. As a matter of fact the method employed by

Haering is admirably fitted to *select* the essentially Christian content from our traditional Christian dogmas and speculations—the content, moreover, with reference to which vital Christian religious experience does lead one to feel assured. But it seems not unfair to say that from the first there has been in this Ritschlian philosophy of religious knowledge an incurable weakness in the matter of apologetics; it is much more efficient in conserving the faith of modern-minded men who are already Christian than in leading those who are not experientially Christian to regard the essentials of Christian belief as even probably true.

The trouble, at least in so far as it is philosophical, lies, we would venture to suggest, in the absolute dualism of the Kantian theory of knowledge, carried over into the field of religion. Ritschl was right in reacting against the monistic theory of knowledge in its idealistic form as he found it in Hegelianism; better a Christian agnosticism than a pantheism, which, so far as the *practical* phase of religion was concerned, *logically* meant atheism. If, however, there can be found a tenable philosophy of religious knowledge, such as would allow the thought of the actual *immanence*, in religious experience at its best, of the divine—some phase of the actual life of an also *transcendent* God—then, on the basis of such *bona fide* revelation, one might build up theology as such a descriptive empirical science as would be able to claim a rightful and most important place in a metaphysical synthesis of the empirical sciences. And from this point of view there could be not only this more unequivocal appeal to revelation, but also a less objectionable use made of the appreciation of religious value in the interests of knowledge. The consciousness of religious value would be a means of selecting the *peculiarly* divine from the total content of human experience, thus discharging an important function in connection with religious perception.

But to return to Haering. The central and indeed essential place he gives to *historical* revelation makes it necessary for him to give considerable attention to the question of the historicity of Jesus. Not every detail of the Gospel narrative, he recognizes, is important in this connection; but the figure of Jesus in history must be sufficiently recognizable and definite to evoke in us the assurance that God was working in him (p. 207). The historicity of Jesus must not only be irrefutable and probable enough to enable the religiously susceptible to surrender with good conscience to the impression made by the person of Jesus, as convincing us of the love and redemptive activity of God (p. 218): “let us suppose that a future, however distant, will prove that Jesus is only a creation of faith, and it is all over with faith” (p. 217). This seems

to leave the basis of our religious knowledge rather too much at the mercy of the historian. Our suggested view of the actual immanence of God in Christ would also call for his actual immanence, even if less completely, in every manifestation of the Christlike spirit, so that the historicity of no *one* recorded fact or unrepeatable series of facts, however valuable, would be absolutely a matter of life and death to our religion.

When he comes to doctrinal details, Haering rightly makes very central the thought of the divine Providence. "All real religion," he says, "is faith in Providence" (p. 514). "Prayer is the exercise of this faith" (p. 528). "God's providential care," however, he insists, "aims at realizing the Kingdom of God. Does this aim not apply to our earthly well-being? Nor to the advancement of civilization? Nor to blessings of such high value as the family and the fatherland? No, we reply, but to the Kingdom of God, for the supreme purpose is this Kingdom of God" (p. 518). And there is one "immovably firm foundation" of this faith in Providence, viz., "the reality of the love of God which appears in the history of divine Revelation culminating in Jesus, in his Cross—this seeming contradiction of all Providence" (pp. 525-26). It would be a further step, and one which Haering does not take, although perhaps it would prove of great value in practical religion, to say that the only direct "special providences" we have any right to believe in are such uplifts in the spiritual life of individuals and communities as come in response to the right religious attitude on the part of man. This view also would be more tenable on the theory of actual immanence which we have mentioned, than on that of the dualistic theory of religious knowledge derived from Kant and Ritschl.

Haering's attitude toward the problem of religion, however, is, on the whole, admirable. He is both free and cautious, both liberal and conservative. Perhaps he goes too far at times in the attempt to find an essentially Christian element in traditional beliefs of Christians; in particular, to one who does not share his ecclesiastical prejudices, his labored interpretation of the sacramental value of infant baptism (pp. 760-61) may seem very artificial and unconvincing. But when we come to the great fundamental themes of Christian doctrine, as a rule we find his formulation both amply conservative in the religious side and yet refreshingly independent, not to say original, in mode of conception and statement. The priestly work of Christ, it is interesting to note, is found in his prophetic work (of revealing God to man), *viewed as having value for God himself*, because of its influence upon men (pp. 644-45, 648). And the following is his way of stating the doctrine of the Trinity:

"The Revelation of God which is given us in Jesus Christ is not a chance and passing glimpse which may be superseded by another, but is actually the full self-revelation of God, of Holy Love. And when God in Christ awakens in his church, and in each individual amongst us, faith and personal trust in this love of his, that is actually personal spiritual communion with himself" (p. 921).

Haering's book is one which could be used with profit in the theological classroom. To the liberally disposed, it may show how much more conservative of the vital religious content of Christian tradition than he had supposed, it is possible for the free and honest thinker still to be; to the conservative it may show how safe it is to sever the enslaving bonds of literalistic traditionalism. The translators are to be thanked for having made so valuable a work accessible to the very large number who read widely in this general field, but only what is published in English. There are many other works in the philosophy of religion and systematic theology, untranslated as yet, which such readers would welcome, and it is to be hoped that the generation will not be allowed to pass without such works as Kaftan's *Dogmatik*, Wernle's *Einführung*, and some of Troeltsch's *Schriften* being made available for the English reader.

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POPULAR ESSAYS ON CURRENT RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS

Theologians are not the only thinkers interested in religion. To be sure, we have been wont to include philosophers as having at least a speculative interest therein. But within recent years we have had an increasing number of practical men of science volunteering an interest in one or another phase of religion. It is refreshing to find within the compass of a brief discussion a treatment of the relations of religion and science so fresh and forceful as that which Professor Keyser has given us in this Phi Beta Kappa address.¹ Professor Keyser rejects the position that religion is essentially idea or concept. It cannot be subject-matter for science, since science destroys what it analyzes. It can be known only through the appropriate emotions. The theory of Professor Gilbert Murray and others, that religion has to do essentially with the uncharted, is controverted; and it is shown that, even if this theory were true, it could not mean an end to religion, since the uncharted

¹ *Science and Religion, the Rational and the Superrational*. By Cassius J. Keyser. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914. 75 pages. 75 cents.

is an infinite of the highest order, which human science can never overtake. However, Professor Keyser's main thesis is that beyond the domain of reason and above it there is a realm of superrational reality, the ultimate and permanent source and basis of the religious emotions. These emotions do not die, but are chastened and purified with the increase of knowledge. While Professor Keyser's appeal to mathematical analogy in support of this theory, particularly the use which he makes of the mathematical method of limits, is wholly non-technical and clear, it will not appear to those outside the circle of professional mathematicians to carry quite the weight attached to it in the discussion.

Professor William Adams Brown does a valuable and wholesome work of mediation in his volume upon *Modern Theology and the Preaching of the Gospel*.¹ The material gathered into this little book was originally presented in lecture form before various bodies of ministers, and appeared serially in the *Biblical World* during 1913-14. This will explain the popular style of the discussions as well as certain clear limitations upon their value. Professor Brown protests against the current tendency to attempt to live upon other people's answers in the field of religion instead of trying to get answers of our own, and suggests that this is the reason for the general impression that theology belongs to the past. Modern theology is not a reconstituting of the facts of the religious life, but a new appreciation of them. The universal fact of religion reveals it as one of the ultimate realities; yet not all religion is equally valuable, and Christianity becomes by pre-eminence the religious hope of the race. Christ is the center of the Christian faith as he is the key to the Bible; everything in the Bible and everything in life must submit to the test of his life. The Bible infallibly leads to a sufficient knowledge of religious truth. The modern view brings God near in character, not in essence, and relieves him of the imputation of arbitrariness; yet it encounters a conception of universal law under whose emphasis the sense of intimacy with God may pass away. We need to reaffirm our faith in miracle, not as signifying an interruption of the order of nature, but as indicating "God's method of self-disclosure to men." Out of such self-disclosure—in new forms, in great men, in flashes of insight—come new beginnings. The most familiar example of self-disclosure in current religious experience is prayer. We no longer conceive of salvation as merely "from hell to heaven"; our sense of the importance of the present and of social relationships demands

¹ *Modern Theology and the Preaching of the Gospel*. By William Adams Brown. New York: Scribner, 1914. viii+274 pages. \$1.25 net.

a new statement. We are to be saved from un-Christlikeness, which is selfishness, and unto Christlikeness, which means saviorhood. Only love can save, but the modern social movement has given a mightier instrument to love. Love is the costliest thing in the world, and the law of cost holds for God as well as for men. "Atonement is something which happens in God." We see that Jesus shared our limitations, yet something within us rebels against the tendency to think of him in the terms of humanity pure and simple. Modern theology helps us to see that the Christian community always meant by the deity of Christ, not a qualification of essence, but the actual service which he performs in meeting the deepest needs of the believer; it makes clear to us the abiding need of "a self-revealing God" and a unified and compelling human ideal. Logical demonstration never leads to belief in the deity of Christ; only when we ourselves know him as trustworthy, righteous, adorable, do we actually believe him divine. The special function of the church is to "remind men of God and help them to realize his presence as the supreme reality"; in the discharge of this function it engages in worship, instruction, and inspiration. The church must lead in the current moral and religious revival, for it has access to the largest number of people, it commands the ultimate religious motive, and of all institutions it is most free from conflicting interests. This obligation makes clear the necessity for a practical unity of Christian people. Just why Professor Brown, having indicated in luminous fashion a path to the new appreciation of Jesus, should revert to the Chalcedonian formula is not quite clear. But he says that if you are a specialist in theology with a technical interest, you are to be told that "Jesus Christ is very man and very God—two natures in one person, each complete and perfect." This is nothing short of a reversion to the Greek philosophy of essence, and a refusal to think your problem of the person of Christ in the terms of modern thought. This tendency appears somewhat less pronouncedly in other connections. At the same time, the discussion will meet the needs of many a thoughtful pastor.

*The Problem of Atonement*¹ controverts the substitutionary theory of atonement. Dr. Wright holds that Jesus is substitute neither for our penalty nor for our righteousness. What he suffered was due to his effort to bring humanity back to God. This is the meaning of both the incarnation and the death on the cross: without them men could never have believed in the willingness of God to forgive and re-establish

¹ *The Problem of Atonement*. By W. Arter Wright. Columbus, Ohio: S. F. Harriman, 1913. 291 pages. \$1.00 net.

fellowship with them. But the sufferings of Christ were in no sense necessary to make God willing to forgive. The Father and the Son were perfectly at one in the purpose to redeem, and the suffering of Calvary simply uncovers the heart of God and makes clear the suffering which he continually undergoes on account of the sins of humanity. The work of Jesus was the supreme illustration of the divine attitude; but that law of vicarious suffering must continue to operate if the world is ever to be won to God. Hence it is the duty of the church to continue what Jesus Christ began. Only such a concrete manifestation of the mind and will of God can bring about in men the necessary change of mind and the willingness to accept a new character implied in the re-establishment of fellowship. We have a vital rather than a mechanical or legalistic view of atonement here. The author is bound, however, in his own thought, to justify his view by appeal to the New Testament, apparently assuming that there is a single and unified view of atonement presented therein. The attempt to explain how the matter lay as between members of the Trinity before the incarnation does not illuminate the discussion. If Dr. Wright's Biblicism and deference to the theology of the ecumenical creeds were modified, he could come nearer reaching a conclusion satisfactory to the modern religious consciousness.

The question of baptism is not one that engages the modern man very deeply, but Dr. Morrison has a thoughtful word for the immersionist bodies,¹ especially in view of the modern imperative of Christian unity. It is urged that the King James translators were quite justified in transliterating the Greek term *baptizo*, rather than translating it, since in the time of Jesus "baptism was an institutional function and not a mere specific physical action." Its initiatory significance and not the matter of form or symbolism was uppermost in the consciousness of the primitive Christian community. The view that the chief meaning of baptism lay in its indication of the candidate's willingness to assume the status of a member of the Christian church Dr. Morrison terms the "functional" view, in contradistinction to the magical and legalistic views. While the value of baptism is primarily in its organic significance, it has a symbolic value when administered in the form of immersion. Those who have not been immersed have missed this symbolic value, which is, however, important but not essential. Immersionist bodies are not justified in imposing rebaptism upon those who

¹ *The Meaning of Baptism*. By Charles Clayton Morrison. Chicago: Disciples Publication Society, 1914. 222 pages. \$1.00.

come bringing proper credentials from other bodies. It is the usual legalistic view of baptism, entertained alike by immersionists and non-immersionists, which leads to this requirement. The functional view, however, is the true one, and to this view Disciples can adjust themselves more readily than Baptists. Only by the adoption of this view can the Disciples justify their contention that they are not themselves a denomination and that there should be a real organic Christian unity. It takes considerable moral courage for one in Dr. Morrison's position to do what he has done in this book with reference to Alexander Campbell and the traditional positions of the Disciples. It is interesting to see that in the mind of Dr. Morrison the matter is still chiefly one of getting a satisfactory exegesis of pertinent New Testament terms and passages. Doubtless the denominational consciousness of both Disciples and Baptists would require that. The book is significant as a piece of denominational self-criticism.

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BRIEF MENTION

THE BIBLE

WOOD, IRVING F., AND GRANT, ELIHU. *The Bible as Literature: An Introduction*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1914. 346 pages. \$1.50 net.

The supposed needs of students in colleges for a good textbook of the Bible have called into existence the "Bible Study Textbook Series." The authors of *The Bible as Literature* are practical Bible teachers in Smith College, and are presenting, in part at least, the results of their classroom experience. This is a sane method of discovery. It should reveal the best method of making clear to a class of college students the meaning and significance of the Bible. Professor Wood treats the Old Testament and Professor Grant the New.

The Old Testament is blocked into four divisions: prophetic books, books of narrative, books of poetry and wisdom, and apocalyptic literature—the supposed order of production in the main. The New Testament has no similar divisional breaks. At the close of each chapter there are a few "topics and assignments," which the teacher is supposed to hand out to the student.

The production of a model textbook of the Bible involves several difficulties. It is practically impossible for the writer of such a book as this to exclude his own personality from its method; in other words, he writes this as the book which he would use plus his own classroom methods. The next user of it must take the cold, bare book itself, and supply the personality which the writer assumes should accompany it. If perchance that cannot be done, then the book is not the model that it was expected to be.

The reviewer sees many gaps which the teacher must fill by his own methods. As an example of this kind, the discussion of Nahum is too brief and too prosy for

the marvelous background which should inspire its narrative. Again, while Jeremiah has many good points, no person, student or otherwise, can read that book intelligently without first arranging it in chronological order. That is positively essential if an Occidental is to understand it.

The New Testament is more comprehensive and clearer in its language for persons who are not acquainted with the technique of the Bible.

The book will do good with the right kind of an instructor behind it.

Pr.

CLARK, FRANCIS E. *The Holy Land in Asia Minor*. New York: Scribner, 1914. 154 pages. \$1.00 net.

The seven cities of the Book of Revelation are rarely visited. In fact, they are scarcely known to Bible students. Christian Endeavor Clark, as he is often and justly called, made a tour of western Asia Minor to visit the sites of those old cities. Smyrna is the only one of any consequence now in existence. The others are either in ruins or mere squalid villages. Six of them can be reached by rail, and are thus more easily accessible than many sites of Palestine.

The author paints a pleasing word-picture of the modern town or ruin, of its ancient importance, and of the character of the church, as implied in John's message to it. He cannot forget that he is a preacher, for occasionally he drops from his descriptive and historical narrative to the moralizing of the pulpit. The sixteen full-page illustrations are well made and give the reader a fair idea of the places described. But why should not the author or the publishers, who certainly know the value of a map, supply this book of travel, for that is what it is, with at least a simple sketch map of Asia Minor, so that the reader can localize at once the place he is reading about? It would be worth more than any illustration given in the book. Neither is there an index of any kind.

Pr.

VON DOBSCHÜTZ, ERNST. *The Influence of the Bible on Civilization*. New York: Scribner, 1914. 190 pages. \$1.25 net.

Historians are profoundly interested in the dynamic value of the Bible. Since its production and dissemination in the world what influence has it exerted on civilization? Who is able to measure that influence? He is a rare man who feels himself competent to pass judgment on that question. It involves both a definition of civilization and a history of the Bible, either topic large enough to occupy an entire volume.

This work is broken into eight chapters to cover the period of time from the New Testament to the present day. "The Bible Makes Itself Indispensable for the Church (to 325 A.D.)," the theme of chap. i, specifies its place in the church prior to Constantine, while chap. ii, "The Bible Begins to Rule the Christian Empire (325-600 A.D.)," describes the power of Christianity in the Roman Empire, especially as seen among the administrative authorities. Chaps. iii, iv, and v deal with the Bible among the German nations (500-800 A.D.), as one basis of mediaeval civilization (800-1150 A.D.), and as the inspiration of non-conformist movements (1150-1450 A.D.). The author's delineation is that of the progress of religion as represented in the Christian church and some of the elements which the Bible inspired in the life of the nation as aside from the church. Chap. vi, "The Bible Trains Printers and Translators (1450-1611)," is a history of the Bible within that period with only a tangential relation to civilization. Chap. vii, "The Bible Rules Daily Life (1550-1850)," and chap. viii, "The Bible

Becomes Once More the Book of Devotion," are quite superficial in their discussions. The author does not grasp the bigness of his theme with that masterfulness which it demands. In fact, the complexity and vastness of the influence which he seeks to describe quite elude him in the latter half of his instructive volume.

PR.

PEAKE, A. S. *The Bible: Its Origin, Its Significance and Its Abiding Worth.* London: Hodder & Stoughton; New York: George H. Doran Co., 1913. xxxvi+513 pages. \$2.00 net.

Students of the Bible welcome everything that will clarify the puzzling problems that stare them in the face whenever they take account of the advances of modern critical study. Professor Peake has had many years' experience in the classroom and fully appreciates the layman's perplexities. For more than ten years he has been publishing popular articles and reading papers before assemblies which have set forth the modern views of the Bible.

The present volume of twenty-four chapters contains nothing new and is rather miscellaneous in character; that is, the themes treated do not constitute a unit. The mere naming of the subjects will indicate the diversity of the separate chapters. Of these, in order from the first, we find "The Situation," "The Method and Temper of the Apologist," "New Light on the Bible," "The Bible in the Original Languages and in English," "The Problem of the Canon," "The Lower Criticism," "The Legitimacy and Necessity of Biblical Criticism," "The Story of Old Testament Criticism," "Reasons for the Critical View of the Old Testament," "The Conservative Reply to the Old Testament Critics," "The Critic and the Apologist," etc.

Part of the first chapters have already appeared in the *Sunday Strand*, and other parts in the *Contemporary Review* and the *Interpreter*. At least four papers read before meetings of various kinds find publication here.

The author presents his opinions in clear, concise English, easily understood. His position is fundamentally the modern one, with only slight variations here and there tending toward conservatism. The superabundant use of the first personal pronoun sometimes becomes, to say the least, rather monotonous and insipid.

The book is eminently healthful reading for the layman who would know the really modern view of the Bible, its origin, significance, and permanent value.

PR.

OLD TESTAMENT

DEIMEL, ANTONIUS, assisted by ROMEO PANARA, JOS. PATSCH, and NIC. SCHNEIDER. *Pantheon Babylonicum, Nomina Deorum e textibus cuneiformibus excerpta, etc.* Rome: Sumptibus pontificii instituti biblici, 1914. xvi+264 pages and 35 plates.

A volume which will be of the greatest help to students of the cuneiform literature is the *Pantheon Babylonicum*, an alphabetical arrangement of the names of all the Babylonian deities with citations of the passages where these are mentioned. The use of the volume in the classroom for a few months has revealed a number of inconsistencies, which do not, however, impair the usefulness of the work.

D. D. L.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

"The Anglican Outlook on the American Colonies in the Early Eighteenth Century" (E. B. Greene in the *American Historical Review*, XX, No. 1 [October, 1914], 64-85).

The purpose of this paper is "to interpret in the light of this (S.P.G.) original material the Anglican outlook on the colonial problem in the early years of the eighteenth century." In reality, the writer has given us a discussion of the activities of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel.

Its intimate connection with the Anglican episcopate, its meager financial resources, its small stipends, the indifferent character of some of its missionaries—these are set forth with commonplace restatement. Some emphasis is attached to the agitation maintained by this society for the appointment of a resident American bishop. "It can hardly be doubted that the establishment of the national church in anything like its full vigor on American soil would have strengthened materially the influence of traditional and conservative ideals."

P. G. M.

"The Degradation in 1686. The Reverend Samuel Johnson" (J. Wickham Legg in *English Historical Review* [October, 1914]).

The author of this article furnishes an edition of the documents connected with Rev. Samuel Johnson's case as found in the Tanner MS, Bodleian Library. Samuel Johnson was tried before the bar of King's Bench in 1686 for spreading sedition among the king's soldiers. He was sentenced first to be degraded from his ministerial function and preferment, then to be placed three times in the pillory, and whipped. He was handed over to Convocation where sentence of degradation was passed and executed forthwith. The indictment and a description of the process of degradation are furnished by Dr. Legg.

T. M. D.

"The Motive of Individualism in Religion" (W. Fite in *Harvard Theological Review*, VII, No. 4 [October, 1914], 478-96).

An attempt is made by Professor Fite in the above-mentioned article to show that the individualistic philosophy, which he holds, is compatible with that reverence and desire for unity with a personal God that are essential to any genuine religion. The writer sets forth his individualistic philosophy in opposition to the individualism of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which conceives the human individual as an exclusive and self-sufficient being, and to what he considers as the current social morality that disregards the interests of the individual in the interest of society. These conceptions of the individual and society, for Professor Fite, are based upon erroneous views of these categories. According to him, the essence of the individual does not consist in its exclusive isolation, nor is that of society found in its group character; on the contrary, their essence consists in the principle of consciousness. The highest mark, then, of the human individual is his self-consciousness, the power to know his ends and direct his acts. This being the case, the individual strives to attain his self-conscious personality. It is only in the deep aspirations for the self that one feels the need and greatness of his fellow-beings with whom he wishes to be in a

conscious communication. Here in the development of self-conscious personality there lies the distinctive mark of culture. And in the stage of religion we find the deeper self-consciousness which brings us face to face with the eternal realities. This deeper consciousness of the self, that exists in religion, demands that there shall be a perfection of human freedom and individuality, not only in relation with other human persons, but also in a conscious communication and fellowship with a being who is vastly more significant and personal than our human selves. "In religion," concludes the writer, "individualism seeks that infinity of personal knowledge and personal love which is expressed in the love of God."

U. K.

"The Essence of Christianity and the Cross of Christ" (B. B. Warfield, in *Harvard Theological Review*, VII, No. 4 [October, 1914], 538-94).

In the above-mentioned article Professor Warfield engages in a lengthy criticism of contemporary theories of the essence of Christianity and sets forth his view of the nature of the Christian religion. The current definitions of the essence of Christianity, which the writer criticizes and rejects, are those of Macintosh, Harnack, Loisy, and Troeltsch. In short, those views of the Christian religion held by the so-called "liberal" theologians are inadequate and unsatisfactory from the standpoint of his own theory. The cross of Christ, according to Professor Warfield, epitomizes the essence of Christianity. Christianity, in other words, is a redemptive religion which has retained this characteristic throughout all its history. It is, to quote his words, "that particular redemptive religion which brings to man salvation from his sin, conceived as guilt as well as pollution, through the expiatory death of Jesus Christ" (p. 589; cf. his article, "Christless Christianity," *Harvard Theological Review*, V, 462-64).

U. K.

"God as the Common Will" (H. A. Overstreet in *Hibbert Journal*, XIII, No. 1 [October, 1914], 155-74).

Psychological and sociological treatments characterize many of the recent discussions on matters of religion. In this article Professor Overstreet endeavors to formulate a conception of God in accordance with certain presuppositions of the modern democratic philosophy of the state. The treatment of the subject is prefaced by a review of the three following political theories. The first type of political theory as expressed by Bentham, Mill, and Spencer regards government and law as of the nature of restraint imposed upon individuals from without against their will. The second type, that of Hobbes, conceives of the state as a real unity of individual wills whose surrendered rights are vested in Leviathan, the Sovereign Person. The third type is one held by Rousseau, according to which the state is the essential will of the citizens, a Common Will which is greater than the sum of isolated individuals, ministering to the good of the individuals.

The religious theories, analogous to the first two political theories, are found in the conception of God as a being who places limitations upon individuals from without and as a father, a supreme individual Person governing the affairs of the universe. In political theory, the writer points out, we have passed from Hobbes to Rousseau; from the theory of Leviathan, the Prince, to that of the Sovereign Common Will. A question is whether we are to look for the same advance in religious theory, an advance from the view of God as the sovereign Monarch of the world to the theory,

more nearly consistent with the spirit of democracy, that God is the Common Will of all living creatures. The author is of the opinion that such an advance is to be made in religious theory. He shows that fears for the disappearance in religion of particularity and concreteness by conceiving God as the Common Will would be overcome by a conscious recognition of the fact that our devotion and loyalty are not really to some Divine Leader as such, but to the truth embodied in him.

God, then, following the analogy of Rousseau's best thought on the state, is our own deeper and more permanent life, the life that is deeply common, a life, though not yet fully realized in the order of time, fundamental to all temporal growth and achievement. In this theory of God as the deep, underlying Common Will, identical with our essential Self, we see a conception of God based upon modern democratic and evolutionary philosophy carried to its logical conclusions.

U. K.

"Generic Christianity" (Shailer Mathews in *Constructive Quarterly*, II, No. 4 [October, 1914], 702-23).

The writer of this article attempts to show that, amid the varied forms of Christianity in thought and organization, there are certain fundamental elements that generically distinguish the Christian religion from all other great religions and constitute its essential nature. These fundamental generic elements of the Christian religion have assumed various forms of expression under the influence of dominant social minds. The social minds which have given their expressions to the content of the gospel are the following: the Semitic that gave us the New Testament and the messianic hope; the Hellenistic, ecumenical dogma; the imperialistic, the doctrine of sin and the Roman church; the feudal, the Anselmic theory of atonement; the national, Protestantism; the *bourgeois*, evangelicalism; and the modern or scientific-democratic mind will give us the theology of the future. Underlying all these forms given by the different social minds are the generic elements of Christianity, namely, (1) the fact of sin and the need of salvation by God—sin, guilt, and the need of redemption; (2) the God of law as the God of love who seeks reconciliation with men in three-fold personal expression—Trinity; (3) the revelation of God as Savior in the historical person, Jesus—deity of Christ; (4) the working of God in human life directly and indirectly through social organization like the church, making it like himself in moral quality—the Holy Spirit as experienced in repentance and regeneration; (5) the death of Christ as the revelation of the moral unity of the love and law of God—atonement; (6) those who accept Jesus as divine Lord and Savior constitute a community in special relation with God—church; and (7) such persons may have the hope of victory over death and entrance into the Kingdom of God—resurrection and eternal life. These elements have remained, in spite of the different forms that have been given to them by the social minds, and will remain, whatever forms they may yet take under the changing theories of life and of the world, as the eternal constituents of the content of the Christian religion; and thus Christianity can be differentiated from other religions.

U. K.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

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- Eisfeldt, Otto. *Israels Geschichte.* (Praktische Bibelerklärung. VI. Reihe der "Religionsgeschichtlichen Volksbücher.") Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. 51 pages. M. o. 50.
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NEW TESTAMENT

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- Carré, Henry B. *Paul's Doctrine of Redemption.* New York: Macmillan, 1914. xii+175 pages. \$1.25.
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- Murray, J. O. F. (ed.). *The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Ephesians.* (Cambridge Greek Testament.) Cambridge: University Press, 1914. ciii+150 pages. 3s. 6d.
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- Parsons, Ernest W. *A Historical Examination of Some Non-Markan Elements in Luke.* (Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature Related to the New Testament, Second Series, Vol. II, Part 6.) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1914. 80 pages. \$0.50.
- Plummer, A. (ed.). *The Gospel according to St. Mark.* (Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges.) Cambridge: University Press, 1914. lvi+392 pages. 4s. 6d.

- Schaeffer, William C. *The Supreme Revelation*. New York: Revell, 1914. 316 pages. \$1.50.
- Wicks, Henry J. *The Doctrine of God in the Jewish Apocryphal and Apocalyptic Literature*. London: Hunter & Longhurst, 1915. xi+371 pages. 10s.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Hitchcock, F. R. *Montgomery. Irenaeus of Lugdunum. A Study of His Teaching*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. 373 pages. 9s.
- Locke, John. *Reasonableness of Christianity*. (Vernünftigkeit des biblischen Christentums, 1695.) Übersetzt von Prof. Dr. T. Winckler in Berlin. Mit einer Einleitung herausgegeben von Prof. Lic. Leopold Zscharnack. Gies- sen: A. Töpelman, 1914. lxvi+140 pages. M. 5.
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- Mason, A. J. *The Church of England and Episcopacy*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. ix+560 pages. \$2.50.
- Mitchell, Anthony. *Biographical Studies in Scottish Church History*. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co., 1914. vi+301 pages. \$1.50.
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- Clark, Henry W. *Liberal Orthodoxy*. New York: Scribner, 1914. xi+313 pages. \$2.00.
- Clark, W. C. *The Christian Faith. A Handbook of Christian Teaching*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1915. 347 pages. \$1.50.
- Hodges, George. *The Episcopal Church. Its Faith and Order*. New York: Macmillan, 1915. vii+204 pages. \$1.25.
- Holmes, John Haynes. *Is Death the End?* New York: Putnam, 1915. xv+383 pages. \$1.50.
- Lucas, Bernard. *The Faith of a Christian*. New York: Macmillan, 1914. vi+216 pages. 1s.
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- Muir, P. McAdam. *Modern Substitutes for Christianity*. New York: George H. Doran & Co., 1914. viii+266 pages. \$0.50.
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- Temple, William. *The Faith and Modern Thought*. New York: Macmillan, 1914. vi+172 pages. 2s. 6d.
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- Marett, R. R. *The Threshold of Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1914. xxxii+224 pages. \$1.50.
- Nilsson-Lund, Martin P. *Die volkstümlichen Feste des Jahres. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher herausgegeben von Friedrich Michael Schiele)*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. 75 pages. M. 1.30.
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DOCTRINAL

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PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

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- Campbell, James M. *The Place of Prayer in the Christian Religion*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1914. 303 pages. \$1.00.
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CHRISTIANITY AND WAR—A HISTORICAL SKETCH

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In view of Jesus' emphasis on brotherly love and his teaching of the principle of non-resistance, in the Sermon on the Mount, it would seem as if it might fairly have been expected that his followers would condemn war and pronounce it un-Christian. As a matter of fact few of them have done so.

Primitive Christian literature contains no explicit statement of the Christian attitude toward war,¹ but the account of the centurion Cornelius, in Acts, chaps. 10 and 11, seems to show that the author of Acts saw no incompatibility between Christianity and the profession of arms; and Paul's words in Rom. 13:1 indicate that at least the use of the sword by the constituted authorities for the punishment of evildoers was not disapproved by him. Whether the principle of submission to rulers enunciated by Paul in this passage and his advice to Christians to abide in the same calling wherein they were called (I Cor. 7:20) mean that he regarded war as consistent with Christianity and the career of a soldier legitimate for a Christian disciple we cannot tell. It must be remembered that military service was not compulsory in the Roman empire and that Paul was expecting the speedy end of the world;

¹ For a discussion of the attitude of the early Christians toward war see Harnack, *Militia Christi* (1905), and the essay by Pierre Batiffol in the volume entitled *L'Église et la guerre* (1913).

so that the problem of the relation of Christianity and war may not have been thrust upon his attention.

We get no further light upon our subject until nearly the middle of the second century, when Justin Martyr, in his *First Apology*, after quoting Isaiah's prophecy of the time when men shall beat their swords into plowshares, says:

That this has come to pass you may convince yourselves. For from Jerusalem there went out into the world twelve men, uneducated and without eloquence, but by the power of God they proclaimed to every race of men that they were sent by Christ to teach to all the word of God, and we who formerly murdered one another now not only do not make war upon our enemies, but that we may not lie or deceive our judges we gladly die confessing Christ.²

Again, in his *Dialogue with Trypho*, he says:

We who were filled with war and mutual slaughter and every wickedness have each of us in all the world changed our weapons of war—swords into plows and spears into agricultural implements—and we cultivate piety, righteousness, philanthropy, faith, and hope which we have from the Father himself through the Crucified.³

Justin's words might be taken to mean that Christians would have nothing to do with war and consequently kept out of the army; but he seems rather to have had in mind the personal relations of Christians with their neighbors. Their attitude toward their fellows, and in persecution toward their judges, revealed the spirit of peace, going even to the length of non-resistance. The interpretation of martyrdom as an expression of the Christian principle of peaceable submission to injury was very common among the early Christians.

By Irenaeus³ the same prophecy of Isaiah is referred to and it is then said:

But if the law of liberty, that is the word of God preached to the whole world by the apostles who went forth from Jerusalem, has caused so great a transformation that they have made their swords and war lances into plows and have changed them into sickles for reaping grain—that is, into instruments of peace—and are now ignorant how to fight, and when smitten turn also the other cheek, the prophets have said these things not of someone else but of Him who has accomplished them.

² Chap. 39.

³ Chap. 110.

³ *Adversus Haereses*, iv, 34, 4.

Whether it is to be concluded from these passages that Justin and Irenaeus would have condemned war in all circumstances and would have regarded Christianity and the profession of arms as necessarily incompatible, at any rate it was recognized in their time that it was a common practice among Christians to frown upon war and to refrain from going into the army as well as from engaging in many other public employments, as is shown by the fact that the heathen Celsus (177-80 A.D.) had to exhort the Christians "to labor with the emperor to maintain justice, to fight for him, and under him, and to bear command in his armies."¹

With this exhortation may be compared the Christian apologist Tatian's *Address to the Greeks* (chap. 11), where military command is classed with political authority, wealth, fame, and the like as things not desired by the author, the implication being, not that the military profession is bad in itself or worse than the other things mentioned, but that they are matters of indifference to the Christian whose mind is set on things above.

By the second-century heresiarch Marcion a sharp contrast was drawn between the God of the Jews—a God of justice and severity—and the God of the Christians—a God of pure love and mercy who punishes nobody. As a consequence of the difference between them Marcion rejected altogether the Jewish God and the Old Testament in which He was revealed. Whether he drew the natural conclusion that it was unlawful for Christians to engage in war we are not informed; but it is worth noticing that the retention of the Old Testament by the Christian church and the recognition of it as authoritative undoubtedly tended to keep alive the Old Testament conception of God as a God of War and to make more difficult the consistent repudiation of all war by the Christian church.

The earliest explicit discussion of the relation of Christianity and war is found in the writings of Tertullian. In his tract *On Idolatry* he says:

There is no agreement between the divine and the human oath, between the standard of Christ and the standard of the devil, the camp of light and the camp of darkness. One soul cannot serve two masters, God and Caesar. . . .

¹ Origen, *Contra Celsum*, viii, 73.

But how will a Christian make war? Nay, how will he serve as a soldier, even in peace, without a sword which the Lord has taken away? For although soldiers came to John and received a rule to govern their actions, and even though a centurion believed, the Lord afterward in disarming Peter disarmed every soldier.¹

He argues the matter at still greater length in his *De corona militis*, adding the further consideration that the profession of the soldier involves a man in idolatrous practices which are wholly opposed to Christianity. Tertullian's opposition to military service on the part of Christians was thus due, not simply to the fighting and killing involved in it, but also and apparently chiefly to its worldliness. He condemned it, as he did many other employments, because it meant a divided allegiance.

Tertullian of course was an extremist, and his teaching in the matter is not necessarily representative of the Christian sentiment of his age. In fact it would seem from his failure to refer to earlier cases in support of his contention that he recognized his rigorism as something new. But he did not stand alone. A generation later Origen, in reply to Celsus' exhortation to the Christians, already referred to, declared that they would help the emperor in many ways, particularly by their piety and their prayers; but that they would not fight under him even though he required it of them.² In the same connection Origen intimated that there might be just wars, but even so Christians did not take part in them, but like the heathen priests, who were not expected to engage in war, they prayed for the army fighting righteously and for the emperor ruling righteously, "that all things opposed and hostile to those doing righteously might be destroyed."³

His contemporary Cyprian called war murder,⁴ and Lactantius some sixty years later denounced it in the severest possible terms, basing his condemnation upon the sixth commandment.

When God forbids us to kill he not only prohibits murder, which is not permitted even by civil law, but he warns also against things esteemed legitimate among men. Thus it will not be lawful for a just man, whose armor is righteousness, to engage in war, nor to accuse anyone of a capital crime, for it makes no difference whether you slay by the sword or by a word, because

¹ Chap. 19.

² Cf. also *Contra Celsum*, v, 33; iv, 82, and i, 1.

³ *Contra Celsum*, viii, 73.

⁴ *Ad Donatum*, chap. 6.

killing itself is forbidden. Therefore in this precept of God no exception whatever ought to be made, but it is always wrong to kill a man whom God willed to be a sacrosanct being.¹

In an earlier chapter of the same work² Lactantius eloquently defended the principle of non-resistance, contrasting his own position with that of Cicero, who countenanced retaliation but not unprovoked injury.

With Lactantius' words may be compared the utterance of a contemporary, Arnobius, in his work *Against the Heathen*³ in which he claimed that the coming of Christ, who taught that evil ought not to be requited with evil and that it is better to suffer than to inflict wrong, had tended to decrease war and promote peace.

On the other hand, in spite of the theory to which these Fathers gave expression and which perhaps was widely acted upon, there were Christians who took a different position. Tertullian had to argue the case against those who quoted Bible texts in defense of the profession of arms, and we know that there were many Christians in the Roman armies of the day. Tertullian himself bears witness to the fact, as for instance in his *Apology*, where he says: "We are but of yesterday, yet we fill every place among you,—cities, islands, fortresses, towns, marketplaces, and even the camp."⁴ And again: "We sail with you and fight with you and till the ground with you."⁵ And Clement of Alexandria, addressing Christian soldiers, says: "Has knowledge laid hold upon you while engaged in military service? Hearken to the commander who orders what is right."⁶

Clement's words suggest that while Christians may not often have adopted the military profession they did not always think it necessary to abandon it when converted, very likely appealing in that case to Paul's advice to his readers to abide in the same calling wherein they were called. The more rigorous Tertullian, on the other hand, in his *De corona militis*,⁷ although he recognizes that the soldier who becomes a Christian is in different case from the

¹ *Divine Institutes*, vi, 20, 15 f.; cf. also i, 18; v, 17.

² vi, 18.

³ i, 6.

⁴ Chap. 37.

⁵ Chap. 42.

⁶ *Cohortatio* 10 (Migne, "Patrologia Graeca," Vol. VIII, col. 216).

⁷ Chap. 11.

Christian who becomes a soldier, yet advises the former to abandon the military career if converted to Christianity, because otherwise he will get into all sorts of difficulties and be obliged to resort to practices unbecoming a Christian.

The presence of Christians in the army in the middle of the third century is testified to by Dionysius of Alexandria,¹ and in the time of Diocletian there were large numbers of Christian soldiers, as is evident from the testimony both of Lactantius² and Eusebius³ and still more from the action of the emperor Constantine in recognizing the God of the Christians at the battle of the Milvian Bridge in 311. This act marked an epoch in the development of Christian thought upon the subject of war. It was believed by the Christians that Constantine was fighting as the champion of Christianity against heathenism, and his victory was ascribed to God, who was thenceforth widely recognized as a God of war like the Jewish Yahweh. Eusebius' account of the victory is very instructive:

Constantine, who was the superior both in dignity and imperial rank, first took compassion upon those who were oppressed at Rome, and having invoked in prayer the God of heaven and his Word and Jesus Christ himself, the Savior of all, as his aid, advanced with his whole army, proposing to restore to the Romans their ancestral liberty. But Maxentius, putting confidence rather in the arts of sorcery than in the devotion of his subjects, did not dare to go forth beyond the gates of the city, but fortified every place and district and town which was enslaved by him in the neighborhood of Rome and in all Italy with an immense multitude of troops and with innumerable bands of soldiers. But the Emperor, relying upon the assistance of God, attacked the first, second, and third army of the tyrant and conquered them all; and having advanced through the greater part of Italy was already very near Rome. Then, that he might not be compelled to wage war with the Romans for the sake of the tyrant, God himself drew the latter, as if bound in chains, some distance without the gates. . . . Thus, as in the time of Moses himself and of the ancient God-beloved race of Hebrews "he cast Pharaoh's chariots and hosts into the sea and overwhelmed their chosen fighters in the Red Sea and covered them with the flood," in the same way Maxentius also with his soldiers

¹ In Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, vi, 41, 22; vii, 11, 20; cf. also *ibid.*, vii, 15, and Cyprian, *Ep.* 39.

² *De mortibus persecutorum*, 10.

³ *Hist. Eccl.*, viii, 1 and 4; cf. also the three martyrologies printed by Harnack, *Militia Christi*, pp. 114 ff.

and bodyguards went down into the depths like a stone, when he fled before the power of God which was with Constantine.¹

Similarly, in Licinius' campaign against the persecutor Maximin a couple of years later the conviction that the Christian God was warring against the gods of the heathen inspired the Christian soldiers.² Finally, when Constantine and Licinius broke with each other, and the latter, recognizing Constantine's greater popularity with the Christians, altered his policy and attempted by showing them disfavor to rally pagan sentiment in his own support, Constantine seemed once more to the Christians to be waging a holy war in defense of Christianity. In the words of Eusebius, "God was the friend, protector, and guardian of Constantine"; and when Licinius "determined to wage war with Constantine he also proceeded to join battle with the God of the universe, whom he knew that Constantine worshiped." The result was inevitable. God prospered Constantine and his son Crispus "in the battle in all things according to their wish."³

From this time on the Christian church supported the imperial wars and strengthened the hands of the emperor just as Constantine had counted upon its doing. The old notion of the inconsistency of Christianity and war appeared now and again. There is a suggestion of it, for instance, in a letter of Basil the Great to Amphilochius, where it is said: "Murder committed in war our fathers did not count as murder, excusing those, I suppose, who fought in temperance and piety. But perhaps it is well to counsel that those whose hands are not clean should abstain from communion for three years."⁴

In general, however, the common opinion of the legitimacy of war, current in the Roman world of the day, seems to have been shared by the Christians too. Athanasius, for instance, after speaking of marriage in a letter to a monk, goes on to say: "For also in connection with other things which are done in life we shall find discrimination necessary, as for instance it is not permitted to kill, but in war to slay the enemy is both legitimate and worthy of

¹ *Hist. Eccl.*, ix, 9.

² *Hist. Eccl.*, x, 8, 6 f.; 9, 4.

³ See Lactantius, *De mortibus persecutorum*, 46.

⁴ *Ep.* 128, § 13.

all praise."² In the fourth century *Apostolic Constitutions*, although it is required that many employments, such as that of the maker of idols, the actor, the gamester, and the professional musician, must be abandoned before a person can be admitted to the church, it is said of the soldier only that he must do no injustice, must accuse no one falsely, and must be content with his wages.³ The great Bishop Ambrose also, in his work *On the Duties of the Clergy*, while recognizing that the study of war seemed foreign to the clergy, for they had to do rather with the soul than with the body,⁴ yet added: "Our fathers, however, such as Joshua the son of Nun, Jerubbaal, Samson, and David, won the highest glory also in war." And in another passage he declared that "courage which in war defends one's country against the barbarians, or at home protects the weak or one's friends from robbers, is full of justice."⁵ And again: "He who does not ward off injury from a friend, if he be able, is as much at fault as he who causes it."⁶

Augustine,⁶ in spite of his theory of the two states, which it might have been expected would lead him to condemn Christian participation in war as involving allegiance to the God of this world, justified it in the most explicit terms and set the fashion for official Christian opinion from that day to this. In his work against Faustus the Manichean, who had criticized the Old Testament among other things because of the wars it represented the Israelites as carrying on at the express command of God, Augustine discussed the question of war at considerable length. The following passages make his position clear:

What is the evil in war? Is it that men who are to die anyway die that the victors may live in peace? To complain of this is the part of the timid, not the religious. Love of doing harm, cruelty in taking vengeance, an angry and implacable temper, violent insurrection, the desire to rule, and the like—these are rightly to be blamed in war, and they are usually and justly punished when against those who resist with force war is waged by the good at the command either of God or of some other legitimate authority.

² *Ep. ad Amunem* (Migne, "Pat. Gr.," Vol. XXVI, col. 1173).

³ *Ap. Const.*, viii, 31 (ed. Lagarde, p. 268).

⁴ i, 35.

⁵ i, 27.

⁶ i, 36.

⁶ For Augustine's attitude see the essay by P. Monceaux in the volume already referred to, *L'Eglise et la guerre*.

After quoting Luke 3:14; Matt. 22:21 and 8:9 f. in support of the lawfulness of war, he continues:

It depends on the reasons for which men undertake war and the authority by which they do it. The natural order fitted to promote the peace of men demands that the prince should have authority to wage war and the right to decide in the matter, and that the soldiers should serve the common peace and safety by obeying the command to fight. Moreover, it is not to be doubted that a war undertaken by the command of God for terrifying or crushing or subduing the pride of men is right, since not even a war caused by human cupidity is able to harm the incorruptible God, or his saints, to whom it serves rather for the exercise of patience, for the humbling of the soul, and for the bearing of paternal discipline. . . . But if it be thought impossible that God can have commanded war, because afterward Jesus Christ said "I say unto you, resist not evil; but if anyone smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the left also," it should be understood that this refers not to the body but to the heart.¹

A few years later a friend having brought to his attention a criticism passed upon Christianity because of its doctrine of non-resistance, Augustine replied:

These precepts of patience should always be retained in readiness of heart, and the benevolence which does not return evil for evil should always be fulfilled in the will. But many things must be done in correcting with a certain benignant severity, even against their will, those whose profit we ought to consult rather than their wishes. Their writings have most excellently praised this in the ruler of a state, for in correcting a son, however sternly, the paternal love surely is by no means lost. Yet that is done which is received unwillingly and in pain by him whom it seems necessary to heal even against his will by pain. And on this principle if this earthly commonwealth keep the Christian precepts even its wars will not be carried on without benevolence, that a peaceful union of piety and justice may be the more easily resolved upon by the vanquished. . . . When God destroys the support of the wicked and makes impotent the lusts of the wealthy he does it in mercy, for in mercy, if it were possible, even wars might be waged by the good, that licentious desires might be tamed and those vices abolished which under a just government ought to be either extirpated or suppressed. For if Christian discipline condemned all wars, the soldiers who sought counsel concerning salvation would have been told in the gospel that they should throw away their arms and retire altogether from military service. But it was said to them, "Do violence to no man, accuse no one falsely, and be content with your wages." Those certainly who are commanded to be content with their wages are not forbidden to

¹ Book xxii, §§ 74-76 (Vienna ed., Vol. XXV, pp. 572 f.); see also *De civ. Dei*, iv, 15; xix, 12 f.

be soldiers. Accordingly let those who say that the teaching of Christ is opposed to the good of the commonwealth provide an army of such soldiers as the teaching of Christ requires. Let them provide such subjects, husbands, wives, parents, children, masters, servants, kings, judges, finally such taxpayers and collectors, as the Christian doctrine demands, and let them dare to say that it is opposed to the good of the commonwealth, or rather let them hesitate to confess that if they were to obey it it would be a great safety to the commonwealth.¹

Again in a letter to Count Boniface,² the Christian governor of North Africa, whose conscience was troubling him because he was obliged to engage in war against the Vandals, Augustine encouraged him with the assurance that Christianity was not opposed to military service³ and with a reference to the example of David, of Cornelius, and of the centurion whose faith was commended by Christ. He insisted at the same time that war should be waged only as a necessity and for the sake of peace, that mercy should be shown to the conquered and to captives, and that faith should be kept with enemies as well as with friends. This did not prevent him from defending the use of strategems in war, for in his *Questions on the Heptateuch*, in referring to God's command that Joshua should set an ambush, he said: "When one undertakes a just war, whether one conquers by an open fight or by snares does not affect justice."⁴ In the same connection he defined a just war as one undertaken to avenge injury, as when a state neglects to make amends for a wrong done by its citizens or to restore property unjustly taken, and also any war entered upon at the command of God, who in this case is the real leader of the army, while the people are to be regarded, not as the authors of the war, but as the agents of God. It is important to notice in this connection that Augustine did not confine just wars to defensive wars only, but recognized the legitimacy also of offensive wars, if they were undertaken for purposes of vengeance. He thus made it possible, by setting the fashion for the theologians who came after him, for Christian princes to invoke the authority of religion in justification of many wars of very doubtful character.

¹ *Ep.* 138 (*ad Marcellinum*) §§ 14, 15 (Vienna edition, Vol. XLIV, pp. 139 f.).

² *Ep.* 189.

³ § 4; cf. *De civ. Dei*, i, 21.

⁴ vi, 10 (Vienna ed., Vol. XXVIII, p. 428).

In the *Decretum Gratiani* of the twelfth century the following passage is quoted and ascribed to a lost work of Augustine's entitled *De diversis ecclesiae observationibus*: "Among the true worshipers of God even wars themselves are peaceful which are carried on not from cupidity but with the desire for peace, that the wicked may be restrained and the good supported."¹

Two centuries after Augustine, Isidore of Seville distinguished just and unjust wars in the following words:

A just war is one undertaken with the purpose of securing redress or for the sake of repelling an enemy. An unjust war is one begun from passion without a legitimate reason, concerning which Cicero says in the *Republic*: "Those are unjust wars which are undertaken without cause." For there can be no just war except for the purpose of punishing or repelling an enemy.²

The attitude of Augustine and Isidore was taken by the leading theologians and ecclesiastics of the Middle Ages, Augustine's authority controlling in this matter as in many others. In his *Speculum Animae*³ Bonaventura says:

But in regard to war we must notice that three things are particularly required for a just war, namely, the authority of the prince; as Augustine said in his work *Against Faustus*: "Authority for beginning war and the decision concerning it belong to the prince"; likewise a just cause; as Augustine said: "Wars are just which avenge injuries"; thirdly, a right intention; as Augustine said in his work *De verbis Domini*: "By worshipers of God wars are not waged with cruelty or cupidity."⁴

The discussion of the matter in Thomas Aquinas' *Summa* has remained standard ever since in the Roman Catholic church. In Part II, ii, Question 40, Article I, Thomas says:

There are three requisites for a war to be just. The first is the authority of the prince by whose command the war is to be waged. For it does not belong to a private person to start a war, because he can prosecute his claim in the

¹ *Decretum Gratiani*, pars II, causa 23, quest. 1, c. 6; in Friedberg's edition of the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, Vol. I, p. 855. At the end of question 1, after giving a number of quotations upon the subject from Augustine and others, Gratian concludes: "From all these it may be gathered that war is not sinful and that the precepts of patience are to be kept not externally but in the heart."

² *Etymologiae*, xviii, 1 (Migne, "Pat. Gr.," Vol. LXXXII, 639).

³ Chap. 1.

⁴ See also Abelard's *Sic et Non*, chap. 156, where an interesting quotation upon the subject is given from Pope Nicholas.

court of a superior. In like manner the mustering of the people that has to be done in war does not belong to a private person. But since the care of the commonwealth is intrusted to princes, to them belongs the protection of the common weal of the city, kingdom, or province subject to them. And as they lawfully defend it with the material sword against inward disturbances by punishing malefactors, so it belongs to them also to protect the commonwealth from enemies without by the sword of war. The second requisite is a just cause, so that they who are assailed should deserve to be assailed for some fault that they have committed. The third thing requisite is a right intention of promoting good or avoiding evil.

To the objection from the text that all that take the sword shall perish with the sword, it is to be said, as Augustine says, that he takes the sword who without either command or grant of any superior or lawful authority arms himself to shed the blood of another. But he who uses the sword by the authority of a prince or judge (if he is a private person), or out of zeal for justice, as it were by the authority of God (if he is a public person), does not take the sword of himself, but uses it as committed to him by another.

To the objection from the text, "I say to you not to resist evil," it is to be said, as Augustine says, that such precepts are always to be observed "in readiness of heart, so that a man be ever ready not to resist, if there be occasion for non-resistance." But sometimes he must take another course, in view of the common good, or even in view of those with whom he fights.¹

Again, in Art. III Thomas says:

Is it lawful in war to use stratagems? The end of stratagems is to deceive the enemy. Now there are two ways of deceiving in word or deed. One way is by telling lies and breaking promises. This is always illegitimate, and no one ought to deceive the enemy in this way; for "there are certain laws of war, and agreements to be observed even among enemies," as Ambrose says. In another way one may be deceived by the fact that we do not open our purpose or declare our mind to him. That we are not always bound to do. Even in sacred doctrine many things are to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, that they may not scoff at them, according to the text, "Give not what is holy to dogs." Much more are our preparations to attack our enemies to be hidden from them. Such concealment belongs to the nature of stratagems, which it is lawful to use in just wars.

Again, in discussing the question, Can there be a religious order destined for military service? Thomas says:

To the text "I say to you not to resist evil," it is to be said that there are two ways of not resisting evil: one way by forgiving the wrong done to oneself,

¹ I have used Rickaby's abridged translation in his *Aquinas Ethicus*, Vol. I, pp. 407 ff., making a few minor corrections and omitting some passages quoted by Thomas from Augustine.

and that may be a point of perfection, when it is expedient so to behave for the salvation of others; the other way is by patiently enduring the injuries done to others, and that is an imperfect and even a vicious course, if one can well resist the wrongdoer. . . . Our Lord says in the same place: "Of him that taketh away thy goods ask them not again"; and yet if one were not to ask back the goods belonging to others when they were his concern to keep, that would be sinful: for a man may laudably give away his own, but not another's. Much less are the interests of God to be neglected.¹

The article on war in the *Catholic Encyclopaedia* presents the matter in very careful shape. According to that article, a nation has the right to go to war, first, if menaced by foreign aggression; secondly, if its rights are actually violated by a foreign power, and it cannot secure redress without war; and, thirdly, if future security demands the punishment of the threatening or infringing nation. It may also be justified in going to war at the request of another state which is in peril, or to stop the oppression of the innocent. On the other hand, the mere advantage of the nation itself, for instance the promotion of its trade or the enlargement of its territory, the need of exercising its standing army or reconciling the people to the tax for its maintenance, or the desire to escape internal revolution, is not an adequate justification of war.

The article insists still further that war is the last resort and should not be entered upon until other means of attaining the desired end have failed. It also takes the position that any damage may be inflicted which promotes the accomplishment of the purpose of the war, but not wanton and useless damage; while actions intrinsically immoral, such as lying, assassination, the killing of non-combatants, and the like, are unconditionally forbidden.

The article is based throughout upon what the author calls natural law, the position being taken that natural law has been reinforced, not abrogated, by Christianity, and still governs all the dealings of men with men and nations with nations. In this the article is true to Catholic tradition. Ever since Irenaeus first clearly formulated the principle in the second century, it has been held by the Catholic church that Christ did away with the ceremonial law of the Jews, but not with the moral law, which was written upon the hearts of men from the beginning and was restated

¹ Question 188, Art. III; Rickaby, Vol. II, p. 431.; see also Questions 41, 42, 64.

in the Decalogue. Instead of abrogating this law, Christianity emphasized and sharpened it, and the Christian law is nothing but this permanent natural law, whose essence is love for God and man. As this law is the same both in Old Testament and New, its precepts, as, for instance, the precept "Thou shalt not kill," are to be interpreted in the light of the pre-Christian as well as the Christian revelation. And hence as war was approved by God under the old dispensation, when the natural law, which is identical with the Christian law, was already in force, the commands, "Thou shalt not kill" and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," are not to be understood under Christianity any more than under Judaism as forbidding war. In other words, all that Catholic ethics undertakes to do for nations and for the rank and file of men is to reaffirm the principles of natural morality.

On the other hand, in its evangelical counsels intended for the spiritual élite of the church, its monks and clerics, the common standard is raised, and among the other employments from which such persons are supposed to abstain is military service. This was decreed in the seventh canon of the Council of Chalcedon, of 451, and a similar prohibition was adopted by many other councils, both early and late, though it was often disregarded, especially in the Middle Ages.¹

The principle governing the prohibition was not that war is inherently bad, but that, like many other employments permitted to the laity, it is worldly in character and as such not meet for those set apart for spiritual affairs. In the words of Thomas Aquinas: "It is not forbidden them to fight because it is a sin, but because such an exercise is not congruous with their person."²

In the earlier Middle Ages the evils of war were widely felt, for, in the absence of strong governments, fighting was going on much of the time between the feudal lords of the day. As a consequence, while the legitimacy of war was generally recognized by the authorities of the church, frequent efforts were made by them to limit its

¹ See Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*, 2d ed., II, 45, 79, 88, 511, 705; IV, 115; V, 222. See also the *Decretum Gratiani*, xxiii, 8, 6 (p. 954), where it is said that clerics are not to fight, but may exhort others to do so (cf. *ibid.*, xxiii, 8, 19).

² *Summa*, II, ii, Qu. 4, Art. 2.

extent and mitigate its evils. The popes often employed their good offices to bring about peace, for instance by acting as mediators; and in the eleventh century, in a number of dioceses in France and later in Germany, peace leagues were formed which had considerable influence. The so-called "Peace of God" was also repeatedly proclaimed by bishops and councils, making it a mortal sin to attack monks, clerics, pilgrims, peasants, women, and other non-combatants and defenseless persons, or to profane churches and other sacred places by conflict and bloodshed.

Similarly in the so-called "Truce of God" the effort was made to limit war by reducing the number of days on which it was lawful to fight. At first the prohibition covered Saturday and Sunday. Later it was commonly made to include Thursday and Friday as well as certain feast days and the whole of Advent and Lent. The prohibition was not intended to interfere with the right of kings to make war at any time, but only to limit the constant strife which was going on between feudal lords and their retainers.¹ The efforts met with but a limited success, and only with the growth of the royal power in the thirteenth and following centuries were private wars finally put an end to.

Although in the ways indicated the church did something in the Middle Ages to limit the ravages of war, it also directly contributed to war by promoting the Crusades and by sanctioning the suppression of heretics. There was developed during this period, and supported by the church, the notion of a holy war against unbelievers—a notion practically identical with that of the Mohammedans. Thus in the *Decretum Gratiani* (causa 23, quest. 5, c. 46) it is said: "Whoever dies in battle waged against the infidels obtains the Kingdom of Heaven" (*Corpus*, p. 944).²

The idea had already been employed in connection with wars against the Saracens, for instance by Popes Leo IV and John VIII in the ninth century. The latter said: "We confidently reply that

¹ See the documents quoted by Robinson, *Readings in European History*, I, 187 ff., and by Henderson, *Select Documents of the Middle Ages*, pp. 208 ff.

² Cf. causa 23, quest. 8, c. 9 (*Corpus*, p. 955), and also the utterances of Popes Urban II, Eugene III, and Innocent III, quoted by Thatcher and McNeal, *Source Book for Mediaeval History*, pp. 517, 528, 543.

those who out of love to the Christian religion shall die in battle fighting bravely against pagans or unbelievers shall receive eternal life."¹

A similar attitude was taken in the Middle Ages in connection with heretics. Into the history of the persecution of heretics it is impossible to enter here. It may simply be said that during the first three centuries it was usually believed among the Christians, as was quite natural in the circumstances, that religious opinion should be left entirely free and that no compulsion should be exercised in connection with it. The following words of Lactantius are representative:

For religion is to be defended, not by killing, but by dying, not by cruelty, but by patience, not by wickedness, but by faith. . . . For if you wish to defend religion by blood, by torments, by evil, it will not be defended, but polluted and violated. For nothing is so voluntary an affair as religion, in which, if the mind of the worshiper is averse to it, it is already destroyed and is no religion.²

But under the emperor Theodosius the Christian state began to proceed against heretics with some vigor, and heresy was even made a capital crime.³ Augustine, after at first opposing the suppression of heresy by force, later advocated it because he saw how efficacious it had proved in his own town of Hippo.⁴ But he urged the civil authorities not to inflict the death penalty, because the aim of all persecution must be, not simply to prevent the spread of heresy, but also to convert the heretic.⁵ In the Middle Ages, however, not only were heretics frequently put to death, but the practice was justified by leading theologians on the same ground as war, that is, that evildoers might be punished and the state protected against them.⁶

The attitude of the Catholics toward war has been taken by most Protestants as well. In Luther's famous tract of 1526, *Ob Kriegsleute auch im seligen Stande sein können*,⁷ he defended in

¹ Thatcher and McNeal, pp. 511 f.

² See the *Theodosian Code*, xvi, Tit. 5 f.

³ *Divine Institutes*, v, 19.

⁴ Cf. *Epistle* 93, 17 (to Vincentius).

⁵ Cf. *Epistle* 100 (to Donatus), 133 (to Marcellinus), and 139 (*ibid.*); on the other side Optatus, *De Schismate Donatistarum*, iii, 7.

⁶ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, II, ii, Qu. 11, Art. 3; and *Decretales Gregorii IX*, iv, Tit. 7 (*Corpus Juris Canonici*, Vol. II, pp. 778 f.).

⁷ Erlangen edition of his works, XXII, 244-90.

his usual picturesque style the traditional position, urging both Scripture and common-sense in its support. The work was written in response to the query whether a Christian could give himself with a good conscience to the military profession. Luther answers the question in the affirmative, appealing to the passage in Luke so often quoted by the Fathers, and he defends also the custom of hiring one's self out as a soldier to foreign commanders, provided it does not interfere with one's duty to one's own country and is not based on mere greed. A just war undertaken for the punishment of evildoers, or for the preservation of peace, is to be approved on the same ground as a surgical operation, and we must look at it with the eyes of men, not with the eyes of children who see only the immediate evil. The prince is intrusted "with the sword, not with a fox's tail," and he is under obligation to use it against the wicked. War is put by Luther on the same footing as the punishment of criminals by the constituted authorities, and the one is justified as well as the other.¹ Wars are of three kinds: The first is a war waged by the people against their rulers. This Luther condemns unconditionally and in any and all circumstances. Subjects have no right to rebel against their rulers, however tyrannical they may be. The people need curbing, and it is better for their tyrants to do them wrong a hundred times than for them to do their tyrants wrong once. It is better for the people to suffer for their rulers than their rulers for them. On the other hand, war between independent princes or separate states is legitimate, provided it be undertaken for a just cause, that is, provided it be a defensive war. Offensive wars are to be unqualifiedly condemned. "We must discriminate," Luther says, "between a war begun voluntarily and gladly and a war into which one is driven by need and compulsion after being attacked by another. The former may be called a war of pleasure; the latter a war of necessity. The first belongs to the devil—may God not prosper it! The other is man's misfortune—God grant his help!"² A third kind of war is that undertaken by princes against their subjects, when the latter rise in rebellion or stir up sedition. This too is justified if it be carried on in the fear of God and with a righteous purpose.

¹ Cf. also his *Von weltlicher Oberkeit* of 1523.

² P. 273.

Taking up the question of the duty of subjects to their princes when commanded by the latter to fight, Luther declares that if they know beyond a peradventure that the war is unrighteous they should refuse to engage in it, but otherwise they should obey as in all other matters.

We are here, they should say, in the service of our prince and in fulfilment of our duty to him, for we are bound by God's will and order to support our lord with body and goods. Although in the sight of God we are miserable sinners as well as our enemies, nevertheless because we know, or, at any rate, have no knowledge to the contrary, that our prince is right in this affair, and are therefore sure and certain that we are serving God himself in such service and obedience, let every one of us be fresh and undismayed and realize that his fist is God's fist, his spear God's spear, and cry with heart and mouth "Hail to God and the Emperor! If God gives us the victory, the honor and glory shall be his, not ours."¹

In his sermons on the First Book of Moses, published in 1527,² Luther defended the wars of extermination recounted in Genesis on the ground that they were commanded by God. Whatever God commands must be done, even if it violate our own sense of right. "If God demands of me that I beat my neighbor, I must do it."³

Many lofty people are offended at such accounts, when they consider them in the light of the reason. But the reason is blind and foolish and cannot do otherwise in dealing with God than suggest to him what is excellent and good; and one must do as it says. This God cannot suffer, and so he often prepares such a deed, and will have it done in order to blind the reason. Hence he says, believe me and have no regard for the nature of the deed, whatever it is, but when I command it, do it.⁴

Finally, in his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, he interpreted Christ's precept, "Resist not evil" in the following way:

But you say: Yes, but Christ has said in clear words, Resist not evil. That sounds plain, as if it were surely forbidden. Answer: Yes, but see with whom he is talking. He doesn't say evil is never to be resisted, for that would put an end to all rule and authority. But he says: You, you shall not do it. Who is this You? The disciples of Christ, whom he teaches how to live by themselves apart from civil government. For to be a Christian, as has been abundantly shown, is another thing than to have a worldly office or position. Therefore he intends to say: Let him that is in the civil government withstand the evildoer and judge and punish him as the jurists and laws teach. To you,

¹ P. 285.² Erlangen ed., XXXIII, 286 f.³ P. 286.⁴ P. 288.

however, as my disciples, whom I teach not how to rule but how to live before God, I say, Resist not evil, but endure everything, and have a pure friendly heart toward those who do you wrong or violence.¹

In his *Institutes*, Calvin took in general the same position that Luther took on the subject of war. And in his commentaries on the Gospels he interpreted the utterances of Christ which pointed in another direction in the traditional way as inculcating only the spirit of love and forgiveness and not an attitude of non-resistance, either for individuals or for states. The following sentences may be quoted from the final edition of the *Institutes*:

To hurt and to destroy are incompatible with the character of the godly, but to avenge the afflictions of the godly at the command of God is neither to destroy nor hurt.² If it be objected that in the New Testament there is no precept or example which teaches that war is lawful to Christians, I answer, first, that the reason for waging war which existed in ancient times is valid also today, and that, on the contrary, there is no reason which should prevent rulers from defending their subjects. Secondly, that no express declaration on this subject is to be expected in the writings of the apostles, whose design was not to organize a state but to establish the spiritual kingdom of Christ. Lastly, that it is there also implied that Christ by his coming made no change in this matter.³

There was evidently no difference of principle between the reformers and the Roman Catholic authorities: the spirit of the gospel, it was believed, has in no way affected the duties of officials and the relations of states, except to emphasize the importance of observing the natural laws of justice in all matters.

But though the official and prevailing opinion both in Catholicism and Protestantism has been as indicated, a very different view has found expression over and over again in the history of the church, the view, namely, that all war is un-Christian and opposed to the spirit of Christ. Augustine's discussions of the subject show that this view was abroad in his day, and in the Middle Ages there were many champions of it, including the Cathari, the Waldenses, and no less a figure than the statesman and theologian Wyclif, who was followed in the matter by many of the Lollards. In his *De officio regis*⁴ (chap. xii), Wyclif discusses the matter in

¹ Erlangen ed., XLIII, 142.

² iv, 20, 12.

³ iv, 20, 10.

⁴ In *Wyclif's Latin Works* (1887), pp. 261 f.

considerable detail, and though he admits at the beginning that war may be just if waged for the love of God and one's neighbor, he yet shows that it is opposed to the law of nature, the law of Christ, and the law of human reason; and he takes up and dismisses as unsound one excuse after another commonly urged in justification of it. Love should control all our relations to our fellows, and vengeance should be left wholly to God. The teaching and example of Christ show that we ought to practice the principle of non-resistance even to the extent of yielding up our goods and our life as well. Since Christ came, the Old Testament has no authority. It is an argument of anti-Christ that force may properly be repelled by force. "We are advised to flee from one city to another, but to resist with violence seems not fitting to mature disciples of Christ."¹

Similarly in one of his Latin sermons,² although he recognizes that a war may be lawful if three conditions are fulfilled: "first, that the cause for which war is waged is just, secondly, that the person attacked has an unjust cause, and, thirdly, that the intention is right," nevertheless he maintains that we cannot war justly unless armed with spiritual weapons, and if we were thus armed, we should beat our swords into plowshares and refrain from fighting. It is not necessary to avenge injury even though the law fails to give us redress. "The counsel and doctrine of Scripture is, that through the patient endurance of injuries and through kindness, the world is conquered far more efficaciously than by weapons of war, so far as concerns the universal church and permanent peace. Those who fight, therefore, spurn the salutary counsel of Christ and follow the counsel of the world."³

In still another sermon⁴ he shows that even the strongest reasons commonly urged for war—the maintenance of justice, the protection of the poor, the checking of wickedness—are inadequate, for we cannot be sure that we are promoting the right in fighting, and in any case we are doing evil that good may come.

¹ P. 273.

² Sermon 24, in *Sermones*, Vol. IV.

³ P. 211.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sermon 4; cf. also the *Opera minora*, pp. 123 f.

In a tract on the seven deadly sins, probably by Wyclif, but possibly by an early Lollard, occurs the following striking passage:

Why should we not fight against our enemies? for else they would destroy us and damn their own souls. And thus for love we chastise them, as God's law teaches us. And so, since our enemies would assail us, but if we assailed them before, since we love better ourselves, we should first assail them and thus we shall have peace. Here methinks that the fiend deceives many men by falseness of his reasons, and by his false principles. For what man that has wit cannot see this falseness? If it be lawful by strength to withstand violence, then it is lawful to fight with men that withstand us. Well, I wot that angels withstood fiends, and many men by strength of law withstand their enemies; and yet they kill them not, nor fight not with them. And wise men of the world hold their strength, and thus vanquish their enemies without any stroke; and men of the gospel vanquish by patience, and come to rest and to peace by suffering of death. Right so may we do, if we keep charity; though men ravish our Lordship, or else our movables, we should suffer in patience, yea, though they did us more. These be the counsels of Christ. But here the world grudges, and says that by this wise were realms destroyed. But here belief teaches us, since Christ is our God, that thus should realms be established, and our enemies vanquished. But peradventure many men should lose their worldly riches. But what harm thereof? . . . If he were thus patient his enemies would kill him. As if a man would say that if he kept Christ's counsel the enemy would foredo him, for he is more than Christ. And if we fight thus for love, it is not love of charity; for charity seeks not one's own good in this life, but common good in heaven by virtuous patience. And well I wot that worldly men will scorn this sentence; but men that would be martyrs for the love of God will hold with this sentence; and they be more to trust, for they have more the charity and better be with God. And deceit of love is with men that fight, as with fiends of hell is feigned false love. But at Doomsday shall men wot who fight thus for charity; for it seems no charity to ride against one's enemy well armed with a sharp spear, upon a strong courser; for even the kiss of Iscariot was more token of charity. And so God's law teaches men to come before in deeds of charity and works of worship; but I read not in God's law that Christian men should come before in fighting or battle, but in meek patience. And this were the means whereby we should have God's peace.¹

After denouncing the Crusades and the Pope's part in them, he concludes: "But belief should teach us to be meek as Christ was, and then should we fare the better, both to body and soul.

¹ *Select English Works of Wyclif*, edited by Arnold, III, 137 f. I have modernized the spelling.

If we have ire in God's cause, keep we that with meekness and with prudence of God, and so shall we please him."¹

In the sixteenth century many of the Anabaptists, Menno Simons and the Mennonites, Henry Nicholas and the Family of Love, and a man of so different a type as the humanist Erasmus, took a similar position, maintaining that war is necessarily opposed to Christianity and is in no circumstances justified.

Erasmus' discussion of the matter in his *Adagia*² is one of the most striking and eloquent arraignments of war ever published. "Nothing," he declares, "doth worse become a man (I will not say a Christian man) than war."³ And again:

War is a thing that should be by all means and ways fled and eschewed.⁴ But after Christ commanded the sword to be put up, it is unlawful for Christian men to make any other war but that which is the fairest war of all, with the most eager and fierce enemies of the church, with affection of money, with wrath, with ambition, with dread of death. These be our Philistines, these be our Nabuchodonosors, these be our Moabites and Ammonites, with the which it behooveth us to have no truce. With these we must continually fight, until (our enemies being utterly vanquished) we may be in quiet, for except we may overcome them, there is no man that may attain to any true peace, neither with himself, nor yet with no other. For this war alone is cause of true peace. He that overcometh in this battle, will make war with no man living.⁵ Ye say ye make war for the safeguard of the commonweal, yea, but no way sooner nor more unthriftilly may the commonweal perish than by war. For before ye enter into the field, ye have already hurt more your country then ye can do good getting the victory.⁶

Erasmus' discussion had the great merit, not shared by all the opponents of war, of distinguishing war from the use of force by the officials of the state in preserving order and putting down crime. The latter Erasmus defends, but the former he condemns unqualifiedly. Punishment for crime is visited only upon the guilty, but war brings suffering upon innocent and guilty alike. And with this in mind, Erasmus exclaims, in striking contrast with many an expounder of religion and law: "It is better to let a

¹ P. 142.

² At the beginning of the fourth *Chiliad*. I quote from the reprint of an old English translation published by J. W. MacKail, under the title *Erasmus against War* (1907).

³ P. 4.

⁴ P. 57.

⁵ P. 45.

⁶ P. 60.

wound alone that cannot be cured without grievous hurt and danger of all the whole body."¹

Erasmus' attitude is all the more significant because there was no personal reason in his case for protesting against war, as there was in the case of most of the sects who denounced war, persecution, and capital punishment as all of a piece, and equally opposed to the spirit and precepts of Christ. That the protest should have come so largely from those oppressed by the authorities is not an accident. It was inevitable that they should question the lawfulness of using the sword when it was thus turned against themselves. That a man like Erasmus should contend eagerly for the same principle means much for his humanity and wisdom.

The attitude of George Fox and the Quakers in the next century is too well known to need presentation. But it may be worth while to quote a couple of sentences from Barclay's elaborate discussion of the subject in his *Apology*, to show the difference between the underlying principles of the Friends and those of traditional Catholicism and Protestantism.

They object: That Defence is of natural Right, and that Religion destroys not nature. I answer, Be it so; but to obey God and commend ourselves to Him in Faith and Patience, is not to destroy nature, but to exalt and perfect it; to wit, to elevate it from the natural to the supernatural life by Christ living therein, and comforting it, that it may do all things, and be rendered more than conqueror. . . . But for such, whom Christ hath brought hither, it is not lawful to defend themselves by Arms, but they ought over all to trust to the Lord.²

It is not necessary to carry this sketch farther. The modern peace movement, which dates from the close of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, has been adequately recounted by many writers. It is of interest to note that most of the proposals to which it has led, including arbitration, international peace congresses, international tribunals, and the like, were suggested long ago in such books as Emeric Crucé's *Le Nouveau Cynée*, of 1523, and Grotius' *De jure belli et pacis*, of 1625. But all such matters belong to the field of law, not of religion, and hence do not fall within the scope of this paper.

¹ P. 49.

² Proposition XV, § 15.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ELEPHANTINE PAPYRI FOR THE HISTORY OF HEBREW RELIGION

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Repeated discoveries in the lands in which the books of the Bible gradually assumed their present shape have exercised a profound influence upon all departments of biblical study. The work of criticism which had been energetically concentrated upon the sacred writings themselves has, in recent decades, been deepened and widened; and as these discoveries brought ever more abundant stores of material, the criticism has tended to become more historical and psychological. New light has been thrown upon ancient oriental life and thought, and the Bible and its contents are accordingly being viewed against the background of those circumstances and conditions which the external evidence, more objective and often contemporary, has at length revealed. But although many difficulties and obscurities have vanished, fresh ones have arisen in their place, and old problems take a new form. While biblical study is being pursued with the help of all that directly or indirectly elucidates the sources, it is not unjust to say that it is seriously embarrassed, partly by the accumulation of material so immense that no single hand can hope to deal with it, and partly also by the fact that those who interest themselves in the theological, historical, archaeological, or in any other of the departments differ considerably as regards standpoint, aim, and method. Especially is this true in those cases where the different lines of inquiry yield conflicting results. Such a case lies before us, and this article purposes to give some account of what has rightly been regarded as one of the most valuable of recent "finds." Indeed, it has been asserted that the evidence constitutes "a turning-point in the Biblical Criticism of our century."¹ But its precise significance has been disputed; and it is not even agreed whether

¹ J. Halévy, *Revue sémitique*, 1908, p. 240.

it supports the conservative, traditional, or orthodox position, or the position of the "critics"! Our purpose, therefore, is to ascertain what the evidence *safely* allows us to infer.

The evidence in question consists of Aramaic papyri from the island of Elephantine in Upper Egypt. The island faces Syene (Assuan), familiar to the Hebrews as the southern frontier-city of Egypt, the phrase "from Migdol to Syene" meaning for Egypt what "from Dan to Beersheba" meant for the Hebrew (see Ezek. 29:10; 30:6, R.V. marg.). Egyptian-Aramaic papyri had long been known, and Clermont-Ganneau, the brilliant French savant, to whom Semitic epigraphy and archaeology owe so much, had already argued that they belong to the period of the Persian domination.¹ His view was confirmed by the subsequent discovery of dated papyri of the fifth century B.C., as also was his equally brilliant conjecture that "the fortress of Yeb," to which they repeatedly refer, was no other than Elephantine itself. The material at our disposal now consists of a number of earlier known inscriptions and papyri from various parts of Egypt, and two collections of papyri from Elephantine: one a small series of papyri acquired by Mr. Robert Mond and edited by Professor Sayce and Dr. A. E. Cowley, of Oxford (1906), the other, a large quantity unearthed in the course of excavation by the Berlin Imperial Museum, and edited by Professor Sachau of Berlin (1911).² As usual, chance played a great part in these discoveries; and Professor Sayce, who has always been both zealous and fortunate in the recovery of ancient "finds," tells of the quantities of papyri and ostraka which native workmen had carelessly lost or destroyed. As for those that survive, they have given birth to a very large literature, and it goes without saying that every writer, like the present, is greatly indebted to all whose labors have assisted in the editing, correcting, and elucidating of the texts.³

¹ *Rev. arch.*, 1878, pp. 95-107; 1879, pp. 21-39.

² For the excavations, conducted on the site of the old Jewish houses, see *Zeit. f. ägyptische Sprache*, 1910, pp. 14-61.

³ The main works are A. H. Sayce and A. E. Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri* (London, 1906); E. Sachau, *Aramäische Papyrus und Ostraka* (Berlin, 1911); a hand-edition of the latter by A. Ungnad, *Aram. Pap. aus Elephantine* (Leipzig, 1911); W. Staerk in

The Elephantine papyri are written in Aramaic, the *lingua franca* of the Persian period from Asia Minor to Arabia and Upper Egypt. In vocabulary, phraseology, and style, the dialect closely resembles that of the Aramaic portions of Ezra and Daniel. It is, however, an older type of dialect; and the view that it is, philologically speaking, earlier than biblical Aramaic has been strongly supported and is not seriously affected by the arguments brought against it.¹

The papyri afford fresh proof of the distribution of Aramaic, its flexibility, and its daily use among various classes of Semitic and non-Semitic peoples. Moreover, it is not out of place to recall the fact that Aramaic was now establishing itself in Palestine, and that its script—and not the old Hebrew or Phoenician alphabet (which was preserved by the Samaritans)—became the parent of the later Jewish and now familiar “square” character. In these papyri the Aramaic character closely resembles that in which the MSS of the Old Testament would be written during the Persian and Hellenistic periods; and not their least value is the picture they give us of the style and writing current among the Jews of the fifth century B.C.

For these papyri actually proceed from a colony of Jews, the date of whose inauguration is not known with certainty (see p. 374). They belong to a military colony at Elephantine, which was closely connected with Syene, the seat of the Persian organization. Much light is thrown upon the political and military régime, and upon the business, social, and religious life. The men are called Jews or Aramaeans; but the language is Aramaean with some Hebraisms,

Lietzmann's *Kleine Texte* (Bonn), viz., Nos. 22 and 23, text (with notes) of the Sayce-Cowley Series; No. 32, three of Sachau's papyri with Old Testament illustrative passages; and No. 94, annotated translation of a considerable number of both collections. Of other literature especially to be named are N. Peters, *Jüdische Gemeinde*, etc. (1910); Ed. Meyer, in *Sitz.-ber.* of Berlin University, 1911, pp. 1026 ff., and his *Papyrusfund von Elephantine* (Leipzig, 1912); the reviews by Nöldeke, *Zeit. f. Assyriol.*, 1907, pp. 130-49; *Literar. Zentralblatt*, 1911, cols. 1503 ff.; Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris für semit. Epigraphik*, III, 69-84, 238-60; and Lagrange, *Revue biblique*, 1908, pp. 325-49; 1912, pp. 127-37, 575-87. See further the bibliographies in Staerk.

¹ See Nöldeke, *Ency. Brit.* (11th ed.), XXIV, 624; C. C. Torrey, *Ezra Studies*, pp. 161 ff.; Driver, *Lit. of O.T.*, pp. 504, 515, and Addenda, pp. xxxiv ff.

and the names are characteristically "biblical," including such familiar forms as Hoshea, Haggai, Menahem, Zadok, and Zephaniah. We hear of the family relations, the material prosperity, and, in particular, of the cosmopolitanism of the day. The people it is true, worship Yāhō or Yāhū—here, and throughout, the correct vocalization of the purely consonantal texts is often quite conjectural—and this *Y-h-w* can be no other than *Y-h-w-h*, Yahweh, the name better known to us in the inaccurate and hybrid form "Jehovah." Yahu had a temple of considerable extent, with its priests, sacrifices, and regular offerings. It dated back to before the time of Cambyses, whose special protection it claims to have enjoyed. But not only do the Jews appear to be under the patronage of Persia, not only do they live in the midst of Egyptians, Persians, and perhaps Babylonians, but there is at least one case of intermarriage with a foreigner—an Egyptian. Besides this, the free use of non-Jewish names also suggests a certain laxity. Elephantine itself was the seat of the worship of Khnum, later Khnub (Chnubis), the deity of the Cataract district, a god of fertility, who was symbolized by the ram. To this add that a mixed military community would foster a comparison of religious ideas, and lead equally to tolerance and to rivalry.¹ Life in Elephantine afforded the opportunity for intermingling of cults, and the papyri reveal the astonishing fact that, although the Jews appear fervent and genuine worshipers of Yahu, so far from practicing the strict monotheism which is characteristic of Jewish prophetism and legalism, they even admit two other deities by the side of Yahu, and thus afford a striking example of that freedom and laxity against which the more spiritual minds in Israel had to protest.

In addition to the significance of the papyri for the religion of Israel, attention has been attracted by the fragments of an ancient and much-traveled romance, the story of Aḥīkar. Aḥīkar is the Achiacharus who is referred to briefly, as a well-known character, in the "apocryphal" Book of Tobit (2:21 f.; 14:10). The hero also finds a place both in the fables of Aesop and in the *Thousand*

¹ On the wall of a private house near the temple of Khnum was found scratched τὸ προσκύνημα τ[ῷ] ἄλλοφύλ[ῳ]—apparently the testimony of some foreign soldiers (at a later date) to the Egyptian god (*Zeit. f. aeg. Spr.*, 1910, p. 25).

and One Nights. Quite as noteworthy was the discovery of portions of the Aramaic version of the great inscription of Darius I, set up by the king in Old Persian, Susian, and Babylonian, to celebrate the victories which brought him to the throne. It is, perhaps, with mixed feelings that we greet these fragments which come to light after the patient toil and years of labor during which the "cuneiform" writing has been made to reveal its secrets. How different it might have been had they come earlier or at the beginning—had they provided a timely clue, as did the Rosetta stone to Egyptology! The difficulty of deciphering the Hittite hieroglyphs today brings home to us the great value of bilinguals. On the other hand, it may be questioned whether oriental studies had advanced sufficiently in 1800-1860 to enable one to interpret the papyri adequately. The Aramaic contains so many foreign words that the translation of the papyri demands all the energies of Assyrian, Egyptian, and Iranian scholars; and it is this mixture—so natural, when we consider the population—which tells against the notion, hastily put forth by one or two writers, that the texts are forgeries! And to the preceding remarks it must be added that although some have lamented that Elephantine has not produced anything so sensational as a biblical text, it is probable that such a discovery would only complicate the present problems, and that the questions raised by the (later) "Nash Papyrus," with its remarkable version of the Decalogue and the Shema^c, would be trifling as compared with those that Elephantine or some other Egyptian site may some day bring, should there be disclosed biblical texts of the Persian period.

It will be best to present a summary of the more important papyri, arranged as far as possible in their chronological order. This will give a fair and unbiased idea of their general character, and the special questions relating to their significance for Hebrew religion can be handled later.

We begin with S 27, dated the second year of the reign of Xerxes I (485-465 B.C.).¹ Together with the undated but evi-

¹ We refer to the Sayce-Cowley edition (S-C) by the letters (A to L), and to that of Sachau (S)—with which Ungnad's handbook agrees—by the number (and not by the "Papyrus" or the "Tafel"). S 31, apparently of 494 B.C., will be found below under the year 407.

dently contemporary S 29, it refers to the provisioning of the garrison, and is a contract between Hoshea b.(= *bar*, "son of") Hoduyah and Ahiab b. Gemariah, on the one side, and ²Esp . . . (?) b. Hanani, the carpenter, on the other. Hoduyah—it must be remembered that the vocalization is always conjectural—is the name which should doubtless be read in the place of the impossible Hodaviah in Ezra 2:40, etc. (the Septuagint *Ōdonia* points to the true form). The name will mean "praise Yah," and it should be noticed that very many of the Elephantine names end in *-iah* (*-yah*), and characteristically resemble those in the post-exilic lists of the Old Testament.

Leaving Elephantine for a moment, we have a funeral inscription, found in 1877 at Memphis. It is dated in the fourth year of Xerxes (*Corpus Inscr. Semit.*, II, 122); and, with a few of rather later date (*CIS*, II, 123, 130, 141 f.), is worth recording as an example of the way in which some Jews, at least, adopted Egyptian cults. The first is a prayer by Abseli for the "accession" of his parents, Abba b. Hur and Ahitobu daughter of 'Adaiah, "before the god Osiris." Another begins "Blessed be Taba, daughter of Tahapi, worshiper of the god Osiris" (No. 141). According to Egyptian belief the deceased went to Osiris, if he did not actually become Osiris himself, and it is much to be regretted that we have no funeral inscription from Elephantine to throw light upon the eschatological ideas of its Jewish inhabitants.

About a decade later, in the fifteenth year of Xerxes, begins the series of archives of the family of Maḥseiah (S-C A). Similar collections have been found of demotic papyri at Thebes and el-Hibeh, and at Nippur there were more than seven hundred contract tablets, belonging to the family of Murāshu, bankers and brokers during the reigns of Artaxerxes I and Darius II. Koniah b. Zadok receives from his neighbor, Maḥseiah b. Jedoniah, both described as Aramaeans of Syene, a portion of his gateway which he uses for a building, the nature of which is obscure. It is carefully described by reference to "the street that runs between us and the house of the sailor Peftṣonit." The scribe is Pelatiah b. Ahio, and the witnesses are Maḥseiah b. Isaiah, Satibarzanes b. 'Athar-ili, Shemaiah b. Hoshea, Phrataphernes b. Artaphernes, Bagdates b.

Nabu-kudurri, Nabuli b. Darga, Ben-tirash b. Raḥamre^c, and Shallum b. Hoshaiāh. The names—Hebrew, Babylonian, Persian, and perhaps Egyptian—vividly illustrate the mixed character of the civilization.

Six years later, the accession-year of Artaxerxes I (465-425), Maḥseiah had to defend himself at court before Damidata and his "colleagues" (*kēndāwāthā*; cf. Ezra 5:6, etc.), against another neighbor, Dargman, a Persian from Khorasmia. He succeeded, and Dargman formally relinquishes his claim, and explicitly describes the piece of land which had been in dispute. Its boundaries are fully stated, but by a curious blunder the scribe has confusedly transposed the cardinal points (see further below, on D, E, and J). In this "deed of conveyance" we read that Maḥseiah, who is here called a Jew, justified his statements by a solemn oath "by Yahu, the god, in the fortress Yeb," and that the Persian accepted the oath as conclusive (S-C B).

To the king's fourth year belongs a rather remarkable document of a dispute between Malchiah b. Joshibiah, an Aramaean, a property-owner in Yeb, and another—the papyrus is mutilated (S 28). One of them is accused of entering the other's house, beating his wife, and carrying off the goods, and the accused is required to purge himself by a solemn oath. Unfortunately, however, owing to the state of the document, it is not certain whether Malchiah states the charge of which the unknown one is to clear himself, or whether he himself is accused, and is explicitly denying that he is guilty of the offenses as stated.¹ Clearance-oaths, whereby a man formally testifies his innocence under particular solemn circumstances, are familiar both in Israelite and Babylonian law; and in modern times an oath will be taken before the sacred tomb of a saint, or weli.² What is remarkable here is the special appeal by "the god Ḥerem-bethel." It recalls the undated text S 33, a dispute between Menahem b. Shallum and Meshullam

¹ For the former see Sachau, Ungnad, Lagrange, and for the latter, Meyer, Staerk, Lévi (*Rev. d'Ét. Juives*, LXIII, 161-84), and Lidzbarski. See also Lagrange, *Rev. bibl.*, 1912, pp. 135 f., 585.

² Cf. S. A. Cook, *Laws of Moses and Code of Hammurabi* (1903), pp. 58-65, and especially pp. 62, 227. P. Volz well compares the "oath of clearance" in Job, chap. 31 (see his edition in *Schriften d. A.T.*, pp. 73 f., and cf. *ZATW*, XXXII, 126 f.).

b. Nathan, touching the possession of an ass. There is a reference to swearing by "Ḥ . . . (Ḥerem?) by the shrine (*masgēddā*) and by 'Anath-yahu." Here, at all events, is evidence for usages which are scarcely in accord with the oath by the god Yahu, and it will be convenient to leave the discussion until we have summarized all the evidence.

Two years later Maḥseiah's daughter, Mibṭahyah was married to her neighbor Jezaniah b. Uriah. In one document (S-C D) her father hands over to her the house which had been the subject of his dispute with Dargman. North and south of it lie the houses of Dargman and of Koniah, respectively; to its west is the house of 'Espemet (the son of the Egyptian sailor in A); while to the east lie the houses of the bridegroom Jezaniah and Zechariah b. Nathan. At the same time Maḥseiah gives her Dargman's deed of conveyance, and binds himself not to seek to recover the property. The last measure is illustrated by the undated S 36 where one of the parents undertakes *not* to say: "the goods and the money set forth in this writing I have given you [viz., the daughter and her husband?] out of love; now I wish to take them away." Again, in S 32 property is secured to Abiyahu the wife of Shelomim. It is interesting to observe that women could possess property, and that it was perhaps very necessary to secure their rights by a deed. At all events, Maḥseiah hands a document to his son-in-law, Jezaniah (S-C C), permitting him to use the land, to build on it, but not to dispose of it. Care is taken to provide in case of a divorce, whether initiated by the man or—what is more instructive—by the woman: the position of women is especially noteworthy.¹ The undated fragment S 39, where the son-in-law makes some contract with his father-in-law touching the bride, is unintelligible.

Passing over a fragment of the seventh year of Artaxerxes,² we come to S 30, a perfect document, dated two years later. Here Jehoḥan, daughter of Mushlak (or the like), acknowledges her debt of 4 shekels to Meshullam b. Zakkur. The scribe is Nathan b.

¹ Cf. Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 71 ff., 110 f., 145 ff.

² Vogüé, *Rep. d'Épig. sem.*, I, 333 ff., No. 438; Lidzbarski, *Ephem.*, II, 221. It has a perplexing reference to a god whose name ends in *-ti*; it cannot (on epigraphical grounds) be Anaiti(s), and the Egyptian Sati is female.

‘Anani, probably the son of ‘Ananiah who is a witness in C and D (above); he is employed several years later as a scribe (see E and G below), and he seems to have had a son, Ma‘uziah, who was in the same profession (H and J). The document is an excellent example of the usual procedure, and can be illustrated by the undated S-C L where we meet the scribe Gemariah b. Ahio (the name of a witness in B), and the witness Maḥseiah b. Jedoniah, presumably the familiar gentleman of that name. In the nineteenth year of Artaxerxes we find Maḥseiah conveying to Mipṭaḥyah (*sic*) a house bought from Meshullam b. Zakkur b. Ater, the Aramaean of Syene (S-C E; cf. the creditor in S 30). As usual he hands her Meshullam’s own deed and renounces all claim to the property. The description of the boundaries is most interesting. North and south of the house lie the house of Ya’ir and the temple of the god Yahu (here *Y-h-h*); east is the house of Gadol b. ʾOshea and the street (*shūkā*) between, and to the west is the — [? property] of Marduk (??) b. Palṭo, “priest” of the gods [Khnu]m [and Sa]ti. The papyrus has several gaps, inaccuracies, and obscurities; but it is clear that there was a temple—the word corresponds to the Babylonian *ekurru*—and that it lay hard by the Jewish colony. But it is also evident that in immediate proximity there was a “heathen” priest of the famous god of Elephantine and apparently one of his female associates.¹

Six years later Mibṭaḥyah is breaking off relations with Pī b. Paḥi of Syene, a builder (S-CF).² They divide money, grain, clothing, bronze, and iron—all the goods and chattels—and he gives her a “deed of quittance.” But in l. 4 he undertakes to give her what we may call “a deed of wifehood” (cf. S 37,

¹ The word for “temple” (מִקְדָּשׁ) was used later of a heathen altar; the word for “heathen-priest” (כֹּהֵן; cf. the use of the Heb. plural *kēmarim*), too, was primarily without any obnoxious suggestion. It may be conjectured that the former was originally used in Ezra 5:3. Torrey (*Ezra Studies*, pp. 175 f.) has already observed that both the old Greek and Theodotion presuppose מִקְדָּשׁ (rendering “roof” and “outlay” respectively), and it is an easy step to the assumption that the term, because of its later heathenish associations, was replaced by the rather colorless *uṣṣarnā*; see my note on I Esd. 6:4 (Charles’s edition of the *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha*).

² The word for “builder” (*ardēkū*) is of Babylonian origin (*arad ekalli*, “temple servant”); and in later Talm. usage denotes an architect or rather a master-builder who had heavy responsibilities. See also S-C G and H.

ll. 4 f.), such as might be expected between a husband and wife; and the question has therefore arisen whether this is not really a deed of divorce.¹ Other interesting features are (a) the fact that the scribe and four witnesses have non-Jewish names—compounds of Nebo are especially marked; and (b) the woman takes an oath (evidently to express her satisfaction with the division) by the goddess Sati. The latter illustrates one of the results of intercourse with foreigners, and recalls the later injunction to avoid associating with a non-Jew lest one should have to swear by his god (Talmud, *Sanhedrin*, 63b).

Had Mibtāḥyah married a second time and separated? Only two months later—but the number of the year is lost!—the lady marries another Egyptian “builder,” As-ḥor, son of Ṣaḥa’ (S-C G). He comes to her father’s house—apparently the widow or divorcée cannot dispose of herself—and pays a modest sum of five shekels as “bride-price” (cf. the *mōhar*, Exod. 22:16). There is a long list of his gifts to the bride, and a short one of her gifts to him. Provision is made in case of her dying childless, or of a divorce whether initiated by either. Most noteworthy is the fact that the declaration of divorce “I detest [lit. “hate,” as in Deut. 21:15] so-and-so” would be made in the “congregation”; the Hebrew term *‘ēdāh* is employed.

Passing over a mere fragment of the twenty-ninth year of Artaxerxes,² we have the remains of an official document of eight years later (S 5). It is addressed to our lord Arsham, who is perhaps the satrap appointed by Megabyzos. It proceeds from Aḥ-m-n-s (some Achaemenes, hardly of course the famous prince of that name), together with his “colleagues” and the “scribes of the province.” It has the usual pious salutation: “God greet our lord,” and is especially interesting for words and phrases familiar in biblical Aramaic. Coming now to the fourth year of Darius II (424–404), we meet the two sons of As-ḥor by Mibtāḥyah (S-C H). They are named Jedoniah and Maḥseiah after their maternal great-grandfather and grandfather. It is to be observed that (a) the names are given or influenced by the mother, and (b) the text

¹ See Fischer, *Orient. Lit. Zeit.*, 1913, cols. 306 f.; Epstein, *ZATW*, 1913, p. 235.

² Clermont-Ganneau, *Recueil d'Arch. orient.*, VI, 255 ff.; Lidz., *Eph.*, II, 220.

illustrates the well-known custom of naming a child after a grandparent (or ancestor).¹ The custom in question is not habitual; it seems to occur only on certain levels and at certain periods, and the influence of the mother is likewise a feature neither ubiquitous nor constant. The evidence, therefore, is interesting and suggestive, but we cannot base any sweeping generalizations upon it. In this document the boys are sued by Menahem and Ananiah, sons of Meshullam b. Shelomim b. Azariah, for an assortment of goods and utensils (wool, linen, bronze, iron, wood, palm-leaf [?], corn, etc.), which their grandfather had deposited with As-hor. Compare the list in S-C F where, again, a "builder" is concerned. The case is tried before Widarnag, the commander of the army, who was destined, later, to become more famous, or rather infamous.

S 19, of the fifth year, presumably of Darius, is one of the sensations of the collection. It is a great list of "the names of the Jewish army that gave money to Yahu, the god, each man two shekels." Jedoniah b. Gemariah is treasurer. The list is dated the third of Phamenoth, the seventh Egyptian month, and the offerings are doubtless for the temple.² The names include thirty-six women, but the list is incomplete, and we miss several well-known names. Besides, although the list enumerates 115 (i.e., 230 shekels), the total sum is given as 31 keresh (1 k. = 10 shekels) and 8 shekels, i.e., 318 shekels. Of this sum it is said "for Yahu, 12 keresh, 6 shekels; for 'Asm-bethel, 7 keresh; and for 'Anath-bethel, 12 keresh in silver." Yahu stands at the head, and on the only natural interpretation he has associated with him here these two subordinate deities, otherwise unknown, but whose names are composed of familiar elements.

Leaving all discussion for the present, we pass to S 6, an exceedingly interesting papyrus clearly dated in the fifth year of Darius. It is addressed to "Jedoniah and his colleagues, the Jewish army"

¹ See G. B. Gray (*Festschrift* to Wellhausen, ed. by Marti, 1914, pp. 163-76), who finds other examples of the practice in these papyri; cf. also his *Hebrew Proper Names* (1896), pp. 2 ff. It is important to notice that, according to Gray (*op. cit.*, p. 164), "The custom first appears, or perchance after a break of unknown duration reappears, in certain communities at a relatively late stage."

² Epstein, *ZATW*, XIII, 145, has suggested the fifth year of Amyrtaeus, i.e., about 400; similarly W. R. Arnold, *Jour. Bibl. Lit.*, XXXI (1912), 29.

from "your brother Hananiah." Only the left-hand half is preserved. It bids them "count four[teen days] and from the 15th day to the 21st day of [Nisan be] pure (?) and take heed no(?) work do not drink, and aught that is leaven do not [from] sun-set to the 21st day of Nisa[n] go (or take?) into your chambers and seal (?), between the days" This most tantalizing fragment has aroused the liveliest discussion. Is it rightly called the "Passover papyrus"? Or, since there is scarcely room for the specific details, does it not rather refer to the Feast of Unleavened Bread? Certainly there is some obscure allusion to the Passover in S 77, No. 2; but an ostrakon published by Sayce, which seemed to be an important contribution to the subject, is, according to Arnold, a harmless letter in which a rather illiterate husband, writing to his wife, desires, among other things, to know how the baby is!¹ Other questions are raised by the reference to the prohibition of some sort of drink.² Again, it is asked, Does the papyrus refer to the introduction of a previously unknown festival? Is the festival now introduced by the command, or by the permission of the great Persian king? If it is not a royal edict that is sent, it may be, that, as Arnold suggests, it is Hananiah who says of himself (l. 3): "This year, the fifth year of Darius the king, being sent from the king to Arsham [I, etc.]"; cf. the otherwise ambiguous "sent" in Ezra 7:14 (Aramaic sent).

The views of well-informed Jewish scholars touching the interpretation of the papyri are worthy of attention.³ They argue that this papyrus cannot be regarded as proof of the new introduction of any institution; and both Jampel and Daiches point to the custom of a yearly proclamation of the arrival of the festival. Daiches observes that the names of the king and of the governor (viz., Arsham) are mentioned because all official announcements had to be made in the name of the king, and he compares the summary allusion in Neh. 8:14 ff. to the chief laws of the Feast of

¹ Sayce, *Proc. Soc. Bibl. Arch.*, XXXIII, 183 f.; XXXIV, 17, 212; W. R. Arnold, *Jour. Bibl. Lit.*, XXXI (1912), 13, note.

² See Strack, *ZDMG*, LXV (1911), 829; G. Beer, *ZATW*, XXXI (1911), 153; Jastrow, *Jour. Amer. Orient. Soc.*, XXXIII (1913), 180-92.

³ See I. Lévi, *Rev. d'Ét. Juives*, LXIII, 164; Jampel, *MGWJ* (1911), 660; S. Daiches, *Proc. Soc. Bibl. Arch.*, XXXIV (1912), 22.

Tabernacles when intimation was sent to the Jews "in all their cities and in Jerusalem." At the present day we are told that "shortly before Passover the main laws regarding the leaven and unleavened bread are made known to the congregations in the synagogues by the Rabbis"; and both Daiches and Jampel note several references to the annual proclamation and warning in talmudic times.¹ Certainly it is very important to determine whether Elephantine was usually in communication with Palestine. This provoking fragment scarcely justifies, by itself, the assumption that it deals with the introduction, for the first time, of a new festival. On the other hand, if, as has been suggested, Hananiah is to be identified with the "brother" of Nehemiah (Neh. 1:2; 7:2), it is not impossible that the new reorganization in Jerusalem affected distant Elephantine. But the document is too brief for us to elaborate its implications, and S 8 (below) is a crowning example of Persian thoroughness in matters of business. The allusion in l. 3 ("from the king"), if not merely conventional, proves how powerful were Persian organization and jurisdiction, even in questions of cult; but it is difficult to determine with any safety precisely what change of cult is involved. At all events from this and from other references we are entitled to assume that the Jews of Elephantine now at least keep the usual observances; and there is nothing to show that these conflicted with their conceptions of Yahu, ʾAsm-bethel, and ʿAnath-bethel.²

We go back to the eighth year of Darius to the two grandsons of Maḥseiah (S-C J). Their father As-ḥor is here styled Nathan. It is not easy to explain the change during the four years that have elapsed since S-C H. If it is because of his marriage with the Jewess Mibṭaḥyah, we should expect it to have been made in H;

¹ Mr. Abrahams, too, has drawn my attention to the references in *Rōsh-ka-Shanah* (l. 3) to the regular dispatch of messengers before the chief festivals. Cf. also II Macc. 1:9, 18, where the Jews in Egypt are bidden to observe the Feast of Tabernacles—as though the injunction was a familiar feature.

² For other discussions of the text and contents see Strack, *ZDMG*, LXV, 829; Perles, *Or. Lit. Zeit.*, 1911, col. 498; Barth, *ibid.* (1912), col. 10; Schwally, *ibid.*, col. 162; Arnold, *Jour. Bib. Lit.*, XXXI, 1, pp. 1 ff.; Smend, *Theolog. Lit. Zeit.* (1912), p. 485; Lagrange, *Rev. bib.* (1912), pp. 131 f., 578 ff.; Lidzbarski, *Ephem.*, III, 243; Steuernagel, *ZATW* (1911), p. 310, and *ZDPV*, XXXV, 91.

the conjecture that he became a Jew in the intervening years, however tempting, is improbable because the two brothers act, even in H, as though they were orphans. It is conceivable, of course, that individuals,¹ especially in cases of intermarriage, had double names. Here the young Jedoniah and Maḥseiah have succeeded in defending themselves against Jedoniah b. Hoshea b. Uriah, the son of the brother of Jezaniah, the first husband of Mibṭaḥyah. The case was brought before Widarnag. It concerned a house the location of which should be compared with the details in S-C D. North and south of it are the houses of Hoshea b. Uriah and of a certain son of Zechariah. To the east is the temple of the god Yahu, with the "king's way" running between them (cf. E); and to the west is the house which Maḥseiah gave Mibṭaḥyah. At first it looks as though the house is that which formed the subject of the dispute between the Persian Dargman and Maḥseiah (S-C B), and was given by the latter to Mibṭaḥyah when she married Jezaniah (C and D). But this property had Jezaniah's house on its right, and therefore it would seem that the house which Jedoniah claimed was that of his uncle the use of which Mibṭaḥyah had presumably been enjoying during her life-time.² Perhaps she had recently died, and her first husband's nephew was now seeking to recover the property for his own family—and in vain. This conjecture is reinforced by S-C K, six years later, where the two brothers Maḥseiah and Jedoniah divide between them two young slaves of Mibṭaḥyah, and undertake later on to divide the mother Tebo and a third child Lilū. Evidently other property had already been shared. (The mutilated S 35 may refer to a similar division between two sisters.) The slaves are said to be branded with "to Mibṭaḥyah," and also with a *yōd*—a very early reference, if the letter *yōd* is intended. The wording is obscure, and perhaps, as Clermont-Ganneau has suggested, the *yōd* is marked upon the arm to the right of the tattooing.³ Another allusion to branding

¹ On the (later) Palmyrene inscriptions men often have Latin in addition to their native Aramaean names.

² Cf. for the rights of widows, Cook, *Laws of Moses*, etc., 141 ff.

³ *Rev. crit.*, 1906, p. 350, n. 3.

or tattooing upon a slave (a female one) is found in the ostrakon S-C M.¹ The custom is well-known; it was a mark of ownership and was used as a mark of adherence to a deity, sect, or group.

With this we leave the series of family records and go back two years. To the twelfth year of Darius belongs S 8, a very difficult but highly important description of the procedure involved in giving instructions for the repairing or renovating of one of the government ships. The account of the orders as they pass from the lower officials until they reach the great satrap Arsham and are then passed down again is a striking illustration of organization in ancient Egypt perilously approaching "red-tape."

The Jewish colony now enters on its most critical years. Rivalries between the Jews and the priests of Khnum led to a revolt during the absence of Arsham in the fourteenth year of Darius (411-410). The temple was destroyed, and our sources are papyri of three years later giving some account of the loss of the temple and praying that it may be rebuilt. To this period probably belong the undated S 7, 10, and 11. The first seems to be an appeal of a Jewish proprietor to Arsham against unjust treatment at the hands of certain officials. The second is a letter addressed to "my lords Jedoniah, Ma'uziah, Uriah, and the (Jewish) army," apparently from some Jews of the province of Thebes. It seems to point to a time of suspicion, enmity, and intrigue, in which, however, Arsham stands out as a supporter of the Jewish complainants. In S 11 Ma'uziah of Abydos writes to "my lords Jedoniah, Uriah, and the priests of the god Yahu, Mattan b. Joshibiah, and Neriah b. . . ." The interpretation is very uncertain.² The writer had been imprisoned by Widarnag on account of a certain precious stone which had been stolen by the traders; he had been released "under the help [literally 'shadow'] of the god of Heaven" by

¹ See for the interpretation, Epstein, *ZATW* (1912), p. 133; Seidel, *ibid.*, p. 298; and for the practice see Isa. 44:5, with the commentaries; *Ency. Bibl.*, art. "Cuttings of the Flesh"; cf. also *Laws of Moses*, etc., pp. 159 f.

² See Meyer, *Süss-ber.*, Berlin (1911), pp. 1035 ff.; Perles, *Or. Lit. Zeit.* (1911), cols. 498 f.; Büchler, *ibid.*, 1912, cols. 126 f.; Torczyner, *ibid.*, cols. 397 f.; Epstein, *ZATW* (1912), p. 129; (1913), pp. 140 ff., 310.

³ See especially W. R. Arnold. *op. cit.*, pp. 19 ff.; and cf. Lagrange, *Rev. bibl.* (1912), pp. 583 f.; Staerk (Lietzmann's *Kleine Texte*, No. 94), pp. 17 f.

Şeha and Ḥor, two servants of 'Anani; and Ma'uziah commends them to the Jews of Yeb. He points out that from the time that Hananiah came to Egypt until now the situation had been growing worse. One sentence even looks as though Ma'uziah advises his friends to sell out the contents of their houses: whether we lose or whether we do not lose, it is all one, and even if we lose we shall gain credit in the house of 'Anani! The interpretation is too hazardous to build upon, but we should notice that 'Anani is evidently a prominent individual, and that Hananiah's arrival (see S 6, above) seems to make a change in the conditions.

Although S-C K, dated in the month Shebat, of the fourteenth year is unaware of trouble, five months later, in Tammuz, when Arsham was called away to the king, the "heathen priests" of Khnum conspired with Widarnag to do away with the temple of Yahu. "This accursed Widarnag"—as he is frankly called—wrote to his son Nephayan to destroy the temple; and this was done with thoroughness. His men broke the pillars of stone and the five great gates, their doors, hinges, the cedar-work roofing—indeed the whole was burned with fire, and the vessels of gold and silver carried off. This temple dated back to the days of the kings of Egypt, i.e., before the Persian Empire; it was especially spared by Cambyses when he came to Egypt, although the temples of the gods of Egypt were destroyed. The writers proudly recall these facts. But now for three years the unhappy Jews besought "Yahu, the Lord of Heaven," fasting and praying. The "hound" Widarnag met with some obscure punishment, he lost all his wealth, and all those who had harmed the temple were slain. A letter had been sent to Bagohi, the governor of Judah, to Jehohanan the high priest, and his associates, the priests in Jerusalem, and to 'Ustan the brother of 'Anani, and the Judaeans nobles. No reply was received. Another letter of the twentieth Marḥeshwan, in the seventeenth year of Darius (408-407) is our authority for the preceding information (S 1 and 2).¹ It tells Bagohi that throughout these three years they have been fasting and wearing sackcloth, their wives treated as widows; they have not anointed themselves

¹ Of this unique letter we have actually two copies, each with errors, and slightly varying from the other.

with oil, nor have they touched wine; no meal-offering (*minḥah*), frankincense (*lēbōnah*), or burnt-offering (*ʿalawah*, [*sic?*]) has been brought. And so "thy servants Jedoniah and his associates, and the Jews, all the citizens [*baalim*; cf. Judg. 9:2] of Yeb," unite in their prayer that the governor may send a letter directing that the temple of Yahu be built up again as it was before. Hitherto this had not been permitted. Let it now be done, and then the meal, incense, and burnt-offerings will be brought to the altar in his name, and they, their wives, their sons, and all the Jews that are there will always pray for him. If this temple be rebuilt it will be for him a cause of merit (*šēdākāh*) before Yahu (cf. Deut. 24:13), even more than if one were to offer burnt-offering and sacrificial offerings of a thousand talents! Finally, the writers state that they have sent and made known all these things in a letter to Delaiah and Shelemiah, sons of Sanballat, governor of Samaria; and it is added, parenthetically as it were, that Arsham was ignorant of all that had been done against them (i.e., he was not to blame).

The crisis is illustrated by some fragments of papyri of independent origin acquired by the University of Strassburg in 1898 and first edited by Euting in 1903.¹ These show that the priests of Khnum bribed Widarnag with money and goods, destroyed some part of the fortress, and stopped up the well upon which the garrison depended. Arsham is asked to verify this for himself through the judges and other officials of the province. The writers protest that they had not been among the rebels, and thus it would seem that the attack upon the Jews was only part of a revolt against the Persian rule. In this case the loyalty of the Jews is the more significant. Certainly, if the Jews had a claim to favorable treatment, they were not altogether disappointed. S 3 gives the reply of Bagohi and Delaiah. It is worth quoting in full:

Memorandum [*zīkrōn*] of what Bagohi and Delaiah said to me, memorandum, viz., It shall be for thee in Egypt to say before Arsham in reference to the sacrificial place [*bēth mādḇēhā*] of the God of heaven which was built aforetime in the fortress Yeb, before Cambyes, which this accursed Widarnag

¹ Sachau, pp. 26 f.; Ungnad, pp. 8 f.; Lidzbarski, *Ephem.*, II, 210 ff.

destroyed in the fourteenth year of Darius the king, to build it up in its place, as it was of old, and meal-offering and frankincense-offering shall [or may] they bring upon this altar, even as it was being done aforetime.

One cannot fail to be struck by the unconventional character of the document; it is merely a docket, a note, in striking contrast to the elaborate record respecting the ship (S 8). It implies other documents. On the analogy of the decree of Cyrus in Ezra 6:3 f., for example, we might at least have expected specific details; and it may be noticed that some fragments of papyri do actually contain obscure measurements, which, however, do not necessarily have any reference to the temple.¹ But they show that details such as those ascribed to the "memorandum" of Cyrus were familiar.

Next, it was at once noticed that S 3 ignores the burnt-offerings. It could be argued that the papyrus is merely a memorandum and not necessarily complete, or that the "altar" (*madbēḥa*) naturally implies burnt-offerings, without which a temple would be of little avail. But the memorandum does not use the term "temple." Besides, Daiches has pointed out that the Talmud asks whether a burnt-offering in the (later) temple of Onias at Heliopolis was valid.² Consequently there may have been a desire to restrict the privileges of the "altar-house" at Yeb. S 4 is relevant but very imperfect (S 4). Five men of Syene, holding property in Yeb, write to "our lord"—presumably Arsham. They are Jedoniah, Maʿuzi b. Nathan (probably the scribe of S-C H and J), Shemaiah b. Haggai, Hoshea b. Yathom, and Hoshea b. Nathon. The following scraps can be made out: "If our lord . . . and the temple of the god Yahu which . . . in the fortress Yeb, as it for[merly was built?], and sheep [*kn*], oxen, goats, burnt-offering[?] [*mḵlw*] are not[?] offered there, but frankincense, meal-offering . . . , and our lord . . . will make . . . he has given [*or we will give*] to the house of our lord . . . a thous[and] measures of

¹ See S 9 and also the text edited by Vogüé, *Rép. d'épig. sem.*, I, No. 246; and cf. Lidzbarski, *Ephem.*, II, 217.

² Talm. B. *Menah.* 109a. See *Zeit. f. Ass.*, XXII, 198n. For the term *bēḥ madbēḥā* in S 3 cf. II Chron. 7:12, and the Aramaic phrase in Ezra 6:3.

barley. . . . " The document seems to refer to a prohibition of animal-offerings, but one is forced to admit that to embark upon conjecture is to explain *obscurum per obscurius*.²

The papyri that remain to be noticed are of less conspicuous interest. S 31 is either of the twenty-seventh *or* of the seventeenth year of Darius; if the former figure is correct, the reference is not to Darius II (424-405), but to the first of the name (521-485). In this case the papyrus will be the oldest extant (494 B.C.). But if we accept the lesser figure, we are in the year 407, and with this later date the writing agrees. Selū'ah and Yethōmah—who reappear in S 73(3)—are daughters of Ḳoniah, and exchange property with Yehah'ōr ("Yahu is light"), the daughter of Shelomim, in accordance with a judicial decree. We observe once more the freedom of women, and should notice that naturally there would be some other document to describe the details of the portions which are exchanged. S 15, between 409 and 405 B.C., is a debt, the creditor being Yislaḥ b. Gadol, perhaps identical with the witness of that name in S-C J. Of greater importance is S 16 which contains the names of certain women (including one named Beryl) and men who suffered in some tumult. Apparently the women were imprisoned, the men taken, the houses entered, and the valuables seized. The remainder is perfectly legible and almost as unintelligible; but one may suspect an allusion to the troublous years during which the colony suffered at the hands of the Egyptian priests. This is supported by the names of the men which include Jedoniah b. Gemariah and Hoshea b. Nathom, the latter perhaps identical with one of the Hosheas mentioned with the former in S 4, as leading citizens of Yeb. The possibility remains, however, that the document belongs to the great revolt which attended the rise of the national king Amyrtaeus who with the help of Greek soldiers threw off the Persian yoke in the last decade of the fifth century B.C. It is conceivable that the attack upon the Jewish colony, which had so evidently enjoyed Persian patronage, and remained loyal to the overlord, formed part of the preliminary steps. At all events, it may be significant that we find no mention of "Jews," after 407, and although there

² See Lagrange, 1912, pp. 130, 577 f.; Steuernagel, ZDPV (1912), p. 90.

are Jewish names, the ethnic, if any, is "Aramaean" (S 15). To the fifth year of Amyrtaeus (*ca.* 400) belongs S 37, an account of the two shekels which Menahem, an Aramaean, in the fortress of Yeb, owed the woman Seluah (his wife?), apparently as part of her dowry.

This concludes our survey of the chief Elephantine papyri, and may suffice to give a fairly objective and trustworthy outline of the life of the Jewish colony. There are the many lists—often fragmentary or scarcely intelligible—of people and of property. There are the records of official, military, and private life. Upon the legal usages much valuable light is thrown. We see something of the ordinary conditions of the people, their wealth and—as the numerous jar-handles tell us (S 82 ff.)—their wine. Of especial interest are the letters, only too often hopelessly obscure. The Aramaic equivalent of the *Grüss Gott* is a familiar feature; and it is worth remembering that the conventional phrase is found centuries earlier in one of the cuneiform letters unearthed at Taanach: "May the Gods greet thee, thy house and thy children" (*ilāni li-iš-a-lu šu-lum-ka šu-lum bīli-ka mārē-ka*). Again, the Jewish writers will declare, "We are all well here" (S 10.; cf. 46 A), just as did their later Greek brothers (*διὰ παντὸς εὐχόμεθα σε ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ὄγω*), and as our own simple folk are supposed to "hope you're well as it leaves me at present." The general conditions were the same, *mutatis mutandis*, in other Jewish centers. This is the most important and certain conclusion we can draw. Notice, further, the elaborate character of the organization, and the careful and systematic methods upon which the Persian Empire was conducted.¹ Aramaic was the *lingua franca*, but the civilization, as a whole, is deeply marked with the result of the earlier influence of Babylonian-Assyrian domination. The Persians preserved the procedure they found in use, and maintained the continuity of tradition. The legal documents, in particular, afford many an example of legal methods, phrases, and terms which find their parallel in ancient Babylonia.² Moreover, these

¹ Upon this the discussions of Eduard Meyer should be especially consulted (above, p. 360, n. 4).

² Staerk's book (Nos. 22, 23) gives many illustrations; see also for demotic and Greek parallels, L. Blau in *Judaica, Festschrift zu Hermann Cohen* (1912), pp. 207-26.

parallels extend down into the talmudic literature, which has other examples of law that can be illustrated from old Babylonian sources; and in Palestine itself the discovery at Gezer of contract-tablets in Assyrian, of the middle of the seventh century B.C., is an indication that the same stamp of legal procedure ruled over the whole area.

We are gradually coming to recognize ever more clearly that there was a certain unity of life and thought throughout the ancient East. The features that may be called international or oriental must be set against those that really prove to be peculiar to particular peoples and areas. A great deal of attention has been paid to the "comparative" treatment of the religion, law, and other aspects of the thought of ancient Western Asia as a whole, and already the results are highly significant.¹ Regarding as one unit the peoples of the "Bible lands"—to employ a convenient term—we have to recognize that although there were many very important differences—e.g., between Palestine and Babylonia—yet the points of resemblance, similarity, or identity must be carefully considered, if research is to proceed upon scientific lines. This means that while the biblical student will approach his problems from the Old Testament, the more historical student will seek to place the Book in the light of our increasing knowledge of the conditions that prevailed throughout the "Bible lands."

The papyri themselves bear witness to the extent of intercourse. The fragments of the Behistun inscription of Darius (p. 350, above) would indicate that copies were sent around (cf. the "apocryphal" Esther 13:1 ff.; 16:1 f.), or at least that there were people evidently interested enough to desire a copy. The so-called "Passover papyrus" (S 6), and the correspondence between Elephantine and the priests of Jerusalem, the governor of Judah, and Sanballat, are evidence of interrelations which, to judge from the various biblical references to Egypt, were not confined to any one age. This point is of the utmost importance for its bearing upon the relationship between religion in Palestine and in Elephantine. Moreover, the jar-handles from Phoenicia indicate communications between Upper

¹ Cf. Meyer, *Papyrusfund*, p. 115; and see especially the writings of Hugo Winckler (in particular *Religionsgeschichtlicher u. geschichtlicher Orient*, 1906).

Egypt and the Levant. Consequently we are not entitled to regard the Jewish colony as some secluded, parochial community, living a sequestered life, retaining such religious conceptions as the early founders had brought with them, and untouched by, if not ignorant of, events in the world outside.

The Elephantine papyri, like the cuneiform tablets from Nippur, reveal something of the many-sidedness of Jewish life in exile (cf. also Jer. 29:5 ff.). The "exile" (*gōlāh*) was more tolerable than "captivity" (*shēbī*). Jews could do business and acquire wealth and reputation. In Elephantine as in Nippur they seem to have mixed freely with other peoples. What is told of a Daniel, a Nehemiah, or a Tobit reflects cases where capable Jews gained high positions, though exiled from their native Zion. The lamentable pictures of desolate refugees represent only one aspect of the situation when the native land was under the heel of the aggressor; and it is important to bear in mind that our ideas are based step by step upon just such evidence as happens to come under our eye. It will be observed, too, that the legal documents represent only a part of the literary activity. How imperfect would be our conception of the Jews of Yeb had we only the Sayce-Cowley papyri! The addition to our knowledge made by the series edited by Sachau is quietly suggestive of the danger, elsewhere, of basing sweeping judgments upon any small or one-sided body of evidence. Every piece of evidence has its implications; the problem is to determine them without exaggeration.

Of the ordinary literary documents the fragments of the story of the wise Ahikar take the premier position. They are a unique example of old Aramaic narrative, and illustrate the speed with which history becomes romance. Written in the first person, the narrative is a good specimen of quasi-autobiographical literature, but of no independent value as a historical source, in spite of its irreproachable names (Sennacherib and Esarhaddon).¹ If the introduction of Achiacharus in the Book of Tobit is to indicate that Tobit was related to this great sage, it is just conceivable that

¹ See Meyer, *Papyrusfund*, pp. 120 ff.; cf. also Torrey, *Ezra Studies*, pp. 244 ff. on the use of the "I" in Ezra-Nehemiah.

the story was also of traditional interest to Jedoniah.¹ However, the Egyptian Jews seem to have possessed other "secular" literature, some of which betrays an anti-Egyptian bias.² There may have been a distinct antiquarian interest and to this may be due the fact that we have two copies of the appeal to Bagohi. The only trifling document is S 43 which, if Lidzbarski is right, is a school-boy's copy.³

The oldest version of the story of Ahikar is already a romance, and it differs from later versions, partly as regards material contents, and partly in the gnomic sayings. The story lent itself to elaboration, and the utterances could be altered at will. Thus, any given fragment of the story does not necessarily presuppose the complete version with which we happen to be acquainted. In textual and literary criticism it frequently happens that we find a general similarity in some particulars and a wide difference in others. Now, whenever we seek to determine the context or the implications of any piece of evidence, there is the danger of giving it a body or framework similar to that which analogous or identical evidence has elsewhere. The risks of hasty inference are well illustrated by the publication of our papyri. The Sayce-Cowley papyri in 1906 first told us of the temple of Yahu; it seemed that the building was merely an altar or shrine. Sachau's early edition of S 1-3 (in 1907) showed that we had an elaborate temple of considerable importance; but the pathetic picture of the suspended cults threw no light upon their true character. Only with the complete edition of all the papyri in 1911 did we learn of the other deities who enjoyed with Yahu the worship of the faithful. Even now it is unsafe to speculate on the precise religious ideas and conceptions that prevailed; and this, not only because of the inadequacy of the evidence, but also on account of the need of a sounder criticism of the religious psychology of the Old Testament. The

¹ See Nau, *Rev. bibl.*, IX, 79; D. C. Simpson, Charles's ed. of the *Apocrypha: Tobit*, pp. 191, 194. Practically all the papyri came from the same quarter of Yeb.

² The story of Ahikar appears in some parts to be anti-Egyptian; and later, of course, Jewish-Egyptian rivalry shows itself in "historical" propaganda—e.g., the stories of Manetho. Cf. perhaps *CIS*, II, 145.

³ *Ephem.*, III, 245. But see Strack, *ZDMG*, LXV, 828; Schwally, *Or. Lit. Zeit.*, 1912, col. 166; Lagrange, *Rev. bibl.* (1912), pp. 136 f.

problem is that of the implications—the “psychological” context—of any piece of the evidence.

The “comparative” study of religions forbids hasty generalization. It happens, for example, that one of the finest of Babylonian hymns is addressed to Ishtar, goddess of war and of love; it is a distinctly “religious” composition, but it concludes with a characteristically “magical” charm. Ishtar is no other than the Astarte (biblical “Ashtoreth”) of Western Asia, certain aspects of whose cults are notorious. Conversely, the Old Testament proves that the worshipers of Yahweh were prone to beliefs and practices which the best minds had continuously to condemn. Thus we are not to estimate the worship of Ishtar solely by those features we repudiate, nor that of Yahweh by the more spiritual elements. We do not gain a correct picture of cults from the lips of reformers, for all reformers focus their gaze upon the blemishes and vices, and not upon any redeeming features that might be found in them. The local cults of Palestine must have had some value for their adherents, and a synthetic view of the development of Hebrew religion should deal sympathetically and critically with the point of view both of the reformers and of those to be reformed. The fact that a Yahu or a Yahweh is worshiped is no proof that the religious conceptions were precisely those which we think it only natural to associate with the names; nor should the fact that a cult contains features which we call “heathenish” blind us to the value it did have, or may have had, for the worshipers. The variations and fluctuations which the student of Hebrew religion has to investigate are analogous to the different readings, recensions, and versions or traditions which occupy the textual, literary, or historical critic. Everywhere it is necessary to co-ordinate *both* the resemblances and the differences; and the best synthesis is that which can best account for all counterarguments.¹

¹ See for the “popular” religion of Israel, Meyer, *Papyrusfund*, pp. 45 ff. Jastrow, too, has observed that we must differentiate more sharply than has hitherto been done between the popular currents and the speculative, between what the people believed and the way in which the priests treated these beliefs (*Aspects of Rel. Belief in Bab. and Ass.* [1911], pp. vii f.). The fundamental principles have already been laid down by W. Robertson Smith (*Religion of the Semites*, chaps. i and ii), who especially emphasizes the *practical* relations and the *working* institutions (see

Perhaps the greatest "sensation" of the papyri was the appearance, side by side, of Yahu, ʾAsm-bethel, and ʿAnath-bethel. Bethel occurs in several compound proper names in the papyri, in the Old Testament (reading Bethel-sharezer in Zech. 7:2), and elsewhere.¹ It is used as a divine name, and this, as has been pointed out, at once illuminates Jer. 48:13, where Bethel stands to Israel in precisely the same relation as Chemosh to Moab. The transition from *bethel*, the object, or place, to the "numen" that abides in it is familiar. In Babylonia the great temple, *Esagila*, is deified in the name *Esagil-idinnam*, and *Ekurru*, "temple," is used in Assyrian, and more especially in Mandaean, in the plural, as a term for "demons."² Moreover, the *Asherah*, or tree-trunk, can hardly be separated from the name of the goddess Ashirat. Finally, *bethel* occurs in S 28, where an oath is to be taken by the god Ḥerem-bethel (p. 352, above). It is natural to compare S 33, where an oath seems to be taken by the *Masgēddā* and by ʿAnath-yahu. The latter name recalls ʿAnath-bethel, and it has been suggested that Bethel (the god) and Yahu were sometimes regarded as identical. This, in fact, is directly confirmed by Jer. 48:13 (above). *Masgēddā*, the Arabic equivalent of which gives us our "mosque," denotes some votive stele, sacred stone, or altar, closely associated with a deity; and consequently it is possible that the oath is taken both by the sacred object, and also by the numen or deity which it represents or embodies.³ But what is Ḥerem-bethel (S 28)? In S 36 a witness is called Ḥerem-nathan b. Bethel-nathan. Here Ḥerem functions like a divine name ("H. gives"), but the interpretation must be left open: it may be the deification of the sacred precincts of a shrine, or, with Lidzbarski, we may perhaps associate the

pp. 82 f.). The standpoint of those who adhered to the local cults in Palestine may no doubt be seen in II Kings 18:22. The late persistence of idolatrous practices is evident from the Talmud; see e.g., *Abodah Zarah* (Elmslie's ed., p. 65). See also the present writer's *The Study of Religions* (1914), chaps. v f., on "survivals."

¹ See Zimmern, *KAT*³, pp. 437 f.; Sachau, *Index*, p. 276 (to which add S 17, l. 8, with Epstein; and *CIS*, II, 154, ll. 2 and 7, an ostrakon from Elephantine).

² See, for the latter, J. A. Montgomery, *Aramaic Incantation Texts from Nippur* (1913), pp. 72 f.

³ Cf. Lagrange, *Études des rel. sémit.*, pp. 206 f., 209 f.; G. A. Cooke, *North-Semitic Inscriptions*, p. 238; cf. also the oath by the altar, Matt. 23:16, 18.

name with that of the South Arabian war-god Ḥ-r-m-n.¹ The latter is suggestive in view of the third deity, now to be considered.

The first part of 'Anath-bethel is the name of a goddess of war who happens to have been known in Egypt many centuries previously. She is represented with helmet and arms and was often associated with Astarte. Several traces of her are found in Palestine in the shape of names: Anathoth (between Jerusalem and Bethel), the Benjaminite compound Anthoth-yah (I Chron. 8:24), Beth-anath and Beth-anoth. Anathi in S 19, col. 6, 1.8 is perhaps an abbreviation of Anath-yahu. It is not certain whether Anath may be equated with the Babylonian Anatum, the feminine of Anu, god of heaven. That she was also a goddess of heaven cannot be proved, but it is probable; in which case we must note that Yahu himself is styled "god of heaven" in S 1-3. The combination 'Anath-yahu (S 33) is therefore not unnatural, for if Anath is a goddess of war, Yahweh in turn has the characteristics of a war-god.² The association of goddess and god in this manner is not unique. On the inscription of Mesha, king of Moab, we meet with both Chemosh and 'Ashtar-chemosh; in Syria the familiar Atargatis is a compound of Athtar ('Ashtar) and Atis, and in Phoenician we have, in the reverse order, Milk-ashtart, Eshmun-ashtart, and Šid-tanith. The combination points to some identity of nature or fusion of cult, and one can hardly avoid the conclusion that Yahu is here as closely associated with a female deity as is Chemosh in the Moabite example just quoted.

There remains the perplexing 'Asm(or 'Ashm)-bethel. The first part has been regarded (a) as an abbreviation of Eshmun; (b) as the Babylonian fire-god Ishum, who reappears in two compound names in S 26; or (c) as the equivalent of *Shēm*, "name." Very attractive is (d) the suggestion connecting it with Ashima of Hamath (II Kings 17:30; the LXX points to a feminine Ashimath). This deity (a goddess?) has also been "discovered" in Amos 8:14, by reading: "they that swear by the Ashima of Samaria and say, by

¹ See *Ephem.*, III, 248 f.

² Lagrange reports that Clermont-Ganneau found fragments inscribed with יהוה צבאות and יהוה שְׁבָאֵ־־וֹת; the latter corresponds to Yahweh Šēbā'ōth, "Yahweh of the (war) hosts" (*Rev. bibl.*, 1908, p. 261, n. 2).

the life of thy god, O Dan, and by the life of thy numen [*dōd*; so Winckler], O Beersheba." Two other identifications are to be noticed: one (*e*) with the Syrian Sime who is associated with Zeus (Hadad) and Hera, and as a daughter of the former; the other (*f*) equates the whole name 'Asm-bethel with the second of the triad in an inscription from North Syria to *Σειμίῳ καὶ Συμβετίλῳ καὶ Λέοντι θεοῖς πατρώοις*. A decisive explanation seems impossible, and although the Samaritan Ashima is perhaps the best the triads are very suggestive.¹

Elephantine was the seat of the cult of Khnum. Names with this element appear among the colonists. Pa-Khnum occurs twice (as father of Hanan and as son of Zakkur), and Peṭe-khnum also twice (as father of Hoshea and as son of Ḥuri, S-C B, S 22). We have already seen that a priest of Khnum dwelt hard by the temple (S-C E), and the only certain instance of intermarriage between Jew and Egyptian was hardly unique (S-C G). In view of the conditions, we are entitled to assume some adjustment of religious beliefs, some interchange of religious ideas. Consequently it is significant that Elephantine had a famous triad: Khnum, lord of the cataract, Sati, mistress of Elephantine, and Ānūkt, a sister-goddess. They are mentioned together in Egyptian inscriptions as early as Sesostris I and as late as Apries. A Greek inscription names six great gods; the second triad is very secondary, but the first place is assigned to *χνοῦβει τῷ καὶ Ἀμμωνι, Σάτει τῇ καὶ Ἥρᾳ, Ἀνούκει τῇ καὶ Ἑστίᾳ*.² Sati and Anuki are thus identified with Hera and Hestia respectively—with the wife of Zeus and with the fire- or hearth-goddess. Sati, the "mistress," was a goddess of fertility (cf. Astarte), sometimes represented with bow and arrows; Anuki

¹ See Dussaud, *Rev. de l'hist. des rel.*, LXIV, 349; Lidzbarski, III, 247, 260-65; Grimme, *Orient. Lit.-Zeit.*, 1912, cols. 14 f.; and especially König, *ZATW*, 1914, pp. 16-30. Offord equates Bethel, Anath, and Ashima with the Syrian Hadad, Atargatis, and Sime (*Pal. Explor. Fund. Quart. Stat.*, 1915, April and July).

² See Breasted, *Records*, I, §§ 500, 644, 646, 650; II, 794, note; IV, 991; and *CIG*, III, 4893. When Herodotus says that Hera and Hestia were unknown (ii. 50) he may not have been aware of the identification, or it may be later than his time. The relation between the three is illustrated by the very late text referring to a king: "he was a son of Khnum, born of Sati, nursed by Ānūkt"; see Wiedemann, *Rel. of the Anc. Egyptians*, pp. 13 f.

wears a foreign headdress of a cap fringed with feathers. It is possible that the Jewish triad arose under the influence of the Egyptian; and while Yahu would correspond to Khnum, the sister-goddesses of the Egyptians would be balanced by the *Bethel* compounds, and of these Anath is certainly female and 'Asm (?Ashima or Sime) possibly so. Moreover, Anath as goddess of war bears some resemblance to Sati, who, as "mistress of Elephantine," stands to Khnum in much the same relation as Anath to Yahu.¹ The problem obviously offers scope for almost unlimited speculation, and one must be content merely to emphasize the two triads. It must be remembered that Khnum was more than a mere local god; he was also "fashioner of gods and of men," and when we throw ourselves back to Elephantine in the fifth century B.C. the question of *my* Khnum and *your* Yahu would naturally interest the Egyptian and the Jew. It is inherently probable that there would be syncretistic tendencies, but in the absence of explicit evidence it would be unwise in this article to go beyond our data.

The really serious problem is the apparently obvious polytheism of the Jewish colony. We might venture to speak of a small pantheon! It is evident that in ordinary speech and solemn oath the Jews were not averse to the use of the divine name (S-C B₄, E₁₄, J₆). The formula "May God (or the gods) greet" may be conventional, and it is disputed whether the subject is singular or plural. Jeremiah's references to the cult of the "queen of heaven" and to the general idolatrous behavior of Jews in Egypt are, however, quite unambiguous. Jampel frankly points out that mediaeval Judaism had its secondary beings or "substances," and that modern oriental and Russian Jews are ready to resort to magic; why then should not the Jewish women have resorted to the "queen of heaven"?² That the religious conditions in Palestine itself, even after the exile, were unsatisfactory from a strictly monotheistic point of view is proved by such passages as Isa. 57:3 ff.; 65:4 f.; 66:17. It is not to be expected, therefore, that in Yeb the situation was better. The efforts made to maintain the monotheism of these

¹ If Anuki was identified with Hestia, may one associate Asm with Ishum, the fire-god?

² *MGWJ*, LV (1911), 662 f., 665.

Jews have not been happy, and we may quote Father Lagrange's shrewd question: "Ne serait-ce pas en quelque manière taxer d'exagération Jérémie et Ezéchiel?" Persian influence is also to be anticipated; and there may be a reference in S 10₆ to a *Mazdayasna*, a devotee of Ahuramazda. The choice of the title "god of heaven" may be suggested by Persian use;¹ and the words "by the shadow of the god of heaven" (S 11₅) at once recall the phrase "by the shadow of Ahuramazd," which, by the way, often recurs in the Behistun fragments (S 65₅, 13, etc.). At the other end of the scale we may place the rude objects disclosed by excavation and indicative of crude and popular ideas of the mother-goddess, etc.² The whole body of evidence, with the mingling of Jewish and non-Jewish names, furnishes a vivid picture of the general religious conditions; yet the religion is outwardly henotheistic: to "Yahu, god of heaven" the temple belongs, and he alone is mentioned at the head of the great list (S 19) which names his two associates.

The antiquity of the colony at Elephantine cannot be determined with any certainty. The outstanding fact is the claim that the temple of Yahu was established before the time of Cambyses (S 13, 35; cf. 72), i.e., before 529 B.C. Naturally there was always some sort of intercourse between Egypt and Western Asia. In the seventh century B.C. Assyrian conquerors had established their garrisons in the land of the Nile. It has been argued that the general character of the cult points to a time before the Deuteronomic reformation ascribed to Josiah (II Kings, chaps. 22 f.). But this argument has little value when we consider conditions in Palestine itself even after Josiah's reign. The time of Psammetichus II has found strong support. In his fourth year he invaded Palestine (ca. 590 B.C.), the Letter of Aristeas (§§ 12 f.) mentions Jewish soldiers dispatched to Egypt to help him in his campaign against Ethiopia, and graffiti at Abu Simbel (Ipsambul) bear witness to the presence of Phoenician, Greek, and Carian mercenaries.³ Elephantine was the frontier city, and later, in the reign of Apries, we hear of a military revolt in which were involved Palestinians, Greeks, Syrians (ʿAmu, Ḥanebu, Satiu), and others. Moreover,

¹ See Lidzbarski, *Eph.*, I, 250 f.; III, 246. ² *Zeit. f. aeg. Spr.*, XLVI, 30 ff.

³ The references can hardly be to Ps. 1; see Alt, *ZATW*, 1910, pp. 288 ff., 296.

the references in Jeremiah (chaps. 42-44; 46:14) attest the presence of Jews in Upper and Lower Egypt, and the mere fact that this is known is instructive, because we must not suppose that the colony, whenever inaugurated, was quite cut off from Palestine. And not only was it known that there were Jews in Egypt, but it is quite possible that Elephantine received additions during the Persian period (see Aristeas, § 35).

An examination of the names of the Jews shows a definite absence of any Phoenician type—exception being made of the jug-inscriptions.¹ They include several divine names of a type that is markedly Babylonian, Assyrian, or Mesopotamian, e.g., Nusku, Hadad, and Nebo. Strangely enough there is no clear case of a name with the ambiguous prefix *El-* (God). Most characteristic is the ending *-iah* (*-yah*), which has abundant analogies in the exilic and post-exilic lists in Ezra-Nehemiah and Chronicles.² The general intermixture of names resembles that among the Jews at Nippur, where, as has been observed, the names are of the time of Artaxerxes I and Darius II; relatively few are earlier, and the new names have ideas which appear to be suggested by the exile.³ Later, at Memphis, Greek inscriptions point to the presence of a definitely Idumaeen circle; here at Elephantine the names are distinctively exilic and post-exilic rather than pre-exilic, a fact which supports the view that the colony, whenever founded, may have received additions from time to time.

It is very generally held that the colony was Israelite rather than Judaeen, Samaritan (with perhaps recruits from Babylonia) rather than Jewish.⁴ The theory may be influenced by the con-

¹ The readings S 82-80 are to be corrected after Dussaud, *Rev. de l'hist. des rel.*, LXIV, 352 f., and, more especially, Lidzbarski, *Abhandl. of the Berlin Academy*, 1912.

² See G. B. Gray, *Proc. of Soc. of Bibl. Archaeol.*, 1903, pp. 262 f., and, on the similar names on Jewish seals, cf. S. A. Cook, *ibid.*, 1904, pp. 109-12, 164-67, with *Pal. Explor. Fund. Quart. Stat.*, 1909, p. 290 (the names), 291 (seals), 305 f. (epigraphical data). The evidence takes us to the Persian rather than to the preceding period.

³ S. Daiches: "The Jews in Babylonia in the Time of Ezra and Nehemiah according to Babylonian inscriptions," *Publication No. 2 of the Jews' College*, London, 1910, pp. 8, 12 ff., 27 f.

⁴ See, e.g., Lévi, *op. cit.*, LIV, 38; LXIII, 182 f.; Grimme, *Orient. Lit. Zeit.*, 1912, cols. 11 ff.; Van Gelderen, *ibid.*, 337; Nau, *Rev. bibl.*, 1912, p. 74; Lagrange, *ibid.*, p. 587. It would be unsafe to rely upon "Jedoniah, the Geshurite" (*CIS*, II, 138A, l. 3), of Elephantine (? the Aramaean or the Philistine Geshur).

viction that Judaeon religion would be purer, by the type of such names as Bethel, Menahem, Meshullam, etc., and perhaps also by the frequent use of the term "Aramaean." On the other hand, there is no decisive reason for supposing that the colony was *not* Judaeon, or that Judaeon religion was necessarily more spiritual. At all events, there is nothing to prove that these Jews were cut off from the outside world, or that they were unaware, say, of the sweeping changes ascribed to Josiah. It is most improbable that Elephantine, with its copy of the inscription of Darius at Behistun, was ignorant of Palestinian affairs; and the mere fact that the priests of Yeb wrote to the high priest of Jerusalem is a pretty clear sign that relations of some sort had been maintained between Jerusalem and Elephantine. If Elephantine was not ignorant of events in Jerusalem, the alternative view is that it did not consider itself bound by them. Even in Palestine there was always need for compromise between strict orthodoxy, on the one hand, and popular belief and custom on the other, between reforming ideals and the body of thought to be reformed. The very first book of the Old Testament retains, side by side, post-exilic "priestly" sources (P) with the earlier popular material (JE), a striking example of the compromise between different levels of thought. It was left for the Book of Jubilees to rewrite Genesis and omit the cruder features, but it is Genesis, with its mixture of "higher" and "lower," of the more spiritual and the less spiritual, which survived, because it always touched the heart. And it is Genesis which still preserves *in writing* the clearest recollection that the *maššebah*, or sacred stone of Bethel, was primarily regarded as the seat of a supernatural presence or influence (Gen. 28:18 ff.). Only later was it looked upon as a harmless symbol or memorial. But it is significant that the later hand did not expunge the tell-tale evidence. Consequently the cruder ideas—which must not be reinterpreted and confused with the more spiritual developments connect themselves with the data at Elephantine. Thus the Bethel-stone recalls the *Masgēda*, the stele or altar, which is joined with Anath-Yahu in the oath, S 33 (p. 353, above). Elsewhere in the Old Testament popular or less spiritual ideas are modified, adjusted, or even excised; and the lengthy and now rather obscure story of the trans-Jordanic

altar 'ed in Josh., chap. 22, shows how the attempt was made to accentuate the unity of worship as having existed from the first. Space forbids more than a general statement that a closer study of the Old Testament reveals abundant evidence for the existence of religious beliefs and customs which were contrary to the stricter monotheistic ideas, and which were reshaped or eradicated as occasion offered. There were fights for the recognition of Yahweh, for his supremacy over other gods, for the annihilation of other gods, for the unitary character of Yahweh as against tendencies to poly-Yahwism—to identifying him with the local Baals. Not without reason does the Shema^c insist: "Yahweh, Our God, is *One* Yahweh." There were the higher and the lower conceptions of deity, and, not least of all, there were the rivalries between religious centers, or between religious bodies; and of all the rivalries one of the latest and most significant appears to have been that between Jerusalem and Bethel.¹

Naturally the papyri are read in the light of the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah; and conversely. After the destruction of their temple (411-410), the Jews of Elephantine appealed to Bagohi, governor of Judah, and to Delaiah and Shelemiah, sons of Sanballat (S 1 and 2).² Bagohi and Delaiah are named in S 3, where permission is given to rebuild the temple and to offer the meal and frankincense offerings. But the omission of burnt-offerings is perplexing. Was the hostility of the Egyptian priests aroused by the Jewish sacrifices—the ram was the animal of Khnum; or did Persian Zoroastrianism find the sacrifices objectionable? Considering the years that had passed since the temple was founded, both views seem improbable. The disaster occurred in Tammuz, the fourth month, long after the Passover; and it was no sudden outbreak. The Jews had laid claim to the special favor of Cambyses; and the disaster is part of a revolt against the Persian rule, when, during the absence of Arsham, Widarnag had been bought over. Whether or no the events are to be connected with the first steps in the rise

¹ See especially R. H. Kennett in *Cambridge Biblical Essays*, ed. Swete, pp. 101 ff., and *Jour. Theol. Studies*, January, 1905, pp. 166 ff.

² Both the LXX and Josephus (Sanaballat) agree with the papyri in recognizing a vowel after the *n* (the Assyrian form would be Sin-uballit, "Sin gives life").

of Amyrtaeus who freed Egypt from Persia, the Jews seem to have suffered as the protégés of Persia and not merely because they were Jews.

Now, with the loss of the temple a new situation was created. A drastic innovation may be injudicious, but when the old order is destroyed one can attempt what one had not previously dared. Compilers and editors have adjusted or modified material that contained objectionable features; they have also tried to rewrite it, or they have excised or ignored it. In like manner, if for any reason the cult of Elephantine was suspect, it was for those who objected to it to adjust or reform it or to suppress it—if they could. The disaster now afforded a new and better opportunity. It is highly significant, therefore, that the Jews complain that they had previously written to "our lord" (i.e., Bagohi), to the priests of Jerusalem, and to the Judaeans nobles, and had received no reply. They had evidently written in all innocence. Perhaps the silence *was* a reply. Did Jerusalem seize the opportunity to show its enmity to the cult at Yeb? Has rivalry with Bethel any bearing upon the silence? Perhaps the so-called "Passover papyrus" (S 6, see p. 357) points to an attempt to institute some reform; and Hananiah (perhaps the brother of Nehemiah), who now appeared in Yeb, caused trouble (see S 11) by his hostility to the cult. Some explanation must be hazarded.

Torrey (*Ezra Studies*, p. 250, note) observes that Delaiah, son of Sanballat, is also the name of one of the degraded priestly families (Ezra 2:60). Is it merely another coincidence that these unorthodox families include the name of Tobiah, recalling the famous Ammonite who was closely related to the Judaeans (Neh. 6:17 f.; 13:4 ff.)? Moreover, Sanballat's daughter had been married into the high priest's family (Neh. 13:28). A period of very close interrelationship between Judah and Samaria was followed by one of hostility, and the exclusivism associated with the names of Nehemiah and Ezra is a new phase in the period—culminating in the Samaritan schism. The question arises therefore whether the silence of Bagohi and Jerusalem on the first occasion is to be connected with the developments in Palestine; and what significance, if any, is to be attached to the fact that the

appeal to both Bagohi and the sons of Sanballat receives attention and that Bagohi and Delaiah reply. This is a problem which more than any other has aroused abundant speculation, but it comes at the end, and not at the beginning, of inquiry. It involves a preliminary criticism of the biblical sources and of all we know of Bagoses (Bagohi) from Josephus (*Ant.*, XI, 7, 1). The Persian period was peculiarly obscure even to the early historians and compilers, and every theory or explanation involves a fuller discussion of the biblical evidence than is possible in this article. Suffice it to say that Jerusalem was evidently unwilling to assist Elephantine, although the latter appealed to it, as though friendly relations had previously existed. Since the reply comes from Bagohi and Delaiah b. Sanballat, it may be that the son of the Samaritan was especially interested in the colony, perhaps because it had traditional associations with Bethel; or perhaps, too, his own relations with Jerusalem were strained, and Judæan exclusivism rankled. The plots and intrigues in Upper Egypt doubtless had their counterpart in Palestine, and the intrigues and rivalries in Jerusalem itself—illustrated in the Book of Nehemiah—are enough to suggest that the question of the rebuilding of the temple at Elephantine would be an occasion for grave searchings of hearts—if not also for questions of “measures of barley” to which S 4 obscurely refers.¹

The fate of the Jewish temple is unknown; no traces of it were found in course of excavation. In taking our leave of it we must notice its general significance. The Elephantine Jews are perfectly acquainted with the Hebrew technical terms for the meal- and frankincense-offerings (*minḥah* and *lēbhōnah*),² for “congrega-

¹ As regards the Palestinian evidence, see my introduction to I Esdras in Charles's *Apocrypha*, I, pp. 6–14. The Elephantine papyri testify to the *sort* of documents cited in Ezra-Nehemiah, but not to those documents themselves. They prove the reality of Persian favor, but not any particular example which is dubious on other grounds. The fact that the Jews had enjoyed special privileges, not only encouraged them to hope for more, but was also enough to tempt them to exaggerate their claims. Modern criticism can logically deny only what is opposed by evidence which is believed to be sounder; and these papyri justify an attitude of cautious doubt where the biblical sources contain statements exaggerated or improbable when compared with other data.

² The same combination and sequence recur in Isa. 43:23; 66:3; Jer. 17:26; 41:5. Strange to say, the term for burnt-offering is *ʿl-w-h* and not *ʿolah*; cf. perhaps *ʿahwah* for *ʿawlah*, “wrong” (Hos. 10:9).

tion" (*ʿēdāh*), "merit" (*šēdākah*), "civilian" (*baʿal kiryah*), "soldier" (*baʿal degel*), etc. The colony and cult had certainly been in closest touch with Hebrew usage; the religion is of Hebrew rather than of any non-Hebraic origin. It is noteworthy that on late jar-handles unearthed at Jericho the divine name is written Yah and Yahu (ten and three times respectively), but it is difficult to determine whether there was any essential difference between Yahu and Yahweh, whether, in fact, as some think, the latter is an artificial form based upon the former. Thus, it will be seen, everywhere the papyri bring us to the point where everything depends upon other evidence and other lines of inquiry; and this article leaves off at the place where all arguments involve particular views of the Old Testament and the "evolution" of religion generally.

But these pages may perhaps establish some conclusions which are indispensable for a proper understanding of the Old Testament. In the first place, everything goes to indicate a very general similarity of conditions of life and thought throughout Egypt and Western Asia. There are indisputable resemblances. But there are also indisputable differences—local and national—and we have to co-ordinate the characteristic and unique features of the Old Testament with the whole oriental area, with which the Book is in general harmony. Next, we must distinguish the present form of the biblical material from the contents. The fact that the Talmud contains legal matter of old Babylonian affinity or origin does not make it pre-Christian; nor is a post-exilic source proved to be pre-exilic by the antiquity of some of its contents. Again the Book of Genesis has much that is old; but once it is recognized that the book in its present form has passed through the hands of post-exilic editors and compilers, and contains post-exilic sources, then those who adhere to the modern *literary-historical* theory—the Graf-Wellhausen, the only existing theory—should work backward, comparing post-exilic and earlier sources with post-exilic and earlier historical vicissitudes. It is especially instructive that the last editors or compilers retain so much that is "popular" and "non-priestly," because the evidence (*viz.*, JE) throws light upon contemporary popular and non-priestly ideas, and proves—what is only to be expected—that the priestly legalism of the post-exilic

age, however characteristic, did not have the whole field to itself. Thus, on the one side, are these variations of thought, while, on the other, we have such evidence as can be obtained for the vicissitudes of the fifth and earlier centuries—the Samaritan rivalry and enmity; rivalries in Judah and Bethel; changes due to the advent of Babylonian exiles; the reorganization under Zerubbabel, the exile. Here, working backward, we have notable events which in the nature of the case must have left their mark upon the thought of their time. Consequently, however important it may be to determine the earliest history, the earliest sources, and their precise extent, there is room for far more tangible and direct inquiry in the exilic and post-exilic periods.¹

Finally, the papyri of Elephantine throw a most welcome light upon the conditions during a period which our biblical sources leave extraordinarily obscure. They bring home to us the very important fact that the Old Testament presents only some of the ideas that prevailed. We have to rely upon such material as has been preserved, and in the form the last compilers gave it. The standpoint of Judah and Jerusalem gains the day; we see history mainly through their spectacles. We are allowed to see the work of Nehemiah and Ezra, but the Book of Ruth survives, and it serves, among other purposes, to promote a kindly spirit between Judah and Moab—thus aiming directly against post-exilic exclusivism.² The temple of Elephantine with its deities would certainly be objectionable to strict monotheistic Judaism; but not only had it enjoyed relations with Palestine; religion in Judah itself could not always afford to throw stones. Indeed the deeper “religious criticism” of the Old Testament raises the very problem which comes to the front today: What is religion, and what is its relation to ethical, national, and other ideals, and in what does the evolution of religion culminate? Questions of this sort, though not consciously realized, have recurred again and again, and our papyri, with the Old Testament, illustrate some of the efforts to deal with the situation. If our interpretation is correct, we may strongly suspect that the

¹ For the bearing of this upon the South Palestinian elements in the Old Testament, see *Ency. Brit.*, 11th ed., XI, 585; XV, 387; XX, 615.

² Cf. Kent, *Beginnings of Hebrew History* (1904), I, 310.

exclusive Judaism of Jerusalem at length refused to tolerate the cult at Elephantine. Yet the Jews of Palestine were never without thought for their scattered brethren, and the writer in Isa. 19:19 still thinks of the pillar at the border of Egypt, a sign and a witness for Yahweh of Hosts.¹ And for an example of the two conflicting tendencies—the one purely universalistic, the other distinctively Jewish, or even Zionist—what can be more striking than Mal. 1:11, on the one side, and Isa. 49:12 on the other? “From East to West my name is great among the nations, and in every place incense is offered unto my name, and a pure offering; for my name is great among the nations, saith Yahweh of Hosts.” Against this remarkable passage set the more characteristic nationalistic feeling—“these shall come from afar, and lo, these from the north and from the west, and these from the land of Syene.”² The restoration of the people is to be complete, and with it would be those who lived far away in Upper Egypt in the border-city on the confines of Ethiopia.

¹ The *massebah* is regarded as legitimate by treating it merely as a memorial; cf. the treatment of the stone in Gen., chap. 28, and of the altar *ed.* in Josh., chap. 22.

² “The Land of Sinim” often supposed to be China should be read as above (so Michaelis, in the first instance; both Targ. and Vulg. rightly placed the name in the south).

WHAT SHALL THE SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGIAN EXPECT FROM THE NEW TESTAMENT SCHOLAR?

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It is the purpose of the present paper to ask certain questions as to the relationship which should prevail between the department of New Testament interpretation and the department of systematic theology in the light of the present methods of scholarship in these two departments.

As the theological curriculum used to be defined, both departments were apparently working with the same material. Systematic theology was supposed to set forth scriptural doctrines. But this was also the task of the biblical theologian. Moreover, since it was assumed that the content of modern belief would be essentially identical with that of biblical doctrine, the interpreter of the Bible would conceive himself to be expounding truths for the edification of modern men. Dr. Shedd declared that the principal difference between systematic theology and biblical theology lay in the fact that the biblical theologian dealt with the body of doctrine part by part, while the systematic theologian considered it as a comprehensive whole.¹ From this point of view the New Testament scholar would be compelled to deal with doctrinal materials in the sequences furnished by the New Testament writers, while the systematic theologian using the same material would be free to consult the logical exigencies of a system.

The influence of this point of view is still felt in both departments. Moreover, the current methods of religious instruction in the churches tend to perpetuate the habits formed under the dominance of this tradition. The New Testament scholar, even when he is attempting to give a strictly historical interpretation, cannot escape the knowledge of the fact that in popular preaching

¹ *Dogmatic Theology*, I, 11.

and in religious instruction the New Testament is used as an authoritative textbook in religion and morals. Consequently, he is led to interpret the New Testament with specific reference to modern religious problems rather than with primary regard for the problems of first-century religious life. So, too, the theologian, bearing in mind this same current use of the New Testament as a doctrinal textbook, is constantly impelled to answer modern questions by asking what the New Testament teaches.

The historical method of interpretation involves the abandonment of this normative conception. Instead of regarding the New Testament primarily as a quarry from which to derive doctrinal material for use in present-day theological construction, the modern New Testament scholar is concerned rather to give a faithful interpretation of the religious thoughts and activities of men living in New Testament times. As this historical point of view has become more familiar, it is realized that the conditions of religious thinking in the first century differed in many important respects from conditions with which modern men are familiar. This means that some elements of New Testament belief are of such a character that they cannot be employed directly in modern theological thinking. For example, we cannot transfer to the theology of our day the beliefs which the New Testament reflects concerning demons or concerning cosmic history. But it is the duty of historical exposition to do full justice to all the aspects of first-century ideas, whether these aspects are or are not of primary importance for present-day thinking.

In systematic theology, also, the former biblical standpoint has been largely abandoned. Scholars in this field are becoming increasingly eager to meet the questions which religious men today are asking and to discuss these questions in such a way as to promote tenable and inspiring religious convictions. The theologian does not need to deal with matters which are practically obsolete, even though these enter into the content of New Testament theology. On the other hand, he must consider problems which men today are propounding, even though these problems did not enter the imagination of men in the first century.

To put it briefly, it is the business of the New Testament scholar to interpret truthfully the religious life and the religious beliefs of Christian men in the first century of our era, while it is the duty of the systematic theologian to discuss frankly and honestly the religious problems of men in the twentieth century. These two realms do not exactly coincide. The New Testament scholar must, therefore, deal with some materials which the systematic theologian does not use at all, while, on the other hand, the systematic theologian must discuss some problems which the New Testament scholar need not raise at all. There is, of course, a certain territory of religious life common to both, but each discipline has its peculiar point of view in dealing with this common material.

Now, the inheritance of the older conception of the substantial identity between biblical theology and systematic theology constantly suggests the method of determining the content of modern belief by an appeal to the New Testament. But the special interests of the theologian naturally lead him to approach the New Testament writings from a dogmatic rather than a historical point of view. The result of such dogmatically prejudiced interpretation is virtually to make a New Testament writer say what the theologian wants him to say. "Proof-text" citations and appeals to isolated passages support forced and distorted interpretations. Such dogmatic interpretation is immediately seen by the historical scholar to be superficial and misleading.

Now the theologian who is not professionally equipped for exact historical exegesis may engage in artificial interpretation with entire innocence. He is therefore not in a position to rescue the study of the Bible from those misinterpretations which are dictated by practical homiletic zeal. The continued employment of loosely edifying ways of interpreting the New Testament, however, inevitably means a loss of the capacity for conscientious truthfulness in reporting and interpreting the words of others. It would be interesting to inquire just what connection there is between the unscrupulous misrepresentations which are so often found in the polemic debates of certain "defenders of the faith" and the methods of biblical interpretation which these same debaters are in the habit of using. When one feels

oneself at liberty to derive from a biblical text precisely the meaning which one wishes that text to have, it is likewise easy to interpret the statement of a theological opponent in such a way as to make that opponent apparently mean what one would like to have him mean in order that his position may be easily refuted. One of the most disheartening things about much theological controversy of our day is the unscrupulous lack of truthfulness in representing the position of an opponent. In too many instances there is apparently no effort made to verify statements which might be verified with very little labor. Such misrepresentations reveal a serious lack of sensitiveness concerning standards which should be familiar to any man who is conscientious concerning truth-telling. There is great danger lest loose and prejudiced methods of interpreting the New Testament may have grave results in encouraging a lax standard in the matter of reporting events or statements in present-day life. In these days of insistence on accuracy, a minister or a teacher whose statements have not been carefully submitted to the best tests available will rapidly lose his influence over thoughtful people.

It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that teachers and preachers of religion should cultivate scrupulous truthfulness in what they say. Yet every New Testament scholar is constantly amazed and amused by current superficial and prejudiced interpretations of New Testament texts. In this superficial interpretation systematic theologians are likely to be sinners along with other persons who have not special training for accurate exegesis. The traditional methods of theology lead one instinctively to feel that a doctrine has been justified if it can be attributed to a New Testament writer. The theologian is constantly tempted to cite the words of Paul or of Jesus in support of his own personal convictions even when a more adequate study of the text and context might easily have revealed inaccuracies in his interpretations. For a systematic theology to incorporate into its arguments misrepresentations of New Testament ideas is surely undesirable from every point of view.

It would seem that here is a duty resting upon New Testament scholars. The theologian ought to be freed from the influences which lead to a misrepresentation of New Testament positions.

The temptation to substitute superficial exegesis for profound theological thinking will continue until the ideal of accurate historical interpretation is generally inculcated as a moral obligation. It is imperative that the New Testament scholar, who alone is in a position to show the precise historical meaning of New Testament statements, should make it clear to the modern world that we are playing fast and loose with truth unless we are scrupulously eager to allow a New Testament writer to say exactly what he meant to say, no matter whether his statement does or does not coincide with what modern religious faith would prefer. In particular, it would be a wholesome thing for New Testament scholars publicly to criticize and expose the superficial methods of interpretation which may mar the work of the systematic theologian. The systematic theologian has a right to expect the New Testament scholar to show the evils of that kind of forced and superficial interpretation which is unfortunately too prevalent.

The New Testament scholar should insist that no authoritative statement of New Testament doctrine should be undertaken unless one has the equipment which fits one for exact historical interpretation. The theologian who is not also a well-qualified New Testament scholar should not be allowed to feel that he has done his duty if he has established certain points of superficial identity between the doctrine which he wishes to uphold and the teaching of the New Testament. The theologian must not assume the right to quote scriptural passages without regard to the specialized work of experts in the field of exegesis. The New Testament scholar should do his part in compelling the abandonment of a practice which tends to excuse the theologian from the more arduous, because scientifically more exacting, task of analyzing and estimating the actual conditions of modern religious belief. To make a plausible homiletic presentation of an alleged scriptural doctrine is far less difficult—and less valuable—than to determine what we today have a right to believe in view of all the conditions of our life and thought. We cannot have a respectable theology unless this latter task is courageously faced. If New Testament scholars should speak out against the practice of superficial biblical interpretation, they would help theologians to see more clearly the real nature of the theological task.

Incidentally, we might remark that such a protest would also have far-reaching consequences in the realm of religious education, compelling here also a much-needed study of the question as to what religious education really is. It would certainly lead us to ask some fundamental questions concerning the actual way in which children attain religious convictions. For if it be made clear that a truthful interpretation of the teachings of the New Testament requires a highly specialized technical equipment; and if it be also shown that current popular doctrinal interpretations of the New Testament are frequently dictated by the religious convictions of modern life, we may well ask whether we shall best understand and promote the religious faith of our day by a method of religious instruction which, in the hands of amateurs, is sure to lead to a reading of the New Testament which in many respects must be adversely criticized by the specialists in biblical study. Should the aim of religious instruction be the mastery of the Bible as a textbook? Or should it be the understanding of the problems of religious life and an appreciation of the convictions which are vitally active in the solution of these problems? Upon New Testament scholars rests a responsibility for calling attention to this serious problem.

The recognition of the fact that New Testament doctrines are historically conditioned leads inevitably to a modification of the idea that systematic theology should incorporate biblical doctrine *in toto*. There are evidently some elements of New Testament belief which cannot be positively used in modern theology. Such, for example, is the belief in demons held by Christians of the first century. So, too, the apocalyptic eschatology of certain books of the New Testament is incredible to one who has come to think in terms of modern evolutionary theories. But there are other elements of the New Testament teaching which, either in their original form or in some legitimate application of their essential principles to modern life, evoke our hearty and grateful assent. May it not be possible, then, to make a distinction between the "temporal" aspects of New Testament teaching and those which are "eternally true"? May we not distinguish between the vital kernel and the incidental husk of doctrine? May we not so analyze the teachings

of the New Testament as to obtain "essential principles" which may be carried over into the constructive work of the theologian? May we not, as it were, take off the first-century garb of religious beliefs and reclothe these beliefs in modern aspects? May we not distinguish between "form" and "content" of New Testament doctrine, and use the content alone as the basis of modern theologizing? If such a program can be carried through, it would seem to do justice both to ancient and to modern thinking; and we could preserve the familiar method of appealing to the Bible to determine the content of our theology.

Waiving the fundamental question whether "content" and "form" can actually be as clearly distinguished as would be demanded by the foregoing proposal, let us confine ourselves to the question whether the New Testament scholar can make the distinctions thus proposed. Can he furnish "eternal truths" to the theologian?

The crucial question here is as to the criterion by which we may distinguish between temporal and eternal aspects of a doctrine. Is there anything in the professional equipment of the New Testament scholar which enables him to make the suggested distinction? He can, of course, tell us better than anyone else just what Paul or John really had in mind in the utterance of certain convictions. But can he tell us by virtue of his technical scholarship that a particular aspect of Paul's theology is of merely temporary significance, while another aspect is eternally true? Just what are the marks of an eternally true doctrine? Are these to be discovered by the technique of the New Testament scholar?

In the first place, the very attempt to make the distinctions above mentioned would be likely to disturb the impartiality of historical investigation. For such an attitude would require one to have constantly in mind the endeavor to bring out clearly those aspects of New Testament teaching which may be positively used in theology. One would be tempted to minimize the significance of the supposedly "nonessential" items in the thinking of early Christians. There can be no doubt that the significance of apocalyptic eschatology in the religious thinking of the primitive Christian community has been greatly underestimated by interpreters who are

dominated by the desire to furnish edifying doctrine to modern men. The New Testament scholar should furnish to us as truthful and sympathetic an account as possible of the total religious life and thought of the period with which he deals. An unsympathetic attitude toward apocalypticism or toward the conception of demons makes it very difficult for him to do entire justice to the sources which it is his business to understand. One mutilates and misrepresents the religion of the New Testament if one subtracts from it any of the items which entered into it, or if one presumes to say that ideas which seemed to the writers of the New Testament to be of primary importance are not really of much consequence.

In the second place, the distinction between a historically conditioned statement of truth and the "truth" itself, freed from historical limitations, is not an easy one to make. In so far as it can be made at all, it rests on a logical analysis of experience so as to distinguish between the way in which a given person thinks of reality and the reality of which he is thinking. Such an analysis requires the expert knowledge of a philosopher, trained to show what is involved in the process of knowing. The training of the New Testament scholar does not necessarily include any such epistemological insight. It is not his professional duty to possess that equipment for the task which would make his decisions respectable from the point of view of scholarship. It belongs to the theologian, rather than to the New Testament interpreter, to determine what use of New Testament doctrine shall be made in the formulation of a modern theology. Whether there are "eternal" truths or not, and, if so, what these truths are, must be ascertained by the theologian rather than by the New Testament scholar.

But if the New Testament scholar cannot undertake to decide what are the metaphysical truths lying behind certain historically conditioned statements, can he not make another distinction of perhaps more importance? Doctrinal statements involve reference to historical facts. In particular is this true in the case of the doctrine of the person and work of Christ. The statements of the Apostles' Creed, for example, declare the virgin birth to be a historical fact, as well as the crucifixion under Pontius Pilate and the

resurrection and ascension. If the theologian is to construct a tenable doctrine of the person of Christ, he must build on historical facts.

It is here that there seems to be a clear demand on the New Testament scholar. He is trained to determine the correct text of our sources of information, and the historical reliability of these sources. He knows how to estimate the writer's point of view so as to make allowances for doctrinal or other interests. May we not therefore expect the New Testament scholar as an expert historian to tell us authoritatively whether Jesus was born of a virgin, whether he wrought miracles, whether he proclaimed himself to be the Messiah who would after his death and resurrection return to earth in triumph, and whether he appeared in physical form to the disciples? These are questions of historical fact. They must be dealt with by processes of historical criticism. Must we not therefore depend upon the New Testament scholar to furnish us with authoritative data on which Christology shall rest?

There is involved here a different kind of interpretation from that required to ascertain the doctrinal meaning of a statement. One might ascertain with perfect certainty that the writer of a given book believed a certain event to have occurred; but one might on the basis of other evidence be able to show that this writer had not correctly apprehended the facts. By citing well-authenticated evidence other than that which the writer employed, the historical critic is able to test his statements, either verifying them or correcting them. As a historian, the New Testament scholar ought to be able to speak with authority on matters of historical evidence.

But before concluding too hastily that New Testament scholarship can here make authoritative statements on all questions of fact, we should look a little more closely at the task. We find that there are really two distinct classes of historical problems. In the one class fall those items where there may be found actual historical data by which adequately to test the correctness of the statement of a given writer. In the other class fall those items where there are no such data, or where the data are insufficient, and where, consequently, the distinction between fact and interpretation of

fact involves more or less conjecture. Exactness of historical criticism demands that these two problems shall not be confused.¹

The first kind of problem may be illustrated in such questions as the following: Are we justified in holding that Jesus was a real historical figure? Where were the Galatian churches located? Was there such a census as that recorded in Luke's Gospel in connection with the birth of Jesus? In the case of these and many other questions the historian may cite actual evidence gleaned partially from a more critical examination of the New Testament writings themselves and partially from other writings or from monuments on the basis of which he may come to conclusions not open to serious question. In such cases the expert ability of the New Testament scholar should enable him to speak with authority. The theologian may rightly look to him to determine the historical data which may be assumed to be sufficiently established to enter into the presuppositions of religious thinking.

Intermediate between these questions and those where historical data are lacking are the instances where the data are of such a character as to give rise to differences of opinion among historians. The question as to the virgin birth of Jesus is an instance of the latter sort. The positive statements of two of the evangelists must be estimated in the light of various other statements found in the Gospels. The significance of the genealogies of Joseph must be taken into consideration, as well as the silence of writers who on general grounds might have been expected to mention and use the story of the miraculous birth to strengthen their doctrinal statements. Moreover, since historical criticism requires one to employ the same canons of evidence in the case of New Testament statements as would be employed in testing the statements of any writer of antiquity, one must consider the traditions of virgin birth found in popular accounts of other characters of antiquity. If one is to affirm a supernatural birth in the case of Jesus, while denying it in the case of Alexander the Great, for example, one must show why

¹ Of course, there is no sharp dividing-line between these classes. Many problems would lie between the two extremes. There would be enough data to form the basis for more or less plausible conjecture, but not sufficient evidence to establish the facts beyond possibility of question.

the data warrant an affirmative decision in the one instance and a negative one in the other.

Clearly the process of weighing evidence in such a case as this is not a simple one. If the matter were one of little or no doctrinal importance, the theologian would be entirely willing to wait indefinitely. He does not greatly care whether the churches to which Paul addressed the letter to the Galatians were in one section or in another of Asia Minor. But when it comes to deciding a matter which has played a prominent part in doctrinal statement, the theologian cannot be quite so indifferent. There is therefore the temptation to demand of the New Testament scholar that he shall hasten to furnish the "assured results of criticism," so that the theologian may build securely.

In the interests of accurate scholarship, the New Testament scholar must steadfastly refuse to give definite and final conclusions in cases where he knows that the data are insufficient to justify such conclusions. He must insist that historical questions shall remain open to investigation just as long as it is impossible to find data adequate to furnish historically defensible conclusions. If, as a historian, he must say that the available evidence is insufficient to enable him to determine exactly what the facts were, he should steadfastly refuse to yield to the demand that he "settle" the disputed questions. No matter how important it may be to the theologian that these should be definitely answered, theology must not demand of the New Testament scholar conclusions which are not historically justifiable. To demand this would be to introduce into the processes of the historical investigator the imperatives of dogmatic necessity. But if decisions are to be made on doctrinal grounds, they should frankly be set forth as *doctrinal* and not as historical decisions.

This doctrinal element comes to play a much more important part in cases where objective historical evidence is so lacking as to make either verification or adverse criticism impossible on strictly historical grounds. In some instances the historian will be obliged to say that the evidence is so inconclusive that various conjectures are compatible with the facts, and that there is no *historical* way of discovering which conjecture is nearest to the truth. In other

cases he will have to say that the only objective evidence which we have is contained in the statement of a single writer, or in a single tradition reported by several writers. The point to which I wish to call attention is that *in cases where objective historical evidence is insufficient the decision as to what shall be held as true is reached as a result of general philosophical considerations*. If this be so, have we a right to expect the New Testament scholar to be exceptionally competent to employ such philosophical criteria? We can perhaps discuss this problem best by citing specific instances.

Take, for example, the story told by Mark of the exorcism of demons from a man, and the passing of these demons into a herd of swine, who thereat ran over a cliff to self-destruction. So far as the narrative itself is concerned, there is not the slightest doubt as to what Mark believed had occurred. He was sure that there were real demons who behaved as he has indicated in the account which he gave. But what are the facts lying back of Mark's interpretation of the event? Here we have absolutely no *historical* evidence by which we can test Mark's story. There are no other witnesses to cross-examine. There are no other accounts (save the parallel ones in Matthew and Luke, which are probably historically dependent on Mark).

Let us ask the question: Were there actually demons in possession of the man, and did these demons actually pass out of the man and into the swine? It is not so easy to give a decisive answer. One must take into consideration the general question whether there are such beings as demons at all. Is a New Testament scholar better able than anyone else to give information here? He can, indeed, tell us exactly what was believed by the evangelist who recorded this incident. But whether we shall regard the evangelist's belief as valid is a question which cannot be answered by a more thoroughgoing study of the New Testament itself. Here the evidence is plain and unequivocal in favor of the real existence of demons. If we decide to abandon the belief in demons, our decision will be dictated by the general presuppositions of modern thinking concerning the forces active in our world. Is the New Testament scholar, as such, exceptionally well informed concerning such presuppositions? Is there any reason why he should be expected to

render an authoritative decision on this question of fact? He may, it is true, be competent to give such a decision; but, if so, it will be because of his general training in science and philosophy rather than because of those traits which make him an expert in New Testament interpretation.

Let us take, as another illustration, the question of the miracles of Jesus. Did he or did he not still the waves, feed the five thousand, raise the dead to life? The New Testament scholar can show that the writers who recorded these events genuinely believed that such miracles were wrought. But if we ask whether their interpretations are accurate representations of fact, we discover that there is little specific evidence in the New Testament writings themselves other than the mere statements of the writers. One must therefore enter upon questions of general credibility. In other words, one must decide whether miraculous occurrences actually take place in the world and if so just what sort of occurrences they are. If one believes that miracles are entirely possible, one will be ready to decide in favor of the historicity of the New Testament miracles. The general presuppositions current in the first century of the Christian era would have made it absurd for a New Testament writer to question the reality of reported miracles. The fact that in modern times we are beginning to make searching critical objections means that the modern man raises inquiries concerning these New Testament records which would never have occurred to a man of the first century. Now, these modern inquiries are set by conditions of modern thinking. These conditions of modern thinking must be critically evaluated, not by New Testament exegesis, but by an examination of the logic of modern thought. Such an examination is more likely to be undertaken by the systematic theologian than by the New Testament interpreter. If this be true, then the position which one should take as to the historicity of the miraculous elements in the New Testament can be better determined by the theologian than by the New Testament scholar, unless the latter himself also becomes a philosopher.

The important part which is played by general scientific or philosophical presuppositions in the determination of "fact" is particularly clear in the case of the problem as to exactly what occurred

in connection with the resurrection of Jesus. It is true that the evidence in the New Testament is conflicting in certain particulars; but it may be said that the early Christians evidently believed unanimously that Jesus had appeared to the disciples in physical form after his death. Now what are the exact "facts" lying back of the accounts given in the New Testament? One who looks to New Testament scholars for a decisive answer to this question is bound to be disappointed. We find that scholars whose reputation for New Testament interpretation is everywhere acknowledged differ among themselves in bewildering fashion when it comes to the question of "fact" as distinguished from the early Christian belief. The theologian who wishes to embody indubitable fact in his doctrine cannot depend on New Testament scholars here. He will find that every "theory" as to the real nature of the resurrection is ultimately determined by certain theological or general scientific considerations. Even to take the New Testament accounts as they stand means the acceptance of the theological doctrine of the infallibility of the Bible. To depart from the statements of the New Testament in any degree involves the appeal to general considerations of an *a priori* character. If the theologian wishes to ascertain just what a modern man ought to believe concerning the resurrection of Jesus, he will be compelled to supplement the investigations of the New Testament scholar by a critical examination of the general question as to what is believable in general concerning life after death. It is true that the New Testament scholar may have equipped himself to deal with this question. But since it is a more pressing question for the theologian, the latter is likely to have given it more adequate investigation.

In short, in cases where there is any great uncertainty as to what the "facts" are which lie behind the New Testament records, the decisive factors in determining what a modern man shall believe belong more naturally to the realm of the theologian than to the realm of the New Testament interpreter. Professionally, the New Testament scholar may with entire propriety limit his contribution to the accurate exposition of the *beliefs* held by the writers, and to the valuation of the historical evidence available in connection with those beliefs. As a historian he is under no obligation to deal with

superhistorical matters. He is not professionally called upon to decide whether there are such beings as demons, whether miracles actually occur, or whether a resurrection of a fleshly body is cosmologically possible. He may, it is true, be sufficiently interested in these superhistorical questions to desire to consider them. But the systematic theologian has no such easy option. He must discuss the problem of a rational belief in superhistorical realities. He cannot remain noncommittal on questions of miracle, of resurrection, and the like. Consequently his professional interests will be likely to lead him to equip himself adequately to deal with these problems. With such equipment, he will be an expert critic of the attempts of the New Testament scholar in this realm; and the pressure of his professional duty will in most cases lead him to give earlier and more continual attention to the critical problems involved than would be possible for the New Testament scholar. At any rate, the wide divergences in opinion on the part of modern New Testament scholars make it impossible for the theologian today to expect these scholars to decide for him some of the questions which must be decided in the formulation of a modern Christology.

What service to theology, then, may the New Testament scholar be expected to render? It is his primary business to furnish us an accurate and vivid description and interpretation of the early days of Christianity, in which the new religious ideals were so powerful in the lives of men. After all, we are not ultimately interested in the mere doctrines of the New Testament nor even in the ultimate "facts." We are rather interested in that wonderful religious life which found partial expression in the New Testament doctrines. The best service which the New Testament scholar with his special equipment can render is not to discuss modern theological beliefs or even to seek to relate modern beliefs to the New Testament. His primary task is to tell us exactly what the New Testament ideas meant in the lives of the men who cherished these ideas. He should furnish to us an appreciation of the fears and the hopes and the struggles of men in the early Christian community. He should show us how these fears and hopes and struggles led them to pray, to meditate, and to act, using all the

material at their disposal, until they found satisfactory answers to their profound questionings.

The New Testament scholar should make it clear that a true understanding of the New Testament will lead men to read it, not primarily for the purpose of finding directly what we must believe, but rather for the purpose of finding out what earnest men of the first century felt impelled to believe as a result of their acquaintance with Jesus and the influence of the lives of those who had felt the power of Jesus. It is, of course, true that an acquaintance with the ideals of the New Testament will inevitably arouse and stimulate high ideals on the part of the modern man; but the vital character of any religious belief is due to the fact that it is actually wrought out in the experience of men. To substitute for this direct struggle with religious problems any short-cut method of taking over ready-made beliefs would inevitably result in a lowering of the vitality of religious thinking. The New Testament scholar should make it clear that any reading of the New Testament which regards it as a book of timeless oracles fails totally to penetrate to the center of that extraordinary creative religious life which constitutes the greatness of New Testament theology.

It is less important to furnish statistics of doctrines than it is to discover and interpret the life which found expression in the doctrine. It is far more important to reveal the function which New Testament beliefs played in the life of New Testament Christians than it is to ascertain merely that this particular doctrine rather than that is recorded in the New Testament. The New Testament scholar will be rendering the truest service, not so much by ascertaining with minute accuracy *what* the apostle Paul believed—though this is absolutely essential—as by showing to us *why* Paul believed as he did.

This means that the New Testament scholar will fail to render his highest service if he has primarily in mind the question whether or not a New Testament doctrine is capable of entering into a modern theology. Just in so far as he allows the exigencies of modern thinking to dominate him, he will fail to do justice to those aspects of New Testament thinking in which the modern man is not interested. But if we are to understand and appreciate the

full significance of New Testament religious life, we must appreciate all the elements of that life. The New Testament scholar must scrupulously refrain from asking the question whether the beliefs which he is interpreting can or cannot be normative for religious thinking in the twentieth century. It is only as he shall seek to reproduce for us the total historical situation with the utmost fidelity to all the aspects of that situation that he will be allowing us to feel the full force of the religion which created the New Testament books. To enable us by the use of historical imagination to live sympathetically and enthusiastically in communion with the great spirits of the first century is his primary task.

If, now, this accurate and sympathetic historical exposition shall be furnished, what will be its value to the systematic theologian?

In the first place, the theologian will be enabled to see clearly that this great religious literature owes its greatness to the fact that it represents a vital creative religious movement. He will thus be delivered from the thrall of the scholastic point of view which regards the New Testament primarily as a compendium of authoritative doctrines. He will come to realize that the theology of the New Testament is what it is because the religious aspirations and perplexities of the day made a creative use of the resources in the environment of the early Christians, formulating convictions so as to cheer and strengthen the soul. Beliefs are thus set in their real relation to religious life. They must be part and parcel of the actual growth of life itself. They cannot be brought to life from without.

In the second place, if this be shown to be true of the Christianity of the New Testament, then any systematic theology in modern times which conceives its task to be that of bringing doctrines from an alien source to be incorporated into religious life will totally fail to reproduce the spirit of the New Testament even though it may endeavor faithfully to reproduce the letter. It is still generally felt that the aim of historical interpretation should be to furnish material which the theologian can directly use. We have tried to show that such an aim is deleterious to scholarship in both departments. If the New Testament scholar will rigidly refrain from attempting to furnish normative material, he will help set the theologian free to do

a new kind of effective work. For if the vitality of New Testament convictions is to be found precisely in the organic relation between those beliefs and the creative religious life of the time, the theologian will be led to see that a modern theology can be vital only as it is the outgrowth of the religious life of modern times. The theologian will then study the New Testament, not in order to make unnecessary the process of original thought, not in order to discover conclusions ready-made which he may adopt, but rather to experience the stimulus which comes from this extraordinarily creative period of Christian life. As he reads the story of this religious life, it will suggest to him countless phases of the process by which a creative faith finds the means for expressing that life in adequate doctrines. These suggestions, however, he will employ as incentives to the task of working out the solutions of modern theological problems by the use of all the resources available to men of modern times. He will thus be delivered from the temptation merely to reproduce the theological convictions of another age. If, when his work of theological construction is completed, he should find that his formulations coincide in certain respects with the formulations found in the New Testament, he will rejoice at being able to use directly the confirmatory words of an early Christian era. If, on the other hand, his conclusions should diverge from those of the New Testament writer, he will be able to show that this divergence is due to the fact that into the modern conclusion entered precisely that quality of creative religious interpretation which led under different circumstances to different conclusions in the first century.

In brief, what is to be expected of the New Testament scholar is the guidance of an expert in that social historical laboratory where were fused together the various elements of religious experience which found partial expression in the writings of the New Testament. The New Testament scholar should not be asked to determine either the form or the content or the norms of a theology for today. He should be expected to expose and rebuke such superficial interpretations of the New Testament as lend a false support to modern beliefs by misinterpreting the meaning of an ancient writer. But his chief task is to show us the process by which the inspiring beliefs of primitive Christianity were wrought out. He

will thus free the theologian from the tyranny of an unyielding literalism and from the confusion resulting from the retention of the idea of a dogmatic authority residing in the New Testament. To show us how the religion of the New Testament grew and organized itself is to show the essential process by which any vital organization of religious life must take place. When the New Testament scholar has thus served as an expert guide in the interpretation of the making of New Testament theology, he will recognize that a modern theology can best be formulated by those who understand the vital issues of our day and seek to meet these as seriously and as directly as the early Christians met the problems of their day.

"MYSTERIUM" AND "SACRAMENTUM" IN THE VULGATE AND OLD LATIN VERSIONS

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In view of present-day discussion concerning the indebtedness of early Christianity to the mystery-religions, any thorough investigation into the use and meaning of terms that are common to both must be of interest. The particular line of inquiry that I desire to present does not pretend to be this, and, as a matter of fact, was suggested by other considerations. The marked resemblance of the terminology of the Vulgate to that of scholasticism, and the dependence of the latter upon the former, have been frequently noted. Instances that occur to anyone are the *gratia plena* (Luke 1:28) for *κεχαριτωμένη* and the *poenitentiam agite*¹ (Matt. 3:2 and 4:17) for *μετανοείτε*. These are faithful translations, but with the later usages of the terms, when the original was forgotten, they became at once inadequate and misleading. The Virgin of the Lukan narrative "endowed with grace" thus becomes a heavenly mediatrix "dispensing grace," and the first word of the Gospel message to Galilean peasants is identified with the requirement of mediaeval discipline, "do penance." Similarly, one of the Vulgate readings for *μυστήριον*—*sacramentum*—is held responsible for the technical senses of that term in scholasticism. It is a far cry from the Roman military oath to the Seven Sacraments of Peter Lombard, or the *Sacramentum*, *Res sacramenti*, and *Virtus sacramenti* of Catholic theology. Accordingly, Professor Findlay writes:

The Greek *μυστήριον* in Christian Latin became *mysterium*, and thus passed into modern languages. The kindred *mystic* and *mystagogue*, imported directly from the Greek, point to the primary significance of this word. In 8 NT passages [out of 27 or 28 where *μυστήριον* occurs] the Latin Vulgate replaced *mysterium* by the alien rendering *sacramentum*, which has taken on with modifications the meaning of the original.²

¹Though Mark 1:15 (Vulgate) has *poenitemini*.

²Hastings, 1-vol. *Dictionary of the Bible* (1909), s.v. "Mystery."

This is indeed a simple account of the matter, but shall it be allowed to stand? Bearing in mind the class of readers for whom the statement was intended, and the difficulty of doing justice to all the facts of the case in three concise sentences, one would be slow to criticize it. But as anything like a full and accurate summary of the data it leaves much to be desired. This is important, because what we have here also represents, if I mistake not, a very common impression, which is at variance in some essential points, with things as they really are. To show this is the chief purpose of the present discussion.

The Vulgate rendering of *μυστήριον* is the first point to be examined. The word occurs three times in the Synoptists (Matt. 13:11; Mark 4:11; Luke 8:10), twice in Romans (11:25; 16:25), and six times in I Cor. (2:1, 7; 4:1; 13:2; 14:2; 15:51)—if, with Westcott and Hort, Moffatt (*v.i.*), and others, we read it in place of *μαρτύριον* in 2:1. In all these 10 or 11 cases the Vulgate has *mysterium*. It is when we pass to Ephesians and Colossians that *sacramentum* first comes into view, where it is adopted in 5 cases out of 10—in Ephesians, 4 out of 6. There is a solitary instance of *μυστήριον* in II Thess. (2:7)—*mysterium*—then follow 2 in the Pastorals, I Tim. 3:9—*mysterium*, and I Tim. 3:16—*sacramentum*. Finally, there are 4 cases in the Apocalypse (1:20; 10:7; 17:5, 7), only one of which, the first, is *sacramentum*. The most remarkable collocation of the two renderings is Eph. 3:3, 4, and 9, thus: "By revelation was made known unto me the *sacramentum* . . . ye can perceive my understanding in *mysterio Christi* . . . to make all men see what is the *dispensatio sacramenti*." With this we may compare Col. 1:26-27, "the dispensation of God . . . even the *mysterium* which hath been hid . . . the riches of the glory *sacramenti huius* among the Gentiles." The "mysteries of the Kingdom" in Matt. 13:11 and parallels is *mysteria*; "stewards of the mysteries" (I Cor. 4:1) is *dispensatores mysteriorum*. On the other hand, as already noted, "great is the mystery of godliness" (I Tim. 3:16) becomes *sacramentum pietatis*, and the famous marriage passage (Eph. 5:32), "this is a great mystery," etc., reads *sacramentum hoc magnum est*. In one place at least (Rev. 1:20) any

Latinist would approve the choice of *sacramentum*—"the sacred symbol" of the seven stars—and would be equally disappointed not to find it in Rev. 17:5—"on her forehead a name written, by way of symbol"—where *mysterium* is adopted.

So much then for the actual data supplied by the Vulgate. Taking these only at their face value, it would appear that the two terms were regarded as ordinary synonyms, and that *mysterium* was preferred to *sacramentum* three times out of four. But such a conclusion, or any inference whatever as to the quality of the translation, would be quite premature at this stage of the inquiry. The Vulgate may be appraised only as any revised version is appraised, i.e., with some reference to the version it aims to correct or supersede. Touching the matter in hand, the contemporary or earlier usage of the terms in question, it is therefore necessary to examine the readings of the Old Latin versions.

The slightest acquaintance with the fragmentary remains of this earlier work which we possess enables one to appreciate some of the difficulties under which Jerome labored, and to understand how in his preface to the Gospels he can refer to these versions as "tot enim sunt poene quot codices." He was confronted with a great mixture of sources. Bit by bit he had to assemble his material. It was before the days of Latin pandects, but there existed a bewildering multitude of Latin texts, which it is certain we can never trace to one original.¹ In the effort to classify the nine or ten chief MSS² which represent the ante-Hieronimian versions it has been customary to distinguish, (1) the African, the earliest form, middle of third century; (2) the European Latin, Western Europe, fourth century; and (3) the Italian Latin, a later revision of (2) and the version apparently used by Augustine. That this third type of the text was the basis of the Vulgate is generally conceded. It is represented by only two MSS of importance, f, Cod. Brixiensis, and q, Cod. Monacensis. The European Latin is richer in remains, which go back to the time when the OL version was in full church use in many parts of Western Europe. The oldest of these MSS, a, Cod. Vercellensis (fourth century) was written by

¹ Wordsworth, "The Corbey St. James," *Studia Biblica*, I, 134 (Oxford, 1885).

² Burkitt, *Texts and Studies*, IV, 3 and *OL Italia* (Cambridge, 1896), enumerates 16.

Eusebius during his retreat from the Arians, after the Council of Milan. He died before the Vulgate was begun, and is not known to have left Northern Italy. Of the same type, but seven centuries later, is c, Cod. Colbertinus, from Languedoc, the country of the Albigenes. The isolation of that heretical community from the rest of Western Christendom accounts for the writing of an OL text at so late a period.¹ All these are MSS of the Gospels, and therefore, for our present purpose, are of limited value. It is with the earliest form of the OL, the African Latin, that we are chiefly concerned. Here again the MSS fail us when we travel beyond the Gospels, with an important exception to be noted later on. Cod. Palatinus, e (fourth century), and Cod. Bobiensis, k (fifth century), probably represent the form in which the Gospels were read in Carthage as early as the middle of the third century, a conclusion based on citations from Tertullian and Cyprian.²

This brief description of the three great classes of OL texts is for the purpose of exhibiting the point implied in Jerome's words above quoted, that the *texts* are properly representative of so many different *versions*.³ A sample comparison of their renderings may be noted here as an illustration of the great diversity that obtained. It concerns a familiar word, *δοξάζω* (occurring 37 times in the Gospels), as it stands in the familiar passage (Matt. 5:16), "may glorify your Father which is in heaven." In this, a and b (European) have *magnifico*; d (the Latin of Beza, also European) and f (Italic), agreeing with the Vulgate, *glorifico*; while e and k (African) read *clarifico*. As a matter of fact, the African text has a number of distinctly marked peculiarities. Burkitt classifies them under three heads, as follows: (1) occasional transliteration of Greek words, where other texts have the vernacular, thus k in Mark 12:23, *anastasis*; (2) the opposite practice, e.g., *similitudo* for *parabola*, *bene nuntiare* for *evangelizare*, *linguere* for *baptizare*; (3) many common words occurring in the Vulgate and service books have less usual synonyms; thus, *claritas* for *gloria*, *sermo* for *verbum*, *felix* for

¹ Burkitt, *op. cit.*

² Novatian's quotations in *De Trinitate* are also of value in this connection; see below.

³ The practice of some writers in referring to "OL" readings quite ignores this.

beatus, saeculum for *mundus* (in John 8:12, e reads *lumen saeculi* for *lux mundi*).¹ As these are not "African" words, the explanation of dialectical peculiarities is at once ruled out.²

It is then a matter of interest to note at this point that while q (Cod. Monacensis)—Italic version—supposed to be Jerome's immediate source, reads *mysterium* in Matt. 13:11, k (the Bobbio MS, African version) has *sacramentum* here and in the parallels.

The data thus far alluded to are confined to the Gospels. It was to be expected that the attempt would be made to recover the African version from the writings of the North African Fathers, and this field of research has been worked over chiefly by the Germans for the last fifty years from Rönsch to von Soden, the former (Leipzig, 1871) dealing with Tertullian, the latter (1909) with Cyprian. Such a reconstruction is not so hypothetical as it seems. A precedent was afforded by the preservation of an almost uninterrupted text of the Apocalypse in the form of a commentary by Primasius in the sixth century. The work and its author are mentioned in terms of the highest praise by Cassiodorus.³ Primasius, bishop of Hadrumentum, is known to us by the part he took in the Three Chapters controversy with reference to Justinian's effort to reconcile the Monophysites.⁴ He was for some time in Constantinople, where he shared the fortunes of Vigilius of Rome. His study of Greek exegesis and his appreciation of the most influential Latin commentary on the Apocalypse—that of the Donatist Ticonius—led to the composition, or rather the editing, of this work on which his fame rests. This earlier writing (the Commentary of Ticonius), by the way, was used by Jerome in his revision of the Commentary of Victorinus. The text of the Apocalypse of Primasius is pre-Cyprian Latin of high purity, and tallies closely with Cyprian's quotations. We are here, then, in the presence of the

¹ Burkitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-14.

² Augustine, commenting on the various readings in Matt. 5:16, writes: "Tria quidem verba sed una res est" (*Contra Sermones Arrianorum*, 35).

³ "Also in our time the predictions of the Apocalypse have been expounded with minute study and with care by the blessed bishop Primasius, the African Primate" (Cass. *De Divinis Lectionibus*, c. ix).

⁴ 551 A.D.

African version of one New Testament book as Jerome knew it. A comparison of its language with that of the Vulgate has shown me about 50 variations in the first chapter alone. An earlier comparison of the *μυστήριον* passages as rendered by the Vulgate with those in the commentary on the Pauline Epistles and Hebrews, ascribed in the *Patrologia*¹ to Primasius, had shown exact correspondence in every case. But Souter, in 1902, definitely established the fact that this latter commentary is by another hand.²

As already noted, there are 4 occurrences of *μυστήριον* in the Apocalypse, and in all 4 Primasius' text reads *sacramentum*.

Returning now to the researches of von Soden and Rönsch, the former gives us for Cyprian's readings,³ *sacramentum* in the Gospel passages, also in I Cor. 2:7, "the wisdom of God *in sacramento*" (Vulg., *in mysterio*), and again, in I Cor. 13:2, *omnia sacramenta* (Vulg., *mysteria*). He gives the word yet again in Eph. 5:32 and Rev. 1:20, in which places the Vulgate agrees. *Mysterium* is absent from von Soden's word-list, presumably because in the version quoted by Cyprian it did not occur.

An important document comes in for consideration at this point of our inquiry, viz., Novatian's treatise *De Trinitate*—so called, though the title is not his⁴—the date of which is certainly prior to 250 A.D., and not earlier than 217 A.D. We are dealing here with a writer whose literary attainments give him an honored place with his contemporaries Tertullian and Cyprian, five of the spuria of Cyprian, his correspondent, being attributed to him by some leading scholars. Indeed, among the Christian writers of the Western church he is the earliest Latin stylist. Tertullian gave the church its Latin dogmatic terminology; it was Novatian, the Roman presbyter, schooled in the works of Vergil and other great classical

¹ Migne, "Pat. Lat.," LXVIII, 409-793.

² Souter, *Text and Canon of the NT*, p. 90 (1913). He ascribes the commentary to Cassiodorus. See also *Sch.-Hers. Encyc.* for Haussleiter's view, IX, 255 (*PRE*, XVI, 56 [1905]).

³ Von Soden, *Das lateinische Neue Testament in Afrika zur Zeit Cyprians*, Leipzig, 1909.

⁴ For the term *Tolas* see H. B. Swete, *Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, pp. 45-47 (London, 1912).

writers, who first made use of it in systematic theological exposition.¹ His familiarity with Tertullian's writings is evident. His acquaintance with Irenaeus' Greek treatise *Against Heresies* is also pretty clearly established. The chief importance of *De Trinitate*, a work of about 20,000 words, lies in the fact, according to Harnack, that it created for the West a dogmatic *Vade Mecum*. It marks the epoch when Tertullian's theology was domesticated at Rome. Jerome, our earliest authority for its existence, describes it as "grande volumen quasi *ἐπιτομήν* operis Tertulliani."² This indeed raises a difficulty, as there is only one known work of Tertullian that offers itself for any comparison on this score (*Adversus Praxean*) and the so-styled *Epitome* is a larger work than that of the African Father. But for our purpose Jerome's precise meaning is unimportant. The thing to be noted is that the Vulgate translator was acquainted with this treatise, that he recognized the indebtedness of his Roman predecessor to Tertullian, and, moreover, it is a fair inference that through the medium of *De Trinitate*, if not otherwise, the OL version of North Africa must be reckoned as among Jerome's available sources.

There are some 300 biblical quotations and allusions in the book, over a hundred of these being New Testament citations. Throughout there is considerable variation from the Vulgate, though in most cases the divergence is slight. Here and there Novatian's text is nearer the Greek than Jerome's. Thus in John 8:14 we have *testificor* for *μαρτυρῶ* (Vulg., *testimonium perhibeo*), in Phil. 2:7 *in similitudine* for *ἐν ὁμοιώματι* (Vulg., *in similitudinem factus*), and 2:9 *superexaltavit* for *ὑπερῆψεν* (Vulg., *exaltavit*). An interesting instance is Col. 2:15 (RVmg "having put off from himself his body")—*exulus carnem*, so *De Trinitate*, 21, reads, and so Hilary, *De Trinitate*, I, 13. One Italic MS has here *exuens se*, in closer agreement with the Greek *ἀπεκδυσάμενος*, but the Vulgate has *exspolians*. Our American and English revisers have considered the supplied word, Novatian's gloss, worthy of incorporation in their margin. These cases are cited simply to show how far, apart

¹ Cornelius refers ironically to his learned opponent as *ὁ λαμπρότατος, ὁ δογματιστής*, etc. (Migne, *Com. ad Antioch.*, III, 761).

² Migne, *De Viris Illustribus*, I, clxx, col. 453.

from the special matter in hand, the African version is entitled to respect.

Novatian does not quote any of the *μυστήριον* passages, but in the nature of the case it was impossible, even in that early stage of Christology, for any writer to deal with the relation of God to the person of Christ without some allusion to mystery. It is then quite in order to observe that the word *mysterium* is not to be found in his treatise, while *sacramentum* is used 9 times. In every one of these places we must render it "mystery."¹ It is thus apparent that this Latin translation of *μυστήριον* which was in common use among the Christians in North Africa was deemed perfectly satisfactory by their contemporary, the cultured Roman presbyter, in the early days of the third century. His testimony is all the more striking from the fact, before mentioned, that he does not quote any of the 28 New Testament passages with which we are concerned, and hence cannot be accused of slavishly copying the Latin scriptural quotations of Tertullian.

But it is time now to consider the great African Father in relation to this matter, and first, as to his biblical quotations. Six of the *μυστήριον* texts in the Epistles are cited as noted by Rönsch.² Of these, Eph. 5:32 and 6:19 ("mystery of the Gospel") are most frequently employed, the latter about a dozen times. In every case the reading is *sacramentum*. It is the view of recent writers

¹ i, *sacramentorum infinita opera*, mysterious operations without limit; ix, *omnium sacramentorum umbras et figuras*, shadows and figures of all mysteries (referring to OT types and prophecies); xviii, *meditabatur in sacramento*, he rehearsed in a mystery; xix, *vim sacramenti*, meaning of the mystery—an allusion to Jacob's name; *per sacramentum passionis*, through the mysterious sign of the Passion, alluding to the crossed hands of Jacob in blessing the sons of Joseph—an idea borrowed from Tertullian, *De Baptismo*; xxiii, *hoc altissimum atque reconditum sacramentum*, this deep and hidden mystery, referring to the Kenosis (Phil. 2:6-11); xxiv, *angelus ordinem istum sacramenti expediens*, the angel explaining that arrangement of the mystery, part of the comment on the Annunciation; xxvi, *sacramentum huius revelationis*, the mystery of this revelation, Peter's confession; xxix, *qui evangelica sacramenta distinxit*, he who has brought out clearly the gospel mysteries. To these may be added *De Cibis Judaicis*, v, the other undisputed work of Novatian, "Christ making plain all things which antiquity covered with the veils of mysteries" (*sacramentorum nebulis*). For some of these translations, as well as for the estimate of Novatian adopted here, see Fausset's edition (Cambridge Patristic Texts), 1909.

² *Itala und Vulgata*, ed. 2 (Marburg, 1895), p. 323.

that Tertullian does not ordinarily quote from a Latin Version, but simply translates from a Greek text. This is Hoppe's¹ opinion as to the Old Testament, and T. Zahn's as to the New Testament. On the other hand, Rönisch² and Briggs³ assume that the pre-Cyprian OL antedates Tertullian, which would carry the version back to 200 A.D. or earlier. Monceaux⁴ affirms that Tertullian possessed translations of Luke, John, Galatians, I Corinthians, Romans, and Ephesians, and Souter⁵ argues for the existence of such translations from references in his writings. It is certain that the Scillitan Martyrs⁶ possessed copies of the Pauline Epistles ("libri et epistulae Pauli") and in Souter's⁷ opinion these "could hardly have been in any other language than Latin." The date of the martyrdom was July 17, 180. Von Soden (p. 1611), who, in spite of such evidence, does not concede that Tertullian knew the Latin version, yet virtually admits that at least a standard translation of part of the Gospels was in use in Tertullian's time. We are not concerned especially with the settlement of this question. Of more importance is the use of *sacramentum* in Tertullian's writings. The word is employed by him in three clearly defined senses, (1) a military oath,⁸ (2) mystery,⁹ (3) sacrament¹⁰—this in a great number of passages, e.g., *De Baptismo* begins with the words *Felix sacramentum*.

In this connection it is interesting to note his comments on Pliny's letter to Trajan, in which the statement is made that the Christians of Bithynia were accustomed to meet before dawn to bind themselves by an oath, *sacramento*. In the *Apol. adv. Gentes*, 2, we read, "Pliny asked of Trajan, then emperor, what he should

¹ H. Hoppe, *Syntax und Stil des Tertullians*, 1903.

² *Itala und Vulgata*, also *Das NT Tertullians*, 1871.

³ *Fundamental Christian Faith* (New York, 1913), p. 99.

⁴ *Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne* (Paris, 1901), I, 110, 113-18.

⁵ *Text and Canon of the New Testament*, p. 36.

⁶ *Texts and Studies*, I, No. 2 (1891).

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁸ *De Corona Milit.*, c. xi; *Ad Martyres*, c. iii.

⁹ *Adv. Praz.*, c. ii, *oeconomiae sacramentum*, "the mystery of the providential order."

¹⁰ See references in *MPL*, tome I, p. 1306.

do for the future, alleging that, except in their obstinacy in not sacrificing, he had discovered nothing else touching their religious mysteries [*de sacramentis eorum comperisse*] save meetings before daybreak to sing to Christ as God, and to form a common bond of discipline forbidding murder," etc. (*et ad confoederandam disciplinam homicidium, etc., prohibentes*). It will be observed that he refers to these early morning religious services as *sacramenta*, and avoids the word when he speaks of the *oath*, which is described as a united pledge, a sort of "solemn league and covenant," for the term is post-classical and common in ecclesiastical Latin.¹ The occurrence of *sacramentum* here as descriptive of a church service, and without further explanation, in a work addressed to pagans, is significant when one remembers the necessary reticence of the apologist. In the same Apology the sacred rites of the heathen are referred to, not as *mysteria*, but as *ritus vestros*,² a more inclusive term.

All this leads to another line of inquiry. It is desirable to ascertain the meanings of *sacramentum* and *mysterium* outside of Christian circles, their usage in heathen writers and common parlance. To say with Dr. Findlay that *sacramentum* in the Vulgate is "an alien rendering" of *μυστήριον* must imply either that it lacks the authority of previous writers and earlier versions—which in the face of the evidence cannot be his meaning—or that its use instead of *mysterium* is from his point of view illegitimate, in other words, a mistranslation. In effect this is to charge the OL versions and the North African writers with misuse of a scriptural term. It might be enough to say that the Greek scholarship of such men would ordinarily be accepted as a guaranty of the legitimacy of this rendering. Is it to be supposed, for instance, that such a man as Lactantius (*ca.* 285) blundered in using *sacramentum* as "a sacred thing," "a mystery"? This noted apologist, of North African birth, the pupil of Arnobius, was honored by two emperors for his scholarship. Called by Diocletian to Nicomedia as a teacher of rhetoric he afterward became the tutor of Crispus, the son of Constantine. The poet Prudentius, of Tarragona, Spain (348-403), Jerome's contemporary, is another authority of equal eminence.

¹ Andrews, *Latin Lexicon*, s.v. *confoedero*.

² *Adv. Gentes*, xiv.

He often uses the word in the same sense.¹ But how about the pagan usage of these terms?

First, with regard to *mysterium*, the case is very clear. How early it came into the Latin from *μυστήριον* we may not know, but it was certainly centuries before Christianity. The whole group of words, *mysterium*, *mysta*, *mystes*, *mystagogus*, *mysticus*, is quite classical. The Romans had the Mysteries of Ceres, and the name Ceres as the Latin form of Demeter, the Eleusinian goddess (ΓΗ ΜΗΤΗΡ), dates from an old Aeolic transliteration. The Eleusinian Mysteries were *μυστήρια* (κατ' ἐξοχήν) in Greek common parlance centuries before oriental mysteries appeared on the scene, and the word, like its Latin equivalent, became a recognized synonym for sacred rites, in which the sacredness, rather than the secrecy, of the rites, was the dominant thought. The common use of the expression *sacra Eleusinia* for the Mysteries of Ceres would indicate something of the sort.

The history of *sacramentum* is well known. Originally the money deposited by the parties to a suit, it was so called, either because the sum deposited by the losing party was used for a religious purpose,² or, more likely, because it was deposited in a sacred place. Another explanation treats it as *pignus sponsionis*. It was called *sacramentum* because to violate what one has solemnly promised is perfidy: hence, the money is *sacramentum*, a *sacro*. The word then came to mean any civil suit or process. Later it had the sense of the preliminary engagement entered into by the newly enlisted troops, which was followed by something distinct from it, viz., the *jusjurandum*. This was voluntary until after the Second Punic War, when it was exacted by the military tribune. Hence, *sacramentum* became *jusjurandum*, the military oath, and, after the Augustan period, any oath, solemn obligation, or sacred engagement. The idea of sacredness persists in all these meanings of the term—the military use not superseding the juridical—and the

¹ *Peristephanon*, x, 18, and often.

² See Mommsen, *History of Rome*, I, chap. v, "Original Constitution of Rome": "The victims needed for the public service of the gods were procured by a tax on actions at law; the defeated party in an ordinary process paid down to the state a cattle-fine (*sacramentum*) proportioned to the value of the object in dispute."

implication throughout is something like divine sanction or concern for the person's act.

As *mysterium* had the like sense of sacredness, it is easy to see how in the earliest Christian Latin the two words might easily be equated, and the absence of anything like the meaning "secret" in *sacramentum* would be no initial disadvantage or obstacle, rather the reverse in fact, when Latin-speaking Christians sought an equivalent for *μυστήριον*. For, according to the New Testament, and as distinguished from the heathen mysteries, the Christian mysteries are for the many, not for the few. They constitute the matter of Christian preaching, they seek publicity, not concealment, so mystery and revelation are all but synonymous terms.¹ The thing being regarded as inexpressibly sacred, and of divine obligation, *sacramentum* might well be used to describe it. There would thus be avoided any possible heathen associations which clung to the other word. Some such theory appears to be called for to account for the facts, but the facts themselves stand apart from any theory, and are abundantly clear.

There are several other questions which have a definite bearing on this discussion, notably those which deal with the quality of the Vulgate. Into that extensive field it is of course impossible to enter. But there is one consideration to be reckoned with before any judgment is passed on Jerome's translations of *μυστήριον*. It is this: that before his time *mysterium* and *sacramentum* were not only domesticated in the European OL, but had taken on technical senses not unlike those which have been common ever since. Accordingly, to regard the Vulgate as the source of these derived meanings is necessarily a mistake, but the point to be emphasized is that it is quite as misleading to say that Jerome, in eight places, prefers a theological word to a biblical word. As a matter of fact, both were fixed in the theological terminology of the West, and *μυστήριον* had undergone the same experience in the East. The three terms were applied, not merely to the great truths of revelation, and to baptism, confirmation, and the Eucharist, but also to the bread and wine after consecration. Moreover, the mystery-sense had by that time become firmly attached to *sacramentum*.

¹ Dr. Findlay in the article cited above.

To give merely a few illustrations, the title of Ambrose's treatise on the Incarnation is *De Incarnatione Dominicae Sacramento*. Hilary, "the Athanasius of the West," who is shortly prior to Jerome (he died in 369), referring to the Eucharist as *mysterium*, speaks of "the sacred rite of the sacraments"—*sacramentorum mysterium*. Theodoret (*ca.* 342) writes on I Cor. 10:16-17, "Do not we who receive the Holy Mysteries communicate of the Lord Himself, whose Body and Blood we say they are?" And again, Hilary (*De Trinitate*, VIII, 13), "We truly receive *sub mysterio* His Body."

Now, taking into account Jerome's erudition, his knowledge of the precedent afforded by the African version, his familiarity with Novatian's vocabulary, and that of Cyprian and Tertullian, not to speak of writers nearer his own time, his three years' intimacy in the East with Gregory Nazianzen, which gave him ample opportunity to correct misunderstandings, and then allowing for the fact that he lived in an atmosphere of developed sacramental conceptions, his treatment of *μυστήριον* in the Vulgate is on the whole satisfactory.

This must be our judgment if we join with De Quincey in condemning the popular delusion that "every idea and word which exists or has existed, for any nation, ancient or modern, must have a direct interchangeable equivalent in all other languages." Dr. Moffatt, in the preface to his *New Translation of the New Testament*, quotes these words, adding the remark that "no one who attempts to translate any part of the New Testament is likely to remain very long under such a delusion." He goes on to say that for terms like *λόγος*, *μυστήριον* and *δικαιοσύνη* "there is no exact English equivalent." It is therefore of some interest to see what he does with *μυστήριον*. Three times out of the 28 he renders it "mystery"; 8 times, "open secret"; in 3 texts, "secret"; in 3, "secret purpose"; in 3, "divine secret"; in 2, "secret truth"; in 1, "secret force"; in 2, "divine truth"; in 1, "secret symbol"; in 2, "symbol"—10 terms or phrases in all. The flexibility of Hellenistic Greek is greater, he reminds us, than was once imagined. Certainly he has shown us its possibilities in this respect, and in a way that would probably have staggered Jerome and his predecessors, could

they have imagined the conscientious and painstaking methods of modern translators.

To conclude, it has been the one purpose of this inquiry to set forth facts, though inferences have suggested themselves all along, and in some cases have been stressed. The attempt has been made to trace the reading *sacramentum* as far back as possible. The conclusions that the data seem to warrant are such as the following:

1. That it was a recognized equivalent of *μυστήριον* in the North African version before Cyprian, and —if the version then existed— before Tertullian; in any case this was its use by Christians as early as the middle of the second century and probably earlier.

2. That it is not necessary to assume that it ever had, in common speech or in heathen writers, the mystery sense, "a secret thing"; that as "sacred rite" or "sacred truth" it need not have been sharply distinguished in people's minds from *μυστήριον* in some of the senses of that term.

3. That its connotation to people of Latin speech was in fact not restricted to that of the military oath, and that to Christian people of Latin speech it need not have been so restricted, even in very early times. If we knew precisely what the lapsed Christians of Bithynia said to Pliny about their *sacramentum*, and whether what he understood them to say was intended by them to be a full disclosure of their sacred rites, it would throw light on such a point as this.

4. Finally, it is at all events hard to believe that *sacramentum* was ever regarded as an "alien rendering" of *μυστήριον*, if only for the difficulty of imagining how on such a theory it could ever have taken its place side by side with *mysterium*, which, in sound, in sense, and by right of etymology, might have claimed sole possession of the field.

THE ABANDONMENT OF THE CANONICAL IDEA

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Much attention has been given to the history of the formation of the Canon of Scriptures. But the idea of canonicity which has dominated theology for centuries has in recent times been modified or even abandoned. This is necessary if we are to appreciate the modern estimate of the authority of Scripture. A leading dogmatician of the nineteenth century defined canonicity as including three requirements: authenticity, trustworthiness, and integrity, and then added: a criticism which loves truth will find these three requirements fulfilled if not totally, yet essentially. This shows how unsatisfying and insufficient the present position is: it is a half-way measure. Faith wants a full, unconditioned authority, not to be disputed in any way by criticism. And criticism does not allow any limits to be set by other needs or reflections. There is no such thing as a "sound criticism," if by this one understands a dogmatically correct criticism. Criticism is sound when it follows nothing but its own rules and does this thoroughly. To trace the process by which the idea of canonicity has been discredited is the purpose of this article.

I

Before taking up the real subject of this paper, let us remind ourselves of a few notable features in the making of the Canon.

1. Canon means "rule"; it is a dogmatic term. Like apostolicity, apostolic succession, and so on, canonicity is a notion belonging to the so-called early catholic system of sureties for the true doctrine.

Of course Th. Zahn has gathered a large amount of evidence that "canon" may mean "list"; he thinks—and others agree—that he has proved that in connection with the Scriptures it always had this meaning and that *κατατίθεω* did not mean "declare to be authoritative," but meant "put in the list of Scriptures to be

read in the congregation." In other words, the question becomes a liturgical one, not a dogmatic one, and would lead us back to the first century instead of to the end of the second; the Canon would be apostolic in fact, not catholic.

Granted even that some Fathers in the fourth century used *κανονίζειν* or *κανονικός* in the sense of "put in the list of books to be read in church," this does not prove that *κανών* had this meaning from the beginning. The early expression, *ὁ κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας*, is not to be translated by "the list of truth." Tertullian in speaking of *scripturarum regula* (*Adv. Marc.*, iii, 17) is likely to give the exact rendering of *ὁ κανὼν τῶν θεῶν γραφῶν*. The ante-Nicene Fathers use *κανὼν* almost always in the sense of rule, be it rule of faith or rule of conduct. It is evident, therefore, that the same development took place here as with *διαθήκη*; something spiritual was turned into something literary; as the old and new covenants came to signify the book dealing with these covenants, so the rule or norm became the current expression for the normative book, ruling the faith and life of Christianity. Isidor of Pelusium (†440) exactly expresses the situation by saying (*Epist. lib.*, iv, 114): *ὁ κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας, τὰς θείας φημι γραφάς*. There was and had always been in Christianity a rule of truth, undefined and yet known to every Christian.

2. This now had become identified with the Holy Scriptures. At the beginning the authority of Christianity had been "the Lord." By this is meant, in the first instance, the sayings of Jesus, to which, according to Paul, an unlimited and indisputable authority was given (I Cor. 7:10, 12, 25; cf. Mark 13:31). It was the Lord, too, who had inspired the prophets of old and who was speaking in the Christian apostles and prophets. The Lord was a spiritual authority, and so were apostles and prophets. But before long books took their places and the authority was attached to the Gospels as representing the Lord, giving his sayings as well as his deeds, and to the acts and letters of the apostles, and to the prophetic books of revelation. The authority is thus transferred from personalities to literature.

The process is the most conspicuous in the case of Marcion whom I believe to be the very father of the New Testament Canon.

Christianity had inherited and so possessed from the beginning the Old Testament as a sacred book invested with divine authority. Marcion did away with this, and so felt bound to provide a substitute: for a sacred book was what mankind wanted at that period. So Marcion for his "reformed Pauline Church" (144 A.D.) created a Bible combining one Gospel and ten Pauline Letters and called these two parts "the Lord" and "the apostle," exactly as Christianity hitherto had named its spiritual authorities. In the fourth century some Marcionites understood that Jesus had written the Gospel as Paul wrote the Epistles (Adamantius, *Dial.*, II, 13, p. 84, Van de Sande Bakhuyzen). As a kind of introduction they put before the two parts Marcion's own *Antitheses*, and probably they added peculiar books of Marcionitic psalms and revelations, in this way approaching the form of the Catholic Bible.

The Catholic church, for its part, accepted the idea of a New Testament Canon, putting this by the side of its Old Testament and adding to the four Gospels and the thirteen Letters of Paul writings of other apostles (i.e., Acts, Catholic Epistles, and revelations), in order to have a Catholic Bible, not merely a particularly Pauline one. At the same time it introduced a much more important change by making apostolicity the test of canonicity. This was the natural consequence of attributing the authority to literature instead of to personality. The Lord had not written anything: on this all agreed; the apostles had written. As long as the emphasis was laid on the content, it was natural to say that the Lord had inspired the apostles. Now for the written book it was equally natural to derive its authority from the apostles. Even the Gospels were thought of, not so much as representing the Lord, as being written by apostles or under apostolic direction.¹ This

¹ For Mark's and Luke's Gospels was claimed the authority of Peter and Paul respectively. It is remarkable how tradition tries to confirm this claim by historical statements: when Tertullian says (*Adv. Marc.*, iv, 5): *Marcus quod edidit Petri affirmatur*, this is a purely dogmatic statement. His contemporary Irenaeus (*Adv. haer.*, iii, 1) knows that Mark wrote after the death of the apostles. Clement of Alexandria (*Hypot.* vi apud Euseb., *H.E.*, vi, 14) says that Peter was still alive but did not take notice of Mark's writing. Eusebius (*H.E.*, ii, 15) knows that Peter, by a special revelation of the Holy Spirit, approved of it; Epiphanius (*Haer.*, li, 6) that he ordered Mark to write it. Origen already had it from tradition that Mark wrote under Peter's

notion of apostolicity fitted admirably into the Catholic system and so soon became the leading one: whatsoever was to be recognized as authoritative had to be apostolic in origin, and what was apostolic had a claim to canonicity.

3. From the beginning there had been degrees of authority. The Lord was more than the apostle; a letter of Paul was appreciated more than an anonymous epistle. The notion of canonicity was opposed to this: whatever was canonical ought to be of equal authority. But it took time to realize this: at the beginning even the notion of canonicity was fluid. Beside Scriptures of undoubted authority stand others of less importance. In the case of the early Fathers of about 200 A.D. it is often difficult to say whether they use a certain book as canonical, i.e., of equal authority with the four Gospels and the Letters of Paul, or not. It is different with the next generation: Hippolytus differs in this respect from Irenaeus, Novatian from Hippolytus, Cyprian from Tertullian, and Origen from his teacher Clement of Alexandria. The ecclesiastical tradition has become stronger; the limits of the Canon have been traced more strictly.

And yet Origen and his school still maintained a gradation of values in the New Testament. With Origen it is literary criticism which leads him to distinguish between "genuine, spurious, and mixed" (i.e., interpolated); Eusebius, too, has three classes, but with him it is the ecclesiastical recognition which marks the difference between "generally acknowledged, partly opposed, and rejected." It is the scholar Eusebius who makes this classification. Eusebius the churchman would prefer another one, allowing only for a very simple partition; canonical and non-canonical books. This is what we find when we look more closely into his canonical list as given in *H.E.*, iii, 25: he wishes to do away with the middle class by including the five books, which he mentions first viz., five of the so-called Catholic Epistles, in the number of canonical books, while rejecting the five others

supervision, and with Jerome (*Epist. cxx ad reditiam*, c, 11) this became a dictation of Peter: now one could say in reality that it was Peter's Gospel, and apostolic in the full sense. Cf. my *Kerygma Petri*, ("Texte und Untersuchungen," XI, 1, 1893), pp. 71 f.

(viz., *Acta Pauli*, *Pastor*, *Rev. Petri*, *Barnabae epist.*, *Didache*) as spurious.¹

The tendency toward equalizing, which we found inherent in the notion of canonicity, comes out most clearly with Athanasius, the great churchman and ecclesiastical leader, who did not care much about scholarly learning and criticism, but was enthusiastic about maintaining the catholic faith against all sorts of heretics. In his thirty-ninth festival letter of 367 A.D., directed against the Meletians, he develops the notion of canonicity to its full meaning: the books of the Bible are fixed in number as well as in order; all are of equal authority; for a book is either apostolic, and therefore canonical, or it is not; and as apostolicity for a non-apostolic book is for the most part claimed by heretics, "non-apostolic" does not merely mean non-canonical, but also means heretical, dangerous, to be avoided. With Athanasius there is no question that all seven Catholic Epistles belong in the New Testament, and so does Revelation; and at the same time it is without question that books like the Acts of Paul or the Revelation of Peter do not belong to the Canon. It is a concession made to the catechetical usage of the church, when Athanasius allows *Didache* and *Pastor* together with five Old Testament apocrypha to form a special class of books to be read for the catechumens. One is tempted to compare this class of "Anaginoscomena" with Eusebius' middle class of "Antilegomena"; the difference, however, is that with Eusebius this class belongs to the Canon, although of inferior authority, while with Athanasius it is distinctly separated from the Canon and has no dogmatical authority at all.

In fixing the notion of canonicity and in standardizing the list Athanasius probably was guided by Western tradition. The Greek church continued to keep alive the former traditions: as late as the sixth and ninth centuries we find lists of canonical books making a distinction between first- and second-class canonicity.²

¹ Eusebius' inconsistency is most conspicuous in the case of the Revelation of John, which he mentions twice: viz., a first time at the end of the *Homologumena*, and a second time after the second pentas of the second class. This means in part including in or excluding it from the Canon.

² The so-called list of 60 books has outside of the 60 canonical books 9 Old Testament books (which we now call Apocrypha) distinguished from what it calls Apocrypha; and the stichometry inserted in the second edition of the *Chronography* of Patriarch

The Latin church for its part had from a very early time a Canon of homogeneous character and equal value in all its parts.

4. The *notion* of the Canon as a collection of apostolic writings endowed with infallible authority in all matters of faith and conduct was current from about 200 A.D. The Canon itself was not complete until the fourth century, or, to speak more exactly, was never absolutely determined. From the beginning the process of collecting had been accompanied by a process of shifting in content. The Roman church about 200 A.D. had some books in its New Testament (as represented by the so-called Muratorian Canon) which were dropped from it later and it lacked others which were taken in during the third century. Certain books never had a specifically defined position in the Canon. The Syrian church had only two or three of the Catholic Epistles and the Greek Fathers knew this and acknowledged the fact without being disturbed in their faith. In the West, Hebrews was not recognized as apostolic and canonical before the middle of the fourth century. The Muratorian Canon mentions three books of revelations: one, the Shepherd of Hermas, is rejected by the author of this list himself; another, the revelation of Peter, disappeared from the Canon between Clement and Origen; and the third, the Revelation of John, was stigmatized for its criticism by the school of Origen (Dionysius of Alexandria, etc.). It maintained its position in the West, but never received full recognition in the East.¹ Roughly speaking, the New Testament contained, according to the Syrians, 21 or 22 books, to the Greeks 26, and to the Latins 27. It is remark-

Nicephorus enumerates for both Testaments canonical books, Antilegomena, and Apocrypha. Even more significant is the distinction made in the Nisibene school (cf. Junilius Africanus, *De partibus divinae legis*, i, 7): *quaedam perfectae auctoritatis sunt, quaedam mediae, quaedam nullius; perfectae, quae canonica in singulis speciebus absoluti numeravimus; mediae, quae adjungi a plurimis diximus; nullius, reliqua omnia.*

¹ According to Professor C. R. Gregory's most recent list, we know of more than 2,200 Greek manuscripts of the New Testament: 50 only contain the whole New Testament, including Revelation; 62 the second part, i.e., Acts, Pauline and Catholic Epistles, and Revelation, with no Gospels; 8 give Revelation together with the Gospels, 8 with the Pauline Letters, 3 with Acts. This makes a total of 131 manuscripts giving Revelation in connection with canonical books, while in addition to this 86 manuscripts contain Revelation either by itself or in combination with the non-canonical writings. That is, we have 217 manuscripts of Revelation (to compare with 2,700 of the Gospels); and of these only three-fifths include it in the Canon, and these are most of them very late.

able that these differences were not among the complaints made by the churches against one another. The theologians knew of them but were indifferent to them as long as the *notion* of canonicity was not affected. The synod of 692 in its records indorsed six different lists of canonical books, giving to all the same sanction.

It is important to keep in mind that all through the Middle Ages the learned doubts and critical remarks of the early Fathers were known, as they were transmitted not only in Rufinus' translation of Eusebius' church history, but also in the prologues incorporated in the Bible manuscripts. This knowledge, however, was ineffective as long as traditionalism and scholasticism prevailed. On the other hand, the later centuries of the Middle Ages were willing to enlarge their New Testament by admitting into it some apocryphal writings: e.g., the so-called Gospel of Nicodemus and the Letter to the Laodiceans are found in quite a number of Bible manuscripts, and not merely in those of heretical origin.

II

Now we come to our real subject, i.e., the breaking of the Canon. The history of the church from the sixteenth century on is much more complicated than before; we must follow several diverging lines; but we shall find that they all tend toward the same end, viz., to disestablish the old notion of the Canon. The development of the first four centuries is repeated again, but in the opposite direction. In Roman Catholicism the importance of the Canon is limited, if not annulled, by making the rule of faith and conduct to be ecclesiastical tradition or papal infallibility; in Humanism the uniform authority is given up by returning to the scholarly distinctions of the third and four centuries; by Luther the authority once more is taken away from the books and given over to personalities. All this happens simultaneously and by mutual influence, but it represents, so to speak, steps backward from the fourth to the third and from the second to the first centuries.

1. Roman Catholicism claims to be the genuine continuation of mediaeval Christianity: but in fact it is different, being at the same time narrower and more developed. At the first glance it looks like a continuation of the early catholic scheme when, at the

Council of Trent, in the fourth session, April 8, 1546, in the *decretum de canonicis scripturis*, it was established as the doctrine of the church that all the books of the Old and the New Testaments, including every part of them, were to be held as inspired and canonical, i.e., authoritative in matter of doctrine and life, and that they were all of equal value and to be held in the same honor. Unity of the Canon was what the church had aimed at since the time of Athanasius. The list of canonical books accepted in this decree was the one given by Pope Innocent in 405 A.D. or the list of the Gelasian decree. A second *decretum de editione et uru sacrorum librorum* ordered that the Vulgate was to be the authentic edition, the official Bible, on which all argumentation had to be based (there was of course no Vulgate properly issued until the editions of Pope Sixtus V and Clement VII, 1590 and 1592). Thus declaring solemnly the canonicity and publishing a fixed list of the canonical books, the Council of Trent went on in the direction given by the mediaeval tradition, excluding at the same time all variations by creating uniformity, a process made possible only by the newly invented art of printing.

But at the same time the Council of Trent did much to weaken the idea of canonicity by adding two more principles, one in each decree. In the first, oral tradition is put with the Canon of Holy Scriptures and invested with equal authority. By means of this one may not only add everything he likes to the doctrine contained in the Scriptures, but he is able to modify this very doctrine by traditions to the contrary. This principle was not quite new; as early as 434 we find oral tradition alongside canonical doctrine in Vincent of Lerius, *Commonitionium*, ii, 1. But the explicit declaration of equal value was new. Likewise the principle proclaimed in the second decree, viz., that the Holy Scriptures are to be interpreted according to the doctrine of the church was not new: this had always been Catholic tradition. But it meant a further limitation of the significance of the Canon, that the right of interpretation here was given exclusively to the ecclesiastical authority. The Council established that there is a Canon and that it is to be honored equally in all its parts—however, not, what you read in it, but what the church says is contained in it is

authoritative. In other words, the authority of the Canon is but decorative. All depends on the authority of the church, which settles the questions of what is in the Canon, which books, which sense! The Canon is fully established by the Tridentine decree, and at the same time the notion of canonicity is weakened, if not abandoned.

The Vatican Council of 1870 makes this still more evident when, after repeating in the third session, April, 27, in the *Constitutio de fide catholica*, chap. 2, *de revelatione*, the declaration of Trent, it proclaimed in the next session, July 18, *Constitutio de ecclesia*, chap. 4, *de Romani Pontificis infallibili magisterio*, the Pope's infallible authority in all matters of doctrine. Now, when one has any difficulty in making out what is the truth, he would be a fool if he took the risk of searching in the Canon of Holy Scriptures: it is much easier and safer to apply for information to the Roman congregation representing the Pope's infallible *magisterium*. The Pope is the Canon. That is the end of it. The Canon of Holy Scriptures is still kept as a sacred relic—I mean to say, the church has not only the Bible, but it has it invested with all canonical authority. In practice, however, this has become quite insignificant and obsolete.

This is in reality the abandonment of the canonical idea in Roman Catholicism.

2. Humanism takes an intermediate position between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism; it is a critical movement among the scholars, breaking with scholasticism but with no religious power for an ecclesiastical reconstruction. It started from the fall of Constantinople and the emigration of Greek scholars to Italy; it was greatly helped by Gutenberg's invention. Its main feature was the Renaissance, the rediscovering of the ancient world of classicism. A new mankind was born, shaking off the yoke of ecclesiastical authority and mediaeval tradition, maintaining the rights of the individual and much inclined to break off all historical continuity, putting aside the dark centuries and going back to the ancient civilization. Italy came near to a restoration of paganism, and France was likely to follow, while English and German Humanism was more religious and conservative. Here the catchword "back to the sources" was applied to Christianity

as well as to arts and letters. The German Humanists read and published the Fathers as well as the classics. Erasmus brought out the New Testament in the original Greek and Reuchlin taught Hebrew. At the same time the literary criticism revived: Laurentius Valla questioned the historicity of the *Donatio Constantini*. Erasmus and others renewed the criticism of the New Testament Antilegomena, as they found it in Eusebius and Hieronymus. What had been before merely dead learning became with the pupils of Erasmus a prominent critical principle: one has to discern between the several books in the New Testament Canon according to their different value. This is stated in the clearest fashion by Andreas Bodenstein von Carlstadt in his *Libellus de canonicis scripturis*, issued in 1520 and reprinted by Karl August Credner in *Zur Geschichte des Kanons*, 1847, pp. 291-412. Carlstadt wishes to prove that there is a gradation of values in the Canon and that there is no use in accumulating proof-texts from all parts of the Scriptures as if they all had the same weight, whereas they are in fact different in authority as well as in importance. Emphasizing the authority of the Holy Scriptures against oral tradition and ecclesiastical ordinances, Carlstadt compares the Canon of Augustine with that of Jerome in order to make out how much is established and what is doubtful. Against the subjectivism, as he calls Luther's treatment of James's Letter, he argues that one has to follow the statements made by the Fathers, and so he comes to distinguish three classes of Scripture writings, the first containing the five Books of Moses and the four Gospels; the second, the eight Books of the Prophets and thirteen Letters of Paul together with I Peter and I John; the third containing the hagiographa of the Old Testament, and the rest of the New Testament, i.e., what he calls the *Catholica anonyma*.

This goes against the Latin tradition; it is opposed to the tendency of Athanasius: it shakes the notion of canonicity at a vital point, denying its unity and uniformity. The church was asked to go back to the time of Eusebius, or rather of Origen. But the church did not accept this humanistic proposal. We have seen already that the Council of Trent insisted upon the unity of value and doctrine for the whole of the Bible and all its parts.

3. Literary criticism has in itself no strength. It was Luther's faith which gave him power, not only to construct a new church, but to establish a new principle which was to overthrow the notion of canonicity. When using his involuntary retirement at the Wartburg in 1521-22 for translating the New Testament from the original Greek into German, he added short prefaces to the whole New Testament and to the individual books. In doing so he did but follow an old usage—almost all Bible manuscripts have short prologues. But Luther's prefaces represented a new type. He did not repeat the traditional data in regard to author, date, occasion of the writing, and so on. He gave his impressions from and his appreciation of the book. It was indeed, as Carlstadt complained, mere subjectivism, but it was subjectivism of the loftiest kind. It was criticism from the point of view of faith. To know about the author of a certain book seemed unimportant to Luther compared with the question, whether one can find in it what his soul is looking for, namely, assurance of salvation. This is given in Christ, and so he introduces the principle of judging every book according to its contents: what preaches Christ is apostolic, and what does not preach Christ is not apostolic. Here apostolic is meant simply as a mark of authority—Luther could have just as well said divine or canonical. It has nothing to do with the literary question of apostolic authorship, at least in principle, since Luther expressly states that what does not preach Christ is not apostolic even if said by Peter and Paul, and, again, what preaches Christ would be apostolic, even if it was issued by men like Judas, Annas, Pilate, or Herod.

This theory abandons the notion of canonicity far more effectually than the criticism of the Humanists does. All literary questions are declined; Luther is not concerned with the books, but with their contents. Instead of going back from Athanasius to Eusebius, from late to early catholicism, he goes straight back to the first century, to the personal authority of Christ in his Gospel and to that of the Holy Spirit in the apostles. It is not because it is written in an apostolic book that anything must be accepted as the true doctrine: it is by virtue of the experience of faith finding in it assurance of salvation that it is valued as apostolic, i.e.,

authoritative. To be sure, this is subjectivism, but it is the most effective and impressive subjectivism, if faith is living and strong.

New ideas need time to work themselves out, and the more ingenious they are, the longer the time. Great men always are ahead of their time. Luther anticipated by centuries the developments of the future; he even overran himself. He was not prepared to keep to his own principle, nor could others do so at his time.

In the usual way of speaking, "apostolic" meant apostolic authorship. It was but natural that Luther, in the same edition of 1522 insisted on apostolic authorship in the case of those books which he appreciated as authoritative, and that he denied apostolic authorship to those books which he thought not worth being apostolic. This was his verdict in regard to Hebrews, James, Jude, and Revelation. In the list of books prefixed to the first edition of his New Testament he numbered the separate writings from Matthew to III John from 1 to 23, but in doing so gave no numbers to the four books just mentioned. He did not dare to exclude them altogether from the New Testament, as he was not bold enough to impose his individual opinion upon other people; but he marked clearly the line of distinction which he drew between them. This line is almost as sharp as the other line in the Old Testament between the canonical books and what he called Apocrypha, i.e., books to be read, but not books upon which to build arguments of authority and value.

In making this distinction Luther was guided by his personal appreciation of the books. But he surely had in mind also the early Christian tradition. Thus he came to shake hands with Erasmus and Carlstadt. And then, when the fight began with the enthusiasts (*Schwarmgeister*) who declined the scriptural authority altogether, relying on their inward enlightenment or inspiration, Luther relied more and more upon what he felt to be the sure basis of faith: maintaining historical revelation against mystical fancies, he put his finger upon the written letter of the sacred book. In this he was even stricter than Catholicism had been; for Catholicism always had a means of escaping by the subway of allegorical interpretation. Luther and Protestantism had not, as they stood for the plain literal sense of the Scriptures. This is the tragedy in

Luther's life: beginning in the spirit, he was brought by his opponents to end with the letter.

Now, if Luther did so, we are not surprised to see his followers do the same. The Gnesio-Lutherans felt it their duty to keep to Luther's distinction of what they called in a scholastic way proto- and deuterocanonical books. In doing so, however, they unconsciously followed Carlstadt more than Luther, arguing from historical tradition more than from judgment of faith. Once more the notion of canonicity made itself effective by leveling all gradations. As time went on the distinction between proto- and deuterocanonical books slipped away; the unity of the Canon, canonicity in its sharpest form, kept the field. Lutheranism conformed itself to Calvinism in this domain, keen as it was in opposing it in other questions.

4. It is remarkable that Calvinistic theology from the beginning had followed a different path. Already the Zurich reformers were biblical in a stricter sense than the Wittenberg men, keeping more closely to the letter of the Holy Scriptures than the latter did—in theory. And Calvin was a biblical scholar in the fullest sense. His *Institutio* in its editions ever increasing in size betrayed clearly the influence of biblical studies upon the author's mind: what he found in his Bible he felt bound to bring into his system. The formal authority of the Canon as the total of inspired books has never been emphasized so much as in Calvinistic theology. The Lutheran creeds praise the Holy Scripture as the unique source of the doctrine of salvation, but they never say which books are to be reckoned as Holy Scripture. The Calvinistic creeds give, most of them, lists of the canonical books—exactly as the Council of Trent did, with this difference, however, that they exclude whatever is called apocryphal, fixing the limits of canonicity as narrowly as possible. Luther could say that Melancthon's *Loci* were worthy to be included in the Canon; he could add his own prefaces to the Bible: Calvinistic Puritanism would not allow for either.

Canonicity never was thought of so highly as in the orthodox theology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Yet its time was over. Pietism lacked interest in dogma: the Bible was to be

read in pious devotion for individual edification: that is a point of view alien from the notion of canonicity, which insists on the ecclesiastical dogma. Rationalism claimed the right of criticizing the Canon freely, i.e., the canonicity of every book.¹ Not the Antilegomena only, but almost all books of the New Testament were put on trial for being spurious, non-apostolic, and therefore non-canonical. Criticism, going too far, corrected itself by further progress. But there remained the fact that the canonical books are to be dealt with on the same principles as all other literature, and that dogmatic authority cannot be based upon historical origin which may be questioned at every moment.

Historical criticism and interpretation have done a splendid work in the nineteenth century. It is simply wonderful what results have been achieved in this domain by the united energy of scholars. At present our task is to bring the doctrine regarding the Bible to the same level. In doing this we must renounce forever the old notion of canonicity. This notion belongs to the old Catholic system, which tried to give securities for salvation in apostolic doctrine and apostolic tradition and apostolic succession and apostolic constitution. We are not going back to this nor rebuilding a system of accurate doctrine. We are longing for life, eternal life, personal life. Experience tells us that we can get this life in the Bible and nowhere else. It is Christ who has brought this life to mankind and it is the Bible which gives testimony to him: the Old Testament affording the indispensable premises; the Gospels bringing Christ himself before us in his words and deeds; the apostolic writings echoing it by their combined testimony. It is the whole Bible and every part of it which can be used in this way; but not a single word has authority merely because it is found in the Bible. The Bible is not an inspired textbook of natural science or of history or of politics, or of economy, nor even of theology or ethics. It is a book of faith and devotion. By reading in it and praying, one will find life everlasting and moral strength.

We do not diminish the authority of the Bible by casting away the notion of canonicity: on the contrary we establish it at its proper place.

¹ T. T. Semler, *Von freier Untersuchung des Canons*, 1771-1775.

CRITICAL NOTE

THE TRIAL OF JESUS

The first thoroughly critical treatment of the trial of Jesus that was supported by adequate historical knowledge was W. Brandt's *Die evangelische Geschichte und der Ursprung des Christenthums*, which appeared in 1893. The work, however, did not receive the attention that its learning and sincerity deserved until the author's results were reached also by W. Wrede (*Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien*, 1901¹), who undertook to explain them in the larger framework of the whole Gospel tradition. Brandt's proposals, thus confirmed, compelled attention and in 1903 were analyzed and modified separately by Wellhausen (*Das Evangelium Marci*) and Johannes Weiss (*Das älteste Evangelium*), the former finding the historical nucleus of the accounts of the trial in an abbreviated form of the Markan narrative, while the latter upheld the version given by Luke.² Wellhausen's results formed the basis of much further work, notably that of E. Klostermann³ (*Markus*, 1907; *Matthäus*, 1909) and Norden (*Agnostos Theos*, 1913), while Spitta (*Die synoptische Grundschrift*, 1912) is, like Johannes Weiss, a champion of Luke. More radical conclusions agreeing closely with those of Brandt were reached by Loisy (*Les Évangiles synoptiques*,⁴ 1907) and still more radical conclusions have been adopted by B. W. Bacon (*The Beginnings of Gospel Story*, 1909) and by W. Bousset (*Kyrios Christos*, 1913). On the other hand, important contributions to the more conservative side of the debate have been made by H. J. Holtzmann (*Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu*, 1907) and Bernhard Weiss (*Die Quellen des Lukasevangeliums*, 1907; *Die Quellen der synoptischen Überlieferung*, 1908), in addition to their earlier publications.⁵

¹ Reprinted 1913.

² Both writers have elaborated their conclusions in later works; J. Weiss in his *Schriften des neuen Testaments* (1906, 2d ed. 1907), to which he contributed the commentary on the Synoptic Gospels; Wellhausen in *Ev. Matthaei* (1904, 2d ed. 1914), *Ev. Lucae* (1904), *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien* (1905, 2d ed. 1911) besides a second edition of *Ev. Marci* (1909).

³ In H. Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum neuen Testament*.

⁴ Two volumes; all references are to the second.

⁵ Especially B. Weiss's commentaries in the Meyer series (*Mt*, 9th ed. 1898 [reprinted unaltered in 1910]; *Mk* and *Lk*, 9th ed. 1901) and Holtzmann's *Hand-Commentar zum Neuen Testament*, I (3d ed. 1901).

It is the purpose of the present monograph to undertake a summary and analysis of the arguments of the above writers,¹ in conjunction with a fresh investigation of the subject that will place the relevant material at the disposal of the student of the Gospels.

The substantial literary priority of Mark may be assumed, as well as the general dependence of Matthew on Mark. The relation of Luke to Mark in the sections under discussion is not quite so simple.

A. MARK

According to Mark's account Jesus was arrested and brought to the high priest at some late hour during the night (14: 53), and at that time or shortly after there occurred an assembly of "the chief priests, the elders, and the scribes," i.e., of the members of the Sanhedrim (vs. 53). Mark states that these dignitaries proceeded to an investigation of the case of Jesus, with, however, their minds made up in advance as to the verdict of condemnation that they wished to reach (vs. 55). They began their session by calling "many" witnesses, whose testimony was useless, for it was false, and its falsity was manifested by the disagreement of those who testified (vs. 56). What this testimony was is not related, except in the case of "certain," who declared: "We heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and in three days I will build another made without hands" (vss. 57-58). However, "not even so did their witness agree together"; the meaning probably being that, while the main statements were in accord, the details varied so much as to vitiate the evidence (vs. 59).

At this point the high priest entered actively into the proceedings. He called attention to the statements made and asked why no defense was offered, but received no reply. The meaning of this silence is not interpreted. The high priest then put the question: "Art thou the Messiah, the Son of the Blessed?" (vss. 60-61). This question brought forth an answer and one that was categorical: "I am: and ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power and coming with the clouds of heaven" (vs. 62). Whereupon the high priest rent his robes and cried, "Ye have heard the blasphemy." And a unanimous formal condemnation to death was voted (vss. 63-64). A scene of mockery follows (vs. 65) and the narrative is interrupted to tell the story of Peter's denial (vss. 66-72).

¹ When only the name of an author is cited the reference is to his commentary on the passage *in loc*. In such cases (except for Loisy) page references are needless.

Returning to the acts of the Sanhedrim in 15:1, Mark's narrative is complicated by a textual problem. The great mass of manuscripts read here *συμβούλιον ποιήσαντες*, which should mean "having held a consultation," or perhaps "having taken a decision." On the other hand, *Ν*CL read *συμβούλιον ἐτοιμάσαντες*, which cannot possibly mean "having held a council," but which must be translated "having determined on a plan." The latter phrase is not strongly supported by the MSS but is vastly the harder reading; so much so that the combination of words appears to be unique. Its alteration into the common phrase would have been easy (especially if copied from an obscurely written text), while the inverse change would be inexplicable.¹ And the *ἔλαβον* of Matt. 27:1 is much more comprehensible as a modification of *ἐτοιμάσαντες* in Mark than it is of *ποιήσαντες*. Consequently *ἐτοιμάσαντες* is to be adopted² and 15:1 is to be translated: "And straightway, early in the morning, after they had reached a decision,³ the chief priests with the elders and scribes, and the whole council, bound Jesus and carried him away and delivered him to Pilate." Mark evidently takes for granted that his readers knew who Pilate was. The "delivery" to Pilate is also evidently conceived to include the presentation of charges, for Pilate without further motive in the text proceeds at once to examine the prisoner, asking the question, "Art thou⁴ the king of the Jews?" Jesus' reply is, "Thou sayest" (vs. 2).

Under the circumstances it is not possible to treat this phrase as anything but an affirmative of some sort, whether unambiguous or qualified.⁵

¹ J. Weiss (*Ält. Ev.*, p. 310) suggests that *συμβούλιον ἐτοιμάσειν* may represent some Alexandrian legal technical term (such as "drew up a protocol"?) that was adopted by the scribe of *Ν*'s prototype. But there is no evidence for such a use either in Alexandria or elsewhere. And if internal motives are to be sought, *ποιήσαντες* would represent an attempt to harmonize with Luke 22:66.

² With Tischendorf, Westcott-Hort margin, B. Weiss, von Soden, Holtzmann, Wellhausen, Klostermann. J. Weiss himself adopts this reading as the basis of his translation in his *Schriften*.

³ *εὐθὺς πρῶτ* belongs in Markan style with the main verb and not with the participle.

⁴ It is tempting here to insist on the emphatic character of the pronoun in *σὺ εἶ ὁ βασιλεὺς*, so as to translate: "Art thou, a person of such unregal appearance . . . ?" But this emphatic character of expressed personal pronouns cannot be stressed in the New Testament (a Hebraism?), and there certainly seems to be no such emphasis intended in the parallel question Mark 14:61.

⁵ "A round affirmative" (B. Weiss, Holtzmann, Loisy); "an unwilling affirmative, 'I am forced to admit it'" (Wellhausen); "acceptance of the fact but not its formulation" (J. Weiss; cf. Bacon). For a very full citation of critical opinion see Holtzmann, *Mess. Selbstb.*, pp. 29-31. And cf. Matt. 26:25.

That "thou sayest" was an ordinary rabbinic formula of affirmation is, to be sure, untrue.¹ As a matter of fact, the phrase is uncommon in rabbinical writings, and when it occurs it gains its meaning entirely from the context. But in the present instance Pilate assumes nothing, but asks a direct question in which information is genuinely sought and a question that means simply, "Are you guilty of these charges?" An evasive negative in such a case is impossible, for anything but a direct denial can be construed only as an admission in some degree. No refusal, for instance, to acknowledge the validity of the proceedings could be deduced by the hearers from "thou sayest." Consequently Mark represents Jesus as admitting in some sense the truth of the charges.

The narrative continues by relating that the chief priests then made "many" (or "violent") unspecified charges, to which Jesus this time made no reply of any sort, to Pilate's astonishment (vss. 4-5). The following section (vss. 6-14) describes Pilate's reluctance to pass judgment and is not relevant to present purposes, but the reluctance was finally overcome (vs. 15). The nature of the crime alleged appears in the wording of the placard placed over the cross (vs. 26), its language agreeing exactly with that of the charge in vs. 2. The passers-by, however, uttered mockeries that reflected the proceedings before the Sanhedrim, the claim of power to destroy and rebuild the temple (vs. 29) and the claim to be the Messiah (vs. 32).

The following difficulties arise in connection with this narrative:

1. The general possibility of accurate information. So, e.g., Loisy (p. 596): "As to precise details touching the judicial proceedings no disciple of Jesus was in a position to note them at the time; no one, doubtless, would have thought of investigating them later; no one, moreover, would have been able to question the persons who had full knowledge of the affair." To this position decided exception must be taken. The justice of the execution of Jesus became a controversial point of the first importance within a very short time afterward, and no policy could have been worse for the Sanhedrim than a refusal to state the reasons that had led to their action.² And on the very day of the crucifixion, the spectacle of the Sanhedrists urging the Romans to condemn him would have needed immediate explanation if trouble were to be avoided, for Jesus was popular (Mark 14:2). Mark's

¹ A convenient collection of evidence in Dalman, *The Words of Jesus* (Eng. tr., 1902), pp. 307-13. Dalman's own conclusion is for a definitely affirmative answer, both here and in Matt. 26:64.

² Brandt (p. 81) thinks that shame caused the hierarchs to conceal what had transpired.

narrative taken at its face value certainly presupposes that such explanations were given (15:29, 32; cf. vs. 10). Moreover, a considerable number of persons were present at the trial who were bound by no oath of secrecy;¹ and there was nothing to prevent them from relating what they had seen and heard to anyone who cared to listen. To be reckoned with also is the possibility that individuals present at the scene became afterward favorably inclined toward the Christians (Joseph of Arimathea?) or actually converted to Christianity. And it is perhaps not impossible that the proceedings were audible in the courtyard to the group that included Peter, or that the progress of the trial was reported to these listeners. The curious way in which the story of the trial is "framed"² in the account of Peter's denial may lend some color to this. But, in any case, while it is perhaps conceivable that later tradition set aside the actual events in favor of some account that was more adapted to polemical ends, it is inconceivable that the Jerusalem Christians of the first generation were not informed as to all essentials of the course of events. Cf., especially, J. Weiss and Klostermann, *ad. loc.*

2. Mark describes a formal trial before the Sanhedrim, in which a capital charge emerges, a formal verdict is rendered, and a formal sentence passed. Was such a trial possible? It is clear enough that the evangelists take for granted that the Jews had no power to execute capital sentences, but the Jerusalem Talmud goes a step farther, saying (*Sanh.* I, 1, fol. 18a; VII, 2, fol. 24b):³ "Forty years before the temple was destroyed the judgments [דיינות] concerning life and death were taken away from Israel."⁴ דיינות certainly should mean something more than "power to execute sentences," and that it does mean "power to pass sentences" is vigorously contended by J. Weiss (cf. Loisy, p. 593, n. 4).

It may be that too much is made of דיינות here. And doubtless the procurators would not interfere with the Sanhedrim's passing as many sentences as might please it, as long as no attempt was made to execute them. On the other hand, there was no certainty that the procurator

¹ Officers and clerks, besides the judges. And *Sanh.* VII, 5, presupposes the presence of spectators also.

² Cf. paragraph No. 10, below.

³ Quoted from Schürer, *Gesch. jüd. Volk.*, 4th ed., II, 261, note 79.

⁴ The period "forty years" is doubtless arbitrary, although according to Schürer (*loc. cit.*) it has been defended by Lehmann, *Revue des études juives*, XXXVII (1898), 12-20. "Sixty-four years" (reckoned from the deposition of Archeläus) would seem to be the correct figure.

would confirm any death sentence that the Sanhedrim might have passed and he always reserved for himself the right of retrying the case.¹ Under such circumstances, would the Sanhedrim be likely to run the risk of cheapening its own decisions by passing sentences that it had no power to carry out? A priori, it would seem unlikely, and the balance against Mark's narrative is turned by the fact that Matthew² carefully deletes this feature (see below). Hence Mark's language must here be judged loose or inaccurate.³

One thing, however, must be assumed as certain, that the Jews held some kind of a judicial or quasi-judicial investigation before delivering over one of their race to the procurator.⁴ In the case of Jesus, no doubt, certain (many?)⁵ of the dignitaries had made up their minds to be rid of him on any excuse or without excuse, but something more definite would have been demanded by the Sanhedrim as a whole.⁶ How such investigations were conducted is unknown, but it is natural to suppose that the forms of an ordinary trial were observed as far as possible. If witnesses could be of assistance they certainly were not discarded, and that the accused was given an opportunity to speak in his own defense may be taken for granted. And the decision to appeal to the procurator must have been voiced in some way, although perhaps not in the hearing of the accused.

3. The account in Mark violates the rules for Jewish procedure, as laid down in the Mishna tractate *Sanhedrin*,⁷ in the following points: The trial is held at night, it is held on the eve of a festival (or actually

¹ That Pilate reserved this right does not, however, prove that the Sanhedrim could not also have tried the case (against J. Weiss, *Alt. Ev.*, p. 316; Loisy, p. 594; Spitta, p. 400; Bacon).

² The evidence of Luke is not so important here, although it is to the same purpose.

³ Edersheim (*Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, 5th ed., II, 557) writes: "Even the language of St. Mark does *not* convey the idea of a formal sentence"; but it is hard to see how more formal language than that of Mark could be employed. However, the whole of the relevant section in Edersheim (pp. 553-62) is even yet (it was first published in 1884) very worthy of study.

⁴ Admitted even by J. Weiss, *Alt. Ev.*, p. 318; Loisy, p. 599.

⁵ The evangelists certainly did not lessen the number of Jesus' enemies.

⁶ Bacon (p. 210) seems to be alone in questioning this, holding that the act of Mark 11:15 was all the evidence needed.

⁷ An excellent German translation of the tractate has been published by Hölischer (*Sanhedrin und Makkot*, 1910). The English translation in Rodkinson's *Babylonian Talmud* (VII [XV], 1902) is indifferent but gives the points at issue sufficiently well. Brandt (pp. 56 ff.) gives the original of the relevant sections, with a German translation.

on a festival day), and the sentence is passed on the day of the trial: all against *Sanh.* IV, 1. And the session is held in the high priest's house² and not in the Xystos hall of the temple, as described in *Sanh.* XI, 2.³

But it is not certain that these rules of *Sanh.* were in force *ca.* 30 A.D. The section IV, 1 belongs to the groundwork of the tractate, but even this groundwork did not take its present form until after the death (*ca.* 130) of R. Akiba, for his disciple R. Meir (died *ca.* 160) is responsible for the present wording. In other words, IV, 1, as a formulated section, belongs to a period some seventy years after the last session of the Sanhedrim and more than a century after the time of Jesus. In the intervening years changes must have taken place and the tendency of the Mishnic tradition was to create more and more precautions against the death penalty.⁴ And *Sanh.* XI, 2 belongs to the later additions to the tractate, some of which are dated in the third Christian century.⁴

The argument from *Sanh.*, consequently, cannot be assigned much weight and it is further weakened by two other considerations. At a time when it was felt that genuine danger to religion threatened, formalities would hardly have been stressed.⁵ And, as the responsibility for inflicting the sentence was not to be borne by the Sanhedrim, the same responsibility for precautions would not have been felt. It is hardly

² Apparently. If *abrē* be read after *συμψηφισται* in Mark 14:53 (with AB Syr sin, Westcott-Hort margin, B. Weiss, von Soden), this interpretation is certain. The ambiguity of *abrē* may have caused its omission.

³ Brandt (p. 59) contrasts also the meeting of the full Sanhedrim with the smaller number of judges (23) required by *Sanh.* IV, 1; I, 4. But I, 5 requires a full Sanhedrim for the trial of a false prophet, and false prophecy (at least) is the point of the proceedings against Jesus. Bacon speaks of Mark's narrative as violating the rules "forbidding night sessions, hasty executions, action on feast days, and the like." What does "and the like" include?

⁴ *Makkoth* I, 10: "A Sanhedrim that puts one man to death in seven years shall be called a destroyer. R. Eleazar, the son of Azariah, said 'one man in seventy years.' R. Tarphon and R. Akibah said 'If we had been in the Sanhedrim no man would ever have been put to death.' R. Simon, the son of Gamaliel, replied 'Then they would have multiplied the shedders of blood in Israel.'"

⁵ It should be noted, however, that Matthew's account seems to know certain of the rules of *Sanh.* (see below). On the other hand, Brandt (p. 56, n. 2) points out the impracticability of some of the procedure.

⁶ Cf. Holtzmann, *Hand-Com.*, p. 101: "Überhaupt hat es keiner Hierarchie je an Dispensen und Absolutionen gefehlt, wo es galt, einen Gegenstand tödtlichen Hasses zu vernichten." So older commentators were accustomed to quote the neglect of forms as a proof of the reckless hate of the Jews.

just to insist (a) that the investigation was not a formal trial and (b) that the rules for a formal trial were not observed.

4. The statement in Mark 14:62 was not blasphemy, for in it no pronouncement of the "name of God" (the Tetragrammaton)¹ occurs,² as is demanded by *Sanh.* VII, 5: "The blasphemer. He is guilty only if he pronounces the name of God literally. R. Joshua, the son of Karcha, said, On that day the witnesses are made to use a circumlocution 'May Jose³ smite Jose.' But at the end of the trial . . . all (spectators) were sent out and the oldest (of the witnesses) was asked and there was said to him 'Say what you have heard in plain speech.' And he said it, but the judges rose to their feet and rent their garments and never sewed them together. And the second (witness) said (only) 'I too (have heard the same) as he.' And the third said 'I too as he.'" (Belongs to the later stratum of the Mishna. R. Joshua was a contemporary of R. Meir.)

This seems explicit enough. But the tradition that Jesus was condemned for blasphemy certainly arose on Jewish-Christian soil, for on gentile soil "blasphemy" as a capital crime did not exist. And if on Jewish soil blasphemy existed only when the Tetragrammaton was pronounced, then it becomes impossible to explain how this tradition ever arose. In this case it could not have arisen as a reading back of later conditions, for the Jewish Christians were certainly not given to reckless pronouncement of the Tetragrammaton. In other words, the record in Mark thus becomes incomprehensible, not only as a picture of the ideas of the time of Jesus, but as a picture of the ideas of any time whatsoever.

Consequently, then, either *Sanh.* VII, 5 was not in force at the time of Jesus or else it was not meant to give an exhaustive definition of blasphemy. The formula it cites, "May J. smite J.," in fact shows that the section is considering only the case where a *curse* was pronounced. "Profanity is not blasphemy unless the Name is cursed" is a comprehensible definition and one, moreover, that links up directly with Lev. 24:16. Accusations brought against profane persons for blasphemy were doubtless not uncommon and a rigorous definition of the crime would have been necessary. But there were other sins that could be called by no other name than blasphemy. To take an extreme case, did *Sanh.* VII, 5 intend to make the claim "I am God" not blasphemous

¹ יהוה.

² Cf. note 3, p. 438, below.

³ יוסי. The pronunciation of יהוה is avoided and a similar word of four letters used in its place.

if only the speaker used *'elōhim* and not *yāhweh*? Claims by a man to powers that seemed to infringe on the divine prerogative were naturally very rare, so rare indeed as to be ignored by the Mishna, but that such claims actually were classed under "blasphemy" is seen from Mark 2:5-8 and parallels, where the concrete claim is of authority to forgive sin. Whether or not the conversation there recorded is historical is not at present the point,¹ but as evidence for the use of "blasphemy" in conjunction with personal claims and where there is no question of the Tetragrammaton it is decisive.

5. Does, then, Mark 14:62 give ground for such a verdict of "constructive"² blasphemy? If understood in the sense that developed Christian theology attached to "son of God" it undoubtedly does do so. But is the claim in the setting given it by Mark "constructively blasphemous"?

Many scholars³ hold the contrary, for this verse in the setting given it is a claim to messiahship (in Jewish language and in a messianic context "son of God" = "Messiah," simply), and such a claim, it is argued, was not blasphemous. There is, to be sure, little tradition regarding the treatment of false claims to messiahship, which were very rare. The most celebrated case is that of Bar-Cochba, who "said to the Rabbis 'I am Messiah.' They answered him 'It is written of Messiah that he discerns and judges, let us see whether he can do so.' When they found this beyond his power they put him to death."⁴ The claim to messiahship here is certainly not treated as blasphemous in itself, but as something requiring investigation. After it had been proved false the claimant was condemned, but the name given his crime is not stated; it hardly could have been blasphemy and was probably "false prophecy" to which the death penalty was attached (*Sanh.* XI, 5).

"Messiah," however, was by no means a term with a definitely fixed content. A very wide range of definitions existed⁵ so that (at the opposite poles) the Messiah might be conceived of as little more than a

¹ But as a matter of fact it belongs to the most reliable stratum of Gospel tradition, despite Bousset, pp. 47-48.

² The phrase is taken from Montefiore's *The Synoptic Gospels*, I (1909), 350. Montefiore's notes are especially interesting here, although he comes to no conclusion.

³ Brandt, pp. 64-65; Wrede, p. 75; Wellhausen; J. Weiss; Bacon; Loisy, p. 604; Spitta, p. 398; Bousset, p. 53.

⁴ Bab. Talmud, *Sanh.*, 93b (quoted from Dalman, *op. cit.*, p. 313). That the account is unhistoric is immaterial.

⁵ Cf., e.g., Volz, *Jüdische Eschatologie* (1901), pp. 197 f.

mere military hero or he might be conceived of as a purely heavenly being, pre-existent and of super-angelic essence, manifested from the clouds at the final judgment in which he would act as the vice-regent of God.¹ In this sense the Messiah was termed "Son of Man," through the influence of Dan. 7:13 (or from the cycle of ideas that affected Daniel). Between the two extreme views all sorts of intermediate conceptions were ranged, so that a claim to be the Messiah needed precise specification before its exact meaning could become clear.

Doubt has been felt,² indeed, as to the real familiarity of Palestinian Judaism with the "transcendental" messianic doctrine. But the immediate and universal adoption of this doctrine by the earliest Christianity is more than sufficient proof of its prevalence, for these earliest Christians were precisely representatives of the rank and file of Palestinianism and were in no sense initiates into an esoteric system. In fact it has even been argued (Brückner, *Die Entstehung der paulinischen Christologie*,³ 1903, *passim*) that the transcendental doctrine was the only one known to Judaism in New Testament times, but this opinion doubtless goes too far in the opposite direction.

The meaning of Mark 14:62, consequently, is perfectly clear in terms used in the Palestinian Judaism of the day.⁴ The messiahship (or "sonship of God") that is claimed there is specified further by the three terms "Son of Man," "sitting at the right hand of power," "coming on the clouds of heaven." A more categorical definition of the transcendental messiahship could not be framed. What could be done with such a claim? The contrast between the position of the individual before the Sanhedrim and the celestial dignity claimed by him made an investigation out of the question. And if the claim of authority to forgive sin was held "blasphemous," the claim of authority to conduct the final judgment could have been held only blasphemous to an infinitely greater degree.

The above argument is controverted by Wrede (p. 75; cf. Brandt, p. 65), who writes: "Everything becomes clear if Mark has meant the

¹ The evidence for this conception—IV Ezra, Syriac Baruch, Parables of Enoch, etc.—is too familiar to require citation. And the conception of the Messiah in this system is altogether different from that of an "arch-angel" (against Brandt, p. 66).

² E.g., Dalman, *op. cit.*, p. 313, "The Similitudes of Enoch . . . do not represent a view in any sense general."

³ Brückner's results were taken as proved by Schweitzer in his *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*.

⁴ Noting especially that the verse is simply made up of two Old Testament passages, Dan. 7:13 and Ps. 110:1.

designation 'Son of God' to be taken supernaturally and metaphysically. . . . No one can doubt that he puts the title into the mouth of the high priest in the sense that it contains for his Christian faith"; and (*loc. cit.*, note 1): "It appears weak when Dalman¹ finds the blasphemy in the verse about the Son of Man's sitting on the right hand of God. That for the narrative the affirmation of the high priest's question is the proper point that constitutes the offense admits of no doubt." This amounts to a plea to erase Mark 14:62b as irrelevant,² for according to this hypothesis the words of this half-verse form an anticlimax. But the words exist and they form a proper climax to the saying in a terminology that is not specifically Christian at all. Mark may well have found the offense in the simple "I am," but if so³ he has shown a sense of fidelity to his tradition in transmitting a saying that was inverted from the standpoint of his own theology, as a contrast with Luke's wording shows.⁴

It may be, indeed, that any messianic claim from a person in Jesus' position would have been thought blasphemous. So Holtzmann contends (especially in *Mess.*, p. 33). Here was an individual of known heterodoxy, forsaken by his friends, and a prisoner, who dragged Israel's most sacred, God-giving hopes through the dust by claiming the power to fulfill them. "Was soll Gotteslästerung heissen wenn nicht das?" This is undoubtedly possible (although Bousset, p. 53, cannot think it meant seriously) but it is needless.

A different approach to the question is that of Wellhausen (and to some degree of Brandt, p. 65), who regards vs. 61b-62 as an interpolation⁵ (so relieving Brandt's difficulties), partly because of their definition of blasphemy. He then finds the crime in vs. 58, arguing that a prediction of the destruction of the temple would be blasphemy to Jewish ears. However, if a mere prediction of the destruction of the temple is meant, a greater difficulty is substituted for a lesser. Denunciations of the temple and predictions of its destruction had ample precedent

¹ *Loc. cit.* The important qualification in footnote 3, there, should not be overlooked; Wrede has not noticed this.

² Wrede here has really returned to the older theological exegesis.

³ Still, in Mark's age the "sonship" would have found its expression in present lordship and "pneumatic" action, rather than in the pure eschatology of Mark 14:62.

⁴ It is interesting to note that Wrede in his *Paulus* (1904, p. 86) holds that Judaism *did* know a full "supernatural" and "metaphysical" doctrine of the Messiah, quite apart from Christian influence. This of course vitiates his argument above.

⁵ But vs. 63 makes a very awkward continuation of vs. 61a. Cf., further, Norden, p. 195, note 2; Bousset, p. 54, note 3.

in the Old Testament, and with such a passage as Jer., chap. 26, in the Canon it is more than dubious if words against the temple could ever have been considered "blasphemous." So Acts 7:48-58 represents the Sanhedrim as listening with more or less self-restraint to Stephen's attack on the temple, but as breaking all bounds when Stephen identifies Jesus of Nazareth with the Son of Man.¹ Furthermore, the prediction of an immediate and more glorious rebuilding robs Mark 14:58 of any character hostile to the temple as such; for the Herodian fabric was certainly not considered sacrosanct. On the other hand, if the acumen in vs. 58 is found in the claim that Jesus would destroy and rebuild the temple, Wellhausen's explanation reduces precisely to that of the discarded vs. 62, as far as supernatural messianic claims are involved.²

6. The contents of vs. 58 are notoriously difficult. The substance of this verse appears again in Acts 6:13-14 and in John 2:18-22, besides the (somewhat modified) parallel in Matt. 26:61 and the echo in Mark 15:29 (Matt. 27:40). And a prediction of the destruction of the temple (but not by the agency of Jesus and with nothing said about its rebuilding) is recorded in Mark 13:2³ and parallels. In Acts, Stephen meets the charge with a depreciation of the temple (7:48-50)—a defense that would seem to be an acceptance and justification of the facts as alleged.⁴ Acts, however, describes the witnesses as "false." John 2:18-22 accepts Jesus as the speaker of the words, but complains that an allegorically meant saying was interpreted literally. In Matthew the witnesses are not described explicitly as false, although their "falsity" seems implied throughout in the context. In Mark the witnesses are described with energy as false and contradictory.

These data are puzzling. From them, however, emerges definitely the fact that the first believers had a tradition that Jesus had spoken words substantially as in Mark 14:62. And this tradition caused them considerable embarrassment, doubtless because the temple had a special interest for the earliest Christianity (Acts 2:45, etc.), which held itself

¹ And this identification would appear to be the real acumen of Acts 6:14.

² The present writer has been unable to reconcile Wellhausen's comment here with his position regarding the self-consciousness of Jesus elsewhere.

³ D *af* *it* read here, "and after three days another will rise up without hands," doubtless under the influence of 14:58 and John 2:21. In the context the addition is impossible, although Bousset (p. 54, note 2) thinks that it "sehr echt aussieht."

⁴ As distinguished from the charge relating to a future abrogation of the Law, which Stephen denies.

to be strictly "orthodox" from the point of view of Judaism¹ (even as late as Acts 24:14). Only a radical minority (represented in Acts by Stephen) would be contented to see an opposition established between Christianity and the temple, however truly a destruction of the same (in conjunction with the end of all things) was awaited (and dreaded?). Consequently the saying that made Jesus the destroyer of the temple was either allegorized away or denounced as a lie. John takes the former course, Matthew is noncommittal, while Mark—on the surface, at least—takes the line of flat denial. It may be, however, that Mark really means to take John's position. In fact, practically all scholars argue here that Mark² or some later editor³ has glossed the text so as to bring out the meaning conceived to be contained in it—the temple made without hands is the Christian church which supplants Judaism—and the witnesses were "false" in designing the statement to be taken literally. The original form, then, would be that in Matt. 26:61, perhaps with "I will" in place of "I am able." This contention seems highly plausible.⁴

Unfortunately, it is impossible to say what historic words of Jesus actually underlie the saying. B. Weiss (on John 2:18), Wellhausen, Bacon, and Loisy (p. 601) hold that the saying is genuine in the Matthean form (B. Weiss explaining it in the Markan sense). J. Weiss and Klostermann suggest something like "if the temple is destroyed, the Messiah will rebuild it," while Bousset thinks of the "western" reading in Mark 13:2.

The embarrassment to Christianity caused by the saying appears explicable only if the saying were thrust upon it from the outside, and the only apparent source for the saying is the Jewish account of the trial.⁵ That the witnesses actually testified as is described there seems no reason to doubt. What their testimony actually rested on is another

¹ Gentile Christianity would have found no difficulty in the saying, and the form in Matthew would have been thought entirely praiseworthy. Rev. 11:1-2 shows how similar predictions could be maintained, despite the destruction of the temple by the Romans.

² So B. Weiss; Holtzmann; Loisy, p. 601; Spitta, p. 397; Bousset, p. 54; and even Zahn (*Int. NT*, II, 500).

³ So Brandt, p. 67; J. Weiss; Wellhausen; Klostermann; Bacon.

⁴ Not quite certain, however. Did Mark really intend the allegory? Or did he only mean to give a grossly exaggerated form of the saying that was palpably "false witness" (cf. Bousset, p. 54, n. 2).

⁵ Something like this appears to be the opinion of Bousset, p. 53.

question, but it must have contained enough truth to make denial seem useless.¹

7. It is clear enough that the general meaning of 14:58 is a claim to superhuman power, and the reference to destroying and rebuilding the temple specifies this power as distinctively messianic. The high priest's question in Mark 14:61 merely puts the evidence into explicit language.² But it is not at all clear why he intervenes at this point, if the last two witnesses had agreed no better than the preceding, for no charge had been made out and the prisoner faced nothing that he need answer.³ "A desperate attempt to save a losing cause"⁴ cannot be taken seriously. Mark's animus against the Jews has led him to give an impossible account here, something recognized clearly by Matthew (see below).

8. That witnesses were present at the trial is comprehensible enough, for the case was one in which there was no time to waste and the preparations⁵ for a rapid arrest⁶ and denunciation would assuredly have included the holding ready of competent testimony, if such were needed. But Mark's picture of a great number of conflicting witnesses is not comprehensible at all, as it presupposes the holding ready of a mob without learning in advance what they would say. Here again Mark's animus is evident, as it is in the phrase "the whole council sought witness," as if at that hour in the night a search for witnesses were instituted.

¹ Wellhausen and Klostermann interpret the silence as giving complete consent; but that of 15:3-5 cannot be so interpreted. J. Weiss regards this silence as part of Mark's general "programme"; Loisy (p. 603) and Klostermann see in it a reference to Isa. 53:7. A reference to Isa. 53:7 was of course thought of at a very early date, although it hardly created the tradition.

² Against Wellhausen; Klostermann; Norden, p. 194; Spitta, p. 397; Bousset, p. ii.

³ So both J. Weiss and Wellhausen suspect an interpolation here, but this is needless.

⁴ So many older commentators and among moderns, Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel* (1909), p. 326: "After a vain attempt to get Jesus to compromise Himself about the Temple, the chief priests took another line."

⁵ Wellhausen, "Das Verhör war vorbereitet, und die Sache hatte Eile," against Brandt, pp. 59, 76; J. Weiss; Loisy, p. 597. In the case of Acts 12:3 f. (cited by Brandt) haste was needless. J. Weiss objects further that the meeting would have "attracted attention." Why not?

⁶ Without entering into the critical questions raised by the figure of Judas, it appears from the Markan narrative that he was employed simply as a guide, for finding a person in the Passover pilgrim camps at night would have been an intensely difficult problem. Moreover, Mark 14:12-15 indicates that on this last night Jesus entered and left Jerusalem secretly. Judas' sign for the officers (14:44) was incidental.

9. On the other hand, the assembly of the Sanhedrim late at night offers no difficulty. Haste was advisable (Mark 14:1-2) and Judas' defection gave the officials certainty of effecting a rapid arrest. There was plenty of notice for making all necessary preparations and the fact that Mark 14:53 (as contrasted with Matt. 26:57) represents the dignitaries as coming together only after the arrest is certainly not to be stressed¹ to the point of conceiving that messengers had to be sent out to wake the judges individually.

10. Grave difficulty is felt by Brandt (p. 54), J. Weiss, Loisy (p. 623), Bacon, and Spitta (p. 396), with regard to the meeting in 15:1 and its relation to that of 14:55-65. As the meaning of two assemblies is not clear, these writers argue that the original synoptic tradition knew only the meeting of 15:1 (Bacon doubts this one also), and in support of this they appeal to the prohibition of night trials in *Sanh.* IV, 1 and (not Brandt; Loisy² with reserve; Bacon's position is not clear) to Luke's narrative. J. Weiss explains by John 18:19-24. There are actually two examinations but one (in the night) was a quite informal questioning by Annas, while the real examination before the Sanhedrim took place at daybreak. Mark has attached the account of the trial to the wrong examination. This is of course highly conjectural. And in any event it is exceedingly difficult to explain how Mark passed over the fixed point (15:1) in his tradition to insert the trial in the midst of a quite different context where nothing suggested it and where he dislocated needlessly a continuous narrative.³

The fact is that 15:1 is necessary after 14:55-65 and if it were not related by Mark it would have to be supplied. The Sanhedrim had reached the conclusion that the prisoner was worthy of death, but the charge that had been proved to them was no crime in Roman law, and some sort of deliberation⁴ would necessarily have taken place to prepare a charge that could be laid before Pilate. This was no second trial; it is to be noted that Mark does not say that the prisoner was called

¹ So J. Weiss, apparently.

² Still Loisy holds that the temple saying (p. 602) and the eschatological claim (p. 606) are genuine but transfers them to the trial before Pilate. This seems out of the question.

³ Brandt (pp. 54, 60) suggests (with some hesitation) that Mark wished to conform here to the Jewish rule of two successive days for a criminal trial and fell into the error of supposing that the Jewish day began at daylight. But a writer who knew the law about the trial would know when the Jewish day began and no one anywhere would ever assume daybreak as the beginning of a legal day.

⁴ There is no question of "dispersing and reassembling here" (Bacon).

in. The emphasis is not on the meeting for deliberation but on the decision reached, which is explained by the next verse. It is not said that this assembly was delayed until daybreak but only that at daybreak they went to Pilate after having reached a decision. And the dignitaries are enumerated, not as participating in this consultation,¹ but as involved in the denunciation to Pilate.

11. The trial before Pilate requires little comment. It was held in the open air and anyone who cared might listen.² Whether or not Pilate used an interpreter is immaterial but probably all the participants knew a little Greek. The only difficulty appears in the sequence of vss. 2 and 3, which led Wellhausen in the first edition of his *Evangelium Marci* (1903) to note the apparent "hysteron-proteron" here, but the procedure evidently was (a) the presentation of the charge; (b) the pleading of the prisoner; (c) the explaining the charge by testimony.

Wellhausen withdrew his criticism in his second edition (1908). Norden (pp. 195 ff., n. 2), however, arguing from it, holds that vss. 3-4 are an interpolation, while Bousset (pp. 55 f.; cf. Bacon) uses the same argument to show that vss. 3-4 are historic while vs. 2 is due to the narrator "who could not wait to bring Jesus' confession of his messiahship into the hearing before Pilate also." Both of these theories are needless and subjective, as their mutually exclusive character shows.

The further charges of vs. 3 were evidently political and are passed over hurriedly by Mark, who probably felt this was dangerous ground³ and who consequently contented himself with recording the general denial given by Jesus' silence. How much fact actually underlies the procurator's hesitation in vss. 6-15 is irrelevant to present purposes, although Mark naturally had every motive to insist on this hesitation.

12. Only such scholars⁴ as have adopted an ultra-skeptical attitude toward the Gospels have questioned the authenticity of Mark 15:26. That Jesus was put to death for messianic claims is comprehensible as a creation of Christian tradition but not that he was put to death as king of the Jews. And an argument such as "The Romans do not understand messiahship, they understand only kingship, therefore they

¹ So J. Weiss. Wellhausen would shorten the list by a textual omission.

² Brandt (pp. 89 ff.) holds that as no disciples were present, nothing could have been known about the trial. Hence he argues that the proceedings before Pilate were deduced (but with tolerable accuracy) from the cross-title.

³ It may even be that the nature of these charges was unknown to Mark. They would not have been a subject of discussion between Jews and Christians.

⁴ Among the authors cited in the present monograph only Bousset, p. 56.

executed him as a royal pretender," assuredly never created tradition, to say nothing of the fact that the "royal pretender" tradition was the most dangerous one possible for Christianity.

Summarizing: Mark is certainly not reliable in his account of the witnesses and he has described the condemnation in too formal terms. Otherwise his narrative, while scanty, bears criticism remarkably well.

B. MATTHEW

In vs. 57 Matthew represents the Sanhedrim as already assembled when the officers brought in their prisoner. This might have been taken to be Mark's meaning or might have seemed simpler. In vs. 59 the testimony is described sweepingly as "false"—naturally. The omission of Mark 14:56, "and their witness agreed not together," leaves unexplained how the falsity was discovered; doubtless Matthew thought it self-evident. So the falsity of the last witnesses seems to be similarly assumed. It is true that Matthew would have indorsed what they said, but it is hardly likely that he would have admitted that any witness at this trial could possibly have told the truth (against Wellhausen and Klostermann). In vs. 61 "I am able" replaces "I will," perhaps to soften the saying, perhaps because the temple was already destroyed. The omission of "made with hands," "not made with hands" is felt by most exegetes (not Holtzmann) to be a return to a more original form of the saying; in this place oral tradition might well play a part. Vs. 59 of Mark is omitted, with the result that Matthew agrees with the rules of *Sanh.*, the trial being opened by the defense (IV, 1) after two witnesses have established a charge (V, 4).¹ The high priest's conduct thus becomes clear. In vs. 63 the latter's question is prefaced by a solemn adjuration, which parallels the forms given in *Shēbū' ōth* IV, 3, 13 (quoted from Klostermann): [3] "If one says 'come and testify to me . . . I adjure you,' [13] if one uses in the adjuration formula the words 'Adonai,' 'Shaddai,' 'Sabaoth,' 'The Gracious and Merciful,' . . . then the witnesses are debtors." This corresponds to the adjuration in Matthew. It may be noted, though, that *Sanh.* has nothing to say about any imposition of an oath, despite explicit directions as to the cautions to be given witnesses.

Jesus' answer in vs. 64 is curiously modified. In place of Mark's "I am" is found "thou sayest"² (as in Mark 15:2), which is followed by

¹ Holtzmann (*Hand-Com.*, p. 101) misunderstands these rules.

² Understood by J. Weiss and Klostermann as an acceptance of the fact but a refusal of the oath.

πλὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ἅπ' ἄρτι ὄψεσθε. . . . Luke 22:70 agrees with Matthew in the "thou sayest" and less closely in the next three words (*ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν*) but not at all in what follows; in fact, the disagreement is so great as to preclude the supposition that Matthew and Luke have used an earlier form of Mark.¹ πλὴν here must mean "moreover," but the meaning of the next words is intensely obscure. B. Weiss and Holtzmann allegorize, "ye shall see by the triumph of my cause." Allen² takes ἅπ' ἄρτι as an inexact expression for "soon." Wellhausen regards this as possible but prefers to compare Matt. 23:39 (26:29) so as to translate, "from henceforth ye shall see me only in glory." So, with reserve, Klostermann and J. Weiss, but the latter suggests also a mixture of two traditions, "the Son of Man shall sit" (Luke) and "ye shall see him coming" (Mark), a suggestion that Loisy, p. 605, and Spitta, p. 399, adopt. Klostermann is inclined to suspect textual corruption. Evidently, little can be made out of this, but the "mixture" hypothesis seems the most attractive.

In vs. 65 the fact of the blasphemy is formally announced but Mark's formal condemnation is avoided in vs. 66. In 27:1 Mark's συμβούλιον ἐτοιμάσαντες is strengthened into συμβούλιον ἔλαβον, showing that Matthew understood Mark in the sense adopted above. From this point on there are no relevant departures from Mark.

Summarizing: Matthew seems to show influence of oral tradition in 26:61, 64, and to have explained certain of Mark's details by means of the Jewish rules for procedure.

C. LUKE

Luke's narrative is so different from Mark's that a separate summary must be made of it. After the arrest the prisoner is kept by the officers and subjected to their insolence until daylight, when the Sanhedrim assembles. No witnesses are called and the high priest is not mentioned. The assembly at once make the demand, "If thou art the Messiah, tell us," a request that conveys a pretended receptivity. The reply may be paraphrased thus: "Your request is not sincere—if I tell you, you will not believe. Moreover, it is purposely ambiguous. 'Messiah' has many meanings and if I ask you to specify what you mean,³ you will

¹ The agreement between Matthew and Luke in the "thou sayest" is doubtless due to a conformation to the scene before Pilate.

² *Int. Crit. Com. on Matthew* (1907), *ad loc.*

³ So Holtzmann, J. Weiss, Loisy. Not discussed by Wellhausen.

refuse.¹ But what you are doing will cause the Son of Man to sit on the right hand of God." The Jews reply, "Thou art the Son of God?" thus apparently equating this term with "Messiah" and "Son of Man." Jesus accepts their formulation. The Jews cry out that there is no need of witnesses after this and immediately lead their prisoner to Pilate.

Brandt (pp. 72-77), Holtzmann, Wellhausen, and Loisy (pp. 607-8) regard this account as simply an editorial revision of Mark and offer the following explanations: The figure of the high priest is omitted because Luke was uncertain of his name (Loisy). The charge of blasphemy is omitted because Luke was so well versed in Jewish law as to know no charge was made out (Wellhausen, Loisy) or because Luke thinks the charge needless (Holtzmann). The witnesses are omitted as of no interest and "perhaps Luke did not care to reproduce the word about the temple" (Loisy), or the whole has been transferred to Acts 6:13-14 and so is not given here (Holtzmann). The words in vss. 67-68 bring out "the independence of the Savior with regard to the Sanhedrim" (Loisy) and their first sentence was suggested by Jer. 38:15 (Brandt, Holtzmann, Loisy). The *ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν* is deduced from Christian experience (Holtzmann, Wellhausen) and the "Son of Man" here is the Christian Messiah as opposed to the Jewish (Loisy). The "ye shall see" of Mark is omitted because at Luke's time of writing the judges were all dead (Holtzmann, Loisy). "Son of God" is meant in the purely Christian sense and so is historically impossible (Brandt, Loisy; contrast Holtzmann). The rending of the high priest's robes would not have been understood by Luke's gentile readers (Loisy). The transfer of the session to early morning is due to independent tradition (Loisy). This transfer has left a gap that is filled up by a compensatory transfer of the mockery to a place before the session (Loisy) or the transfer was made to allow of 22:61 (Brandt).

These arguments are not very convincing. The name of the high priest has nothing to do with the narrative and there is certainly no reason to suppose that Luke knew Jewish law better than Mark or Matthew. Luke shows interest enough in the words about the temple in Acts 6:13-14 and it is perverse to suggest that the appearance of these words in the later work is the reason for their omission in the earlier.

¹ ADX. *minn verss* add [μοι] ἡ ἀπολογία. Among recent editors B. Weiss alone adopts this reading, which he considers too hard for a gloss. But later scribes seem to have missed the point and to have thought the text deficient. The addition gives to *ἐρωτήσω* the content "the reason of my arrest" (so B. Weiss), something that was not in dispute.

Vss. 67-69 really make Jesus treat the Sanhedrim more seriously than does Mark—and why should a reference to the very obscure passage Jer. 38:15 displace a reference to Isa. 53:7? Vs. 69 is a simpler combination of Ps. 110:1 and Dan. 7:13 than is Mark 14:62, and the purely passive *sessio ad dextram* that alone receives explicit statement (although much more is implied) would have been quite inadequate for Luke's Christology. The story of the night is amply filled up with the account of Peter's denial without leaving any "gap," while 22:61 is quite unrelated to any particular position of the mockery. Moreover, the very number and ingenuity of the explanations required are evidence of the artificiality of the hypothesis, and the only natural conclusion is that Luke is here based, not directly on Mark at all, but on some other source.

This the conclusion of B. Weiss, J. Weiss, and Spitta (pp. 396-400, cf. Bacon), B. Weiss even attempting¹ a hypothetical reconstruction of the Greek text of this source. As to its value, however, the three scholars dissent, B. Weiss holding it to be inferior to Mark while J. Weiss and Spitta claim that in the omission of all the points that caused difficulty in Mark (the two sessions, the witnesses, the verdict of blasphemy, and the formal condemnation) Luke's narrative shows its higher value. As regards vss. 67-69, in especial, J. Weiss argues (here in part following B. Weiss) that the extreme indirectness here is incomprehensible as a deliberate weakening of Mark. Yet, considered as an actual saying of Jesus, the passage is psychologically accurate for the setting: "How shall I answer such as you? But this moment, that of the fulfilment of prophecies, will bring its own answer"—words spoken in prospect of immediate death.²

This last point seems very well taken. Moreover, vss. 67-69 are too delicately framed to be reflexes of later controversy, which asserted the messiahship without reticence or ambiguity; nor is there anything in them of a concealment motive. Again Luke must be right when he makes the servants and not the hierarchs the authors of the mockery, for Christian tradition never tended to diminish the guilt of the rulers.

On the other hand, the hypocrisy of Luke's vs. 67 cannot be original and there is nothing to be said for his omission of the figure of the high priest. Vs. 71 is obviously incongruent in its present context and is

¹ *Qu. d. Syn. Üb.*, pp. 156-57.

² Spitta's argument is similar. But he adopts (from Ps. 8) an impossible sense for "Son of Man."

due to the influence of Mark on Luke.¹ And vs. 70 offers a very real difficulty. B. Weiss and J. Weiss, to be sure, see in "Son of God" here simply "the one chosen by God" in order to accomplish his purpose in the future and so make the title really rather less than Messiah—"not yet Messiah." Holtzmann indorses this as correct for the historical use, but it is hard not to agree with him when he says further that the separation of "Son of God" and "Messiah" has been for the purpose of emphasizing the former title. As a matter of fact, Luke is unhistorical in his climax. "Son of God" could be applied to the Messiah in any aspect, but only in the transcendental apocalyptic did he bear the title "Son of Man" so that, despite the apparent meaning of the terms, the latter phrase actually meant more than the former. In Mark the order is correctly given and it is not "Messiah" nor "Son of God" that causes the assembly to burst forth, but the more harmless sounding title "Son of Man." Luke's vs. 69 makes vs. 70 an anticlimax and delays the indignation to the wrong point. So it is almost inevitable to regard vs. 70 also as not in Luke's special source but as a not very fortunate attempt of the Evangelist to harmonize by introducing a detail from Mark.²

The residuum of this special source consists then only of vss. 66b-69 or an account of the trial reduced to its barest essentials. None of the additional matter in Mark is necessary for an understanding of the trial, and Luke doubtless felt that when he had supplemented his source with the Markan matter in vss. 70-91 he had done enough. So no argument can be built on his omissions.

The further narrative advances on Mark by specifying the charges made before Pilate. These contain nothing that could not readily have been deduced by Luke, but separate tradition may have played a part here.³ After Pilate's refusal to pass judgment (vs. 4) the accusers make a further charge which leads up to sending Jesus before Herod (vss. 5-10). Here is evidently a separate tradition⁴ (note the preparation for this as far back as Luke 9:9). Herod, however, does nothing except return Pilate's courtesy (vss. 11-12) and the remainder of Luke's narrative proceeds much as does Mark's, with a still greater insistence on

¹ So all commentators cited. But this use of Mark does not prove that Luke depended solely on Mark (against Brandt, Loisy).

² So Spitta (p. 399), although for different reasons.

³ But B. Weiss (*loc. cit.*) thinks that vs. 3 is another insertion by Luke from Mark, so maintaining (with Bousset, p. 56) the authenticity of vs. 2.

⁴ The interesting theory of Loisy (p. 640) is worth study, but Brandt's (p. 112) assumption of a confusion with Herod the Great is gratuitous.

Pilate's unwillingness to pass judgment. It is to be noted, however, that the Barabbas dialogue is awkwardly introduced in Luke and is not homogeneous to the narrative.¹ And there is nothing in Luke corresponding to Mark 15:29, although Mark 15:32 is paralleled by Luke 23:35.

D. SUMMARY

As far as the trial before the Sanhedrim is concerned Mark's narrative rests on a solid basis apart from certain details. Matthew, chiefly through his better knowledge of what was possible to Jewish procedure and to a less degree through independent tradition, has corrected Mark's version in various particulars. Luke's account rests partly on material drawn from Mark, partly on a separate tradition. This last was very brief but has preserved Jesus' words more accurately than have Mark or Matthew. A narrative, then, about corresponding to Matt. 26:59-66 with the substitution of Luke 22:67b-69 for Matt. 26:64 represents the actual occurrences as far as they are recoverable. This narrative so constructed is self-consistent and consistent also with the concepts of the time it purports to portray.²

As regards the trial before Pilate, Mark 15:1-5, 15 is accurate as far as critical tests can show.

The wider question as to the homogeneity of the account here with the critically recoverable data of the Gospel tradition as a whole raises the vast problem of the self-consciousness of Jesus and can be answered only in an extended treatise. Granted, however, that Jesus held himself to be the Messiah in any sense, it is difficult to see how at the time of the trial he could have held himself to be the Messiah in any but the apocalyptic sense. Inherent in the meaning of "Messiah" was not only teaching the way of salvation—this was the work of the "prophet"—but actually effectuating salvation. And Jesus at the time of his trial, face to face with the prospect of certain death, had not yet effectuated salvation; his messianic work was still to be done. If he could not admit that his conception of his vocation was mistaken, the only alternative was to look forward to the accomplishment of his work despite—or even on account of—approaching death and so in the world to come.

As to the question of the Sanhedrim's responsibility, it is difficult to see how this body, with the evidence before it, could have reached any

¹ Held by B. Weiss (*loc. cit.*) to be from Mark, Luke's special tradition having no mention of Barabbas.

² Such a statement as Bacon's "a more complete tissue of absurdities would be hard to frame" hardly belongs to serious criticism.

different decision, and the blame heaped by generations of Christian writers seems unjustified. It should be needless to point out that Jesus' ethical teaching was not brought into question at all, although this teaching had surely helped create the antagonism that led to the trial. The Sanhedrim is open to reproach only for one of two reasons: either Jesus was a priceless teacher who should have been spared despite his claims, or else these claims, translated perhaps into different categories, were justified.

The perversion of the charge of blasphemy into one of high treason before Pilate is a different matter, and here, no doubt, the Sanhedrim must always bear a certain blame. Still, history offers only too many parallels for such half-distortions of the truth on the part of ecclesiastics who felt that a matter vital to God's cause was in question.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

SKINNER'S CRITICISM OF DAHSE

Professor Skinner has published in book form a collection of articles originally published in the *Expositor*, in reply to Professor Dahse's theory of the divine names in Genesis.¹ Dahse's view is that these names "have nothing to do with this or that document, but are variable elements of the text," the variation being determined by the divisions of the Pentateuch in the lectionary of the synagogue. These divisions, as we know, were of two kinds, the Sedarim based on the readings of the Pentateuch occupying from three to three and a half years, and the Parashas, on the basis of a yearly reading-schedule. Thus in Genesis there are 43 (or 45) Sedarim, or, according to the other scheme, 12 Parashas. The particular relation of these reading-portions to the divine names, according to the "Pericope-hypothesis," is as follows: The LXX text, it is maintained, was regulated by the Seder divisions and the MT by the Parashas. "And since the former division is known to be older than the latter" (a position which Skinner declines emphatically to admit), Dahse concludes "that the LXX represents an earlier stage of the text than the Hebrew" (pp. 33 f.).

The following facts and principles according to this theory entered into the problem: First, the original text contained different divine names, but owing to subsequent editings, greater in the MT than in the LXX, these cannot now be determined. Secondly, the editions of the Hebrew text underlying the LXX (i.e., following the Sedarim divisions) were guided by the following rules: "They never practically change an *Elohim* into *Yahwe*; but in certain circumstances they change a *Yahwe* into *Elohim*. If they found either name used consistently throughout a Seder they allowed it to stand. But if a Seder contained both *Yahwe* and *Elohim* their practice was to let *Yahwe* stand at the beginning or end, and elsewhere to change it to *Elohim*." Thirdly, the editors of the MT (following the Parashas) "were influenced by the Parasha divisions to this extent, that they replaced the *Elohim*s standing in the middle of the Sedarim by *Yahwe*, but only in *Elohim* places which lie midway between *Yahwe* sections," a statement which Skinner considers very

¹ *The Divine Names in Genesis*. By John Skinner. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. 303 pages. 6s.

obscure (pp. 37 f.). Such is the complicated theory advanced by Dahse to supersede the documentary hypothesis. In it are involved intricate problems of textual criticism and comparison of versions. There can be no doubt regarding the writer's qualifications for dealing with these difficult questions, but as Skinner shows in his searching examination of his position and arguments, his statements are frequently obscure, his methods are often arbitrary, and his conclusions as a whole do not correspond with the facts.

The following are some of the more important lines of argument followed by Dr. Skinner in controverting Dahse's views. He shows, for example, that this scholar holds an unwarranted view of the significance of the divine names in the documentary hypothesis. This hypothesis does not after all stand or fall by this criterion, though it has its important place. The important part filled by the divine names is to give a clue to the distinction of sources, which scholarly research shows rests upon deeper "differences of conception, of tone and atmosphere, and language." The different divine names "have really served their purpose when they have put criticism *on the track* of this distinction." These points, to which Skinner calls attention, are so commonly recognized today by students of the Pentateuchal problem, that it seems unaccountable that a scholar of Dahse's standing should overlook them, as he has, in the development of his argument throughout.

Accepting, however, the challenge involved in Dahse's theory of the manipulation of the divine names, Skinner proceeds to discuss all the details of the question as presented by its advocate. He demonstrates the fact that the distribution of the divine names is a much more stable and reliable element in Genesis than Dahse would have us believe. Comparing the LXX, in its best established text, with the MT, he finds that there is agreement in the employment of the divine names in *five-sixths* of the instances, and he holds that the variation in the other one-sixth can be accounted for, either by the fact that "the translators did not attach importance to literal exactness in their work, or by inadvertent changes natural to Greek copyists" (p. 134). A careful tabulation is given of the different divine names of the two texts in Gen., chaps. 12-50 (pp. 44-47). The result of the comparison is decidedly unfavorable to the Pericope-hypothesis, for out of the 35 Sedarim into which these chapters are divided the divine names in the two versions agree entirely in 23 of them; in six "there is only one divergence; in four there are 2; and only in two are there as many as 3 and 5, respectively," i.e., a divergence of 22 out of 216-19 occurrences. He concludes that "that

proportion of differences (from one-tenth to one-seventh of the whole) is not so great as to invalidate any critical conclusions properly deduced from the Massoretic text by itself" (p. 57).

This reliable feature of the MT he further argues is shown by a comparison with the Samaritan text of Genesis, there being only 8 or 9 instances of variation in the divine names. This agreement of the two versions in 300 and more of the divine names Dr. Skinner regards as a "remarkable phenomenon." "It means that through two independent lines of descent the divine names in Genesis have been transmitted with practically no variation" from at least the fourth century B.C. A reasonable inference is that between the fourth century B.C. and the fifth (=the date of the redaction and promulgation of the Hexateuch) the text was as carefully preserved by the temple authorities in Jerusalem. Owing to the fact that the "Jewish scribes were capable of an astonishing degree of accuracy in transcribing the names for God," it is not "an extravagant assumption to hold that in the MT we have a substantially correct reproduction of the divine names as they stood in the original documents" (pp. 173 f.).

It will not be possible in this review to go into details of the textual problem, especially of the LXX, to which considerable space is given in this volume. A few points, however, brought out by the author may be noted. Thus in reply to the contention of Wiener (whom Dahse recognizes as a valuable ally) that the "LXX was translated from the last of a line of Hebrew MSS which had an independent circulation in Palestine or Egypt from a time anterior to the separation of the Samaritan text from the Jewish," Skinner answers by showing that the readings peculiar to the LXX are "in most cases inferior to those common to the Sam. and MT," and hence represent corruptions of a text which is more faithfully preserved by them (pp. 125 ff., 131).

In the chapter on "The Limits of Textual Uncertainty," Dr. Skinner puts forward what seems a reasonable proposition, "that the unanimous reading of all LXX authorities must be accepted as the original LXX, whether it differs from the MT or not." This is in opposition to Wiener (whom Dahse cites as a textual authority) who thinks the variant readings represent the true text. For example, in the tables compiled by Dahse there are over 80 divine names in the LXX (=about a fourth of all the divine names in Genesis) of which there are no "internal variants," and of these there are only five which disagree with the MT. "By Wiener's rule the original LXX would only be established for these five names" (pp. 160 f.).

The difficulty of determining the best standard LXX text is recognized. Dr. Skinner frankly states, "I have no pretension to speak on such a question otherwise than with great diffidence." He, however, concludes that "the readings of the Sixtine and Cambridge editions, which seldom differ, represent in a great majority of cases the consensus of the best MSS." Of the 320 occurrences of the divine names in Genesis (=in the LXX almost 330) there are about 60 cases where the Cambridge LXX has a different reading of the divine names from the MT, i.e., three-sixteenths of the whole. Attention is also called to the fact that the LXX is a translation, and its text has been "in a state of perpetual flux as far back as its history can be traced," the names of Deity being "handled with a freedom which was not allowed to Jewish scribes." The possibility must also be taken into consideration that the distinction between the two Greek names for Deity (corresponding to יְהוָה and אֱלֹהִים), i.e., *κύριος* and *θεός* (often contracted in MSS to *κς* and *θς*), a difference without much significance to a Greek-speaking writer, was likely to be confused or "effaced through the natural predilection for *θεός*" (pp. 166 f.).

In the chapter on "The Problem of the Priestly Code" is found an interesting and important discussion. As opposed to the critical conception of P, as divided in the final arrangement of the Hexateuch into sections longer or shorter into which was introduced the material of the other sources (especially JE), Dahse holds that the framework of Genesis, for instance, represents "a series of annotations, which never had a separate existence." While P and Dahse's editorial portions are not identical, "the two theories are mutually exclusive." This is shown by a table in which the material common to the two is underscored (cf. p. 192). Dahse's view is that these annotations occur mostly at the beginning or end of a Seder. A careful examination of this theory in Gen., chaps. 12-50 (=35 Sedarim and 33 P sections), is made, and it is shown that it fails in 60 per cent of the cases, which is rather damaging evidence. On the other hand, the number of cases of "coincidences between Priestly sections and the Seder divisions is greater than can be accounted for by the doctrine of chances. In mere bulk about one-seventh of the text of Gen., chaps. 12-50, belongs to P, whereas a P passage opens or closes about two Sedarim out of five." This the author thinks can be explained most naturally as the work of a skilful compiler, who in dovetailing P "into the connection of JE looked for the interstices of the old narrative as the places where he could most suitably insert the bulk of the new material. . . . Not less naturally, the framers of the lectionary

frequently selected these same points as the places where a reading in most cases might fittingly close, just as nearly half of the modern chapter divisions coincide with divisions of the old Jewish lectionary" (pp. 223 f.).

The point should be noted, in justice to Dr. Skinner's attitude toward the LXX, that he allows that it had a Hebrew basis which differed from the MT, and in certain cases contained a text superior to it. The main point of his contention is that that text could not have been such as Dahse claims to have discovered, in which the divine names were manipulated according to the divisions of the Synagogue lectionary (p. 240). The evidence which he has furnished in the different lines of argument seems conclusively to substantiate his position.

Dr. Skinner has performed a task of great value which has involved an immense amount of research and exacting labor. It is a work which must have meant much personal sacrifice. For this he is entitled to the gratitude of Old Testament scholars. Aside from the value of the book in disproving Professor Dahse's vagaries, the fact has been demonstrated anew that the documentary hypothesis is the most reasonable theory at present in the field in explanation of the complex phenomena of Genesis.

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STUDIES IN JEWISH LITERATURE

Swete's indispensable introduction to the Septuagint has recently appeared in revised form by R. R. Ottley.¹ But the work of the reviser has been confined within very narrow limits, since he has been required to retain the pagination of the original edition. When he ventures to rewrite a paragraph, as on p. 9, for example, he duplicates exactly the lineation of the old page. In the footnotes and bibliographies by crowding the lines or extending the page now and then, brief supplementary items, or minor corrections, are introduced; and free space at the end of a chapter has sometimes been utilized. The more substantial contributions of the reviser are contained in a section of "Additional Notes" (pp. 498-530) where he treats more at length items which for lack of space could not be discussed in their proper place in the text. Unfortunately, however, the fact that a note has been added is not usually indicated in the text. This neglect is especially serious in those places

¹ *An Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek*. By H. B. Swete. Revised by R. R. Ottley. With an appendix containing the letter of Aristas edited by H. St. J. Thackeray. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. xiii+626 pages. 7s. 6d.

where one must consult the notes in order to correct misstatements of the original. Thus on p. 145 the remark that no transcription or collation of Codex Taurinensis has been published is allowed to stand, and unless the reader on his own initiative chances to turn to p. 508 he will not learn that the manuscript was actually transcribed and published half a dozen years ago. One of the first things a reader must do is to go through the book penciling upon the margin the points at which it is desirable to refer to the additional notes. It is hard to condone negligence of this sort on the part of author and publisher. Many students, doubtless, will greatly regret that the new volume does not furnish a fresh discussion of Septuagint problems commensurate with present-day needs. But this much-prized book must still be given a foremost place in its field, even though the new "revision" is virtually only a scantily annotated reprint of the former edition.

A useful elementary book dealing in the main with that portion of Jewish literature usually designated "Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha" has recently come from the pen of W. O. E. Oesterley.¹ Though the title mentions only the Apocrypha, nearly all the pseudepigraphic writings are treated briefly in the course of the discussion (e.g., pp. 198-223). The volume is divided into two parts: "Prolegomena to the Apocrypha" and "Introduction to the Books of the Apocrypha." Under "Prolegomena" the author allows himself considerable liberty in the choice of topics. He first describes the Hellenistic movement as it affected Jews both in Palestine and in the Diaspora, and as it is reflected in the Old Testament and the Apocrypha. Then he discusses in order the Apocalyptic Movement, the Scribes, the Pharisees and Sadducees, the Origin of the Old Testament Canon, Uncanonical Books, the Apocalyptic Literature, the Wisdom Literature and the Jewish Conception of Wisdom and the Doctrinal Teaching of the Apocrypha. These preliminaries occupy more than one-half the entire volume (pp. 1-315). Part II, the "Introduction" proper, is devoted to the apocryphal books taken in chronological order. The discussion deals with such typical themes as title, authorship, content, purpose, date, etc. This manifest lack of unity in the plan of the book will, we fear, detract from its usefulness, especially in the case of the general reader for whom the work is primarily designed. But fortunately since Part II is perfectly intelligible without reference to Part I, the concise treatment of the apocryphal books may be read by itself. The student will also easily discover that he has in the

¹ *The Books of the Apocrypha: Their Origin, Teaching and Contents.* By W. O. E. Oesterley. New York: Revell, 1914. xiv+553 pages. \$3.00.

section of the Prolegomena on "Apocalyptic Literature" a brief but serviceable introduction to most of the Pseudepigrapha. The rest of the book will serve as a brief introduction to Judaism, though as such it is scarcely comprehensive enough to meet the needs of even elementary students. In dealing with the apocalyptists, and with the Pharisees and Sadducees, the author is disposed to follow the less generally accepted views of M. Friedländer and of Leszynsky. But these positions are advocated with caution, and sometimes with reserve, and the reader is usually told where he may find access to the more usual type of opinion. From time to time references are given to modern literature. These add considerably to the value of the volume, which should prove of service to many readers.

In his popular handbook tracing the religious development of the Jews in the period between the Old and the New Testaments, Charles¹ sets the apocalyptic literature prominently in the foreground. At the outset he compares prophecy and apocalyptic, greatly to the advantage of the latter as a functioning item in the religion of the period. The "Kingdom of God" and the "Messiah" are also found to have derived their significance largely from apocalyptic imagery; and this also stimulated the belief in a blessed future life. The ethical phases in the development are sketched under the caption "Man's Forgiveness of His Neighbor"; and the functions of tradition and custom are traced in a chapter on "Reinterpretation and Comprehension." Finally, two chapters on the literature—one on the Apocrypha and one on the Pseudepigrapha—close the sketch. The limitations imposed by the plan of the series (the "Home University Library") necessitated a brief treatment, yet one feels that it might have been more representative and less selective.

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STUDIES OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY

This book in which Professor Lake² publishes in a revised form his Lowell Lectures of 1913-14 is valuable not only for its own sake but as a welcome sign of the times. Many of us have felt with the author that the modern theologian is "too often primarily a historian

¹ *Religious Development between the Old and New Testaments.* By R. H. Charles. New York: Henry Holt [no date]. v+256 pages. \$0.50.

² *The Stewardship of Faith; Our Heritage from Early Christianity.* By Kirsopp Lake, Professor of Early Christian Literature in Harvard University. New York: Putnam, 1915. vii+237 pages. \$1.50.

rather than a student of living religion" (p. 196). This, indeed, is a very moderate statement, for in much of our theological literature there is no feeling whatever for the vital, practical issues of Christianity. We have here a book by a scholar of the first rank which frankly abandons the merely objective point of view, and tries to correlate the results of investigation with the actual problems of our time.

The leading idea of the book is expressed in the title. "Christianity has always been a movement; the stewardship of faith is to carry on the movement. We must continue the same process of changing theology and changing institutional life which is revealed to us by the study of history." The historical period which comes under survey is that of the early, and especially the New Testament, church; and the chapters follow the broad outline of the development. Beginning with the apocalyptic background of the Gospels, we pass to the teaching of Jesus, and to the transformation which it underwent as the church became involved in the larger life of the Roman Empire. The three great conflicts of the growing church with heathenism, Gnosticism, and "un-instructed Christianity" are discussed in separate chapters. It is shown how "the church did not triumph because it preserved its theology, its ethics, or its institutions unchanged, but because it changed them all, and changed them rapidly, in order that they might express more rapidly and more fully the spiritual life which remained the same" (p. 4). Even the most cherished beliefs were wholly transformed, or at times discarded, when they proved inadequate to the needs of this spiritual life.

Within the limits allowed him Professor Lake can deal only briefly or allusively with the many intricate historical problems which he encounters in the course of his survey. Throughout he occupies an advanced critical position, but his attitude is eminently fair-minded and tolerant. He even goes out of his way to discover elements of truth in views which are no longer tenable. Although content for the most part to accept the results of scholarship, without detailed discussion, he rarely fails to state them in a fresh manner, and to add some illuminating suggestion of his own. Occasionally his conjectures seem a little hazardous, as when he maintains that an opposition to the Zealot movement is one of the underlying factors in the teaching of Jesus. Might it not be argued that in the time of Jesus the prevailing religious mood was one of quietism, and that it was the Zealots who came forward as the protesting minority? Again, the suggestion that financial interest was largely responsible for the priestly attack on Jesus is somewhat far-fetched. To do the chief priests justice, they had other, and more

substantial, motives for their hostility. Questions of a graver kind will be raised by Professor Lake's acceptance of Wrede's theory of the messianic secret, and, perhaps, by his view of Docetism as a phase of "vulgar" or "uninstructed" Christianity.

The historical survey, however, is subsidiary to the practical thesis of the book. It cannot be denied that in his endeavor to illustrate the present-day task of the church from the facts of the early history, the author sometimes yields to a natural temptation. The facts are subjected to some violence in order that they may march in line with their modern counterparts. But the method adopted is not without its advantages even from a strictly historical point of view. Not a few aspects of early Christianity become more intelligible, as well as more real and interesting, when they are considered in the light of present conditions. The main contention of the book has already been indicated. Christianity has for its aim the development of the spiritual life, and if it would achieve this aim it must continually recast its theology and institutional forms. Professor Lake holds strongly that a restatement which will satisfy the needs of our own time must be completely new, not a mere adaptation of the traditional doctrines and phraseology. To illustrate the futility of interpreting ancient formulæ by some method of symbol and allegory, he points to the attempted pagan revival in the first century. It failed because men saw through its artificiality and turned to a religion which plainly said what it meant. Along with this thoroughgoing restatement of doctrine Professor Lake desires a fuller recognition of the psychological element in religion. Protestantism, he believes, has much to learn from the treatment of the spiritually sick, as it is practiced in the confessional. At the same time he acknowledges the duty which modern Christianity owes to society, as well as to the individual. In the Roman Empire the ethical problem consisted in the regenerating of personal morality; for our age it rather takes the form of imposing higher standards on social and national and international life.

Many readers will feel that the main argument of the book suffers from a certain vagueness. The author does not try to analyze that inner spiritual life which he rightly considers to be more important than forms and creeds. He does not allow for anything distinctive in the Christian mode of communion with God, and there seems to be little reason why Buddhism or Mohammedanism, properly restated, should not answer his purpose as well. There is much to be admired in his plea that the old beliefs should be fearlessly translated into their modern equivalents; but is there not something to be gained by preserving the continuity

of the religious tradition? He shows us himself, for that part, how primitive Christianity attached itself to existing ideas—Jewish and Hellenistic—and how this wise conservatism was no small element in its strength. In his demand for a closer study of the “varieties of religious experience” and a spiritual clinic based upon that study, he undoubtedly calls attention to a real need. But is there not a danger that his method might defeat its own ends? The cure of souls, when all is said, cannot be practiced like a medical art, by means of scientific rules. Everything depends on native insight and sympathy. If the pastor is deficient in these, no amount of psychological study will help him, while, if he has them, it may only blur and confuse his own intuition.

It is no small part of the value of the book that it continually provokes question, and sometimes dissent. Professor Lake brings an original mind to bear on all the well-worn themes which he touches, and compels his readers at every turn to reconsider old conclusions. It would be ungrateful to close a notice of the book without mention of its literary quality, which makes it a pure pleasure to read.

This latest addition¹ to the well-known series of “Studies in Theology” is concerned with the life of the Roman world in the age when Christianity made its first conquests. The importance of the subject has never been fully recognized until recent years. We are now coming to understand that the conditions of the time not only prescribed the task of the new religion, but reacted in a hundred ways on the message it delivered. It was a happy thought to gather up in a single convenient handbook the results of the large literature which has gathered round the many different aspects of the subject. The comprehensive nature of Professor Angus’ work may be judged from the titles of his chapters: “General Characteristics of the Era”; “Social and Moral Conditions”; “Religious Conditions”; “The Jew”; “The Greek”; “The Roman”; “The Language of Christianity.” To discuss any one of these themes exhaustively in the compass of a small volume would of course be impossible; and the author does not aim at more than a summary presentation of results. But the amount of material which he has compressed into a few brief chapters is surprising, and all the more so as he has made his book readable and interesting throughout. Naturally he

¹ *The Environment of Early Christianity*. By S. Angus, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of New Testament and Historical Theology, St. Andrew’s College, University of Sydney. New York: Scribner, 1915. xi+240 pages. \$0.75.

draws largely on investigators such as Dill, Friedländer, Wendland, Deissmann; but he writes almost everywhere with the authority of a scholar, who has examined at least his literary sources at first hand. In all that concerns the more external features of first-century life and society his account leaves little to be desired. We could have wished for a fuller treatment of spiritual and intellectual conditions, e.g., the nature and influence of later Stoicism, the effect of astrological beliefs, the mystical speculations which grew out of the fusion of Eastern and Western ideas. It might have been well, too, if the church had been placed in a more vital relation to its environment. The author proceeds too much on the old assumption that Christianity was an alien movement, triumphing because Providence had secretly arranged a peculiarly favorable set of conditions. Are we not now learning to recognize that in many important respects it was the resultant of the forces at work in the world which it conquered? But within the limits which he has defined for himself Professor Angus is an entirely safe guide. We would commend the book especially to the notice of theological teachers. They will find no more useful textbook for what must now be regarded as an indispensable branch of New Testament study.

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ROBERTSON'S GRAMMAR OF NEW TESTAMENT GREEK¹

The first impression made by this book is that of size. For fourteen hundred pages it wends its way through the various highways and bypaths of the grammar of the language of the New Testament. It is a herculean task which Professor Robertson has brought to completion, whether one views it from the standpoint of the mere mechanical work involved or from the standpoint of the more taxing labor of reading and research.

The appearance of so large a book on such a subject is a matter of interest in these days when, to state it mildly, the linguistic discipline no longer retains the firm hold which it once possessed in college and seminary circles. The feeling on the part of many that the heyday of rigid linguistic requirements is past, at least for a time, renders the production of such work as this a matter of some note.

¹ *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research.* By A. T. Robertson. New York: George H. Doran Co., 1914. xl+1,360 pages. \$5.00.

Yet it was time for a new grammar of the Greek of the New Testament to appear. The various translations and revisions of Winer have done heroic service and are still valuable, but new things needed to be said. The failure of Schmiedel to complete the work begun many years ago was a disappointment, and left the need for a new volume insistent. The *Prolegomena* of J. H. Moulton caused New Testament scholars to look wistfully for the completion of the task assumed by that author, but they have looked in vain. It is to the credit of Professor Robertson that by dint of energy and persistence he has completed his task in this field. How much persistence was required may be gathered from the fact that the project was launched twenty-six years ago; how much energy has been devoted to it a perusal of the pages will reveal.

The main justification for the volume, and it is the one on which Dr. Robertson relies, is the progress which has been made in the last generation in certain lines which are of vital importance to the study of the language of the New Testament. The emergence of the study of language as a historical science would in itself have warranted the undertaking of such a task; while the important and almost amazing discoveries regarding the popular language of the Greco-Roman world made such an undertaking imperative. There have been pioneers in this field. The names of Deissmann, Milligan, Moulton, Thumb, and many others arouse feelings of gratitude in those who study and teach in this realm. That Professor Robertson would be indebted to such men was to be expected and he himself makes full and grateful acknowledgment of such indebtedness.

The book is an attempt to re-work the field of New Testament grammar from the standpoint of comparative philology and historical grammar. In an introduction of some one hundred and forty pages the author discusses the new material which in recent years has been placed at the disposal of the grammarian of the New Testament. Comparative grammar, advance in the grammatical and textual fields of the classic Greek authors, and the material of inscriptions, papyri, and ostraca receive due attention. A chapter is devoted to the application of the historical method to grammar, following which the *κοινή* and the relation of the Greek of the New Testament to it are discussed.

Such a survey is desirable in a work of this type and readers will find here within comparatively small space material otherwise widely scattered. The chapter on new material will be helpful to those who have neither time, ability, nor inclination to pursue the matter at first hand. The treatment of the historical method is such as to cause one to wonder

if enough has been done to be of real assistance to those who are not already conversant with much that is there discussed. Should the readers be already familiar with the ground covered, much of the material is unnecessary. The question arises whether it should not be done more thoroughly or not attempted within such limits. To some, however, the summary will be a useful one. In the chapters devoted to the *κοινή* and the relation of the New Testament to it there are some good features. The discussion of the term *κοινή* makes clearer several matters which were probably obscure to some students. The position which the author assumes on Semitic influence in New Testament grammar is sane and well taken.

The rest of the book, with the exception of a few notes and some indexes, is divided between accident and syntax. The author tries to bear in mind the comparative and historical point of view from which he is writing and he achieves a fair measure of success. In the main the ordinary categories of grammar are followed. Much of the ground covered is old; in the very nature of the case that must be. But many interesting and suggestive features appear in consequence of the new material and the new point of view. The method of approach to the preposition, namely, from its original meaning and its root idea is promising even if it fails at times of consistent pursuit. The discussion of the cases, e.g., the genitive, is instructive and will be found of value. The treatment of the so-called "accusative and infinitive," while admittedly not new with Professor Robertson, should prove of no little assistance to students in seeing more clearly the significance of that construction.

In the process of producing this work the author has made himself familiar with a considerable literature. Many of these volumes are among the best in their field and they have helped to determine the general trend and treatment. Some of these authors Professor Robertson follows closely. Others he treats with a degree of independence; sometimes he is almost cavalier in his treatment of them. In some of the chapters, notably in the early part of the book, one feels that the author's reaction on the works which form the basis of his discussion is not so thorough as one could wish. There is too great a proportion of quotation and too little of the author.

It is a large book. The reviewer would be glad if he were able to say that it was a great book. But, in spite of the time and labor and devotion and enthusiasm which manifestly have gone into its making, it can scarcely be so called. The fault is not with the subject, nor does it inhere in the material at the author's hand. The author himself has

failed to make it a great book. The work is uneven in quality. Perhaps this was to be expected in a volume which had been so long in process of becoming. A more discriminating attitude as to the material which was necessary and relevant would have resulted in a smaller but surely a better book. Both in statement in the text and in reference in the foot-notes there is room for improvement in this respect.

In literary matters there is not a little to criticize. Some of the defects may be explained as resulting from the adoption of a colloquial style. But one wonders whether such adoption is permissible in a work of this kind even when discussing colloquial Greek. Other features which deserve criticism are due to loose and careless revision. One does not expect such things in a work which both aims at being and claims to be a scholarly production to be used by educated readers. Fortunately, however, in most of the passages the meaning is fairly clear. But there are cases where it is extremely difficult to ascertain the author's meaning. The following is an aggravated instance: "There is less difference in the syntax of the *κοινή* and that of the earlier Greek than in the forms, though the gradual disappearance of the optative use of *ἴνα* and finite verb in the non-final sense rather than the infinitive or even *ῥη*, the gradual disuse of the future part, may be mentioned" (p. 64). The reviewer thinks that he knows the thought which the author intended to convey, but the idea was gained only after a reconstruction of the sentence and a careful comparison with other parts of the volume.

It is not only in point of literary style that the book is deserving of criticism. In the discussions there are statements to which many readers will hesitate to give assent, while others will refuse to admit them. The assumption of the bilingualism of Peter and the bilingualism, if not the trilingualism, of Jesus (pp. 28-29) is not the result of careful work. If Peter spoke Greek on the day of Pentecost we should be interested to know what later service Mark rendered him as interpreter. Is the tradition of Papias to be sacrificed on the altar of bilingualism? This part of Dr. Robertson's argument betrays a lack of sympathetic understanding of the problem of Gospel origins. In fact, throughout the volume the author's treatment of questions of introduction to the books of the New Testament is unsatisfactory. It is true that he declares that such problems are not the special concern of the grammarian. One might be content to let it rest there were it not for the fact that the writer of the volume constantly assumes a position on disputed questions and proceeds to argue thereon.

Professor Robertson admits (p. 389) that there are instances "where theological bias will inevitably determine how one interprets the Greek

idiom." Such an admission is not encouraging. There may be some who doubt the inevitability of such a procedure. Be that as it may, there are not wanting occasions when the author cannot be altogether absolved from this fault. The nominative following the preposition *ἀπό* in Rev. 1:4 is repeatedly given a theological explanation. A theological bias is occasionally seen in the treatment of some prepositions, such as the bold declaration of the telic use of *εἰς* in the phrase *εἰς ἀφ᾽ ἑσθιν* in Matt. 26:28 and a certain hesitation to admit a similar significance in the same phrase in Mark 1:4 and Acts 2:38 (p. 595). The discussion of *ὑπέρ* on p. 631 savors a little of special pleading from the theological standpoint especially, in view of a statement on p. 567 concerning this preposition and two others that they approach the subject of the death of Christ from different angles. Surely the grammarian did not require the aid of the theologian in so simple a matter as the significance of the conditional sentence in Luke 4:3. But our author argues the question in so strange a fashion that the argument deserves quotation. "In Luke 4:3, *εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ* [*sic*], *εἰπεί*, we have a good example of the first class condition. The devil would not, of course, use the second class (assumed to be untrue), for that would be an affront to Christ. The third and fourth classes would throw doubt on the point. The temptation, to have force, must be assumed as true. The devil knew it to be true. He accepts that fact as a working hypothesis in the temptation. He is anxious to get Jesus to *prove* it, as if it needed proof for Christ's own satisfaction and for his reception. If the devil used Aramaic, then we have Christ's own translation or that of the evangelist" (p. 1009). One scarcely knows how to meet such *naïveté*. The use of Aramaic by the devil is novel. If Jesus were bilingual, as Professor Robertson holds, what was to hinder the tempter from speaking Greek unless he were linguistically limited to the Semitic tongues? Moreover, the point of the discussion is the significance of the conditional form in Greek. Could the same fine distinctions be expressed by those using the Aramaic language? Elsewhere in the book the author makes a strong statement to the effect that the Greek conditional clauses formed one of the noblest achievements of syntax because of their ability to indicate fine distinctions. Did Aramaic equal Greek in this respect? The foregoing quotation savors of the classroom in one of its lightest and, it is to be hoped, rarest phases.

There are other matters, not theological, that seem to reflect the lecture room in its lighter moods rather than the study of the scholar. One scarcely knows whether Dr. Robertson is humorous or serious in such a statement as the following: "It is hardly worth while to warn the

inept that there is no connection between the article τό and the English *to* in a sentence like Phil. 1:21, ἐμοὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῆν Χριστὸς καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν κέρδος." Surely no one so inept as to need even the slightest reminder on this point would be likely to make much use of such a volume as the one under review. Is it not possible that the author slightly underrates the intelligence of his prospective readers?

In the sphere of grammatical statement and treatment some criticisms must be made. A more thorough discussion of anarthrous nouns with emphasis on the qualitative use is to be desired. At times an element of positiveness appears which is not entirely warranted by the facts. The ὅτι clause of Mark 4:41 is cited as a "very clear" instance of the consecutive use of that word (p. 1001). Some will think that the causal function is the simpler explanation here. At any rate, the case is not "very clear." The relative clause in Matt. 24:2 is better treated as a descriptive relative clause than as consecutive. The infinitive μνησθῆναι in Luke 1:54 expresses purpose rather than result. In fact there is room for improvement in the entire discussion of those clauses which lie on the borderland between final and consecutive functions. A much better example of a conditional clause, determined as unfulfilled, than Mark 6:5 (p. 1013) could have been selected. Is not the use of εἰ μὴ in this instance exceptive rather than conditional? The rejection of the category "attendant circumstance" for the circumstantial participle simply necessitates the extension of the boundaries of other categories, sometimes at the cost of awkwardness.

Perhaps it is too much to expect complete consistency in so large a book written during so long a period. However that may be, we do not always find it. "The Johannine writings reflect the vernacular style very distinctly" (p. 76). "The Gospel and First Epistle [of John] probably had the care and the assistance of cultured friends" (p. 137). On p. 966 while the author is discussing Mark 5:4 the following comment is made: "Burton thinks that here διὰ gives rather the evidence than the reason. Why not both?" On p. 1071 we find the remark: "In Mark 5:4 it is rather the evidence than the reason that is given."

The typographical errors seem to be few. The following were noticed during the reading of the book: "Millegan" for "Milligan" (p. 65), "soonly" for "so only" (p. 252), ʒ for ʒ (p. 225). The mechanical work of the book is well done and its execution reflects credit on the publishers.

The author designed this volume "for advanced students in theological schools, for the use of teachers, for scholarly pastors who wish a comprehensive grammar of the Greek New Testament on the desk for

constant use, for all who make a thorough study of the New Testament or who are interested in the study of language, and for libraries." The constituency to which appeal is made is a comprehensive one and doubtless there will be those within its limits who will find occasion to consult the work. When they do so there will be many facts and suggestions which will reward them. These would stand out in bolder relief if a considerable amount of repetition had been avoided and if irrelevant material, possibly the collection of the years devoted to the preparation and making of the book, had been omitted. The volume will serve as a book of reference to be used cautiously and discriminatingly; its magnitude will not favor a widespread use.

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LIBERAL ORTHODOXY¹

Dr. Clark in his book of this title undertakes a historico-critical survey of the theological movements, especially in Germany and Great Britain, during the period from the seventeenth century to the present, which have sought to adjust the Christian religion to the intellectual changes of the times. The author's hypothesis is that, in this process of adjustment, liberal orthodoxy, conceiving the essence of Christianity to consist in a system of certain supernaturally given ideas, has tended in one of two directions; on the one hand, desiring to maintain the *residuum* of Christianity, it has drifted toward a formal externalism; while on the other hand, desiring to do justice to changing intellectual movements, it has tended to lose its orthodoxy entirely. This unfortunate "drift" could have been avoided, according to Dr. Clark, through the conception of Christianity as the "life-dynamic" in Christ. Having outlined this hypothesis in his chapter on "The Antecedents," he proceeds to verify it, in the following chapters, through an examination of historical facts.

Dr. Clark finds the forerunners of liberal orthodoxy in the Cambridge school of Platonists represented by Benjamin Whichcot, Henry More, John Smith, and Ralph Cudworth. The movement died out in the early years of the eighteenth century owing to the rise of Deism, but it revived in the first part of the following century. Christianity was forced by the deistic controversy to defend itself in new ways. One of its foremost

¹ *Liberal Orthodoxy*. By Henry W. Clark. New York: Scribner, 1914. xi+313 pages. \$2.00.

defenders was Schleiermacher, who, in the beginning of the nineteenth century by his theory that religion consists in the feeling of dependence on God, attempted to place Christianity beyond the attack of rationalism. Schleiermacher connected the Christian's feeling of dependence on God through the church with the historic Christ in whom the God-consciousness appeared in its absolute form. Here our author points out the defect in Schleiermacher's system: the transmission of the God-consciousness of Christ to the Christian through the church does not furnish a direct contact with Christ. The "revival" of liberal orthodoxy in England in the so-called "Oriental" and "Coleridgean" schools is sympathetically treated. But neither of these effected a theological reconstruction. The reason for this is found in the fact that they conceived of Christianity as a system of ideas, and so failed to make central the "life-dynamic" in Christ. Hence there was needed a development of liberal orthodoxy which should do justice to this item.

Coleridge

This development was attempted by the "Erlangen" school, by Martensen in Denmark, by the "Groningen" school in Holland, by Dorner and others who sought to establish liberal orthodoxy against the skepticism created by the Hegelian dialectic, Strauss's mythical hypothesis, and Baur's tendency theory. The development in Great Britain followed along the lines started by the Coleridgean and Oriental schools. Erskine, representing the former's position that truth must commend itself to the moral constitution of mankind, applied the theory to the doctrine of salvation. Christ through his sinless life has reconciled God to humanity. Robertson, representing the Oriental school, made a positive application of the principle of freer interpretation of the Scripture in his quest for a vital communion with God. In this attempt of the English schools Dr. Clark observes that they came almost to the "life-dynamic" in Christ, but did not quite reach it.

This brings us to his chapter on "Later Years" in Germany, in which the author surveys the Ritschlian movement. According to Ritschl the primary thing in Christianity is the revelation of God in the fact of the historic Christ who immediately creates for and in us the consciousness of our victory over sin and the world. Consequently we need not employ the aid of speculative philosophy to establish Christianity. Ritschl effected this divorce of theology from philosophy through his theory of value-judgments and theoretical judgments, assigning the former to theology, and the latter to philosophy. So Ritschl did not deal with the problem of ultimates. The followers of Ritschl such as Häring and J. Kaftan, who insisted that theology's voice in the matter

of ultimates must be final, tended toward the position of the positive school represented by Seeberg, while the Ritschlian left, who held to the primacy of philosophy, ended in the historical school, represented by Troeltsch, which gives very small place to the historical Christ, or in the Christ-myth movement, advocated by Drews, which maintains the all-sufficiency of ideas about Christ without the historical fact of Christ.

In his closing chapter on "Later Years" in Britain Dr. Clark points out that, while the positions of the Oriel and Coleridgean schools were continued, there was no such systematic development of doctrines as was worked out in Germany. Only particular doctrines such as the atonement and retribution were considered. Meanwhile, however, under the influence of Spencer's evolutionary philosophy, liberal orthodoxy was led to the conceptions of the historic Christ as the head of the human race, the ideal man, and of his incarnation as an anticipation of what humanity would be in the future. In all this something special and unique about Christ remained. But in the main liberal orthodoxy drifted toward the minimizing of the place of Christ in such a way as to cease to be an orthodoxy in any sense.

Dr. Clark has furnished a very clear and suggestive survey of the development of theology in the last two centuries. But it is questionable whether he has not permitted his doctrinal thesis to dominate his history too completely. As has been indicated above, he holds that all the forms of liberal orthodoxy which he has described conceive Christianity to consist in a system of ideas. There can be no doubt that this holds good with respect to some of them; but to classify *all* under the one category is far more than is allowed by the facts of history. For example, to say that Schleiermacher and Ritschl, who respectively opposed the rationalism and speculative philosophy of their times, the former standing for a deep underlying emotional religion and the latter for moral religious experience, held Christianity primarily as a system of supernaturally communicated ideas is trespassing on the canons of historical criticism. Moreover, Dr. Clark deplors the fact that some forms of liberal orthodoxy have ceased to be orthodoxy at all. But why should we lament this fact when it is granted as the genius of liberal orthodoxy to adjust itself to the changing intellectual as well as other movements of the times in order to make itself acceptable to and effective in them? With regard to the solution which Dr. Clark presents in his conception of the "life-dynamic" supernaturally introduced into the world at the appearance of Christ and which is supernaturally communicated to individuals so that there is created between them and the

Christ a sort of mystical relation (see Epilogue, pp. 292 ff.) for the establishment of liberal orthodoxy, it is not difficult to see what would be the fate of a theology based on such a conception. While this sort of theology would be acceptable to those who share the religious experience and scientific training of the author, to those of unlike religious experience and education it would seem unintelligible and ineffective. Its vaguely mystical character makes refutation difficult; but the question may be raised whether so subjective a starting-point is any more certain to retain its "orthodoxy" than are some of the positions criticized by Dr. Clark.

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THE THIRD EDITION OF FRAZER'S *GOLDEN BOUGH*¹

It is now twenty-five years since the first edition of this work appeared in two medium-sized volumes. In the meantime sub-topics have grown into chapters and chapters into whole books, until at present the complete work embraces twelve volumes. The eight hundred openly printed pages of the first edition have now been expanded into over four thousand pages much more closely printed. This increase is due both to the introduction of a large amount of new illustrative material and to a more extended treatment of the subject-matter.

The original purpose of the work, as will be remembered, was to explain the obscure custom of the priesthood of Diana at Nemi, according to which each new aspirant for office must slay his predecessor after first plucking a bough from the sacred oak which grew within the sanctuary. The accomplishment of this feat entitled the performer to fight the priest in single combat and, if victorious, to preside over the sanctuary and bear the title "King of the Wood." This bough from the sacred tree is identified with the branch which Aeneas plucked before under-

¹ *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion*. By J. G. Frazer. London: Macmillan. Part I, The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings. 2 vols., 1910, xxxii+426 and xi+417 pages. \$6.00. Part II, Taboo and the Perils of the Soul. 1911. xv+446 pages. \$3.00. Part III, The Dying God, 1914. xii+305 pages. \$3.00. Part IV, Adonis, Attis, Osiris: Studies in the History of Oriental Religion. 2 vols., 1914. xvii+317 and x+321 pages. \$6.00. Part V, Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild. 2 vols., 1912. xvii+319 and xii+371 pages. \$6.00. Part VI, The Scapegoat, 1913. xiv+453 pages. \$3.00. Part VII, Balder the Beautiful: The Fire-Festivals of Europe and the Doctrine of the External Soul. 2 vols., 1913. xx+346 and xi+389. \$6.00. Vol. XII, Bibliography and General Index., 1915. vii+536 pages. \$6.00.

taking his perilous journey to the nether world, hence the title of the present work, *The Golden Bough*.

The endeavor to explain the practice at Nemi leads the author far afield in his study of primitive magical and religious customs. He believes that the priest is the deific embodiment of the tree-spirit, and that originally this priest was slain yearly in his capacity of incarnate deity, thus making way for a new and more vigorous incarnation. This ceremony was a magical rite designed to infuse new life into the waning vitality of nature. This hypothesis is coupled with the theory that the development of human intelligence with respect to the interpretation of nature proceeds through three principal stages. The first is that of magic, in which man depends upon his own ability to control the forces of nature about him. The second stage is ushered in when he discovers his own weakness and turns suppliant, having become convinced that there are behind nature certain invisible beings whose aid he must invoke. This is the religious stage. Then follows the reign of science, which gradually rejects the religious theory of nature and recognizes only inflexible natural law.

The central theme of these volumes is the notion of the slain god, studied in the light of the author's special anthropological theory. A brief statement of the content of the various parts will give some idea of the character of the work. Part I deals with magic and its relation to the evolution of the king and his functions in primitive society. The various types of magic are expounded at some length. The king is believed to have been at the outset a concrete embodiment of some phase of the vital force of nature, and so to have been essentially divine. The second part treats of the principles of taboo, more particularly as applied to sacred persons such as kings and priests. These human gods, since the welfare of the community is thought to depend upon them, are required to observe many rules to insure their own safety and that of the people.

Thus far the discussion is only preliminary to the main theme, the dying god, taken up in Part III. The general principle is first established that the motive for slaying the man-god is the fear lest the declining old age of the body in which the sacred spirit dwells should have a deteriorating influence upon that spirit. It must be released from the feebler body and become incarnate in a stronger in order that the decomposing forces of nature may be checked and an ever-new vitality preserved. Part IV pursues the same subject, directing attention more especially to the figure of the dying god in the Orient of classical antiquity. The materials are gathered about three familiar names, Adonis,

Attis, Osiris, but much information is also brought to light regarding minor deities of a similar character. The two volumes of Part V examine similar figures in other parts of the world. In Greece, for example, the vine-god Dionysus and the corn-goddess Persephone, with her mother and duplicate Demeter, are personifications of cultivated plants. From this point one easily passes to a consideration of similar figures among primitive agricultural peoples whose religion is so widely colored by the care of the corn as the source of sustenance. Passing next to savages whose interests are mainly in hunting, fishing, and pastoral occupations, the source of religious reverence is found in the beasts, birds, and fishes, from which food is obtained. Since the savage assumes the immortality of the animal's soul, he makes efforts to appease the ghosts of his victims. Similarly the immortality of man is a very primitive notion, and the custom of worshipping the ghosts of dead men arose at an early date. These various phenomena are examined at more or less length in Part V, under the caption "Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild." Part VI completes the study of the dying god by an examination of the use which has been made of him as a scapegoat to free the worshippers from various ills. The origin of the notion is traced to a confusion between the real possibility of transferring a physical load to other shoulders and the supposed possibility of transferring our bodily and mental ailments to someone else.

Part VII is in the nature of a supplement. Since the "golden bough" at Nemi has been assumed to be a branch of mistletoe growing on an oak in the sacred grove, the Arician priest-king of the wood is placed beside the Norse god Balder who is reported to have perished by a stroke of mistletoe. But the analogy is admittedly remote and is used chiefly as an excuse for appending a study on fire-festivals in Europe, since fire played a part both in the myth of Balder and in the ritual at Nemi. Formerly the author advocated the solar theory of this rite as an act of sympathetic magic designed to reinforce the sun's light and heat, but now he thinks the rite to have been originally purificatory in significance.

The series is completed by a large volume containing an exhaustive bibliography covering the general field (pp. 1-144) and a comprehensive index of the subject-matter (pp. 147-536). Although each part is accompanied by a good index, it contributes very substantially to the convenience of the reader to have at hand a complete index of the whole. In this way the great wealth of materials contained in these books is placed at the disposal of every reader who may wish to use

them as works of reference, a purpose for which they are admirably suited.

This mere sketch of the content of these volumes gives no adequate idea of their real worth. Their value is very great, quite apart from any question one may raise at certain points regarding the validity of the author's anthropological theories. Indeed, he is much more anxious to inform his readers than to indoctrinate them anthropologically. While most of the data are taken at second hand, they are collected with great diligence and communicated to the reader in very attractive and informing fashion. The work is of particular interest at present to students of early Christianity because of the light it sheds upon primitive beliefs in dying and rising divinities.

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A TRANSLATION OF ANCIENT BUDDHIST TEXTS¹

The translation comprises chaps. 1, 2, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, and 27 of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* and the *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā*.

This partial translation of one of the oldest and most important texts of Mahāyāna Buddhism is a valuable addition to our knowledge of the development of Buddhist dogma and of the metaphysics which took the place of the practical ethics preached by Buddha himself. The trained Hindu mind is philosophical and demands a rational basis of belief. Buddha refused to give any such rational basis of belief, refused to decide metaphysical questions, and turned his thought resolutely from outward desires and craving to a limitation of such desires.

The many references to the "emptiness" of the objective world in a text as early as the first century B.C. or the first century A.D. form a link in the chain of reasons for regarding the Vedānta of Gauḍapāda and of Śaṅkara as a later development based on a reaction against the growing negativism of Buddhist thought. With the publication of each new work on Mahāyāna Buddhism, Deussen's interpretation of the Upanishads and his theories concerning the development of philosophical thought in India become more and more untenable. From the Abhidhamma texts through the *Milindapañha* and the early Mahāyāna

¹ *Prajñāpāramitā: Die Vollkommenheit der Erkenntnis. Nach Indischen, Tibetischen und Chinesischen Quellen.* Translated by Max Walleser. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1913. 164 pages. M. 6.60.

texts to Aṣvaghōṣa, Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, and Asaṅga the development can now be traced in an orderly, natural, logical way, and approximately dated. Until the later Upanishads, such as the *Ṣvetāśvatara*, can be given a definite date instead of merely being assigned to a relative position in the group of the Upanishads, we must accept Walleser's conclusion (in his *Der ältere Vedānta*) that Gauḍapāda (fifth century, A.D.) gave the first definite Brahman statement of an absolute monism.

The aim of the Prajñāpāramitā group of texts is to give a description of the insight and illumination of Buddha, to show how meaningless are our concepts of Being and Non-being, to prove that the objective world has no absolute truth, that its truth is entirely relative, and that from the absolute point of view it is an empty appearance. The word "emptiness" (*śūnyatā*), does not denote, as has so frequently been asserted, an absolute annihilation, but means that from the point of view of a higher synthesis the world of matter has no meaning. The very word *māyā*, which is later used by the Vedānta, is of frequent occurrence: cf. p. 42, "Wie meinst du, Subhūti, ist ein anderes der Trug [*māyā*], ein anderes die Erscheinung [*rūpa*]? Erscheinung eben ist Trug, Trug eben ist Erscheinung. . . . Die fünf Haftungsgruppen [*upadāna-skandha*] sind nämlich wie ein Zaubermensch zu erfassen." This point of view is not developed in a systematic way. The texts are a jumble of dialogue and of dialectic, resembling rather the earlier Pāli Suttas than the later philosophical works. Each concept is analyzed and the contradiction implied by it is shown. Any concept implies limitation. Each concept must have an antithesis; so all concepts are denied and Buddha or the Prajñāpāramitā is said to be neither Being nor Non-being, but to transcend the antithesis implied by all particular conceptions.

The important introduction gives bibliographical material concerning the Prajñāpāramitā texts, discusses the elements of negativism in Buddha's own teaching, and traces their development in the later philosophical history of Buddhism.

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BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT

RYLE, H. E. *The Book of Genesis. In the Revised Version, with Introduction and Notes.* ["The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges."] New York: Putnam, 1914. \$1.10.

The "Cambridge Bible" has long lacked its opening book. That need is now supplied. There is no lack of good commentaries on Genesis for all classes of readers. The class to which this appeals is already provided for by Driver, Wade, Bennett, and Mitchell. But doubtless this volume, being in this famous series and its author being a well-known leader in the church, will find many readers whom its predecessors have not touched. The work is well done. It makes no contribution to existing scholarship; but that is not the purpose of the series. Its author is well informed as to the results of the best scholarship and has used them fully in his interpretation. The standpoint is that of historical criticism, but the application of critical methods is cautious and moderate. The volume is thus admirably suited to the needs of the average man. The literary sources of the text are indicated by the appropriate symbols in the margin. Half a dozen half-tones and two maps add to the interest and attractiveness of the book. An appendix gives illustrative materials from Babylonian and Egyptian records. The introduction is clear and sufficiently full, without becoming wearisome. The comments are really helpful in the interpretation of the text.

Hammurabi's date is now known to have been 2123 to 2081 B.C., i.e., about a hundred years later than the dates accepted by Ryle. The old statement that the name "Jehovah" was first so pronounced by Petrus Galatinus in 1518 B.C. is reiterated. But George F. Moore, in the *American Journal of Theology*, Vol. XII, pp. 34 ff., showed clearly that this pronunciation was in vogue before the days of Petrus Galatinus, since the latter discusses the subject in such a way as to show that he is not introducing a new pronunciation but defending an old one. The transliteration of Hebrew words is of little value in this type of a book and, if done at all, should be done with careful consistency. The excavator at Susa was de Morgan (p. 167). The book as a whole is notably free from errors.

J. M. P. S.

DUHM, B. *Das Buch Jesaja übersetzt und erklärt.* Dritte, verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. [Handkommentar zum Alten Testament.] Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1914. xxiv+459 pages. M. 10.

Twenty-two years after its original issue this famous commentary reaches its third edition. Its author tells us that "no page and often no sentence has remained unchanged." Along with this change in subject-matter goes a change from roman type to German. This is a part of the general movement in Germany to maintain the superiority of all things German; but the German type is harder upon the eyes. The change in content is not vital; indeed, there is no single change of first-rate significance. For example, in the entire Introduction to the commentary the more important changes are but three in number and they are of but minor significance at that. On p. xv, the new edition is less certain than its predecessor as to the date at which chaps. 40-66 were welded into a unit. On p. xvii, 29:56-7 is not assigned to 711 B.C., as it was in the former edition. Lastly, on p. xix, 14:22 f. is not credited to a contemporary of Deutero-Isaiah, as in the second edition. The changes are, for

the most part, both in Introduction, translation, and comments, either the substitution of one more accurate synonym for another or of a smoother rhetorical idiom or the addition of brief interpretative suggestions here and there. The large number of these minor changes constitutes a great improvement in the commentary. Attention to details such as these makes for perfection.

The literature of the last decade has left little impress upon this commentary. As in the earlier editions, Duhm contents himself in the stating fully and clearly his own views and pays little attention to contrary views. The opinions of this edition are essentially those of its predecessors. As a matter of fact, the interpretation of Isaiah, since the issue of the first edition of this work, has gone mainly in the direction indicated by that epoch-marking book. Yet we ought to have here an evaluation of the more recent work affecting Isaiah. No more important question presents itself in the interpretation of Isaiah than that of the proper treatment of the eschatological and messianic materials. Gunkel and Gressmann have opened up a new avenue of approach to this problem. Duhm gives no recognition to this suggestion. He is content to travel in the path that he marked out twenty-two years ago.

J. M. P. S.

EISZFELDT, OTTO. *Israels Geschichte*. [Praktische Bibelerklärung.] Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1914. 52 pages. M. o. 50.

This compact little book deals in a thoroughly critical fashion with the principal events in the life of the Hebrew people, from their beginning to the exile, having in all twenty-seven short chapters arranged in seven divisions, and prefacing each chapter with brief quotations from the Old Testament text. The style is clear and simple, and the writer has a facility in pointing out in a few words the religious as well as the political importance of the events mentioned.

The book follows the modern line: The patriarchal period does not furnish us history; Hebrew tribes reach Palestine after 1400, some of them wander to Egypt about 1300, are led out by Moses after 1250, and are in the west-Jordan country before 1200; the conflict with the two types of Baalism is clearly pointed out; and the period of the Kings and Prophets is dealt with in brief though pointed characterizations of men and messages.

D. E. T.

SANDERS, FRANK KNIGHT. *History of the Hebrews*. Their Political, Social, and Religious Development and Their Contribution to World-Betterment. New York: Scribner, 1914. xiii+367 pages. \$1.00.

This book is intended as a textbook for classes in undergraduate Bible-study and may serve as well for elementary theological classes. Though the writer disclaims any originality as to material, the volume shows the results of a vast amount of work. The most characteristic thing about it is its arrangement and the method of study for which it prepares the way. After eight short introductory studies covering in all only 17 pages, the author divides his entire work into five parts and follows the analogy of the principal periods in the physical and mental development of an individual life; viz., (1) Childhood, (2) Adolescence, (3) Maturity, (4) Mental and Spiritual Productivity, (5) Age of Fixed Convictions. To these correspond in Israel's corporate life, (1) The Patriarchal Period, (2) Settlement in Canaan to the Disruption of the Kingdom, (3) From Disruption to 586, (4) 586 to Ezra and Nehemiah, (5) Judaism down

to 135 A.D. Each of these main divisions is elaborately subdivided into small sections, each of which is carefully introduced with reference to its historical and religious setting and clinched with a set of questions; in all, there are 534 sections. There is much supplemental material in the way of maps and longer lists of questions dealing with the principal divisions of the history, as well as an appendix with references to the literature bearing on each section, and a good index. The work gives one the impression of great thoroughness, and in the hands of a skilful teacher should pave the way for a thorough grounding in the knowledge of the Jewish people.

D. E. T.

WEHLE, THEODORE. *Origin and Meaning of the Old Testament*. New York: R. H. Fenno, 1914. 199 pages. \$1.00.

The aim of the author of this small treatise is to present impartially and in a concise form the results of modern criticism of the Old Testament writings. It is his hope that it may serve as an introduction to a more detailed study of the same field or as a public-school textbook on the history and development of the people of Israel. An introductory chapter deals largely with the bearing of archaeological results upon Old Testament study; though necessarily it is far from complete. Chap. i deals briefly with the nature of the Old Testament records, then in a series of five chapters the principal events from Moses to Ezra are set forth in the briefest possible form. There is nothing new in the book, as it aims to set down only the points that have been well established by criticism. In some cases, notably with respect to early Babylonian chronology, the latest findings have not been followed.

On the whole the book is very readable and may well fill a place for the lay reader who wishes to gain some familiarity with the Old Testament as viewed by modern investigators.

D. E. T.

RICHARDSON, ERNEST CUSHING. *Biblical Libraries*. A Sketch of Library History from 3400 B.C. to 150 A.D. Princeton: University Press, 1914. xvi+252 pages. \$1.25.

This book opens with an introductory chapter of 35 pages, which sets out to prove that a library is a library, so that the author may have a lively theme for the remainder of the book. After reading the pages of the work, one sees in every age, from the dawn of civilization down through New Testament times, most elaborate and well-organized collections of books, housed in splendid library rooms, private as well as public, sacred as well as secular. A lively imagination supplies at every stage those elements which sober facts fail to provide.

The title is misleading since the book covers more non-biblical than biblical material, and deals with the book collections of every people who in any way touched the life of the Jewish people.

Among these various peoples, the author concludes, the temples had extensive archives; these contained primarily temple business records including letters, but also private business documents, contracts, deeds, wills, etc., while private business firms kept their own collections of records in their own counting-rooms; the temple schools had sign lists, exercises, etc., and hundreds if not thousands of religious texts were to be found both in the schools and in the temple area. It is with the purpose of substantiating the foregoing statements that the author has brought together the materials of

the book and placed his far-fetched interpretation upon them. The book is an array of materials regarding books and book materials and book depositories in many ages, but its style is not smooth and some serious typographical errors have not been corrected. The author allows his quarrel with the Assyriologists and even with modern biblical thought to obtrude itself too prominently in many places.

D. E. T.

ELMSLIE, W. A. L., AND SKINNER, JOHN. *Isaiah XL-LXVI*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. xxxiv+137 pages. 1s. 6d. net.

This little book is the second volume on Isaiah in the series "The Revised Version, edited for the Use of Schools." It goes without saying that the work is thorough and probably as helpful as it can be made to the reader who must confine his researches almost exclusively to the English text. The notes on the text are more than reasonably full.

Interest centers in the Introduction. The authors seem to be loath to make a clear-cut division of this section of Isaiah at the end of chap. 55. This they finally do in a short section, though one reads the greater part of the Introduction with the very clear impression that the whole section is the work of one author.

The authors feel that the Servant passages are best explained by a synthesis of the two principal views regarding them, viz., the individualistic and the nationalistic, and even the third view of the Servant section as a "righteous section" is not to be excluded. Thus the Servant may represent Israel, "not in some sense, but in many senses." The Servant passages are held to be the work of the same author as chaps. 40-55 as a whole.

D. E. T.

KÖNIG, EDUARD. *Das antisemitische Hauptdogma*. Bonn: Weber, 1914. 64 pages.

The agitation on the subject of "Antisemitism" has produced considerable literature within the last ten years. Writers upon the theme have essayed to find its roots in Old Testament times, in the so-called antagonism between Judah and Israel, or the Jews and their neighbors. König vigorously combats such an idea, and properly discredits and defeats the contentions of its advocates. The present "Antisemitic" attitude has no corresponding phase, either in the Old Testament or in New Testament times. It belongs to later areas.

Pr.

CHEYNE, T. K. *Fresh Voyages on Unfrequented Waters*. London: A. & C. Black, 1914. xxii+176 pages. 5s. net.

We are becoming accustomed to the prolific crop of books from the pen of Professor Cheyne. *The Mines of Isaiah* was a work on his researches, mainly on proper names, and this is a continuation of that book. He begins with Haggai and Zechariah and concludes the Old Testament in thirteen chapters and the New Testament in six. The territory around which nearly all the narratives revolve is North Arabia, and the magical name which lies concealed in some code form in many of the proper names found in his "voyages" is *Yerahme'el*. The so-called "discoveries" of the author are merely conjectures, mere juggling with letters and words, but, like a dice-thrower with loaded dice, he knows exactly the result ahead of him. As an example:

"*Bethlehem* is merely a record that here in olden times was a settlement of N. Arabians; in short, *Lehem* is . . . but a witty popular modification of *Yerahme'el*." With all his acute mental display in disposing of difficulties, and in pure conjecture to fit his North Arabian *Yerahme'el*ites, the author occasionally makes a valid point worth considering. "Boldness" is not the word to characterize his attitude, but rather recklessness, and little regard for anything except his theories.

PR.

DAHSE, J. *Die gegenwärtige Krisis in der alttestamentlichen Kritik*. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1914. 30 pages. Pf. 40.

Wiener's attacks on the Wellhausen theory of the origin of the Pentateuch have their echo in Germany. Dahse goes so far as to say that the appearance of different names of God as found in the J and E documents are not marks of different documents. They may be theoretically due to the divisions of the Septuagint and of the Hebrew text which stood at the basis of the Septuagint into Sedarim, and of the Massoretic Text at a later time into Parashim.

PR.

WIENER, H. M. *The Pentateuchal Text*. A Reply to Dr. Skinner. London: Stock, 1914. 6s.

A reprint from the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, April, 1914, pp. 218-68, in reply to Skinner's articles in the *Expositor* (April to September, 1913).

PR.

KÖNIG, EDUARD. *Die moderne Pentateuchkritik und ihre neueste Bekämpfung*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1914. 106 pages. M. 280.

König takes up the gauntlet thrown down by the two pamphlets of Dahse and Wiener. He not only takes his stand on the modern view of the Pentateuch and by a mass of detail and painstaking investigation shows the weakness of their arguments, but presents also with equal care the strength of the modern view. On two points König fortifies his position: (1) He proves the text-critical authority of the Massoretic Text in general, and especially with reference to the use of the divine names. (2) He investigates the text-critical authority of the Septuagint regarding these same divine names.

The second and third parts of his brochure are the most convincing and valuable, for here he proves that Dahse's theory that the names of God are variable elements is false.

The pamphlet concludes with a sketch of the correct view of the Pentateuch as König and the modern progressive school view it. It should have a salutary effect upon the superficial and rambling methods of such amateur critics as Wiener and Dahse.

PR.

SCHWAB, JOHANN. *Der Begriff der nefes in den heiligen Schriften des alten Testaments*. Borna-Leipzig: Noske, 1913. x+103 pages. M. 4.

Some of the best contributions to special themes in the Old Testament are made by such Doctor's dissertations as this one on נֶפֶשׁ, presented to the faculty at the University of Munich. Schwab was obliged to work in a well-cultivated field which had yielded an abundance of literary products. These he has most industriously

examined, and by his own acumen made some advance here and there over his predecessors. At the conclusion of his first chapter the author practically agrees with Briggs, that *שֵׁן* was the "seat of the emotions and passions." And the second, which discusses the animal life-principle in the word, finds that the Old Testament writers know no higher spiritual activities of *שֵׁן*. When death comes this life-principle leaves the body; whether it goes to Sheol or ceases to exist is not solvable. The fourth division of his book discusses *רוּחַ* and *נֶפֶשׁ* as principles of life and spirit. The latter is that part of man reserved for the higher spiritual activities in contrast with the animal principles of *שֵׁן*. The similar or same meaning attributed to these two terms is due to their occurrence in poetry, but their difference is marked in ordinary straightforward prose. This thesis is a good piece of thorough work with some notable independence of judgment.

Pr.

PILLET, M. L. *Le Palais de Darius I^{er}*. Paris: Geuthner, 1914. 106 pages. Fr. 5.

M. L. Pillet (*architecte diplômé par le gouvernement*) presents a simple account of the excavation of the palace of Darius I (522-486 B.C.) at Susa, intended primarily as a guidebook for visitors to the Salon des Artistes Français interested in archaeology. Before taking up his main subject the author gives a brief description of the site and environs of Susa, the biblical Shushan, and mentions the important work of exploration carried on by Loftus and others before the visit of M. de Morgan to Persia in 1889-91, which resulted in the formation, in 1897, of the *Délégation scientifique en Perse*. Among the earliest and best known finds of this expedition were the stela on which is engraved the Code of Hammurabi and the Stela of Victory of Naram-Sin. The scientific publication of the matter here treated in a popular manner is to form a volume of the *Mémoires de la délégation en Perse*, to appear "in the course of the year." It will probably throw much light upon the Book of Esther.

D. D. L.

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

CHAPMAN, A. T., AND STREANE, A. W. *The Book of Leviticus in the Revised Version with Introduction and Notes*. [The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.] Cambridge: University Press, 1914. lx+195 pages. 3s.

Mr. Chapman, to whom we owe the excellent *Introduction to the Pentateuch* included in "The Cambridge Bible," as well as the larger part of the present volume, died in December, 1913, leaving this work incomplete. Mr. Streane completed the preparation of the book and saw it through the press. It is an excellent piece of work, such as we have learned to expect from the recent issues of this very useful series. The introduction is full and comprehensive, taking up in turn the name and contents, the sources and literary structure, the analysis, the origin and meaning of sacrifice, and the religious value of Leviticus. In the latter section, from the pen of Dr. Streane, there is a little too much of the old type of interpretation which sought to find in all the details of the sacrificial ritual significant foreshadowings of the sacrificial death of Jesus. The religious value of Leviticus, to the modern man at least, must be sought along a different line. Supplementary notes by way of Appendix yield much further

information upon the literary structure of Leviticus, the Priestly code, the relation of the Holiness Code to Ezekiel's legislation, the wave-offering, and Azazel. A very good bibliography increases the usefulness of the book. The comments really explain where explanation is possible, and are based on adequate knowledge of the archaeology of the elaborate ritual.

J. M. P. S.

HUDAL, ALOIS. *Die religiösen und sittlichen Ideen des Spruchbuches*. [Scripta Pontificii Instituti Biblici.] Rom: Verlag des Päpstl. Bibel-Instituts, 1914. xxviii+261 pages. \$4.50.

The post-exilic character of the Book of Proverbs as set forth by most of the progressive critics of the day does not go unchallenged. The Catholic biblical critics are attacking the position with considerable vehemence. Hudal has laid down his proposition at the very outset of his investigations; and it is after he has read widely and on both sides of the problem. He says, "Catholic Bible-investigation holds fast to the pre-exilic origin of the collections of Proverbs" (p. 11). He is in substantial agreement with the positions of his coreligionists Zschokke, Cornely, and Calmet.

In pursuit of his investigations to fortify his position he readily brushes aside all traces of Greek and Persian influence, and finds no valid argument for the post-exilic redaction of Proverbs. He finds no ground for any intimate relation between the Hebrew *מִקְרָא* and the Greek *σοφία* (pp. 80-84). Their fundamental difference lies in the fact that Proverbs deals with action, but Greek philosophy with speculation.

In the treatment of the ethical conceptions of the Proverbs he discloses what seems to him the connection of these ideas with the law. Neither here nor in the eschatological thoughts of the author or authors of Proverbs does Hudal find any trace of the piety of post-exilic times. Rather there is in the Book of Proverbs a certainty that early in the endeavors of Israel there grew up a practical philosophy, based on the everyday experience of the people, colored, however, by their theocratic ideas, which did not entirely ignore the Law.

While recognizing the work of the last quarter-century, the author is wholly unmoved by it. The concluding sentence of his book combined with a quotation from Kautzsch (*DB*, extra Vol., p. 729) settles the problem of the date of Proverbs, and estimates its literary value thus: "Proverbs belongs among the pre-exilic literature of Israel as 'one of the sublimest monuments of the religion of Israel.'"

Pr.

NEW TESTAMENT

CARRÉ, HENRY BEACH. *Paul's Doctrine of Redemption*. New York: Macmillan, 1914. 175 pages. \$1.25.

In this volume Dr. Carré, professor of biblical theology and English exegesis, Vanderbilt University, has raised his voice clearly and distinctly against the growing tendency to regard Paul as dominated by the Jewish-eschatological thought of his day, and incidentally against the sacrificial conception of Christ's death. Having in mind Schweitzer's emphasis upon the eschatological character of early Christianity, Carré says that, although the eschatological element was an important item in Paul's thought, it does not furnish us the key to unlock the central treasure of his world-philosophy. The eschatological is only the last stage. "To look at the end without

having regard to the beginning as well as to the period between the beginning and the end is to misunderstand Paul."

Man's salvation is a chapter of cosmic history. In this cosmic history sin and death play a large part. They are to be classed among the principalities and powers. The cosmic struggle is not a struggle between the powers of the devil and men, but between the powers and God. The question is: "How shall God overthrow this victory of Sin and Death?" All fleshly beings have proved inferior in strength to these superhuman powers. The resurrection of Jesus after his death was God's first decisive victory over sin and death. The redeeming work of Jesus was thus dynamic and cosmic in its effect. The cosmic triumph of Christ over sin and death breaks the absolute dominion of these powers over men. Through faith the Christian is united with the cosmic Redeemer and has at his command the power of God; through love he gives expression to this power; through hope he is enabled to rise above his present adversities.

A brief but good bibliography and a Scripture index complete the book. It is somewhat strange to find that Deissmann's *Paulus*, a book so similar in many of its conclusions, is not mentioned even in the bibliography. That the conclusions of the book are new to the scholarly world could not of course be asserted. In fact we wonder why the author stopped short at certain points. We note only three of these: "No actor ever suited the word to the action or the action to the word more perfectly than Paul suited his *figures of speech*" (p. 76). Yet in speaking of redemption the author labors under great difficulty because of unwillingness to see that redemption is a figure of speech intended primarily as a vehicle for a single thought, namely, the joy of the life of freedom. Again, "Paul's philosophy was practical not academic" (p. 12). There is great need of a book which shall consistently treat Paul's letters as practical, which shall say that even Romans is a record of a personal conflict in which the risen Jesus proved a timely ally. Paul's aim was not so much to explain as to persuade. Thirdly, although the significance of the death and resurrection of Christ is not ethical but cosmic, faith is defined as an enlistment with Christ in the cosmic struggle, and hope is described as helping us to live such a life as will stand the test of the Judgment Day. This is practically saying that Paul conceived of the Christian life as a struggle to prepare ourselves to meet the Judgment. Yea, we even find a fairly complete idea of hell and the punishment of the wicked. Could the author have been influenced by a desire to make Paul's idea of the Christian life accord with Jesus' idea of it?

But these minor matters do not mar the beauty of this unified and clearly written presentation. It is to be recommended as a book which will greatly help toward the new and saner understanding of Paul's conception of the death of Christ and hasten the day when Paulinism, that wonderful sarcophagus, shall be pried open far enough to give us a glimpse of the living Paul who has been so long entombed therein.

B. W. R.

ANDERSON, FREDERICK LINCOLN. *The Man of Nazareth*. New York: Macmillan, 1914. 226 pages. \$1.00.

The literary quality and the reverent approach combine to make this sketch of the ministry of Jesus a welcome and inspiring help in the devotional life of minister or layman. It is a "treatment of the most important problems about Jesus and his career . . . from the viewpoint of Jesus himself." These "problems" do not include any phase of any miraculous elements in the ministry.

The handling of the question of Jesus' consciousness of messiahship is characteristic of the suggestive and charming treatment throughout the book. Jesus acknowledged his messiahship at his trial. Yes, he had known of it at Caesarea Philippi. Yes, and he had been conscious of it at baptism. In fact before baptism, clear back into his early boyhood, we can trace consciousness of sonship. That sonship was always felt in a unique way because of his unique sinlessness. His sinlessness can be proved in "incontestable" fashion as follows: "The higher a man's moral and spiritual standard, the surer he is to see and confess his sinfulness and shortcomings. The greatest saints, like Paul, Jonathan Edwards, and John Wesley, have felt their sin most acutely. Now all will acknowledge that Jesus was a man of exquisite moral feeling. . . . He never seems to have been conscious of any sin" (p. 44). So the boy lived in daily communion with his Father. Isaiah's prophecies of the purity and joy of messianic times, he felt were completely fulfilled in his own heart. So in a natural and charming way the conviction of messiahship grew as fast as the boy grew. "With this treasure in his heart, Jesus looked out of happy eyes upon the world of men about him. He observed the motives and conduct of his brothers and sisters, of the men and women of Nazareth. . . . They had no idea that this quiet, good boy was to make the name of his obscure town known on all the continents and through all the centuries" (p. 51). The boy saw that their life and happiness were spoiled by sin and selfishness. He was impatient to bring men into the same communion with God which he possessed. This impatience increased until his baptism released his energies.

In chap. iv, "How Jesus Handled Messianism," the "clouds of heaven" are explained as metaphor, and the catastrophic appearance of the Kingdom is likened to the birth of a child. "Gradual growth often ends in a catastrophic consummation." In chap. v, "How Jesus Handled Legalism," Jesus' love for the Old Testament is reconciled with his abrogation of its precepts by the statement that Jesus looked upon it, not as a legal code, but as a book of religion. In the last chapter, "The Finality of Jesus," the treatment is likewise suggestive and helpful: "Jesus grows on the world. The more men study him, the more he impresses them."

A brief outline of Jesus' ministry (three and a half years in length) and an index contribute to the usefulness of this book, which ranks with any that has been published in recent years as a help to the adult Bible student or church member to whom Jesus may have seemed unreal or distant.

B. W. R.

SCHAEFFER, WILLIAM C. *The Supreme Revelation. Studies in the Synoptic Teaching of Jesus.* New York and Chicago: Revell, 1914. 311 pages. \$1. 50.

This volume contains the Swander Lectures of the year 1913 delivered at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, by Dr. Schaeffer, who is professor of New Testament science in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church, Lancaster. The volume is more careful and scholarly than its title would perhaps indicate. He states his problem: "It is to ascertain just what Jesus was and what he taught" (p. 30). He analyzes the sources to the point of the doubly attested sayings. He rightly rejects as inadequate the ordinary way of reconstructing the Logia out of the discourse material common to Matthew and Luke. He systematizes his material around Jesus' conception of the Kingdom of God. He studies in successive chapters Jesus' ideas of God, Man, the Kingdom, the Founder, the Founding of the Kingdom, the Citizens, the Life, the Development, the Consummation of the Kingdom.

In the conception of God, Jesus' originality consists "in this, that he first of all apprehended in his own experience all that is involved in the ethical content of God's Fatherhood." The inestimable worth of man is based upon the fact that "man created in the image of God, fitted by nature to live in communion and fellowship with him, by responding to his love, will by and by attain unto that for which he was created." Was Jesus eschatological in his teaching concerning the Kingdom? The discussion of this question is not wholly satisfactory. "The primary and fundamental conception of the Kingdom is the reign of God in the heart of men." In his teaching concerning himself as the Founder, Jesus definitely claimed messiahship (p. 184). In the chapter on the founding of the Kingdom, the author is inclined to accept the whole passage Matt. 16: 18, 19, "Thou art Peter," etc. "The rock denotes Peter, but not Peter simply as an individual, but as the embodiment of the faith which he had just confessed" (p. 213). In the life of the Kingdom, pure morality consists of loyalty to (1) fellow-men, (2) family, (3) state. The chief feature in the consummation of the Kingdom is the separation of the good and the bad. The last words of the volume are "weeping and gnashing of teeth."

We could have wished for a careful discussion of the nature of parable and of the relation of parable to teaching. The brief words about the Book of Enoch, the relation of which to the teaching of Jesus is "beyond dispute" (p. 84), whets the reader's appetite for more. We could have wished a chapter or at least a section on Pharisaism or on the ethical teaching of the rabbis. But what we do have in the book is excellent as a plain, straightforward presentation. The author need not apologize for "another book on the teaching of Jesus."

B. W. R.

PEETERS, PAUL. *Évangiles apocryphes. II. L'Évangile de l'enfance*. Rédactions syriaques, arabe et arméniennes. Traduites et annotées. (Textes et documents pour l'étude historique du Christianisme.) Paris: Picard, 1914. lix+330 pages. Fr. 3.50.

Peeters' book consists chiefly of translations into French of the Arabic Gospel of the Infancy and the Armenian Book of the Infancy of Christ. He has prepared an improved text of the Arabic which it is his purpose to publish. For the Armenian he has followed the most complete, which is by no means the worst, of the several texts available. These two documents are descended from the same ancient Gospel of the Infancy. The Armenian was developed from a Syrian amplification of it, which in the sixth century passed into Armenian and in that version afterward became very popular. Another form of the ancient document after successive abridgment and expansion in Syrian and Arabic hands, including the incorporation into it of a number of miracles of the Virgin Mary, developed into the Arabic text here translated. There is an extended introduction dealing with the manuscripts and literary problems involved, as well as notes, indexes, and appendixes.

E. J. G.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT

- Driver, S. R. *The Ideals of the Prophets.* Edinburgh: Clark, 1915. xii+239 pages. 3s. 6d.
- Johns, C. H. W. *The Relations between the Laws of Babylonia and the Laws of the Hebrew Peoples.* London: Oxford University Press, 1914. xv+96 pages. 3s.
- Kittel, Rud. *Die Psalmen Israels.* Leipzig: Deichert, 1915. viii+217 pages. M. 2.50.
- Lauré, Martin John. *The Property Concepts of the Early Hebrews.* Iowa City: University of Iowa, 1915. 98 pages.
- Swete, Henry B. *An Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek.* Cambridge: University Press, 1914. xiii+626 pages. \$2.50.

NEW TESTAMENT

- Bousset, D. W. *Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1915. viii+319 pages. M. 12.
- Goodspeed, E. J. *Die ältesten Apologeten. Texte mit kurzen Einleitungen.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1915. xi+380 pages. M. 7.40.
- Gressmann, Hugo. *Das Weihnachts-Evangelium auf Ursprung und Geschichte untersucht.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1914. 46 pages. M. 1.20.
- Plummer, A. *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians.* New York: Scribner, 1915. lviii+404 pages. \$3.00.
- Wohlenberg, D. G. *Der erste und zweite Petrusbrief und der Judasbrief.* Leipzig: Deichert, 1915. lv+334 pages. M. 9.50.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Aitken, J. R. *The Christ of the Men of Art.* Edinburgh: Clark, 1915. xxiv+358 pages. 15s.

- Gressmann, Hugo. *Albert Eichhorn und die religionsgeschichtliche Schule.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1914. 51 pages. M. 1.60.
- Hodges, George. *The Early Church.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915. xiii+311 pages. \$1.75.
- Parker, I. *Dissenting Academies in England.* Cambridge: University Press, 1914. xii+168 pages. 4s.
- Peake, A. S., Bosanquet, B., and Bonavia, F. *Germany in the Nineteenth Century. Second Series.* New York: Longmans, 1915. xvi+123 pages. \$1.25.
- Schaff, David S. *John Huss, His Life, Teachings and Death after Five Hundred Years.* New York: Scribner, 1915. xv+349 pages. \$2.50.

DOCTRINAL

- Brent, Charles H. *The Revelation of Discovery.* New York: Longmans, 1915. 129 pages. \$1.00.
- Haas, John A. W. *Trends of Thought and Christian Truth.* Boston: Badger, 1915. 329 pages. \$1.50.
- Hirsch, Emanuel. *Fichtes Religionsphilosophie im Rahmen der philosophischen Gesamtentwicklung Fichtes.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1914. vi+132 pages. M. 3.60.
- Hough, Lynn Harold. *The Quest for Wonder, and Other Philosophical and Theological Studies.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. 302 pages. \$1.00.
- Ihmels, D. L. *Die christliche Wahrheitsgewissheit; ihr letzter Grund und ihre Entstehung.* Leipzig: Deichert, 1914. viii+352 pages. M. 7.50.
- Meyer, Konrad. *Kirche, Volk und Staat, vom Standpunkt der evangelischen Kirche aus betrachtet.* Leipzig: Deichert, 1915. 53 pages. M. 1.20.
- Sharpe, Charles Manford. *The Normative Use of Scripture by Typical Theologians of Protestant Orthodoxy in Great Britain and America.* Menasha, Wis.: George Banta Publishing Co., 1912. 77 pages.

- Snath, John. *The Philosophy of Spirit*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. vii+405 pages. \$3.00.
- Stalker, James. *Christian Psychology*. New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. 281 pages. \$1.25.
- Turton, W. H. *The Truth of Christianity*. New York: Putnam, 1913. viii+636 pages. \$1.25.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

- Armstrong, Robert C. *Light from the East. Studies in Japanese Confucianism*. Toronto: Librarian of University of Toronto, 1914. xv+326 pages. \$1.50.
- Cook, Stanley A. *The Study of Religions*. London: Black, 1914. xxiv+439 pages. 7s. 6d.
- Davids, C. A. F. Rhys. *Buddhist Psychology. An Inquiry into the Analysis and Theory of Mind in Pali Literature*. London: Bell, 1914. x+212 pages. 2s. 6d.
- Davis, Gladys M. N. *The Asiatic Dionysos*. London: Bell, 1914. x+276 pages. 10s. 6d.
- Nicholson, R. A. *The Mystics of Islam*. London: Bell, 1914. vi+178 pages. \$1.00.
- Steiner, Rudolf. *Christianity as Mystical Fact*. New York: Putnam, 1914. x+241 pages. \$1.25.
- Wallaser, Max. *Prajña Pāramitā. Die Vollkommenheit der Erkenntnis*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1914. 162 pages. M. 6.60.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Barnes, Charles W. *Social Messages. The New Sanctification*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1914. 100 pages. \$0.50.
- Brent, Charles H. *Prisoners of Hope and Other Sermons*. New York: Longmans, 1915. x+279 pages. \$1.50.
- Carey, Walter J. *My Priesthood*. New York: Longmans, 1915. xi+155 pages. \$1.26.
- Caspari, Karl H. *Geistliches und Weltliches. Zu einer volkstümlichen Auslegung des kleinen Katechismus Lutheri in Kirche, Schule und Haus*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1915. xxx+402 pages. M. 1.40.

- Connell, Rev. Alexander. *The Endless Quest*. New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. viii+312 pages. \$1.50.
- Gibbon, J. Morgan. *The Veil and the Vision*. New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. viii+312 pages. 6s.
- Hodges, George. *Faith and Social Service*. New York: Macmillan, 1915. 270 pages. \$1.25.
- . *The Cross and Passion*. New York: Macmillan, 1915. 76 pages. \$1.00.
- Hughes, Edwin Holt. *The Bible and Life*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 239 pages. \$1.00.
- North, Eric McCoy. *Early Methodist Philanthropy*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1914. viii+181 pages. \$1.00.
- Sachsse, Eugen. *Einführung in die praktische Theologie*. Bonn: Marcus u. Weber. 111 pages. M. 2.80.
- Schenck, Ferdinand S. *The Oratory and Poetry of the Bible*. New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1915. viii+249 pages. \$1.25.
- Wakinshaw, William. *John's Ideal City*. London: Kelly, 1915. 208 pages. 2s. 6d.
- Ward, William T. *Variety in the Prayer Meeting. A Manual for Leaders*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 192 pages. \$0.50.

MISCELLANEOUS

- Ballard, Dr. Frank. *Plain Truths versus German Lies*. London: Kelly, 1915. 143 pages. 1s.
- Carus, Paul. *K'Ung Fu Tze. A Dramatic Poem*. Chicago: Open Court Co., 1915. 72 pages. \$0.50.
- Cobb, W. F. *Spiritual Healing*. London: Bell, 1914. xii+312 pages. \$1.60.
- Eisfeldt, Otto. *Krieg und Bibel*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1915. viii+84 pages. M. 0.50.
- More, Louis T. *The Limitations of Science*. New York: Holt, 1915. 268 pages. \$1.50.
- Titius, Arthur. *Unser Krieg. Ethische Betrachtungen*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1915. iv+84 pages. M. 0.50.
- Vierteljahrsschrift für Innere Mission*, 1. Heft. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1915.

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THE THEOLOGY OF THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES

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The Acts of the Apostles have been studied of recent years from many points of view, and by many distinguished scholars, with reference to the sources which may have been used by their author, and with the desire of fixing the date at which they were written. There has however been but little direct effort to discover the theological system which underlies their composition. Yet it may fairly be urged that this is a matter of considerable importance, because, although the Acts were certainly not written in order to maintain a series of theological propositions, they undoubtedly represent the beginnings of what may be regarded as normal Christianity, as distinct from the eccentricities of heretical sects, or the learned efforts of theologians to discuss those metaphysical problems which, however important, can, from the nature of the case, never have been central in the mind of the ordinary Christian. No excuse therefore is needed for an attempt to set out the main characteristics of the theological system implied by the Acts, drawing attention to its central features, and indicating, rather than discussing, the subordinate problems, which, though they deserve separate treatment, can scarcely be handled in the body of an essay without that disproportion familiarly known as "not seeing the wood for the trees."

The antithesis which we are usually inclined to make between Jewish and Christian and our comparative ignorance of heathen

theology are likely to obscure from us the predominantly Jewish character which Christian theology (to a greater extent than Christian practice) must have had in the eyes of Theophilus and his contemporaries.

The main features of the Jewish propaganda in the Roman Empire were well known. The missionaries of the synagogue claimed that their God—the God of Israel—was the true God, as opposed to the false gods of the heathen, who were either evil demons or altogether non-existent. This God was identical with the unknown cause of existence sought by the philosophers and had revealed himself, his nature, and his will to the Jews. In the beginning he had created the world out of nothing, and all events in it were under his control. At any moment he could intervene and perform some wonderful act against those who opposed him, or in favor of those who accepted his sovereignty. Moreover his help was always ready to be given to his worshipers, and the correctness of this contention could be seen in the many wonderful deeds which he performed at their request, whether in their own behalf or in behalf of those whom they befriended. Such a view was, of course, the very opposite of the Lucretian axiom, *nullam rem e nilo gigni divinitus unquam*, and of the philosophic determinism which was, on the whole, the general belief of the educated classes in the Roman Empire; it would therefore immediately strike the attention of the gentile world and would appeal most to the class which felt the force of the philosophers' argument against polytheism and idolatry but was repelled by their rigid determinism. It was absolutely accepted by the Christians and formed a chief part of their teaching.

Scarcely less important in the general scheme of Jewish preaching than this doctrine of a free omnipotent God as absolute monarch of a universe which he had created was the proclamation that this same God had selected a single nation and given it the promise of ultimately inheriting the kingdom or dominion over the whole earth under the leadership of a King anointed by God as his representative. Probably there were differences of detail in the Jewish presentation of the promise, and in Jewish literature the figure of the anointed King or Messiah seems sometimes to be omitted, but the promise to the chosen people is in some form always present. It was however conditional: God had given his people a law, and

those who were willing to observe it could be incorporated into Israel, and so inherit the promise. But for the men and nations who remained outside there would be a day of judgment, carried out either by God himself or by his Messiah. On this day the chosen people would be safe, but all others would incur the wrath of God and be unable any longer to gain the salvation offered by the preachers of the synagogue to those who would listen to them. Finally, the proof that all this was true, as well as the enactments of the law, could be found in the Sacred Book, the infallible Scripture of inspired men, which carried in itself the guaranty of its truth by having foretold beforehand things which had already come to pass, and thus gave security that it was to be trusted in its further prophecies.

Such were the main features of the Jewish propaganda: familiar enough as it seems to us it was sufficiently strange to the Greek world, and to its ears the essentially Jewish character of Christian preaching must have been obvious. The Book of Acts does nothing but confirm this view. The "true God," "the promise," "the chosen people," "the Messiah," and "salvation from the wrath to come" are clearly represented as essential parts of the Christian teaching, though they are not put forward in a controversial manner, and the implication is clear that Theophilus needs no convincing on these points; they are outside the circle of Luke's controversial interest.

Far more emphasis is laid on the new facts and doctrines which separate Christian from Jewish teaching.¹ These were in the main

¹ This increased emphasis is partly due to the fact that there was a living controversy at the time when Acts was written as to the right of the Christian church to exist in the Roman Empire. Judaism was tolerated, even if disliked, but if the Christians were not true Jews they could not claim the protection of this toleration. Two lines of argument were possible. First, that in accepting the Jews' repudiation of the Christians' claim to be the people of God the Roman Empire was doing what it had in the beginning refused to do—and becoming a judge of "words and questions of their law." For that reason the story of Gallio is told in Acts with so much emphasis. Secondly, that if the precedent of Gallio was really to be abandoned it was the Christians, not the Jews, who really represented the true religion of Israel. The answer of the Roman courts would of course have been that they were strictly following the precedent of Gallio and the best traditions of imperial government. They refused to be "judges of these questions" and accepted the view of the leaders of the Jews, not because they had passed judgment on it, but because it was the view of the official representatives of a superstition which they tolerated for reasons of state, though they despised it in all its branches as intellectual depravity.

either points concerning Jesus, from which arose the necessity of bringing into mutual accord the facts of his life and the customary doctrine of the Messiah, or points concerning the community of the Christians, from which arose the similar necessity of reconciling their position with the retention of the Jewish Scriptures. It is of course impossible sharply to divide these two series or to deal with them quite separately, for they constantly overlap; but on both can be traced the effect of the religious experience of the community and the influence on originally Jewish ideas of the connotations of the Greek expressions used to translate them.

To understand the attitude toward Jesus on the one hand and messianic or christological doctrine on the other, it is necessary to keep in mind the development of thought which precedes it. Jesus certainly did not announce himself to the people as the Messiah; but it seems equally certain that he believed that he was in fact the Messiah in the sense that, though the kingdom over which he was to reign was not yet in being, he had nevertheless been anointed by God, through his representative, John the Baptist, just as David had been anointed by Samuel long before he actually attained to the functions of king. Thus he was the Messiah, but was not yet to come to reign as Messiah. This was the secret which he did not announce to the multitude, but at least some of his disciples knew of it and, regarding the resurrection as the proof of its correctness, announced it openly.

The difficulty from the Jewish point of view was that the prophets knew nothing about a suffering and dying or risen and glorified Messiah. The Christian controversialist was therefore obliged, unless he broke away altogether from the argument from the prophets, to modify the doctrine concerning the Messiah so that it should cover the ministry, death, and resurrection of Jesus. This modification is exactly what we find in the Acts. The ministry of Jesus, especially his preaching and his cures, is taken as the fulfilment of the promise and of the utterances of the prophets; his passion is explained as the fulfilment of the prophecy of the Servant of the Lord; and the resurrection and ascension are not only proved and explained by the argument from prophecy as the fulfilment of

the promises made to David but are brought into direct contact with the experience of the community by being taken as the direct cause of the gift of the Holy Spirit to the disciples. In the same way the experience of the gift of the Spirit was first explained as the fulfilment of the prophecy of Joel, and as a sign that the "last days" were come, but soon came to be valued for its own sake, as the direct reception of divine life, and was explained as due to the glorified Jesus who sent the Spirit from God, with whom he was, to his followers on earth.

Obviously this whole complex of theological exegesis was produced by the necessity of bringing the facts of the life of Jesus into accord with messianic doctrine, but equally obviously it changed the meaning of that doctrine. It tended to move the center of theological gravity from the future, containing the hope of Israel, to the past and present which contained the fulfilment of the promise, and it transformed the functions to which the Elect one was anointed from those of ruler in the Kingdom of God to those of Savior and Giver of the Spirit in an existing community.

This changed view of messianic doctrine was promoted by the connotations of the Greek title adopted as the equivalent of Messiah by the circle of Christians from which the Acts proceeded. The attempt to translate "Messiah" literally by the Greek word meaning "anointed"—*χριστός*, Christ—was a failure, because "anointed" was meaningless, or nearly so, to Greek ears, and "Christ" almost immediately was adopted as a name instead of a title. The permanent title used by Hellenistic Christians for Jesus is *Kyrios*, "Lord." Probably it was adopted not directly as the equivalent of Messiah, but rather through the intermediate stage of an Aramaic use of the title *Mar* (*Mari* or *Maran*), perhaps in Antioch rather than Jerusalem. This title was not specifically messianic, but an honorable appellation especially appropriate to kings, and was naturally rendered by *Kyrios*, "Lord." In the narrative of Acts "Lord" and "Christ" are clearly regarded by the writer as synonymous, for he is too good a scholar of the Septuagint not to realize that "Christ" is a title, though in the common formulae of Christian expression he succumbs to the custom of treating "Christ" as a name. Whenever therefore he is writing freely, if he use the word

"Christ" at all, he takes it as a title, but more often he uses the word "Lord" which was more intelligible to Greek ears.

At the same time, though there is little doubt but that in Acts "Lord" and "Christ" are synonymous, they must not be interpreted in the light of what "Messiah" meant historically in Jewish theology. It is characteristic of Greek Christians always to prefer the implications of their translations to the real meaning of the originals. Just as the Septuagint, not the Hebrew text, is the authoritative scripture of Greek Christianity so the word *Kyrios*, with its implications in Greek, is taken as the title of Jesus, and "Messiah" or "Christ" is interpreted in the light of "Lord," the Greek equivalent used for it, not of its original and historical meaning. It is therefore desirable to ask how the word *Kyrios* came to be used, and what are its implications.

The exact connotations of *Kyrios* have been the subject of much learned discussion in the last few years. The important points which have emerged are that to Greek ears "Lord," when used in a theological sense, was associated with two main ideas: first, elevation above humanity, and secondly, the headship of a community of worshipers who were benefited by the supernatural action of their Lord. An educated Greek would not have identified with the Source of all being the Lord whom he worshiped, but he regarded him as the source of his own salvation, both in this world and after death; he trusted, "had faith" in him and in the power of his name; he accepted the rites which he had established as of supernatural efficacy. If he belonged, as might be the case, to more cults than one, he would have more Lords than one; he would not deny the existence or power of the "Lords" worshiped by others;¹ he might

¹ It is noticeable how much confusion was introduced into theology by the different attitudes of Jews and Greeks with regard to the connotation of the word "god" in relation to "lord." To the Greek mind *theoi* did not necessarily imply omnipotence. A god was more powerful than a man, but he was not able to do everything, and some gods were greater and more powerful than others, because the various gods had various powers. If *theoi* were taken to mean the general characteristic which made a being a "god," rather than a "man" or anything else, the "lords" of the various cults were "gods." But a tendency among philosophers to permit the use of *o theos* as an expression for the indivisible, eternal, and "incomprehensible" nature of ultimate reality which is "one" and not "many," obviously clashed with this form of thought. A philosophic Greek could recognize the element of *theoi* in an infinite number of

admit they were their Lords, but they were not his. Lord, therefore, is essentially the title of the superhuman head of a cult-community, and when the Christians referred to Jesus as the Lord, it was in this sense that Greeks must have understood them—whatever they meant themselves—and in this sense that Greeks explained “Christ” after their conversion whenever they recognized that it was a title and did not use it merely as a proper name.

It is obvious how powerfully this use of “Lord” as the title of Jesus, equivalent to Messiah, must have worked in harmony with the other line of thought, previously described, which, owing to the Christian interpretation of the Old Testament, placed the work for which Jesus was anointed in the present and past as well as in the rulership of the still future Kingdom of God. It completed the process which made him be regarded not as one who had been ordained by means of anointing to functions of ruling in the future, but as one who was the Lord of an already existing community.

It is now possible to go back a little and notice how another line of thought developed the conception of an already existing community rather than the Kingdom of God as the sphere of government of the Lord Jesus. This was the development of that part of the promise which stated that God had chosen Israel as his own people. The Christians fully held to this view, but they maintained

manifestations, some greater some less than himself, and any one of them might be his “lord.” He could accept the statement that his lord was *θεός* so long as room was left for recognition of *θεός* elsewhere, but he would be obliged to reject the statement that his lord was *ὁ θεός*, not because it was positively untrue, but because its connotation of exclusiveness was untrue. On the other hand the mind of the true Jew would have accepted the statement that his Lord was *ὁ θεός* precisely because of this connotation of exclusiveness. He was prepared to recognize the working of God everywhere, but the existence of *θεός* itself only in his Lord. Philo is here, as in so many respects, far from being a typical Jew; he is either *sui generis* or Greek rather than Jewish. The transition of Christianity from Jewish to Greek surroundings made inevitable a mixture and confusion between these two lines, and the extraordinary complication of the development of Christian theology is due largely to intellectual hybridization. It is the production of some who thought “Jewish” but spoke “Greek,” of others who thought “Greek” and spoke “Jewish,” and of others again who achieved the maximum of instability by thinking and speaking on various subjects in every possible combination of both “Jewish” and “Greek” at once.

that the promise made provision for the changing of its basis in the last days, so that the opportunity of enjoying its privileges should be extended to the Gentiles, and the congregation, or people of God, be no longer on a national basis. They therefore adopted, in speaking of themselves, the title of *Ecclesia*, which to Hellenistic ears must have inevitably taken with it the claim that the Christians were the chosen people, the true Israel.¹ This contention again necessitated a new series of arguments from prophecy, and the Acts shows how part of the Christian theology was the elaboration of proof texts to show that the promise was not to the Jews only, but also to a congregation chosen out from the Gentiles. We have in fact the beginning of the elaborate arguments of the Christian apologists and of writers, such as the authors of Hebrews and Barnabas, who desire to show that the whole of the Old Testament foretells the Christian church and belongs to it.

Once more it is clear that this line of development converged to meet that supplied by the identification of Jesus as a "Lord." Just as the original messianic doctrine, with its center in the Hope of Israel for the future, is swallowed up in the Hellenistic acceptance of Jesus as the Lord, ruling in the present, so the belief in an eschatological Kingdom of God is swallowed up in the conception of Christians as the actual *Ecclesia* existing in the present—new, and yet in a real sense the ancient people of God. The Kingdom of God has not been omitted from the future, but it has receded into the background.

It is easy to see in this development the controlling influence of actual experience, however profoundly modified by the suggestion

¹ *Εκκλησία* is the representative in the Septuagint, except in Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers, of *qahal* (usually translated in the R.V. by "assembly"). It is this use of the word in the Septuagint which is really important, rather than any considerations derived from Greek etymology. Etymologically *ἐκκλησία* means the assembly "called out" from a Greek city by the herald, but as is usually the case with well-known and often-used words, this original sense, referring to the method of the assembly, was completely merged in the acquired sense of the assembly as such, and the persons composing it. For those who, like the first Christians, took the Septuagint as their sacred book, the fact that *ἐκκλησία* represented *qahal* rather than *e'dhah* would be a point of small importance. The word would be familiar to all as the characteristic designation of Israel, the people of God, especially in Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah. See F. J. A. Hort, *The Christian Ecclesia*, pp. 3-15.

of words and their connotation. The Christians felt that they were indeed the chosen people of God, and they emphasized their organic unity with the people of Israel. But on the other hand their sense of newness was explained, and rightly so, by the consciousness of a psychical experience differing from that of the Jews, and this in turn was explained (in thought borrowed from Judaism, but in language familiar also to Gentiles) as due to the gift of the Spirit. This consciousness of a valid experience was also the main factor in bringing about the decisive action on the part of the Christians which broke the connection with the law of the synagogue beyond all chance of repair. Acts is quite clear in its testimony that the reason why the law was abandoned was the discovery, in the case of Cornelius, that the new psychical experience, which was explained as the gift of the Spirit, was shared by Gentiles, who, without observing the Law, had accepted the Christian teaching as to God and as to the "Lord of all"—Jesus of Nazareth, whom God had anointed—and therefore that such Gentiles could not be regarded as outside the congregation of the people of God—the church.

The episode of Cornelius is clearly given in Acts as the actual fact which led to this breach with the law, and the writer's sense of the extreme importance of such a breach is shown by the way in which he claims divine authority for three lines of argument in its support: first, the revelation made to Peter in direct connection with Cornelius, secondly, the conversion of Paul and his special mission to preach to the Gentiles, and thirdly, the argument from prophecy adduced at the Council of Jerusalem.

It is however noteworthy that Acts does not attempt any arguments of the kind found in Galatians, the Epistle to the Hebrews, or the Epistle of Barnabas. He clearly regards the law as having no authority for gentile Christians but as valid for Jews and Jewish Christians, and he always depicts Paul, a Jewish Christian though the apostle of the Gentiles, as himself observing the law quite strictly. The prophets on the other hand belong to the Christians, whether Jewish or gentile, not to the nation of the Jews, and they foretold the church, not the synagogue, as the heir of the promise. So much is clear, but Acts does not argue out the logic of this

position: it is content to tell the story so as to let history show why the church had reached this conclusion.

The theology which in this way distinguished the prophetic from the legal aspect of the Old Testament seems to us extraordinarily artificial, and the position either of the Jewish Christians, who accepted the authority of the whole, or of Marcion, who rejected it, appears to be far more logical. To consider it from this point of view is, however, to miss the most important factor. The theology of Acts (which here, as in almost every detail, is the earliest form of Catholic theology) is the product of the attempt to be true both to history and experience. Roughly speaking, the Old Testament was the chief monument of the history of Israel: to reject it was to be cut off from the history of the chosen people, from the promise, and from the hope. To do this was the mistake of Marcion. But on the other hand, to accept the law was to deny the validity of the experience of the gentile Christians. To do this was the mistake of the Judaizers. However illogical and arbitrary may have been the form of early Christian theology—and it is incontestably both—it was right in maintaining that, though there is often a clash between experience and any given view of history, there can be no ultimate contradiction between history itself and experience. At all events, that seems to be the generalization in modern language of the theology which underlies the narrative given in Acts of the facts which led up to the Judaistic controversy. It is expressed a little later by the formula that the same Spirit which was in the Christian church had also spoken by the prophets.

Thus in the theology of Acts, along with the conception that the community belongs to Jesus its Lord, is the complementary view that its members are the recipients of the Holy Spirit.

The connection of the *Ecclesia* with the Lord Jesus is implicit throughout Acts, as it is in all other early Christian literature; the apostles are specifically his missionaries, and to his service Paul is converted. But it is not less plain that the members of the church were regarded as gifted with the Holy Spirit; even though certain points are obscure in the view which is presented of the working of the Spirit. It seems plain that the Spirit is the "Spirit of the Lord" of the Old Testament, but it is also sent from God by Jesus (Acts

2:33), and in one place it is apparently described as the Spirit of Jesus (Acts 6:7). This reminds us of the manner in which in Rom., chap. 8, the words "Christ," "the Spirit of Christ," "the Spirit of God," "the Spirit," are interchanged with no apparent difference of meaning, but in Acts the connection of the Spirit with the Lord has not reached the stage of identification represented by such passages, or still more by the direct statement, "the Lord is the Spirit" in II Cor. 3:17. Moreover the apparent exchange of usage between "Spirit" and "angel of the Lord" in the story of Philip (Acts 8:26,29,39) suggests the confusion between angel and Spirit which is noticeable in Hermas and Tertullian and seems to have its origin in a remote chapter of Jewish theology. There is however nothing which really enables us to answer the question whether the Spirit was completely hypostatized or was regarded as an impersonal element sent by or from God. On the one hand the Spirit "speaks," which is a personal act, but on the other hand it is "poured out," which points rather to the view that it was an element, or, to use the customary and convenient phrase adopted by the Germans, a *Fluidum*. Constant combination of these views, inconsistent with each other though they seem to us, is as noticeable in Acts as it is in almost all early literature. It is as common to say that a man was filled with the Spirit and therefore spoke, as to say that the Spirit spoke through the man.

Psychologically this difference of expression and the apparent confusion of views which it implies is due to an underlying difference of experience. The prophetic speaker feels that he speaks because the Spirit first spoke to him; the message which he delivers is not his own, but that of the Spirit which constrains him; the Spirit is greater than he is, and if there is any question of the absorption of the one being by the other—"the Spirit" and "himself"—it is the "Spirit" and not "himself" which predominates and survives. But from the people this feeling of the prophet is hidden: to them it is clear that the prophet speaks, and the Spirit is looked on as an element which affects him in a manner analogous to the working of wine. It would be out of place to discuss here the degree of truth reached by these theories, but it is important to notice that the double line of thought which is so clear in Acts is

not merely due to the survival of various forms of primitive theology, though this no doubt affected it, but also to the fact that we have the description of the phenomena of inspiration from two angles of vision—that of the prophet, who regarded them from the point of view of perception from within, and that of the people, who regarded them from the point of view of observation from without. Ancient and mediaeval theology erected a doctrinal edifice by means of the application of logic and metaphysics to the data provided by these two descriptions of the phenomena of inspiration, but the productive work of the future will consist chiefly in the attempt to go behind these descriptions to the facts described. In other words, we are brought here to the territory which has been marked out as his own by the student of psychology and to that particular part of it which has become famous from the application to its dark recesses of the theory of subliminal consciousness.

Since Gunkel's remarkable book, *Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes*, there has been considerable discussion of the question whether in early Christian literature the Spirit is regarded as the source of all Christian life or only of special activities. The view has been widely held that in the Pauline epistles the Spirit is regarded as the source of all Christian life, and some writers have been inclined to think that part of the contribution of Paul was the conversion of the earlier concept of the Spirit to a more ethical form. It is not necessary to discuss whether this be true of the Epistles; for the present purpose it is sufficient to notice that Gunkel has shown that it is certainly not true of Acts.

The general conception in Acts is that Christians normally receive the Spirit, but not that all their actions are inspired by it. It is, as it were, only sometimes that the Spirit takes possession of them, and they speak "in the spirit," either with or without *glossolalia*, or perform miracles, of healing or of punishment, by its means. The Christian is not so much a man who is always and entirely obsessed by the Spirit, as one who is capable of obsession, or, one might almost say, liable to obsession, at critical moments.

It is by no means plain in what way Acts conceives the means whereby the Spirit was imparted to Christians. It was certainly

given to the apostles, and only the apostles could impart it to others, but was it by baptism or by the laying-on of the hands of the apostles? In the text of Acts, as it stands, there is no clearly expressed theory on the subject, or rather two conflicting theories seem to be implied. According to one series of passages it is implied that baptism ought normally to bring the gift of the Spirit. According to another it is implied that baptism alone did not confer this gift, but that it followed when the apostles laid their hands on the converts. It is however possible that this difference in presentation is due to a difference in the sources used by Luke in compiling Acts. If so it is noticeable that the passages which fail to connect baptism with the gift of the Spirit come either from Harnack's "Jerusalem source A," or from a special Peter-Philip tradition in the eighth chapter. These are the parts of the Acts which can with the greatest probability be attributed to written sources used by Luke, and, if it be nothing more, it is a remarkable coincidence that the chapters which on general grounds are suspected of representing a Palestinian tradition, different from that of the Hellenistic Christianity to which Luke belonged, should also contain a view of the gift of the Spirit which is in harmony with Jewish ideas as to the method of imparting the Spirit rather than with Greek ones. The view that the Spirit could be conveyed by the laying on of hands of an inspired person is found in the Old Testament, but does not seem to be Greek, while the idea that it could be imparted by baptism in the name of a person may be Greek, but scarcely seems to be Jewish.

Putting aside the question of the possible existence of different conceptions due to difference of sources, there naturally arises the problem of the origin of the "Spirit" theory of Christian experience. It is desirable to formulate sharply the exact problem. It is not the question of the origin of the experience. The experience itself is taken as given; but the question is raised why the early church formulated the expression or explanation of its experience in this particular way. From what *Weltanschauung* was it borrowing? Was it purely a Jewish-biblical one, or was it Greek, or was it both?

The popular Greek belief seems to have been twofold. Sometimes "Spirit" is used as a synonym for "demon" and its union

with men is regarded as obsession; sometimes it is an element, a *Fluidum*, which was imparted by a god to the initiates into his mysteries.

Both these forms of thought reappear in Jewish theology. The ancient Israelites seem to have had the primitive conception of a number of "Spirits" who were in the constant service of God. This service might result in good or evil for men, but it was all at the command of Jahweh, and it was possible to speak of an "evil Spirit from Jahweh." The Spirits were the agents by whom Jahweh worked in the world, and it is impossible to distinguish between the primitive conception of Spirits and the later conception of angels, for even if the theologians among the Jews distinguished the two, the popular mind certainly did not do so. This may be called a polypneumatic theory; it doubtless survived up to the time of the New Testament, but it was modified by the development of the doctrine of devils, or beings who were "Spirits" but were not obedient to Jahweh. Gradually this modification took the place of the older view that evil as well as good comes from Jahweh, and theories as to the origin, work, and final end of those demons are frequently found in the Jewish pseudepigrapha and passed from them into Christian literature. Thus by the beginning of the Christian era the primitive polypneumatic theory of spirits working good and evil alike in obedience to Jahweh had been replaced by the theory of evil demons who worked evil against the wish of God and of angels who worked good at his command. The difference is due partly to changing nomenclature, partly to a changing doctrine of God and to a consequent reluctance to ascribe the existence of evil to him or to his agents.

Perhaps not so old, but at all events much older than the times of the New Testament, is the doctrine of "the Spirit of God," regarded practically as a *Fluidum*, an element which he "pours out" at will on chosen persons, or almost as what German writers very expressively term *Gottesstoff*—material of which God consists. The possession of this element was ordinarily the privilege of prophets, or inspired persons, but it was believed that in the last days the Spirit would not be reserved for a

few specially favored persons, but would be poured out on all Israelites.

Finally there was a tendency in Judaism, both in Palestinian and Hellenistic circles, to hypostatize the spirit, so that it consciously or unconsciously was regarded as a separate being, indissolubly connected with, yet distinct from, Jahweh. This hypostasis seems sometimes to be almost if not quite identified with the "angel of the Lord" or with the hypostatized "Wisdom." Thus a close approach was made to a doctrine of a divine Spirit as personal as the Spirits of the old Semitic religion, which still survived in the form of angels and demons, but this doctrine was monopneumatic instead of polypneumatic.

It is this last line of thought, a monopneumatic hypostatizing doctrine, which seems to differentiate Jewish from Greek thought, though the line of division is not easy to define. It undoubtedly reappears in Christianity, and it can certainly be traced to some extent in Acts, but it is not clearly stated, and in some passages the *Fluidum* doctrine seems to be more prevalent. There is therefore scarcely enough evidence to justify us in regarding the view that the Spirit was especially given to Christians as due exclusively to the Jewish community or exclusively to the Hellenistic church. Both are possible, but certain indications in the facts already given point to the probability on the one hand that the origin of the doctrine—just as in the case with the title "Lord"—must be sought in Palestine (and in this instance probably in Jerusalem), and on the other hand that its character was changed in some details in Hellenistic circles.

There is no doubt but that the early chapters of Acts regard the gift of the Spirit as a "sign of the times." That is Jewish: it is the belief that in the last days the spirit shall be poured out on all flesh. It was not a sign that the Kingdom was come, but that it was near at hand, and it is entirely in accord with all that we know of the theology of the earliest Palestinian Christians. It is also a markedly Jewish characteristic that the "Jerusalem source A" and the Peter-Philip tradition contemplate the imparting of the Spirit by the "laying on of hands." That also is a Jewish form of appointment, though it cannot be shown that the Jews regarded it as conferring

spiritual gifts.¹ It most probably represents a tradition which is older than the Hellenistic movement.

On the other hand the idea of baptism as a means of imparting the Spirit is unparalleled in Jewish thought, but is analogous to the rites of the Graeco-oriental mysteries. It is also true that baptism *into or in the name of a person* is wholly un-Jewish. The Jews used "baptism" or "washings" in religious services, but it is doubtful whether even the "baptism" of proselytes was an initiation service,² and the idea of connecting it with a personal name is quite unknown. Still less is there any Jewish analogy for the idea of a baptism which conferred the Spirit, and it must be noticed that this is not affected by the fact that in the Gospel John the Baptist is regarded as prophesying the gift of the Spirit by Jesus. The saying, "I indeed baptize you with water, but he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit" clearly points to the gift of the Spirit, but it is in antithesis to, not in connection with, baptism in water, and this view is clearly taken in Acts 1:5; 2:4ff. The apostles were not baptized with water at Pentecost, but the gift of the Spirit to them on that day has always been regarded as the fulfilment of John's prophecy of a baptism with the Spirit. Baptism with the Spirit is a metaphor in which "Spirit" takes the place of "water."

¹ The statement is made by P. Volz (*Der Geist Gottes*, pp. 115ff.) that the rabbinical theory of ordination implied that at least in some cases the Spirit was conveyed by the "laying on of hands." But Professor G. F. Moore points out to me that the passage on which he seems to rely says merely that "Men like Hillel and the little Samuel were worthy of the Spirit, but their generation was not worthy," and this seems rather to imply that in spite of their worthiness they did *not* in point of fact receive the Spirit. There is no evidence that rabbinical ordination was regarded as conferring the Spirit, and the translation "laying on of hands" for the rabbinical *shemikha* is unfortunate though literal. Maimonides, whose testimony is uncontroverted on this point and therefore probably correct, states that *shemikha* never involved a literal manual act. The ordination consisted in using the name of the ordained (not, be it noted, of the ordainer) and announcing that he has authority to act as a judge, and the rabbis were very careful to secure a succession of authority in this manner. It must be remembered that this ceremony was much more parallel to calling to the bar, or to appointment as a magistrate, than to ecclesiastical ordination.

² The proselyte was baptized because he was a proselyte, he did not become a proselyte because he was baptized. The opposite is true in the Graeco-oriental cults: the initiate was an initiate because he was baptized, or otherwise magically treated. The same difference of view can be traced in the history of Christian baptism.

Such are the main features of the system of theological thought which underlies the Acts. It is based upon two pillars: the conception of Jesus as the Lord, and the conception of the church as the chosen people of God inspired by the Holy Spirit; but the two pillars are not separate, for the lordship of the Lord is a sovereignty over the community, and the Spirit which inspires the community is sent by the Lord.

It is probably desirable, in conclusion, to attempt roughly the task of fixing the general position of this system of theology as compared with that of the other main documents of New Testament theology. It is clear that the point which really divides the Lukan theology from that of Mark or of Matthew is the conception of the church as a community which is separate from the Jews, but at the same time is the true representative of the ancient "people of God." That is why Luke, unlike Matthew and Mark, was obliged to produce a second book and not merely confine himself to recounting the life and the teaching of Jesus.

Mark seems to have had the single object of persuading his readers that Jesus was the Messiah, in spite of the fact that Jesus himself had not announced this fact openly. In order to establish his case he tells the story of the wonderful deeds of Jesus; as a second line of evidence he quotes the testimony given on two occasions by the voice of God, first at the baptism to Jesus himself, and the second time, in identical words, to the disciples on the Mount of Transfiguration; and as a final corroboration of these two lines of proof he adds the culminating witness of God in the resurrection. It does not appear to be any part of his plan to suggest that the teaching of Jesus was a new law, different from the law of Moses, or that his disciples were a new community, different from the community of the Jews.

Matthew accepts the position of Mark but wishes to go farther and expound his view that the teaching of Jesus had the force of a new law. Therefore, while making use of the material already collected by Mark he adds to it from other sources all that he could find bearing upon the teaching of Jesus, and edits this so as to prove his point. His interest in Christianity is not that the disciples form

a new community, but that they have been intrusted with a new law which supplements and takes the place of the law of Moses.

Luke, like Matthew, accepts the position of Mark and wishes to supplement it: but his supplement is not the proof that the teaching of Jesus is a new law, but that the Christians are a divinely instituted church, and therefore, although it is as necessary to his plan as it is to that of Matthew to repeat and expand the Markan document, it is also necessary for him to give the evidence justifying his claims not merely for the Christ, but also for the church of the Christians. It would not however be fair to say that Luke in this respect necessarily represents a chronologically more advanced standpoint than Matthew; the truth is rather that he and Matthew represent two different lines of development, probably in different places. Both of them are clearly later than Mark, but though they differ from one another, we cannot say that either is necessarily later than the other, as neither seems to spring out of the other.

More striking still is the fact that the theology of Acts and the theology of Paul seem in the same way to represent separate lines of development. Even the most radical critics have been so much under the influence of the tradition that Luke was a pupil of Paul that they have been anxious, sometimes perhaps unconsciously, to find traces of Paulinism in Acts. But an unprejudiced inquiry rather goes to show that Acts and Paul are singularly independent of each other, for sometimes one and sometimes the other seems to be the more advanced, and there is no satisfactory evidence that either borrows from the other.

Three sets of facts are especially cogent in this connection. As we study the use of the word "Christ" in Acts and in the Pauline epistles, Paul represents a greater divergence from what must have been the original usage of the word than Acts. In the Pauline epistles "Christ" is almost always used as a name, but in the Acts, except in certain formulae of belief, "Christ" is nearly always used as a title, and not as a name. There can be no doubt that the Acts stands in this respect nearer to primitive custom than Paul.

In the same way in the Pauline epistles the soteriological explanation of the death of the Christ represents a more advanced type of thought than anything which is found in Acts. In most of the

speeches in Acts, in which the crucifixion is alluded to, there is little or no suggestion of any soteriological doctrine, and it is regarded primarily as the wicked act of the Jews. Here again Luke seems to be less advanced than Paul, though, unless one is prepared to maintain that they both belonged from the beginning to the same circle, "less advanced" is not necessarily the same as "earlier."

Against these two points, which go to show that the Pauline theology is in some respects more advanced than the Lukan, must be set the fact that the interpretation of the figure of the Servant of the Lord in Isaiah as a reference to the Messiah is markedly characteristic of Luke and is not found in Paul, although one would have supposed that, had he known it, Paul would certainly have made use of it to support his soteriological arguments. Here, therefore, Luke is more advanced than Paul.

It seems therefore to be clear that, just as Matthew and Luke represent two lines of development in Christian thought, rather than two points on the same line of development, so also do Paul and Acts. It therefore follows that no safe conclusion can be drawn from a comparison between Acts and Paul as to the relative chronology of the Pauline epistles and Acts, even though it may very well be urged that we have here a fair argument that the editor of the Lukan books can scarcely have been a disciple of Paul. Although it is not true that pupils always represent an advance upon the ideas of their teachers, such serious retrogressions as the omission of the Pauline explanation of the crucifixion and the more primitive use of the word "Christ" clearly afford a strong argument against the traditional view of the authorship of the Lukan writing. These have received far too little attention from A. von Harnack in his recent writings, owing apparently to his having fallen a victim to linguistic arguments of which it is safe to prophesy that few of them are likely to stand investigation in the light of a wider research into the custom of Greek writers.

The relative importance of Pauline and Lukan theology seems sometimes to be misunderstood. No doubt for the history of Christianity Pauline theology was ultimately the more important, and in the end played the greater part in the formation of doctrine, but for the historian of the first two centuries their relative

importance must probably be reversed. The theology of Acts really presents to us in its earliest and simplest form the common intellectual basis of two divisions of thought, the interaction of which produced Catholic Christianity. There emerged from it on the one hand the attempts of the theologians, such as Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, who combine it with a Johannine Logos doctrine in order to provide a statement acceptable to educated Greeks, and on the other there arose a popular and uninstructed Christianity which practically forgot the teaching of the "true God" and replaced him by a "new God," Jesus Christ; its most developed representation is in the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles, just as the apologists and Irenaeus represent the line of the theologians. The struggles of the fourth century were very largely the inevitable contest between these two lines, and the victory of Athanasius was the triumph of logic over loose thinking; yet both lines can be traced by the historian to their origin in the rudimentary theology of the Lukan Acts, far more than to anything in the Pauline epistles.

ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST IN THE GERMAN ANTI-CLERICALISM OF THE FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES¹

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Historians, both Catholic and Protestant, agree in affirming the existence of an anti-papal and anti-clerical sentiment in Germany during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. So much evidence has already been adduced in support of this affirmation that no further demonstration of its truth is necessary. The testimony of contemporary sources, presented in the following discussion, ought, however, greatly to strengthen such an assertion. Less general agreement will be found among historians as to the causes of this late mediaeval anti-papal and anti-clerical sentiment. The best authorities, it is true, concur in the view that this sentiment was the product of several causes or motives. Among the most familiar of these motives may be mentioned: the moral depravity of the clergy generally, and of the papal court in particular; the influence of Humanism, with its attacks upon the ignorance of priests and monks, with its ridicule of a stultifying and degenerate scholasticism, as well as with its exposition of the contrast between primitive and mediaeval Christianity; the religious need, i.e., the failure of mediaeval man to find religious satisfaction in the external, mechanical conception of Christianity prevalent during the Middle Ages, and his demand for a more personal and spiritual religion;

¹ This paper, which was read at the meeting of the American Historical Association, December, 1914, is the partial product of an investigation as yet incomplete. The author's researches have been restricted, thus far, to the printed and unprinted records of the four cities Basel, Zurich, Frankfurt am Main, and Nürnberg, as well as to such published sources of other German municipalities as he has been able to obtain. It is his intention to continue his study of municipal and monastic archives, as well as of printed materials bearing on the subject, and thus to complete an authoritative monograph upon the economic activity of ecclesiastical organizations at the close of the Middle Ages.

and, finally, the motive of political interest, due to the clash between the interests of princes and city-states, on the one hand, and those of the ecclesiastical hierarchy on the other. Moreover, no student of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century conditions in Germany can be ignorant of the claim, made by a considerable number of scholars, that economic self-interest was one of the important factors responsible for papal and clerical unpopularity both before and during the Reformation period.¹

Several reasons might be urged why this last-mentioned factor should be subjected to more thorough investigation. In the first place, possibly in consequence of a very natural hesitancy to ascribe a change in religious convictions to so unworthy a motive as material self-interest, historians have failed to give it the attention it deserves. Secondly, the evidence adduced in support of this claim is, as yet, so fragmentary and limited as to be unconvincing. Finally, this claim has called forth already some opposition.² Even if it has been admitted in part, effort has been made, none the less, to belittle its importance.³

Material self-interest of one sort has been generally recognized by historians, Protestant as well as Catholic, as instrumental in producing the German anti-clericalism of the later Middle Ages.

¹ Johannes Janssen, *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes* (17th and 18th eds., Freiburg, 1897), I, 742; II, p. 68; Traugott Geering, *Handel und Industrie der Stadt Basel* (Basel, 1886), p. 384; Kurt Kaser, *Politische und soziale Bewegungen im deutschen Bürgertum zu Beginn des 16. Jhs.* (Stuttgart, 1899), pp. 3 ff. and 188 ff. Credit is due to Professor Kaser for having called attention to more varieties of economic complaint against the clergy than any previous writer. In the excellent treatise just mentioned, he has made reference to most of the matters discussed in this article. In some instances, however, no definite sources have been cited; in others, the evidence presented is meager, very restricted both in quantity and in scope, and insufficient to justify the inference that such conditions widely prevailed. The writer of the present article believes he has not only set forth in a less scattered and more forcible arrangement matters already mentioned by Professor Kaser and others, but has also furnished enough new evidence and interpretation abundantly to warrant the publication of his research. It ought also to be known that the author of this article was unacquainted with Professor Kaser's contribution to the subject until a large part of his materials had been collected.

² Burckhardt-Biederman, *Bonifacius Amerbach und die Reformation* (Basel, 1894), p. 55; Wilhelm Stolze, *Der deutsche Bauernkrieg* (Halle, 1907), p. 27.

³ Burckhardt-Biederman, *op. cit.*, pp. 60 ff.

I refer to the interests affected by the papal financial oppression so common and so frequently criticized, particularly in Germany, during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and early sixteenth centuries. Bruno Gebhardt's monograph, *Die gravamina der Deutschen Nation*, has made us familiar with the complaints against the papal traffic in benefices; against the pallium and confirmation fees; against the claims of popes to the incomes of vacant prebends; and against crusade taxes, as well as against the multiplication of indulgences—complaints iterated and reiterated throughout the two centuries immediately preceding the Protestant revolt.¹ It is not difficult to understand how such papal impositions, resulting in a steady flow of wealth to Rome, might arouse opposition, not only from the higher clergy, but also from kings, territorial princes, and city councils, whose lands were being thus drained of their wealth. The common man in both town and country was also made to feel these burdens, as the higher clergy, in order to meet their obligations to Rome, were wont to levy additional taxes upon all those under their ecclesiastical jurisdiction. "Exactly these financial burdens [imposed by the popes]," Janssen asserts, "played the chief rôle in the opposition to Rome."²

A few writers have made brief reference to the fact that the tithes furnished an additional economic cause for anti-clericalism. Most of the peasant articles, drawn up in connection with their revolts, contain complaints against at least the lesser tithes, as well as recommendations as to how the greater tithe should be employed. Moreover, in the council records of German free cities one finds numerous references to refusals on the part of peasants to pay their tithes.³ From the beginning of the sixteenth century until the outbreak of the Peasants' Revolt of 1524-25, complaints of the

¹ Bruno Gebhardt, *Die gravamina der Deutschen Nation*, pp. 33, 48, 58, 78, 83 ff., 95 ff., 109 ff., and elsewhere.

² Johannes Janssen, *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes*, I, 742.

³ Nürnberg, *Kreisarchiv*, Ratsmanuale, 1502-3, Heft 7, "Sabato Lamperti"; 1505-6, Heft 5, pp. 22a and 22b; Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Ratschlagungsprotocolle, 1498-1510 (1507), p. 98b; Zurich, *Staatsarchiv*, BV, 2, p. 125, No. 119; p. 128, No. 125; p. 177, No. 191; pp. 322 ff. and 329; BV, 3, pp. 62b, 227a, 227b, 229b. Mentioned without definite references by Kurt Kaser, *Politische und soziale Bewegungen*, p. 3.

clergy concerning difficulties experienced in collecting the tithes grow steadily more frequent.¹ That this reluctance to paying tithes and the anti-clerical sentiment engendered by attempts of the clergy to force their payment were favorable to the success of the Protestant movement is self-evident. The peasants certainly believed that the triumph of Lutheran or Zwinglian conceptions of Christianity involved their emancipation from this hated financial burden. Considerable contemporary evidence could be cited to show that such a belief existed. A peasant of Schaffhausen, for instance, meets a priest, slaps him on the back, as he laughingly remarks: "My Lord, your wax will become scarce soon, for, in the future, we are not going to give you so much in tithes or other offerings as formerly."² Again, representatives of several peasant communities under the jurisdiction of Zurich, in their complaint to the city council concerning the tithes, assert that they are informed and instructed by the Scriptures that the tithe is merely an alms (i.e., a voluntary, not a compulsory, offering).³ Evangelical preachers often encouraged the peasants in their hope of freedom from the tithe.⁴ The abolition of this tax was an avowed tenet of some so-called Anabaptists.⁵ Even Zwingli, in his early preaching at Zurich, proclaimed such an economic gospel.⁶

¹ Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Bürgermeisterbücher, 1522, pp. 17b, 20a, 20b, 22b, 41a; 1523, p. 36b; 1524, p. 30b, 52a, 54b, 61a; 1525, p. 33a, 33b, 57a; Ratschlagungsprotocoll, 1517-33, p. 98b. Cf. also *Actensammlung zur Geschichte der Zürcher Reformation*, ed. by Emil Egli (Zurich, 1879), p. 93, No. 267; p. 97, No. 273; p. 98, No. 274; p. 131, No. 365, etc.

² Egli, *Actensammlung*, p. 110, No. 314.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 132, No. 368.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 93, No. 267; Karl Dändliker, *Geschichte der Stadt u. des Kantons Zurich* (3 vols., Zurich, 1908-12), II, 311.

⁵ Dändliker, *op. cit.*, II, 335; Heberle, "Die Anfänge des Anabaptismus in der Schweiz," *Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie*, III (1858), 232 ff.; G. Tumbült, "Die Wiedertäufer," *Monographien zur Weltgeschichte*, VII, 17. Here the author repeats the charge, made by contemporaries, that Hubmaier preached against the payment of tithes. This charge Hubmaier denied. Cf. J. Loserth, "Die Stadt Waldshut," etc., in *Archiv f. oesterreichische Geschichte*, LXXVII, 20.

⁶ "Allso sust mit sundern anschlegen hatt er [Zwingli] vil fromer lüt verfür, dann er wüst jedem vogel sin ruf, jedem den strick zu legen, darnach er sich satzt, und si verblendet mit dem schyn, si werdend, so im anhiengend, fry lüt werden, der zins, zeenden und pfaffenbeschwården entladen" ("Johann Salat's Chronik," *Archiv f. Reformationsgeschichte* [Solothurn, 1868], I p. 41). Cf. also Dändliker, *op. cit.*, II 299; Heberle, *Die Anfänge d. Anabaptismus*, p. 232.

The tithe, however, was only one of many economic grievances against the clergy. It must not be forgotten that cathedral and other church corporations, as well as monasteries, were in possession of manorial estates. In Germany, ecclesiastical landlords were seldom, if ever, less oppressive in their exactions of rents, services, death taxes, and the like than their lay colleagues. Complaints against these burdens are too familiar to need more than mere mention.¹ Furthermore, the fact that the monasteries and other ecclesiastical foundations were so frequently the objects of attack during the peasant revolts of the later fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries is pregnant with meaning.²

Another economic cause for anti-clericalism among the lower classes was the practice, adopted by the clergy, of exacting fees for religious services. Complaints against the imposition of charges for baptism, for masses, for extreme unction, for burial services, for the tolling of the church bells, and for gravestones are fairly common.³ To these exactions, moreover, must be added the surplice fees, collected at intervals by the priests; voluntary contributions urgently requested on frequent occasions; the purchase of candles; and gifts solicited by the begging friars.⁴ Stimulated by the early successes of the Orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic, mendicancy

¹ Zurich, *Staatsarchiv*, Ratsbücher, BV, 3 (1515), p. 86b; (1523), p. 237b; cf. also Egli, *op. cit.*, p. 319, No. 703 (1525); F. L. Baumann: "Quellen z. Gesch. d. Bauernkrieges in Oberschwaben," *Bib. d. litt. Vereins in Stuttgart*, CXXIX (Tübingen, 1876), 419 and 725.

² Baumann, pp. 393, 399, 447, 479, 510, and elsewhere.

³ Egli, *Actensammlung*, p. 116, No. 330; p. 132, No. 368; p. 168, No. 426; Johannes Kessler, *Sabbata* (Egli & Schoch, St. Gallen, 1902), p. 61; Salat's "Chronik," *Archiv f. Refg.*, I, 57; Oscar Schade, *Satiren und Pasquille* (Hannover, 1863), III, 141; "Flugschriften aus der Reformationszeit," XV, *Joh. Eberlin von Günzburgs sämtliche Schriften*, II (ed. Enders in *Neudrucke deutscher Literaturwerke d. XVI. u. XVII. Jhts.*, Niemeyer, Halle, 1900), Nos. 170-82, p. 66; Walter Friedensburg, *Der Reichstag zu Speier* 1526, p. 545; G. E. Steitz, "Reformatorsche Persönlichkeiten," *Archiv f. Frankfurts Gesch. u. Kunst*, N. F., IV, 116.

⁴ "Flugschriften aus der Reformationszeit," XVIII, *Joh. Eberlin von Günzburgs sämtliche Schriften*, III (1902), in *Neudrucke d. L.*, Nos. 183-92, pp. 176 ff.; Egli, *Actensammlung*, p. 110, No. 314; p. 214, No. 490; Schade, *Satiren u. Pasquille*, II, 144; *Luthers Werke* (ed. Walch), XV, 2081, 2084, 2583, and 2597; Kurt Kaser, *Politische u. soziale Bewegungen*, p. 3.

had increased so enormously that, by the beginning of the sixteenth century, it had become a veritable plague. Monks and nuns and even secular priests, as well as a host of laymen, followed the example set by the friars. City authorities were forced to adopt measures to check the evil. Begging was forbidden within the city walls unless authorized by the council.¹ There is strong evidence, however, that the mendicancy of friars, monks, and priests was still a grievance at the outbreak of the Lutheran revolt. Not only did Luther write against it, but the representatives of the free cities placed it first in their list of complaints against the church, which they presented at the Diet of Speier of 1526.²

Among the sources of revenue of the monasteries and other ecclesiastical foundations, few were more profitable than the endowments for anniversaries (*Jahrzeiten*) and similar services for the dead (*Seelgerät*). The belief in purgatory, as well as the belief in the church's power, through its intercession, to set souls free from this place of suffering, supplied the church with an instrument more potent, perhaps, than the rod of Moses. Inexhaustible springs, not of water, but of gold, were opened up when the church proclaimed its doctrines of purgatory and priestly intercession. Early in the Middle Ages it had become the custom to provide for the welfare of souls in purgatory by means of endowments for masses and other services for the dead. These might be founded in one of two ways. Either property (or a sum of money) might be given to a church or monastery as an endowment to defray the expenses of certain services specified in the deed of donation, or, to meet these expenses, a sort of mortgage could be placed upon one's property, necessitating an annual payment to the church or monastery of a stated quantity of produce, or its equivalent in

¹ Such was the case, for instance, in Nürnberg. The Ratsmanuale contain numerous grants of permission to friars, nuns, and lay individuals to beg for a limited period and at a specified place, such as the following: "den closterfrawen zu Mariepurgh bei Abenberg ist vergonnt an ein tafel einen tag das almusen ze sammeln vor einer kirchen," (1492, Heft 6, Sabbato post Urbani; cf. also 1499, Heft 1, where the Augustinian Hermits are warned not to beg without the consent of the council, and 1515-16, Heft 5, p. 8a).

² *Luthers Werke* (Weimar ed.), VI, 450; Walter Friedensburg, *Der Reichstag zu Speier*, 1526, p. 544; *Luthers Werke* (ed. Walch), XV, 2060, 2082, and 2563.

money.¹ The latter of these alternative methods was very common, particularly among the less prosperous. In this way it came to pass that, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, houses occupied by unfortunate burgesses in the towns, as well as peasant property in the country, were pretty generally burdened with these annual obligations (*Gülten* or mortgage-interest) for *Jahrzeiten* or *Seelgerät*.² That the day for the meeting of these obligations came around with most annoying rapidity we can well imagine. In bad years as in good years the debt was the same. We may be sure, moreover, that the creditor, in most cases at least, exacted full and prompt payment. It should cause us no surprise, therefore, if these exactions aroused in both townsmen and peasants a bitter hatred toward the clergy. We can easily understand, also, how welcome to those thus burdened must have been the gospel of Luther and Zwingli, with its abolition of purgatory and its offer of salvation without money and without price. Complaints against *Jahrzeiten* and *Seelgerät* were in fact common enough, as the pamphlet literature and official records of the Reformation period clearly prove.³

Another practice had developed before the end of the Middle Ages which further burdened the property of many a poor peasant and townsman. I refer to the practice of borrowing money on mortgages (if, by analogy, we may so term them) created in much the same manner as those just described. In this procedure the borrower, in return for cash received, contracted for himself and

¹ For illustrations of *Jahrzeit* and *Seelgerät* contracts cf. Frankfurt's *Stadtlarchiv*, St. Bartholomäus Stift, No. 4085 (1500), and Barfüsser Kloster, No. 940 (1515). Cf. also Wilhelm Arnold, *Zur Geschichte des Eigentums in den deutschen Städten* (H. Georg, Basel, 1861), pp. 95 ff.

² Basel's *Stadtlarchiv*, Erkenntnisbuch, II, 114 (1509); *Zürcher Stadtbücher* (Zeller-Werdmüller), I, 64, No. 157; p. 244, No. 43; cf. also Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

³ Egli, *Actensammlung*, p. 20, No. 105; p. 116, No. 330; p. 106, No. 299; p. 169, No. 426; p. 214, No. 490; p. 235, No. 543, and p. 320, No. 703; Schade, *Satiren u. Pasquille*, II, 38, 144, 236; III, 104, 142; *Joh. Marstellers Aufruchbuch* (Grotefend-Jung, *Quellen zur Frankfurter Geschichte*, II, 174 ff.), Article XIV; "Die Berner Chronik des Valerius Anshelm," V, 111 ff., Article XXXIII; cf. also G. L. Kriegk, *Bürgerwitze und Zustände im Mittelalter* (Frankfurt am Main, 1862), pp. 104 ff.; Dr. Wilhelm Lühe, "Die Ablösung der ewigen Zinsen in Frankfurt am Main," *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift f. Gesch. u. Kunst*, XXIII (1904), 36 ff.; Kurt Kaser, *Politische u. soziale Bewegungen*, p. 4.

heirs to pay annually to the money-lender (or to the latter's heirs) a specified sum (called a *Gült*, or often, but less accurately, a *Zins*). The rate of mortgage interest was moderate enough, being generally 5 per cent, or a one-gulden *Gült* for a twenty-gulden loan. As in the case of *Jahrzeiten* and *Seelgerät*, these loans were made without time limit. So long as the principal remained unpaid and the occupant of the mortgaged property met regularly the annual *Gült*, or mortgage interest, the contract remained in force. The borrower or his heirs could, of course, cancel the contract by paying back the principal, provided the annual interest had also been paid up to date. In these contracts, moreover, the land, buildings, or usufruct rights on which the mortgage had been placed were deeded to the money-lender, although left in the possession of the borrower or his heirs. Should the interest (or *Gült*) not be paid when due, the creditor, as stipulated in the contract, could immediately foreclose the mortgage, bringing the matter before the courts, and claim such part of the property as would cover the debt as well as all costs involved in the transaction.¹ It will have been observed that these annual interest obligations passed thus

¹ Portions of such a contract, so selected as to set before the reader the characteristics described above, will be the best evidence in support of statements made in the text. "Ich Josterpeder gesessen zu offenbach und ich Posten Brede sin elich huss-frau irkennen offnlich in diesem brieffe vor uns und unser erben das wir . . . den hochgelerten würdigen und ersamen Herren Conrad Hensel doctor der heiligen geschrieffte pherner der pfarkirchen im stift zu Sant Bartholomeus in der stat franckfurt und den capellanen derselben pharkirchen und iren nachkomen . . . eyn halben gulden gelts jerlicher gulte franckfurter werunge der alle jare jerlichen und iglichs jars besonder uff unser lieben frauwen tag . . . erscheinen und gefallen sal. Und ist der verkauff gescheen umb zehen gulden in gold egnanter werunge der sommen gelts wir verkeuffer . . . wole vernoget und gewert sin und wir die inne unsern gebruch gewant und gekort han. . . . Und uff das die egnanten hern pferner und cappellanen und ire nachkomen der jarlichen gulte siecher und hebindig sin mogen so han wir yne vor den erbern luden schulthess und scheffen des geriechts zu offenbach . . . in underpfants wise ingesetzt und belacht einsetzen und belegen in craft diess brieffs unser hoffreyde im dorff offenbach gelegen huss schuren gaden und aller irer zugehore. . . . Ist vorhin eigen und gefallen in dieselbe hoffreyden zehen schilling . . . und ist die itztgnante hoffreyde vor hien nit versatzt vorpfant oder verschrieben in keyne wise. . . . Und were sache das wir verkeuffer unser erben und nachkomen besitzer der obgnanten unser hoffreyden an bezalung des halben gulden gelts jerlicher gulte sumig worden und den uff zyt und ziel vorgnant nit bezalten, so mogen die obgnanten hern pferner und cappellanen ire nachkomen und inhelter dieses brieffs . . . von iretwegen uffstunt nach solichen unserm sumenisse oder wan sie darnach wollent die obgemelte hoffreyde mit aller irer besserung und zugehore wie die funden wurdet vor die erschienen versessen und ussteende gulte auch kosten und schaden daruff ergeenden von geriechtes wegen oder mit bottenlone an geriechte zu ofinbach und als

from one generation to another. Now, one can readily imagine how a new generation, which had not enjoyed the benefit of the loan, but which had none the less to meet the annual obligation therefor, would feel toward the creditor who collected this annoying payment. The unpopular creditor might be a layman, for this practice furnished a profitable employment of money to many a lay capitalist in the prosperous German cities. Perhaps even more frequently, but at least very often, the creditor in such money-lending operations was some ecclesiastical corporation—a church or monastery. The rich landed possessions and other sources of revenue of ecclesiastical foundations provided them generally with ready money which they were not slow to employ in this profitable manner, once they recognized its possibilities. When, however, one realizes that the Canon Law forbade usury—and, in the popular understanding, any interest or charge for the use of money was usury—one is not surprised to find considerable complaint against this practice of money-lending and particularly against the clergy who profited by it.¹

an damselben geriechte gewonheit und recht ist uffholen und erlagen die zu iren handen brengen und nemen damit thun und lassen brechen und bussen als mit andern iren eigen gutern. . . . Doch so han die obgnanten hern pherner und capellanen uns obgnanten verkeuffern die sonderlich gunst und freundschaft gethan das wir oder unser erben und besitzer der obgemenen hoffreyden eyns yeden jars wan uns gefuget den halben gulden gelts jerlicher gulte mit zehen gulden an gold frankfurter werunge widderkeuffen mogen so ferre wir yne bevor abe betzalen die gulte nach antzal des jars mit aller ussteender und versessener gulte mit auch allem kosten und schaden daruff ergangen und so ferre die guter vorgnant nit weren wie vorsteet uffgeholt" Frankfurt am Main, (*Stadtarchiv*, St. Bartholomäus Stift, 445 [1500]). Cf. also *ibid.*, 4385 (1508), which contains several similar money-loan contracts, the rate of interest in each case being the same, viz., 5 per cent. Even tenants could and did often make loans in this manner, burdening property not their own without the consent of the owner; cf. Arnold, *Gesch. d. Eigentums*, pp. 112 ff.

¹ Cf. Schade, *Satiren und Pasquille*, "Von der Gült," II, 73 ff. The city council of Frankfurt sought to protect the citizens from abuses of this money-lending practice by demanding that it be notified of such transactions and by establishing a maximum rate of interest, as may be seen in the following decision: "Und wo sich aber begeben das die geistlichen so zinss daruff hetten die behusunge buwen solten und wolten und die erbuwete behusunge uber iren grundt zinss further umb eyn zcimliche widderkauffs gulten vererben wolten, sol man inen gonnen doch so das sie das eynem erbaren Ratt der widderkauffs gulten halber ein erkenntnus vonn irem Capittel und oberkeit geben sollen und eyn gulden nit hoher dann XX gulden vererben sollen." Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Ratschlagungsprotocolle, 1498-1510, I, 76a ("Feria septa post dominicam invocavit anno 1505"); cf. also *Frankfurts Bürgermeisterbücher*, 1521, p. 104a, and *Joh. Marstellers Aufruhrbuch* (Grotefend-Jung, *Quellen zur Frankfurter Geschichte*), pp. 174 ff., Article XVI.

It will be well, at this point, to consider the landed wealth of the church and the various ways in which it affected the attitude of laymen toward the clergy. The exact amount of land owned by the church in town and country has never been accurately estimated. It is to be regretted that there is so little reliable, statistical information concerning this matter. Beyond a doubt the landed wealth of the church was exceedingly great, possibly a third of the total land area, the usual approximate estimate. Gifts as well as purchases of land, continuing through several centuries, had increased its holdings enormously. Toward the close of the Middle Ages additional property, in the form of land-leases, together with the buildings and other appurtenances thereto, was being acquired by the foreclosing of mortgages through the failure of mortgagors to meet the annual dues for *Jahrzeiten*, *Seelgerät*, and loans. This vast amount of property, it is well known, was not devoted wholly to religious purposes. To what uses, then, did the churches and monasteries put their lands, leases, and buildings?

From very early mediaeval times it had been the practice of both lay and ecclesiastical landlords to lease their lands in return for annual payments, either in kind or in money. Among German-speaking peoples such payments were known as *Zinsen* (from the Latin *census*).¹ The leases, in return for which these *Zinsen* were paid, might be granted for a specified term of years (*Zeitpacht*) or in perpetuity (*Erbpacht*). The latter method was the more common and the annual payments or lease-rents were described as *ewige Zinsen*.² It will surprise no one to learn that a large portion of the income of ecclesiastical foundations was derived from this source. Investigation shows that each individual *Zins* was ridiculously small, owing to the fact that land values, until late in the Middle Ages, were not high.³ However, the multiplicity and varied

¹ Arnold, *Gesch. d. Eigentums*, pp. 60 ff.

² The term *ewige Zinsen* was not applied exclusively to rent payments, but also to the annual obligations, in money or in kind, for *Jahrzeiten*, *Seelgerät*, and loans, for the words *Zins* and *Gült* became interchangeable, hence indistinguishable, unless the purpose or cause of the payment were stated.

³ Naturally, with the growth of the population in the cities and the consequent increase in the demand for land, land values increased. This unearned increment is indicated by the new *Zinsen* added to the old, not generally by the original landlord

character of these annual dues (*Hofzins* or *Martinszins*, *Vogteizins*, *Leihzins*, *Schnitter*, *Ringe*, *Ehrschatz*, etc.) which had to be paid at various times during the year by the occupant of the property must have caused much annoyance.¹ That the tenants should desire to be freed, in some way, from such frequently recurring payments is natural enough. And in fact we find, toward the end of the mediaeval period, an increasing demand for the privilege of purchasing emancipation from these numerous, annoying obligations by a single large payment. The official records of German cities furnish copious testimony to the fact that the discharge of these perpetual rents was a reform urgently demanded by both peasants and townsmen.² Now, inasmuch as the clergy set themselves generally against this reform, such opposition, as well as the multitude of ecclesiastical claims to dues, so obnoxious in themselves, must have contributed much to increase the anti-clerical sentiment of the age.³ One should bear in mind, in this connection, that perpetual property rents or similar obligations placed on property (*ewige Zinsen*) had come to be so highly esteemed by ecclesiastical corporations that, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, they made a practice of securing the right to such dues from property not their own. Long before the end of the mediaeval period,

but by the tenant or lessee who improved the property, erected buildings on it, and subleased parts of it. The original or earlier annual rent obligations still persisted, in large part, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, although they had begun to disappear about a century earlier. Cf. Arnold, *Gesch. d. Eigentums*, pp. 60 ff.

¹ Zurich, *Staatsarchiv*, Ratsbücher BV, 2, pp. 137 f. (1506); BV, 3, p. 31 (1515), p. 65 (1515); Egli, *Actensammlung*, p. 134, No. 370; "Salats Chronik," p. 41; Grotefend-Jung, *Quellen*, II, 48 (No. 101), 69 (No. 166); Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Barfüsser Kloster, No. 99 (1516). Cf. also G. E. Steitz, "Reformatörise Persönlichkeiten," *Archiv f. Frankfurts Gesch. u. Kunst*, N. F., IV, 135; *Rechtsquellen von Basel*, I, 236.

² Zurich, *Staatsarchiv*, Ratsbücher A, 43, 1, No. 18 (1522-23); *Zürcher Stadtbücher*, III, 229, No. 147; Grotefend-Jung, *Quellen*, II, 70; also *ibid.*, pp. 174 ff. (*Marstellers Aufruhrbuch*, Article XI); Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Bürgermeisterbücher, 1525, pp. 79a, 87a, 105b, and 111b; *ibid.*, Mgb. C 25, pp. 30-37; *Rechtsquellen von Basel*, I, 370; Friedensburg, *Der Reichstag zu Speier*, p. 547; cf. also Dr. Wilhelm Lühe, "Die Ablösung der ewigen Zinsen in Frankfurt a/M.," *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift f. Gesch. u. Kunst*, XXIII (1904), 36 ff.; Arnold, *Gesch. d. Eigentums*, p. 302; Kurt Kaser, *Politische u. soziale Bewegungen*, pp. 205 f.

³ Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Bürgermeisterbücher, 1525, pp. 79a and 87a; Egli, *Actensammlung*, p. 13, No. 71; Arnold, *Gesch. d. Eigentums*, pp. 297 f.

as is well known, property rents had become a marketable commodity—a circumstance of the greatest importance to the landless craftsmen of the Middle Ages, enabling them to invest the money saved from their trade-earnings in profitable incomes from land, if not in land (which was less easily obtainable), thus raising notably their status in the social scale.¹ But churches and monasteries also invested their surplus capital, to a large extent, in *Zinsen*, although need of ready money forced them often enough to sell such revenues. Bequests made to ecclesiastical corporations were another means by which land rents came into the hands of the clergy. At the beginning of the sixteenth century persons paying annual dues to the clergy for the use of property must have numbered many thousands, and hostility to the clergy, on this account, was correspondingly widespread.

Zinsen and *Gülten* caused complaint, however, for other reasons than those thus far mentioned. One can readily perceive that property overburdened with such obligations would be undesirable. In the course of time, as the buildings deteriorated, the rents and mortgage dues might amount to more than the use of the property was worth. The result was that occupants of heavily burdened, old buildings in the cities found better and less expensive quarters in newer portions of the town. Those to whom the *Zinsen* and *Gülten* were due often had difficulty in obtaining new tenants. Such buildings, no longer remunerative, were allowed to go to rack and ruin. In consequence, the city authorities were forced to enact laws requiring the holders of *Zins* and *Gült* obligations to improve the property. Ecclesiastical corporations refused, frequently, to heed such laws. Conflicts between the clergy and city councils ensued, which, we may safely affirm, contributed somewhat to increase anti-clerical sentiment in the German cities.²

¹ Arnold, pp. 138 f.

² "Item als hievor zu mehr malen der wusten und oden flecken so hie zu franckfort ligen, ist geratschlagt und uf das mail den Stifften nemlich Sant Bartholomeus, Sant Leonhart und zu unser lieben frauwen verkunden und bynnen jarsfrist zu buwen," etc. There follows a threat to seize the property if the repairs were not made within the year (Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Ratschlagungsprotocolle, 1510-17, Ia, 153a). Cf. also Ratschlagungsprotocolle (Frankfurt), 1498-1510, Ia, 76a, 82a, and 82b; *Rechtsquellen von Basel*, I, 236; Kriegg, *Frankfurter Bürgerswiste*, etc., pp. 104 ff.; Lühe, *Die Ablösung der ewigen Zinsen*, pp. 36 ff.

The privilege of exemption from taxation, long enjoyed by ecclesiastical corporations, furnished, doubtless, one of the most frequent and universal causes for conflict between these bodies and the German municipalities. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, as has been remarked, the landed wealth of ecclesiastical foundations was enormous. It is evident that the exemption of so much land from taxation involved a serious loss of revenue to the city governments. Now, no student of mediaeval history can be ignorant of the efforts of the kings of France and of England, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, to tax the clergy in their dominions. It should cause no surprise, therefore, to learn that the German cities, in like manner, sought to force ecclesiastical corporations under their jurisdictions to pay somewhat for the protection given these corporations by the city governments. And, in fact, the official records of several larger German cities do contain evidence in plenty of attempts to increase municipal revenues by curtailing clerical exemption from taxation. Privileges were obtained from emperors; appeals were made to the popes; and laws were enacted, with the one object, viz., to prevent a further loss of revenue by the falling of property into the dead hand.¹ Monasteries, the Teutonic Knights, and similar orders, finally also the city churches, were forbidden to acquire additional lands, either by purchase or by bequest. Should property be bequeathed to them, they were required to sell the same to laymen within a year or pay no less taxes thereon than a layman would be assessed.² Before the end of the Middle Ages the ecclesiastical corporations in a few German cities had been forced, also, to pay some taxes to the municipal governments in addition to those assessed upon property acquired subsequent to the passage of the law just

¹ *Chroniken der deutschen Städte*, XVIII (Mainz), 126 f.; *Zürcher Stadtbücher*, II, 219 (No. 255); Lühe, *Die Ablösung der ewigen Zinsen*, pp. 36 ff.; Kurt Kaser, *Pol. u. soz. Bewegungen*, pp. 39 ff.; A. von Kostanecki, "Der öffentliche Kredit im Mittelalter," in *Staats- u. sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen* (Schmoller), IX, Heft 1, p. 29.

² Böhmer-Lau, *Urkunden der Reichsstadt Frankfurt*, II, Nos. 4, 69, and 108; *Archiv f. schweizerische Geschichte*, V, 215; *Zürcher Stadtbücher*, I, 19 (No. 48); III, 212 (No. 127); Klemens Becker, *Wirtschaftsverhältnisse des westfälischen Benediktinerklosters Liesborn* (Diss. Universität zu Münster, 1909), p. 34; Lühe, pp. 36 ff.; Kaser, pp. 156 ff.

mentioned. In Frankfurt am Main, for instance, the three leading churches and other secular clergy of the city were required to pay, together, one hundred gulden, as often as the city council imposed the *Bede* or general poll and property tax.¹ The enforcement of laws so injurious to clerical interests often called forth the most obstinate resistance. In the struggles which ensued, the clergy employed all the weapons at their disposal, including even papal interdicts.² During intervals, sometimes short, sometimes longer, the clergy had to submit. However, evasions of these laws, if not open resistance to them, continued down to the Reformation to be common enough.³ Moreover, even in those cities in which the clergy paid regularly and peaceably the taxes levied upon them, the burgesses were keenly conscious of the fact that ecclesiastical corporations did not pay their just share of the fiscal burden imposed by the city authorities. The demand that the clergy be taxed as heavily as other citizens was certainly quite common at the beginning of the sixteenth century.⁴ It needs, therefore, no strong

¹ Cf. "Die Rachtung Johannis," of 1407, Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Mgb. C, 25, the more important contents of which are given by Lühse, *Die Ablösung d. ewigen Zinsen*, pp. 36 ff. In 1446 the clergy of Basel with an income of 30 gulden or over were required to pay an income tax; cf. Gustav Schönberg, *Finanzverhältnisse der Stadt Basel*, pp. 211 and 215. This requirement was omitted from subsequent tax regulations, but we find the clergy in Basel, some time later, paying a considerable *don gratuit* (*ibid.*, p. 416).

² *Chroniken d. d. Städte*, XVIII (Mainz), 126 f.; Kriegk, *Frankfurter Bürgerswiste*, pp. 104 ff.

³ Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Dominikaner Urkunden u. Akten, 427 (1480). This document contains a protest of the Dominican Order in Frankfurt against the proposal of the city council that the secular clergy and orders bear the same fiscal burdens as other citizens. Cf. also Frankfurts Ratschlagungsprotocolle, 1498-1510, Ia, 15 (Teutonic Knights ordered to sell property kept beyond the one year allowed by law); Frankfurts Bürgermeisterbuch, 1517, p. 47 (Dominican Order requested to sell three newly required vineyards to laymen); *ibid.*, 1522, p. 57b (St. Bartholomeus foundation guilty of keeping lands contrary to law).

⁴ Basel, *Staatsarchiv*, Politisches, M, 4, No. 2, which contains the following: "Zu dem andern, so sind u[n]sere h[erren] [i.e., the city council] des entlichen willens mit allen geistlichen briestern oder clostern ein treffennlich insehenn zu thund, damit sy gleich wie annder burgere hinfur gemeine burgerliche bschwerde tragen müssen." Cf. also Basels Ratsbücher, A 6, p. 118; B 4, p. 15; Frankfurt BB., 1525, p. 95b; Grotefend-Jung, *Quellen*, II, 174 ff., Article III; *Die Berner Chronik d. V. Anshelm*, V, 111, Article 35; Friedensburg, *Der Reichstag zu Speier*, p. 547; *Chroniken d. d. Städte*, XVIII, 106 ff.; Kaser, *Pol. u. soz. Bewegungen*, p. 188, n. 1.

imagination to regard this economic grievance as another of the causes for German anti-clericalism.

But property taxes were not the only fiscal burdens from which the clergy claimed exemption. From their own manorial estates, outside the cities, as well as from their *Zinsen* and *Güllen*, ecclesiastical corporations obtained considerable revenue in produce—such as grain, fruits, vegetables, wine, etc. In early mediaeval times the clergy had been allowed to bring these products into the cities free from the usual tolls and import duties. During the thirteenth century municipal authorities seem to have awakened to the fact that these supplies amounted to more than the clergy could, themselves, consume, and that this surplus was being sold, with great injury to the revenue from excise taxes. Attempts were soon made to stop this leakage in the fiscal income. Restrictions were placed upon the quantity of produce which ecclesiastical corporations could import into the city free of duty. Each church, convent, monastery, or similar clerical organization was permitted to import, without toll or tariff obligations, only a specified amount of grain, wine, or other dutiable products, supposedly not more than enough for its own actual needs. The quantity, fixed by law, varied according to the number of persons for whom each corporation had to provide.¹ These measures proved insufficient, however, as the secular clergy and monastic orders either evaded the laws and brought in more than their allotted amount or such allotment was more than the needs of the corporation required. Hence the

¹ "Item den prediger herren sint eyn hundert und drissigk achtel frucht eyns iglichen jars zu irem gebruch und nit mehe male gelten fry zu gelaissen etc." (1495) (Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Gesetzbücher, III, XXVIII^a. For similar restrictions, made by the city council of Frankfurt am Main, cf. Gesetzbücher, III, XVIII^{6b} (1491), XXVII^a (1495), XVIII^{7b} (1509). An interesting illustration of the attitude of the council, in such matters, is contained in the following enactment: "Item wan die Capellanen uff der pfarre wyne nidderlegen, den sie fur sich selbst im huse gebruchen wollen, so sollen sie inne den Rat sohriben und bitten sie uss genaden des nidderlage gelts zuerlaissen, wess dan eyn Burgermeister oder der Rate die porten herren desshalber bescheyt dar nach mogen sie sich zu halten haben und anders nit" (Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, 'Ugb. 85 F. pp. 16 f.; also Ugb. 85 F', pp. 35 f.). Cf. also Frankfurt's Ratschlagungsprotocolle, 1498-1510, Ia, 34b, 78b, and 79a; *Chroniken d.d. Städte*, XVIII (Mainz, Vol. II), 126 ff. and 129; Gustav Sohmoller, *Strassburg zur Zeit der Zunftkämpfe*, p. 136. That Nürnberg had similar laws is evident from the complaints against evasions given below.

cities enacted laws greatly restricting the rights of the clergy to sell produce on which excise duties were levied unless they paid these taxes exactly as lay citizens did.¹ In some cities the clergy were strong enough to resist, successfully, all such efforts to curtail their privileges. Long and bitter conflicts were the result.² Generally, however, they simply evaded the laws, either secretly or openly. Many instances of such evasion or disregard of the law could be cited from the official records of Frankfurt am Main and Nürnberg. The sale of wine, both wholesale and retail, was the most common offense of this sort. Monastic organizations, including the orders of friars and even of sisters, as well as the Teutonic Knights, were the most frequent offenders, although the secular clergy, also, often incurred the displeasure of the city councils for a like disobedience of the law.³

¹ Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Ugb. 85 F', pp. 35 ff. The city council of Nürnberg likewise forbade the clergy to engage in commerce as is shown by the following decision: "bede closter zubevelhen und erpitten das er sich ains rats willen halt und weltlich handel mussig sei" (Ratsmanuale, 1515-16, Heft 10, p. 15a). The Teutonic Knights were allowed to sell swine in the Frankfurt market but were required to pay the usual excise tax (Ratschlagungsprotocolle, 1498-1510, Ia. 79a).

² *Chroniken d. d. Städte*, XVII (Mainz, Vol. I), 331, 333; *ibid.*, XVIII (Mainz, Vol. II), 124 f.; Kaser, *Pol. u. soz. Bewegungen*, pp. 49 ff.

³ The clergy of St. Bartholomew, in Frankfurt, were found guilty of selling a large quantity of grain, contrary to the law (Bürgermeisterbücher, 1518, p. 27); the Teutonic Knights in Nürnberg were called to account for evading the grain-tax (Ratsmanuale, 1505-6, Heft 1, pp. 4b ff.; Heft 3, p. 2b); the monks of Heilbronn, near Nürnberg, likewise evaded the law (Nürnberg, Ratsmanuale, 1497, Heft 5). "Als geistlichen etwan viel win verschencken und eyn canoniken dem andern gipt an scholt" (Frankfurt, Ratschlagungsprotocolle, 1510-1517, p. 156b); the Vicar of Our Lady (*Liebfrauenstift*), in Frankfurt, sells wine contrary to the law (*ibid.*, p. 184a); a canon of St. Bartholomew refuses to obey the law, insisting on his right to sell wine (*ibid.*, p. 230); cf. also Frankfurt's Bürgermeisterbücher, 1517, pp. 30a and 130a; 1520, p. 45a; 1521, p. 85b; 1522, p. 52a; 1525, p. 52b. The illegitimate sale of wine by ecclesiastical organizations under the jurisdiction of Nürnberg was particularly common. The following citation shows clearly the determination of the city council to make an end of such evasion or disregard of the law: "Item es ist erteilt das hinfur von eynem yeden der im deutschen hof [i.e., the headquarters of the Teutonic Knights] trinkt, zecht oder wein herausragt, das gelt nach laut des statgesetz genommen werden sol, unangesehen ob er furgeb, er hat des gesetz keyn wissen, auch ungeacht, ob man im den wein geschenckt oder vergebens geben hab" (Ratsmanuale, 1494, Heft 2, "Feria v post Domini Invocavit"). Cf. also Ratsmanuale, 1494, Heft 7, "Sabbato vigilia Petri et Pauli apostolorum"; *ibid.*, Heft 12, "Sabbato post Katherine," and Heft 13, "Feria ante Lucie"; 1495, Heft 3; 1505-6, Heft 4, p. 13a; 1510-11, Heft 1,

In addition to this loss of revenue suffered by the municipal governments, there was another ground for complaint against clerical participation in the sale of grain, wine, and other produce. The ecclesiastical corporations became, thereby, dangerous competitors of lay citizens engaged in the same commerce. Moreover, when one considers the numerous and heavy fiscal burdens which laymen had to bear; when one remembers, also, that the clergy managed, generally, to undersell the lay merchants, one can realize how serious and injurious such competition must have been. Complaints brought by the guilds before the city councils prove conclusively that the citizens were fully conscious of this danger to their interests.¹

A much larger number of guilds—and hence of citizens—may have been brought into opposition to the clergy, or, more accurately, to the monks or orders, as a result of industrial competition. If not a great deal, at least some evidence can be adduced to show that the craft-guilds also had a grievance, because their economic interests were endangered by monastic industrial enterprise. Monasteries, convents, and the Teutonic Knights, in some places, if not everywhere, received as members or employed persons skilled

p. 166, Heft 2, p. 100, Heft 12, p. 166; 1516-17, Heft 3, p. 210, Heft 5, p. 26 and 76; 1515-16, Heft 1, p. 1, Heft 2, p. 50, Heft 5, p. 220, Heft 6, p. 186, Heft 9, p. 130.

In the original draft of this article, it was asserted that the records of Basel, Zurich, Mainz, Speier, and of Worms, as well as those of Frankfurt and of Nürnberg contained evidence of clerical evasion of laws restricting the sale of grain and wine. Inasmuch as the clergy of Mainz, Speier, and Worms refused from the first to recognize such laws, they cannot be said to have evaded them. For evidence of opposition to clerical sale of wine in Basel and Zurich, see the following footnote.

¹ "Als die wirt uber die priesterschaft clagen, mit inen reden, das sie nit schencken in iren eygen husen," etc. (Frankfurt, Ratschlagungsprotocolle, 1517-33, p. 112b). The wine merchants' guild of Zurich complained to the council that the sale of wine by the clergy was detrimental to their interests; cf. *Staatsarchiv*, Zurich, B VI, 246, p. 71 ("Samstag nach Margarethe," 1516). Evidently in response to complaints made by the guild of wine merchants in Basel, the council of that city, in 1523, enacted a law restricting such commerce. This enactment reads as follows: "So ist erkanth und geordneth dasz die closter, stiftt noch einzig geistlich personen hinfuro keinen wein, er sig von zinsen, zehenden, schulden oder in ander weg ankomen zu dem zapffen hie in der statt verschencken noch anmessen lossen sollen, er sig dann derselb gewachsen und haben denselben wein hie in unserenn bann erbawen," etc. (Basel *Staatsarchiv* Erkenntnis Buch, III, p. 207; also in *Handel und Gewerbe*, Y, I, and *Weinleute* Buch, 3, p. 258; cited by R. Wackernagel, *Geschichte der Stadt Basel*, II, 436).

in the trades. Under the direction of the religious corporation these persons carried on their crafts, working, however, to supply the wants of those outside as well as of those within the organization. For instance, the city council of Nürnberg forbids a bleacher in the employ of the Teutonic Knights to ply his trade in the service of outsiders, threatening him with expulsion from its territories if he does not desist.¹ Both in Basel and in Frankfurt am Main the bakers' guilds complain that in the monasteries bread is baked, not only for the monks, but for citizens as well.² The weavers of these two cities urge before their city councils that nuns in the neighboring convents be restrained from competition with them.³ Evidently in response to petitions from several craft-gilds, the city council of Basel adopted, in January, 1526, a series of enactments having as their purpose the suppression of all monastic labor detrimental to craft-gild interests. From these laws one can safely infer that the monasteries, in and near Basel, had been competing with a number of crafts, viz.: the bakers, bookbinders, shoemakers, cloth-cutters, coopers, carpenters, joiners, glaziers, and masons.⁴

¹ "Und den Birchelschund uff der teutsch hern pleychhaws sein hantwerck zu arbeyten sitzt, zu besennenden, in furhalten seines hantwercks also zu arbeyten absteen, wo er nit wil, im die stat vom lannde zuverpieten" (Nürnberg, *Kreisarchiv*, Ratsmanuale, 1497, Heft 10, "Tercia post Mauricy").

² Basel, *Staatsarchiv*, Handel und Gewerbe, Y, I; Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Bürgermeister Buch, 1517, p. 77.

³ Frankfurt, *Stadtarchiv*, Ratsschlagungsprotocolle, 1510-17, p. 269a; Basel, *Staatsarchiv*, Handel und Gewerbe, Y, as above I (pages unnumbered).

⁴ "Item die bueffler [coopers' gild] beclagen sich der clöster, dass sie in drefflich in ir handwerck griffen, dan sy machen reiff band dugen und böden fass," etc. "Item die dischmacher [i.e., joiners' gild] beclagen sich der clöster halben, das sy fensterramen machen . . . do mit sy unss grossen schaden dundt." "Item diewil sich ein ersamer zunft der spynweter als murer küffer zimmerlüt dischmacher sich erclage we sy bisshar grässlich von den clöstern beschweret, das dieselben clöster brüder habenn die selbige hantwerck konnden, deshalben sy zu brüderenn uffgnomen . . . desglichen sollen sy keinen bruder me haben der ein hantwercks man sig und das inn irenn clöstern trybe, es sig schnider, schumacher zimmerlüt murer dischmacher oder anndere . . . und niemans annders inenn wercken lassen," etc. "Item es sollenn auch hinfurer weder priester oder münch in den clöstern bütcher andern am lon ze binden [geben] . . . sollen sy keine knecht so nit bürger oder zunfftig sind ze binden in iren leden setzen, sunder die selbigen den buchbindern so unser pürger oder zunfftig sind ze binden geben." "Item es soll auch hinfurer niemans weder pfaffen münch in clöstern oder sunst weltlich personenn so der glaser hantwerck nit gelert, ir zunfft nit habenn

Yet, it must be admitted, Basel may not have been typical in its complaint against monastic industrial competition. Indications of such competition in other cities thus far investigated are surprisingly few.¹ Unless much additional evidence of its existence elsewhere be brought to light we must regard this grievance of Basel's craftsmen as somewhat exceptional. Nevertheless, inasmuch as competition of this sort existed at all—and the evidence submitted proves that it did exist—it furnishes us with another phase of economic self-interest likely to increase anti-clerical sentiment in the German cities and to make Protestantism popular in those influential centers of German life.

Surely, it must be admitted, the mediaeval church afforded abundant cause for economic complaint. Not only the evils of papal finance, not only the draining of money to Rome, but a long array of other more or less injurious practices of an economic nature could be and were charged against the clergy, both secular and regular. The grievances to which we have called attention include the tithes; feudal dues and unremunerated labor; the sale of religious rites and ceremonies; so-called offerings, filched by avaricious priests and mendicant friars; burdensome obligations for *Jahrzeiten*, *Seelgerät*, and loans; property rents, made doubly onerous by their variety and by the hopelessly eternal character of such payments; clerical claims to exemption from taxation—depleting the city revenues and increasing the burdens of lay citizens; clerical resistance to tolls, tariffs, and excise dues; and, finally, unfair clerical competition with merchants and craftsmen.

In the light of facts such as these must one not conclude that the Protestant revolt was essentially an economic movement—that material self-interest was the fundamental factor in the great sixteenth-century schism? No. That is not a necessary inference.

keinswegs am Ion fremdbdenn oder heimischen in der statt Basell nit glasenn oder venster machen," etc. (Basel *Staatsarchiv*, Handl u. Gewerbe, Y, I). Brief reference to this competition in Basel has been made by Ochs, *Geschichte von Basel*, V, 537; also by Geering, *Handel u. Industrie d. Stadt Basel*, p. 381, and by R. Wackernagel, *Geschichte d. Stadt Basel*, II, 418.

¹ For Zurich cf. Egli, *Axtensammlung*, p. 263, No. 589. For Mainz cf. *Chroniken d.d. Städte*, XVIII, 130. See also Becker, *Wirtschaftsverhältnisse d. westfälischen Benediktinerclöster Liesborn*, pp. 25, 29.

Any unprejudiced student of pre-Reformation conditions will find plenty of evidence that other motives, as well as economic self-interest, operated to produce that anti-clericalism which made the success of Protestantism possible. German municipal records bear testimony, in no uncertain manner, to the existence of political causes for complaint against the clergy. The private letters and printed works of educated men furnish indisputable proof that many were intellectually convinced that the church had departed far from the purity of primitive doctrine and practice. Many others, no doubt, were arrayed in opposition to the mediaeval church and its clergy as a result of moral and religious aspirations. It is more sane, therefore, and more in accord with all the facts, to affirm merely that the economic factor was much more widely and generally operative in the success of Protestantism than historians have, heretofore, been able or willing to concede.

THE CHARACTER OF JESUS: A GENETIC INTERPRETATION

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I

A popular preacher tells us that in a recent sermon on the claims of Jesus he quoted the familiar panegyric on Jesus by Jean Paul Richter: "He is the purest among the mighty, the mightiest among the pure, who with his pierced hand has razed empires from their foundations, turned the stream of history from its old channel, and still continues to rule and guide the ages." But for some reason the quotation, although made in the climax of the sermon, did not carry: he was conscious that it had not reached the heart of his audience, and it was an interruption in the stream of his own thought. In the quiet of his study he sought the reason. He had often used the quotation, and generally with effect; it represented his own profoundest conviction, and it was an appeal to imagination which at the fusing point of real sentiment in an audience is always ready for the rich rhetoric of a superlative affirmation. His investigation into the psychology of that quotation did not end till he had made this discovery. The modern man does not care to have Jesus commended by the old methods of superlative and rhapsody and purple patches of rhetoric. He fails to respond to the art, homiletical or other, which stiffens Jesus into a background of gold and keeps him there "faultily faultless, splendidly null, dead perfection, no more." That particular preacher has omitted the quotation in question and its many literary brothers ever since.

An experienced preacher to college students makes the confession that for years he has avoided any reference in his addresses to college men and women to Napoleon's famous words on Jesus spoken to General Bertrand in St. Helena. The last time he used that histrionic piece of rhetoric he noticed that the students

smiled. They felt that the words were a pose; and the poseur as confessor may deceive some of the elect, but college students will not worship where they are not allowed to discriminate. They are not satisfied with the call to take the shoes off their feet; they must know that they are standing on holy ground. The character of Jesus they have not been allowed to examine in a scale of values. They have been told in one way and another that it is as unnatural as to botanize on their mothers' graves.

These two words of confession, growing out of experience with men in entirely different spheres of life, show us that the intellectual and moral demands of the world are about the same everywhere. There is a demand, probably more or less unconscious, for a sense of reality in dealing with the character of Jesus. Men are not satisfied with what has been told them about that character, usually by the accredited teachers of the church. They have the feeling that what they have heard is rhetorically strained, psychologically faulty, or morally unusable.

The heart of humanity is right in thinking that the character of Jesus is central, and unless the more acute moral sense of our age is satisfied a revolution is bound to follow. There is no doctrine of the faith that does not come back at last to find in the character of Jesus confirmation and support. There is no hope which does not find in Jesus its goal and home, and only in his character can the hope be realized. But at the same time we are conscious of a number of changes. In ten years the entire problem of ethics has been revolutionized. What were once virtues may be regarded with suspicion, and old-fashioned pieties may be reprobated. It has been a shock to many excellent Christians of the old-fashioned sort to learn that they were "criminaloids"—criminals in the making. Specialists in certain virtues may even be counted very dangerous enemies to society. All this means that a new conception of character is growing up very rapidly in our modern life, with a stringency and sense of penalty which the old seldom had, with a feeling of responsibility which is almost an obsession, and with a social content which admits no substitutes for defective or lacking graces of the life. The old method of interpreting character was atomic and verbal; it made much of single moods, actions,

motives, and virtues. The new method is genetic. The old psychology was that of distinct faculties; the new psychology is the examination of the stream of consciousness as it passes, recognized as a single, flowing, and vital unit, whose depth and direction may be studied, but whose content cannot be changed. It is also the new ethics: life is a flowing stream, character is its recognition and value. The ethical conception has changed many times in the history of faith, and the character of Jesus has had to be reinterpreted at each change. The reinterpretation of Jesus is going on at the present time. In what form does his character come forth?

The last term in the interpretation of the character of Jesus is his will. It is strange that never till recently has it been made the co-ordinating center of his life. It has always been recognized as an element to be considered, but as the synthesis of all his holiness it has been strangely overlooked. Just as the new psychology makes will the integral fact of all life, so the new ethics refuses to stop till personality has been interpreted in terms of will. Jesus as an expression of will is giving to our faith a new sense of religious psychology and religious character. But it has taken a long time for interpreters to reach the place of vision, and some who are old in faith find it difficult to orient themselves.

When we go to the sources in the Gospels we are confronted by these indubitable difficulties as we begin to gather the material for ethical appraisalment of Jesus. The synoptic problem is by no means settled, and the mystery of the Book of John is greater than at any time in the history of biblical scholarship; but we have found out enough to show that there are differences of value in the Gospels, and that they cannot be quoted or used indiscriminately. No people at the time of the birth of Jesus had such a conscience for character as we know it today. The very word character, while Greek in its origin, was metaphysical in its meaning, and was so used by the author of the Hebrews. Very late in time it has been taken out of the region of metaphysics and given an ethical content. In the King James version the word does not appear at all. It is only in the last 150 years that the word has become acclimated in our common speech. In some evangelical quarters,

where obscurantism is cherished and ignorance is beatified, the word character is still held in deep suspicion. Salvation by character is said to be the most deadly tenet of modern Unitarianism; yet there are many who have never taken the trouble to find out what Unitarians mean by the phrase. It does not hold quite the absurdity which evangelical piety is accustomed to see in it.

But above all, even a cursory reading of the Gospels as they have come down to us makes us aware of a peculiar order of appreciation with regard to Jesus. To us, living in this far-off result of time, his character is first in importance. But in the Gospels we find another order of appreciation altogether. His *power*, with all its evidences of miracle and authority, was what first of all appealed to men. Then his *teaching*, with its simplicity and novelty, gripped their imagination: they said that no one had ever spoken like him, and that what he delivered was a "new doctrine." What are usually called his "*claims*," but unhappily so, next arrested the attention of his generation and invited a valuation of his personality. The question of his *character*, as we use the word, became acute nowhere except in Jerusalem, and was not even there made an issue till the Passion Week. His personal religion, or his *piety*, was considered of such secondary importance by the writers of the Gospels that we recover it only when we have enough spiritual imagination to deal with hints and to use sidelights.

Ullman says: "Jesus made upon others an inevitable impression that he was sinlessly perfect—only a monotone of approbation and admiration of the moral elevation of Christ." It is almost perverse even for a man obsessed with an idea to write that way. In his lifetime definite charges were made against Jesus, and uncertainty as to his character and sincerity persisted to the very end. In most of these charges there was the spirit of hatred, malignancy, and crass ignorance; the standards by which he was judged were those of the legalism and conventionalism of the age. But when we have made every explanation and every acknowledgment the fact remains that for many of the pious, in the fine sense, in Israel, Jesus was a problematical character. Ullman's statement is contradicted by the critical atmosphere into which Jesus came and in

which he lived. The charges made against him in his lifetime were of three classes.

The social charges were the first in order. The men of his time were scandalized when he ate with outcasts; when he enjoyed good cheer—from which they concluded that he was no prophet at all, but a gluttonous man and a winebibber; when he did not employ the ablutions which sanctified the social customs; and when he unclassed himself by making himself a friend and champion of outcasts. These charges we have turned into the glory of his character; but to the men of his day they were unforgivable transgressions. The personal charges against Jesus were more serious: they were mostly the result of the bitter controversies in Jerusalem. He was accused of having a devil, of being a Samaritan, of being insane, of being a deceiver and a liar, and flatly of being an “evil doer” or “sinner.” The religious charges against Jesus were three—he had broken the Sabbath, he had broken the traditions of the elders, and he had committed the sin of blasphemy. The last offense was of course the most heinous of all. He was accused of having committed the sin of blasphemy when he forgave sins, when he made himself equal with God, when he called himself the Son of God, when he claimed pre-existence, when he prophesied the destruction of the temple, and when he promised to return to earth as judge. The piety of Israel revolted against such pretensions—and it was not all malignant hatred or misunderstanding. There was not in the religious apperception of the time that subconscious appreciation which could accept the novelty of Jesus. While much of this material is from the late Gospel of John it represents without doubt a common feeling on the part of many with regard to Jesus.

Ullman's statement is just as inadequate when we test it by the appeal which the character of Jesus has made since his own contemporaries passed judgment upon him. We are familiar with the general skepticism of the gentile world as to the character of Jesus for at least three hundred years. It would be a depressing task to make a list of the charges against the character of Jesus which were hurled so generously during those centuries—some of them so unutterably vile that we can trace their source at once to the moral

purlieu of the Roman Empire. The acutest criticism of Jesus which has come down to us is that of Celsus; it was his evident conviction that Jesus was an impostor. The charge was an easy one to make, and as easy to credit, because in the breakup of the Roman Empire shams were more popular than any realities, whether of knowledge or life. The neo-Platonists, however, were disposed to think of Jesus as a great sage, and to him they accorded the character of a sage.

In our own time there has been a reaction from the superlative praise of Jesus, and in the process the character of the Master has been called up for reappraisal. Those who now judge him are not scandalmongers; the fleshly school leaves Jesus alone. They are men who are in earnest over the great concerns of our age; many of them are militant leaders for righteousness. Some of them judge by asking anxious questions. Others have the fear that they may have to send from the prison of the age and beseech Jesus to tell if he is sufficient for these things, and if not, are they to look for another? In the discussion in the *Hibbert Journal* on "Jesus or Christ," these defects in the character and teaching of Jesus were found in all seriousness. The ethics of Jesus are limited in these ways: he has no adequate sense of social justice, his teaching on divorce is rigoristic and based on the theory of sex subordination, his denial of the virtue of thrift has had disastrous social results, his teaching on non-resistance is so unfitted to occidental life that the Christian world has simply ignored it, and his concessions to popular belief, such as demoniacal possession, have been responsible for some of the darkest ages in the history of the world, and for cruelties which cannot even be mentioned. We can also recall the moral equivocations of which it is said Jesus was guilty when he destroyed property and used the methods of the exorcist. Then, too, there are many who cannot see the life or teachings of Jesus in any other than the apocalyptic sense. They agree with Robert Louis Stevenson, who in his *Lay Morals* tells us that Jesus "is too hard on men." The judgment passed on the character of another is so much a matter of training and experience that we can appreciate at once the shrewd observation of Julian the Apostate, in which he condemns the Master he had once served.

"Having done nothing in his lifetime worthy of fame unless anyone thinks it a very great work to heal lame and blind people and exorcise demons. . . ." All good men have come to believe that the greatest work of all!

II

All this makes one thing, at least, entirely clear. There is no "monotone" of appreciation of the character of Jesus. It will show also how from time to time in the history of the church the terms of that appreciation have shifted and new emphases have been created.

We shall get rid of some metaphysical intrusions whose one business seems to confound, if we will make clear to ourselves a very simple distinction. Jesus at no time claimed absoluteness in knowledge, power, or character. In the records as we have them, we find that in these realms of life he was distinct from God and inferior to God. He was less than God in knowledge. "Of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father" (Mark 12:32). He was less than God in power. "But I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straightened till it be accomplished!" (Luke 12:50). He was less than God in character. "Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is God" (Mark 10:18). When we attribute the qualities of absoluteness to Jesus at the time he went about doing good, we get lost in a maze of contradictions. It is well to remind ourselves, therefore, that we can do nothing in proper interpretation till we accept the fact that Jesus had really emptied himself.

Then, too, the method of representing Jesus in the character which we follow is not uniform in the New Testament. The different conceptions of the incarnation which we find in the New Testament are responsible for as many distinct interpretations of his character. Four suggested modes of incarnation are found in the New Testament; each has its corresponding conception of the character of Jesus. In the Synoptists the incarnation is treated as an *imposition* of divinity on Jesus, partially in earlier life, essentially at his baptism, and completely in his resurrection. Since incarnation is thus a gradual process, his character must be

dynamic: he grew in grace and in favor with God and man. In Paul's writings the incarnation is the serial story of *suspended divinity*. It is not the history of something taken on, but of something held back. Just what was in Jesus and of which he was impoverished and which was emptied from his higher nature, Paul does not tell us. But he can have only one theory of the character of Jesus in such a view. Since the entire transaction is on the plane of the miraculous and supernatural, the character of Jesus is a piece of flawless integrity. The human aspect of the making of the character of Jesus does not seem to have appealed to Paul in any way. John's interpretation of the character of Jesus is unique. He does not agree with Paul that the incarnation means suspended divinity; it is *the assumption of other modes*. In other words, Jesus did not yield any power or knowledge when he was in the flesh. His life was a perfect microcosm of the eternal glory. The character of Jesus in John is not only perfect, but transcendent. The teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews with regard to the incarnation is based on the theory of correspondences; the writer has little to say about the metaphysics of the problem, but much to reveal concerning its ethical import. To him the incarnation was essentially a problem in *mediumship*—how God could get himself known to men. As a medium Jesus had to be entirely human or he could not stand between man and God. The treatment of his character, therefore, is genetic. Jesus had real life, real fears, real temptations, and real suffering. The character of Jesus was not something which he inherited, but something which he achieved—he was “made perfect.”

The New Testament, therefore, considers Jesus as faultless, holy, righteous, or perfect. Is any one of these terms sufficient to describe character as we know it and demand it today? Is there any term beyond these that we can use, and which will take the truth in them and make it integral? In the history of the church there has been a natural order in the interpretation of the character of Jesus. What does that order disclose both of conclusiveness and satisfaction?

1. It was entirely natural that the first test of the character of Jesus should be the negative one which is always suggested in a

society thoroughly conventionalized and legalized. The *sinlessness* of Jesus rather than his positive character is the issue at stake. Was Jesus sinless, faultless, blameless? This was the first question and, as we have seen, was answered in very different ways. It was the question which Jesus put to his own contemporaries, according to the late writer of the Book of John, and which they found impossible to answer affirmatively. "Which of you convicteth me of sin?" It was the question uppermost in men's minds as the end drew near. Was he really guilty of the charges brought against him, or of the more deadly innuendoes which the authorities dropped concerning him? The first testimonies to the innocence of Jesus were spoken by those who knew him slightly or not at all. Pilate said he found "no fault" in him; his wife called Jesus "that righteous man"; the robber affirmed that Jesus had done "nothing amiss"; and the centurion had the profound impression that he was a "righteous man." It is possible to make too much of these testimonies. They were not spoken by those who had accompanied with him, and only one of the four ever made confession of him.

Yet we cannot doubt that in the first age the church did well to foster the idea of the sinlessness of Jesus, even as a purely negative conception. Jesus was further commended to that generation in terms of ritual and custom. In the first chapters of Acts he is called several times the Righteous or Holy One, and even in later writings this view-point of the character of Jesus is pressed (Acts 3:14; 8:25; 22:14; I Pet. 3:18; I John 2:1; 3:7; Heb. 4:5). It seems that a more positive conception of the character of Jesus would not have been accepted or understood in that age which had much to say about law and its infringement. He was "without sin"; he had "no guile"; he was "without blemish"; and as a high priest he was "holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners" (Heb. 4:2; I Pet. 2:21; 1:9; Heb. 7:27; I Cor. 5:21; I John 3:5). The New Testament references to the character of Jesus are, almost without exception, in proof of his sinlessness. But when we examine the passages they impress us by their infrequency and also by their casualness. They show that the character of Jesus did not mean to the early church quite what it does to us.

The extended studies in the character of Jesus have kept close to the negative New Testament conception. The very titles of Ullman's and Dorner's books, *The Sinlessness of Jesus* and *On the Sinless Perfection of Jesus*, show that they are almost entirely concerned with the proof that Jesus did not sin. The verdict of "not guilty" is excellent as far as it goes, but in our modern love of the positive and efficient it will not carry us into the appreciation we desire. We must agree with Schmiedel: "So far as Jesus is concerned, it is certain that all the writers of the New Testament assumed his sinlessness, even though they spoke of it with remarkable infrequency." The mind of the church could not long be contented with the purely negative portrayal of the sinlessness of Jesus.

2. When the Greek mind in the church began to deal with the question of the character of Jesus it did what anyone might have foreseen who was at all acquainted with the Greek genius. The Greek fathers interpreted the character of Jesus in terms of his *knowledge*. It was a theory which had held a consistent course since the days of Socrates that knowledge is virtue. The Platonic idealism had made complete knowledge final character, and Aristotle had made the *φρόνιμος* as distinct from the *σπουδαῖος*, the perfect man. When the theory was applied to Jesus a certain balance of syllogism was inevitable. Perfect knowledge means infallible character. If Jesus was perfect his knowledge must have been complete. The difficulties which the Greek fathers found in the Gospel records they got rid of in one of two ways: they either ignored the passages which showed the ignorance of Jesus, and fastened on such a book as John, which clearly taught that the knowledge of Jesus was not suspended by his incarnation, or they evolved some form of the Docetic doctrine that Jesus only appeared to be ignorant—he created an illusion for a holy purpose. This conception of Jesus was so common among the Greeks that Lucian called him "crucified sophist."

The connection of the knowledge of Jesus with his character is to this day an unsettled question in evangelical circles. The sharp finality of the Greek principle that knowledge is character is of course denied in view of the psychology and ethics of all experi-

ence. But the question is still open in view of the entanglement of the knowledge of Jesus with problems of his consciousness and authority. Besides, the question is asked in all seriousness if ideally perfect knowledge does not mean complete character—if Jesus is final character—there must be in the human consciousness of Jesus full knowledge of all things. It is recognized, however, that a statement like this is too rigorous; formal logic has a way of breaking down entirely in a problem of actual experience. The unethical results of the balanced theory of complete knowledge and final character are too obvious to be ignored: in that case the character of Jesus was a gift or inheritance and not a development, it was an inevitable result and not a discipline. This conception of the character of Jesus, therefore, has ceased to make appeal in times of experience, while it is often revived for theological necessity. A word like this from Garvie is like a tonic: "Neither omniscience nor omnipotence can be tempted. The one is protected by the insight into the moral character of all actions, and the moral results of all decisions, and the other by its absolute command over all moral resources."

Recent discussions in the consciousness of Jesus have made us understand some things in the twilight zone. The complete knowledge that Jesus claimed was a revelation of God. "All things are delivered unto me of my Father, and no man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him" (Matt. 11:27). Here is the claim to final knowledge, but it is the knowledge of personality, insight, and process: it is not the knowledge of phenomenal fact or history. The ignorance of Jesus is no sign of defect in character, nor does it reduce our sense of reverence. Knowledge in itself does not always excite reverence; it may only create a reaction or excite pity. The signs of the ignorance of Jesus Gore believes are the following: he was surprised at his parents' anxiety (Luke 2:49); he marveled at the unbelief of the people; he was perplexed by the desire for a sign (Mark 8:12); he asked questions which showed that he desired information, "Who touched me?" "Where have ye laid him?" (John 11:34). The very word that John uses to describe the knowledge of Jesus—

γινώσκειν—shows that it came from experience (John 2:24). The insistence on the perfect knowledge of Jesus as a mark of his complete character comes largely from those who would use his name and words to decide questions of history and scholarship. We simply cannot read the character or even the authority of Jesus in terms of his knowledge. We must believe that his character, like ours, was made in many gaps of ignorance as well as on the tablelands of revelation. We can quite understand Luther's peace of mind when he says: "When I thus picture Christ to myself, then I paint him rightly and accurately. I seize and have the right Christ as he paints himself, and then let all thoughts and speculations of the divine majesty go. I hang and cleave to the humanity of Christ." The reaction from the theory of the complete knowledge of Jesus has gone very far when a writer like Forsyth tells us that Jesus was uncertain of his own death: "this truth was not always perfectly clear in Christ's earthly thought; he was mistaken about it, even in Gethsemane the thought which he missed about it was discovered by the Apostles." Schleiermacher's word has a definite meaning: "The measure of knowledge is plainly to Jesus not the measure of piety."

3. The sacramental view of life was bound to create another equation with the character of Jesus. The suffering Savior was made perfect by the things which he suffered. What makes character, according to this standard, is not sinlessness or knowledge, but suffering. Because there was no sorrow like the sorrow of Jesus there could never be a character like his. Because he carried the sins of the world, because his wounds were for the healing of the nations, there was only one way out, and that was the perfecting of his character. In other words, complete character means complete sacrifice. Because Jesus was the man of sorrows and acquainted with griefs, he was the perfect son of God. Because he cried from the depth of human woe, he is now "the holiest in the height." Suffering is the exact measure of character.

There is something so fine and noble in this teaching, especially when flung by actual experience in the face of a gainsaying world, that in many quarters it is accepted as a commonplace. There is much of psychological truth in it; all things worth having, so a

great psychologist tells us, are won at the point of pain. The sacramental ideal of life has made the upward trend in evolution and at the same time created the Christian order. It has made Christianity the cult of the Suffering God. But it does not contain the whole truth. Suffering does not always create character; it is generally an acid in which something of value is dissolved and lost forever. It has made the martyr idea the test of life and fidelity; the test that Jesus proposed to himself was that he had *finished* the work which God had given him to do. It has often magnified passivity where positive virtues were needed; it has even called some of the healthy reactions of revolt and change sins against the Spirit. The sacramental view of the character of Jesus dominated all art for more than a thousand years: it became the natural inheritance of the mystical spirit. Without modification it still holds its own in some communions. It was against this Jesus that Swinburne revolted and objurgated "the pale Galilean" whose breath had made the world gray. Suffering is not a complete equation for the suffering of Jesus, although it is an element which must always be used.

4. The evangelical spirit was too healthy to hold forever to the hectic Christ. When speculation ceased to be dependent on an exact equivalent for the character of Jesus that it might have a basis for a theory of the atonement—with the attendant problem of merit and transference—the character of Jesus was studied as an ethical whole and as an example. It became an embodiment of *virtues*, which men might see written large, and which they might copy. For a time a number of books appeared in which the virtues of Jesus were made so many examples for life. They were often sentimentally considered and as casually discovered. The lists of these virtues have never been the same, nor has a harmony of them ever been attempted. The basis of analysis has always depended on the immediate practical need, and the result has been either a string of adjectives or a book of balanced rhetoric. Sometimes the virtues have started from the mental characteristics; but as often they have been expressions of sentimental division in the personality of Jesus. We get the feeling, however, that there is no finality in the recital of a string of virtues; it has always been

notorious that what is the illegality of one generation may be the virtue of the next. The set of approved virtues of one period may make no appeal at all to the men of the next age. The changes are too swift to make the character of Jesus a scheme of graces, one of final and universal appeal. Our missionaries have discovered that the virtues of the Orient are very often the scorn of the Occident. Interpretation of Jesus by way of the virtues generally means that only those virtues which appeal to a generation are brought out, while the others, which may in every way be more important, are either ignored or denied. The particular virtues that an age finds in Jesus tell us what its ideals are, but only in a most unsatisfactory way are they a real interpretation of that character itself.

Some of these interpretations have had great practical value. They have humanized the Master, they have fitted him into definite social situations, and they have revealed him as one who knew what was in men and who lived like men. But they have failed to satisfy. They have been too atomistic, they have been too impressionistic; and they have fitted too easily into some social or ethical scheme. This has often been felt, and attempts have been made to find either "the balance" or the "universality" of his character. Yet as a discipline in instruction this method will always have value. But it will never be final as it has no co-ordinating principle.

5. The search for the co-ordinating principle in the study and interpretation of the character of Jesus has resulted in a very fruitful line of research. It has been given different names: it has been either a study of the sentiments of Jesus, a quest for his temperament, or a psychological review of his life. But practically they have all had the same result: the character of Jesus was what grew out of his peculiar endowments, whether we think of them in terms of temperament or heredity. It has been a deliberate attempt to recover the humanness of Jesus. In so far as it has done that, it has succeeded.

It has made several emphases which were needed. For one thing, it has made the character of Jesus positive. It has proved that such a statement as this by Paulsen is entirely wrong. He says that the Greeks believed in affirmation; but that Jesus commended and exemplified abnegation. He is sure that the Greeks

had a love of nature; but he is just as certain that Jesus scorned it. He says that the Greeks believed in intellectual development; but that Jesus taught the need of intellectual distrust. Jesus, again, believed in non-resistance; the Greeks taught the personal and social values of courage. The temperamental interpretation of Jesus shows all this to be entirely inadequate. Neither the teaching nor the character of Jesus was negative. In Pindar's Orphic Hymn Jupiter is represented as uniting both sexes in his own person. Jesus did unite in his character what seemed to be the most antagonistic elements—but it is only when any one of them is severed that it seems to be negative.

Furthermore, the temperamental study of the character of Jesus has recovered the joy of Jesus. The early church knew it and loved it, but it was lost during the long night when his suffering was the sole test of his character. The tendency has been to unite it with a certain sentimental tenderness. Strauss began this kind of appreciation. "Jesus appears as a naturally lovely character, which needed but to unfold and to become conscious of itself." A word like this from Renan is what we might expect: "His lovely character, and doubtless one of those transporting countenances which sometimes appear in the Hebrew race, created around him a circle of fascination." Even the highly critical Keim has this to say of him: "Is not the principal description of him as being gentle and joyous justified by the record?" In the last edition of his life of Jesus, Strauss says: "This joyous continuous conduct of a lovely soul—may it be described as the Hellenic quality in Jesus."

The popularizers have made much of the joy of Jesus. Dawson says concerning it in his very readable life of Christ: "He became the incarnation of the spirit of joy, the symbol of the bliss of life—Christ's gracious gayety of heart proved contagious. "In his *Dreamers of the Ghetto*, Zangwill puts into the mouth of a Jew this astounding proposition: "I give the Jews a Christ they can now accept, the Christians a Christ they have forgotten. Christ, not the tortured God, but the joyous comrade, the friend of all simple souls, the lover of warm life and warm sunlight, and all that is simple and free and beautiful." The same recovery is reflected in Bouck White's *Call of the Carpenter*: "There is joy breathing

forth in the Carpenter which is unmistakeable. His words are full of wedding bells—an unabashed joyousness." Many such quotations might be given, but these will show how completely the aspect of the joy of Jesus has entered into the conception of his character.

The recovery of the joy of Jesus and the recognition of his human quality in temperament have been suggestive and thoroughly stimulating. But they do not hold the final factors in the character of Jesus, and in themselves they may easily be exaggerated in importance. As a matter of fact, the study of character from the standpoint of temperament is always unsatisfactory. We never know whether the photograph of the passing mood is a real indicator or not. Emotional states are always unstable, and where the material from which we can draw is so slight as we find it in the Gospels, there is always a great uncertainty and exact statements have no value. We do not know what the temperament of Jesus really was. From the same material three psychologists have come to as many different conclusions. One is absolutely sure that he was of the gentle, sanguine type; the second is quite as certain that he was of choleric, even irascible character; the third tells us that Jesus is the most complete melancholiac of history! If his temperament is uncertain, if his moods can be variously interpreted, and his emotions can be exaggerated, it must be acknowledged that it is not in these that we have the final terms of the character of Jesus. Yet in coming to this conviction we grant with appreciation the contribution which this aspect of the humanity of Jesus has furnished in the interpretation of his character.

6. The character of Jesus is now in process of reinterpretation and appreciation in the correlations of will. It is the final factor which will give us a complete co-ordination of his character, and at the same time make a unity which no other suggested factor such as sinlessness, knowledge, sacrifice, virtues, or temperament can furnish. It takes every valid interpretation which these points of view can furnish, and it drops from them everything that is merely casual or non-essential.

The interpretation of the character of Jesus in the terms of his will is the only one to which we can now advance. The new psy-

chology is a psychology of will. Will has been taken out of the purely metaphysical realm and made a problem of practice. Some elements in the old discussion of free will versus determinism are now seen to be later scholasticism. Neither life nor mind furnish the sharp alternatives which the Fathers supposed. More and more as the study of the consciousness of Jesus has progressed it is seen to be primarily a question of states of will. The new social demands, with their emphasis on efficiency and the adoption of the philosophy of "the power to will," have made will the final test of all character. The test the modern man puts to himself and to his generation he automatically transfers to his interpretation of Jesus.

When we turn to the Gospels, as we have already seen, it is not the separate virtues of his life which first impressed the people, but his exhibitions of will. What they felt first, and what they never ceased to be fascinated by, was his display of power, was his instinctive authority, was his complete mastery over every situation. The qualities which he showed are those of will—his courage never failed him, he had always the calmness of mastery; his loyalty, according to Royce, was the completeness of his character, and loyalty is will turning itself into holy habit; his self-possession gathered what would otherwise have been scattered thoughts and feelings into complete use. Only a will fully co-ordinated can be intellectually free, and at the same time can be morally dissident. It was these qualities of his will which made the authorities turn from him in the first place. It was the ability either to impart himself to others or to be absolutely alone that declared him the Son of God with power. These are the qualities which show resources of will—and they never failed him.

Furthermore, the tests for life which Jesus proposed for himself and for others are the tests of will. "He that willeth to do his will shall know." The word for love which he used was *ἀγάπη*—which is good will. It is the love based on appreciation, a sense of values, and a loyalty of mind. It was that which made Jesus bow before the disciples to wash their feet, and at the same time made the interpreter think that as Jesus had begun to love them he would love them to the uttermost. The knowledge and the love, therefore,

which Jesus commended are the qualities of will. He believed that his will was complete because it was an exact expression of the will of God. Because he had discovered the will of God he had been intrusted with the Father's love, power, life, mission, and honor: these are so many rays from the central orb of the divine volition.

When we analyze the will of Jesus a little more closely we find it strictly true that in his case "character is perfectly educated will"—to use Novalis' famous definition. From his own language we gather that he tested his will in these distinct ways.

a) He had a complete mystical relation with God. To be in touch with God is the result of discipline; in it hunger and instinct may give us the first impulse, but only a will in mastery makes it a habit. The latest interpreters of the mystics tell us that mysticism is only another name for transformed will in its relations with the divine.

b) Jesus tested his will in the sense of the divine purpose. To think the thoughts of God after him was in Herder's view the final test of a disciplined mind. If that be true in the phenomenal world of nature, we can see at once why Jesus had the right to boast when he read God's purpose in the providential order. "I do always those things which please him."

c) Jesus tested his will by the mobility of his plan while he kept his purpose unaltered. Rigidity is will ceasing to work on the side of imagination. We cannot tell how far the plan of Jesus was changed. Recent interpreters are inclined to think that it was changed frequently. But some things are entirely clear. The several escapes which he made, the rapid movements which he frequently ordered, and the growing or changing emphases of his teaching show how responsive he was to the immediate need. Jesus knew how to deal with the very difficult situation of the changing order.

d) Jesus tested his will by the dedication of his life. He was about his Father's business. Whether as servant or son his one task in life was to carry out his Father's will. Dedication is an act of will—it is a process of elimination, subordination, and responsiveness.

e) Jesus tested his will by the discipline of his life. There was much from which he shrank and from which the human in him revolted; but it was all to him the Father's will, and therefore his plan. The discipline of life is the expression of will.

f) Jesus tested his will by the expression of his personality. He was not afraid to let the man within him speak. In the jargon of the present day, he realized himself. But he knew how to co-ordinate that self-realization with his devotion to the will of God.

g) Jesus tested his will by his sufferings and death. He was "straitened" till it was all accomplished. It was a cup of blood and a baptism of death: but he "learned obedience"—his will grew stronger and stronger—by the things which he suffered. When he said "not my will, but thine be done," it revealed the fact that he had been made perfect through sufferings.

These are the tests, then, which Jesus made for his own character: they are all tests of will. They show the grace of God working in his life. It is the reactions from these evidences of will which show us how complete the character of Jesus really was.

a) *Reactions on men.*—His will helped him to understand men: in John's phrase, he "came to know what was in men." Royce tells us that perfect insight is perfect will. It is illustrated in the case of Jesus. It was his will that enabled him to love men. We have already seen that his love was good will, and that it could never be changed—it was love to the uttermost. When it became discriminating in appreciation, sympathy, indignation, and moral recoil it was proved to be perfect love working in the ethical sphere. It was his will which made him assert his authority over men. We see it in the form called forth by the exigencies of the moment. It appears as egoism; it is a call to men; it is an exhibition of power; it is a challenge; it is a positive service. Only a perfect will, working through good will, can finally enlist and hold the wills of men.

b) *Reactions on his situation.*—The reactions of will on the situation of life have always had the quality of a great test. Jesus had a will fit for any situation because he was free in his choices of means. He never allowed himself to be locked up to a method. Adaptation is complete will. The very versatility of the methods

of Jesus shows us what he had gained in discipline. He was equally at home in the stereotyped methods of synagogue and temple, and in the teaching and life of a peripatetic ministry. The reaction on the narrowing sphere must have been a difficult test even for Jesus. When he saw the opposition to himself increasing, when he found his following dropping away from him, it meant spiritual discipline of a complete kind not to strike a ready compromise. The reaction on his situation is shown in its finest form in his choice of the end. When that end was inevitable, and the cross was seen to be the means of the sorrowful way, he "set his face" to go to Jerusalem. It was character in the presence of the cross.

c) *Reactions on himself.*—These by-products of will have always been gracious indicators of the character of Jesus. It is the quality of will to make self-discovery. He knew what was in himself as well as in God and man. He had disappointment and keen sorrow; from him the cry of pain in the disillusion of life more than once escaped. But that was not the whole story. He knew how to show a leaping gladness, not only when he saw Satan as lightning fall from heaven, but also when for the joy before him he endured the cross and despised the shame. On him finally descended that peace which passes all understanding. It was piety on its side of trust and religion. It was the expression of what has been called the personal religion of Jesus. It was that state of mind, the test of co-ordinated intellect, feeling, and will, which Wordsworth calls "wise passiveness."

In these factors of life and in their reaction we can find those virtues which might be called the phenomena of the experience. After all, what we are interested in is not so much the phenomena, but the noumena—the constant inner facts. The virtues as such are not to be imitated, but the spiritual situations are to be created which will make them inevitable by-products.

The notes in the will of Jesus as we have read it in terms of his character are learning, development, and perfection. They are the story of that character itself. He learned—even to the end; he grew; he was "made perfect." He learned—he had to find out God, men, and himself; he grew—as a soul grows naturally,

as it grows painfully, cutting itself through the woodlands of difficulty; he was "made perfect." The perfect will was revealed in the perfect sacrifice on the cross. He who passed into the Father's keeping had achieved perfect character. That perfect character is the redemption of the world.

III

The relation of the character of Jesus to the character of men becomes final and inevitable when we read his character in expressions of will. The character is not a sacrosanct miraculous perfection, utterly unrelated to the ordinary methods of acquisition. Such a character can neither atone nor help. It is neither ethical nor spiritual.

When we recognize the fact that the character of Jesus is both ethical and human, and that its terms are found in those of life itself, three uses of that character have successively arisen. One is to realize it by imitation. But Protestantism has practically abandoned the idea of imitating the character of Jesus. The reason is very near. Jesus was the product of an age as well as universal man. When we socialize the character of Jesus we discover that many of the things that he did grew out of the customs, the spiritual climate, and the life of his age. To imitate the Galilean Jesus would mean that we would lose the universal Christ. Another method of using that holy life is bound up in the word *imago*—not *imitatio*. This idea of following Jesus is to discover what he would do in situations—and then repeat his method. This way of dealing with the example of Jesus is not satisfactory for two reasons: he did not and could not show the ideal in all situations, because a host new to every generation were not presented to him at all; besides, no situation ever exactly reproduces itself. Not the *imitatio Christi*, not the *imago Christi*, but the *vita Christi* is the only way in which we shall appropriate and use his character. The common life is a union of wills, and when our wills are made one with his will we have his character for motive, for present virtue, for new situation, and for the unknown future.

THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION AND THE CONCEPTION OF GOD

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The one far-reaching contribution of the nineteenth century is the inductively formulated concept of evolution. The researches made by Darwin and other biologists were so convincing that not only the fact of evolution but also its methodological and theoretical implications have become fundamental in all organic and social sciences. Theology for a time stubbornly resisted the theory of evolution in its field. But so empirically convincing is the theory and so universally is it applied in other fields of investigation that theology cannot remain immune from its influence. The theological application of the doctrine, however, has been limited to the history of theology. It has not yet been made to its basal object, God. The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the significance of the doctrine of evolution for certain elementary problems connected with the conception of God.

The method employed in this study is as follows: First, we shall indicate the problems due to the attempt to relate the traditional conception of God to the doctrine of evolution. Secondly, we shall make a brief criticism of the solutions of the problems as given in Royce's absolute idealism and Eucken's philosophy of life. This will be followed by a statement of the results and the theological implications of our study.

I. PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE RELATION OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF GOD

One of the essential evolutionary ideas is that of change. The static view of the world was characteristic of the prevailing philosophies and theologies prior to the dawn of modern science; and the satisfactions of life were found in absolutes, finalities, immutabilities, eternities, fixities. With the growth of biological science

the view of reality as changing has been gaining ground and has come to dominate the very thought and life of the modern world. Bergson, indeed, universalizes the idea of change, making it the very essence of life.¹

Another element of the evolutionary theory is the notion of growth in the being of reality. Previous to the full sway of organic science, evolution meant an unfoldment of something already given. Reality was held to be ready-made; hence it was not subject to the process of growth. Over against this closed view of the world, the modern theories of evolution stand for an actual growth in the being of things; for organic beings are not merely evolving what were their latent potentialities, but they are growing in the content of their being. It is particularly one of the radical contentions of Bergson that there is a *real* growth in things. Reality, for him, is not ready-made; but it is constantly creating, becoming, growing, adding to itself new worlds.²

The theories of evolution, moreover, hold to the view of the continuity and solidarity of organic beings. Lamarck constructed a phylogenetic tree showing the oneness of organic forms. The enormous amount of inductive data accumulated by Darwin in his works, *The Origin of Species* and *The Descent of Man*, is intended to establish the organic relation of all living beings, man included. This belief is shared by all biological scientists. Bergson apparently differs from them in his view of the evolution of life as taking place in divergent lines; yet he is fundamentally one with them in his recognition of the unity of all living forms by virtue of the original impetus of life.³

What now are the factors of this process of change, growth, and continuity? Here, as to the philosophy of evolution, opinion differs. According to Lamarck and Darwin, the actual forces of evolution are natural, although the agency of God is admitted in their deistic view of him as the first cause.⁴ In opposition to their view, Bergson maintains the *élan vital* as the fundamental cause

¹ See *Creative Evolution*, pp. 1 ff.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 251 ff.

³ *Op. cit.*, chap. ii; cf. pp. 251 ff.

⁴ Lamarck, *op. cit.*, I, 113; Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, pp. 424 f.

of the evolutionary process.¹ But however various their views as to the ontological nature of the factors of evolution, they all agree in the idea that these factors are immanent in the organisms and in their environment.

This leads, finally, to the question of teleology in the process of evolution. This is another mooted problem. Lamarck believed that forms of life were tending from less perfect to more perfect forms.² Darwin considered that the organic evolution has reached its summit in man; but he refused to commit himself to any definite view as to the ultimate destiny of human life.³ Bergson repudiates radical mechanism and radical finalism alike, but does not deny all purpose in the evolutionary process.⁴ That there is some purpose in the process is not denied by these evolutionists. The purpose they would admit, in view of their conception of the organic world as involved in the process of change and growth, marked by accidents, setbacks, and the like, is bound to be a changing, growing, and therefore finite purpose.

We may, then, summarize the meaning of the evolutionary theory in the statement that, according to it, all forms of life are characterized by the process of change, growth, and organic continuity, which is effected by the forces immanent in the organisms and in their environment in accordance with a limited, growing purpose.

Turning now to the traditional conception of God, we note that it embodies the two essential ideas, namely, God as the transcendent supernatural personality and as the absolute being. The conception of God as the transcendent supernatural personality underlies all systems of orthodoxy.⁵ The world-view underlying this conception of God is a philosophy which divides reality into two realms: a natural and a supernatural. The connection

¹ For views on this matter, see Jordan and Kellogg, *Evolution and Animal Life*, pp. 9 f., 468 f.; Kellogg, *Darwinism Today*, p. 378; Henderson, *The Fitness of the Environment*, pp. 305 ff.; Wallace, *Darwinism*, chap. v; Simpson, *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, pp. 254 ff.; Schmucker, *The Meaning of Evolution*, chap. xix

² See Packard, *Lamarck the Founder of Evolution*, pp. 323, 345 f.

³ *The Descent of Man*, pp. 702 ff.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 265 ff.

⁵ See, e.g., Greene, "The Supernatural," *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, pp. 142 ff.

between the two is effected by means of supernatural acts of God. Accordingly, the emphasis in this view of God is placed upon his specifically supernatural deeds in his relation to the world of nature and of man.¹ Now, it is this insistence on the supernaturalness of God in his relation to the world that leads orthodox theologians to oppose the modern doctrine of evolution. To hold that the world and man have come to be what they are by the process of a slow and gradual evolution means atheism.² It should here be noted that their antagonism to the evolutionary theory is due mainly to the desire to maintain intact the finality of their system deducible from the infallible scripture given by the transcendent, supernatural God, and to furnish a positive basis of assurance to men that he is powerful to perform even miraculous deeds, if necessary, for their ultimate victory.

The other essential element in the traditional conception of God is the idea of him as the absolute being. This is the philosophic view of God which orthodoxy endeavors to combine with the conception of the supernatural and individualistic God of popular Christianity. Philosophically conceived, God is the ultimate reality, the source and ground of all existence. God so viewed possesses such attributes as spirituality, infinity, perfection, personality, immutability, and the like.³ God as such is beyond all the limitations of time and history. He is absolutely immutable in his essence, attributes, and purpose.⁴ With this insistence of traditional theology on the absoluteness of God goes also its effort to retain the finality of its system. The absoluteness of the divine revelation, the uniqueness of Christ, the completeness of Christianity, all stand or fall with the doctrine of the absoluteness of God. Hence he must by all means be conceived of as the absolute being free from time and historical change.⁵

¹ See, e.g., Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, I, 535 ff., 550 ff., 151 ff.; II, 378 ff.; Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, I, 393 ff., 61 ff.; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, I, 353 ff.; II, 371 ff., 669 ff., etc.

² See, e.g., Hodge, *op. cit.*, II, 11 ff.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, 499 ff.

³ See Strong, *op. cit.*, I, 248.

⁴ See Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 390 f.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, 351 f.

⁵ The absoluteness of God, from the standpoint of orthodoxy, does not, however, signify that he embraces the whole of reality (see Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 382 f.).

In brief, these two elements—God as the supernatural personality and as the absolute being—constitute the basic ideas in the traditional conception of God. They represent the practical ethico-religious and philosophical interests of man in his attempt to interpret the world and human life. But it is this very view of God as the supernatural personality and the absolute being and the presuppositions which it implies that are opposed to the theological implications of the evolutionary theory. Hence there arise many problems in the attempt to bring the traditional conception of God into relation with the doctrine of evolution. Some of these problems we may now state.

The problem of method comes to our first notice. The method followed by science in the formulation of the evolutionary theory is antithetical to that employed by traditional theology in the construction of its conception of God. The former employs the inductive, empirical method; the latter, the *a priori* appeal to revelation. The one outstanding feature of evolutionary theories is that they are formulated as result of more or less careful empirical investigations of the processes in the organic world.¹ It is quite otherwise with traditional theology. It maintains that God has made his final revelation of himself in the Scripture. Its conception of God, therefore, is obtained by a systematic analysis of the content of this infallible revelation.² Which method should, then, be used in the formulation of the conception of God? This is a critical problem, for on its solution depends largely the character of any conception of God.

The problem of method is closely connected with the other problem: that of the relation between theology and science. This involves a metaphysical problem, viz., Can the affirmations of science be held final on the ontological realities with which theology deals or must theology maintain that there is more to reality than is revealed by science? Traditional theology, having an infallible source for its affirmations, does not make any real use of

¹ One may question this statement with respect to Bergson. It should be replied, however, that he, too, set forth his theory of evolution after years of study in the field of organic evolution.

² See, e.g., Hodge, *op. cit.*, I 182 f., 364.

the results of scientific investigation. This dogmatism of traditional orthodoxy has been polemically transferred to what Perry calls naïve, uncritical naturalism¹ which assumes that it has the last word on the matter of reality. Manifestly here we have a conflict between the two dogmatisms. What then shall be done with the conflict?²

Another problem is that of God as the supernatural personality. Traditional theology, as we have seen, holds the view of God as the sovereign person who has determined the course of the world and who expresses his relation to it in specific supernatural acts. The evolutionary theories know only this world where the forces that carry on the evolutionary process are immanent in the organisms and in their environment. These theories know no such supernatural interventions from an unknown realm of reality as is assumed by traditional theology. Thus is raised the problem of the transcendence and immanence of God. Is God organically related with the life-process or is he to be identified primarily in miraculous interventions? This question is closely bound up with the next problem, namely, that of God as the absolute being.

The traditional conception of God tenaciously maintains his freedom from the exigencies of time and history; evolution is wholly foreign to the character of God. But in the evolutionary theory change and growth are held as characteristic of all the forms of life. Accordingly, absolutes, finalities, eternities, perfections are not found anywhere in the realms open to scientific investigation. But is God free from change and growth? All admit that our ideas of God have changed from the days of primitive man. But do change and growth hold true only of our conceptions of God and not of the object of these conceptions? Is God absolute or is he in any sense finite? This is the most critical problem that calls for a careful consideration.

And there is yet another problem to be mentioned, namely, that of God's relation to the world and man. The traditional conception of God assumes the distinct creation and absolute control of the world by the divine will. The theories of evolution, however,

¹ *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, chap. iv.

² See, on this point, Perry, *op. cit.*, chap. v, "Religion and the Limits of Science."

reduce existing things to so small beginnings that the creation of them seems scarcely worthy of the supreme being. The evils involved in the process of natural and human evolution also cast a serious doubt upon the assumed absolute control of the world by God. What, then, is the real nature of God's relation to the world and man?

The foregoing may be said to constitute the essential problems involved in the effort to effect a tenable relation between the evolutionary theory and the traditional conception of God. We shall now turn to certain typical recent attempts at their solution.

II. A CRITICISM OF CERTAIN TYPICAL RECENT SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEMS

Here we shall take certain aspects of the discussions in Royce's absolute idealism and Eucken's philosophy of life in order to illustrate the problem we have in mind. For these philosophers of religion, more than any of the professional theologians of our time, recognize the inadequacy of the traditional conception of God and are fully conscious of the problems raised by modern scientific concepts, including the evolutionary theory.

In general it can be said that Royce works out his conception of God from the standpoint of his absolute idealism. He analyzes human temporary and fragmentary experiences and absolutizes them into an all-inclusive, absolute experience.¹ Or he analyzes human ideas or thoughts and reaches his theory of being and considers this theory as the basis of his system.² Thus he makes the Absolute Experience or Being the ultimate basis of our finite experience and thought. It is from the standpoint of such an Experience or Thought that Royce finds the criterion of his evaluation of the world and man. Accordingly, the method of Royce is opposed to that of the empirical theories of evolution. The intellectualism and apriorism of his method are in full accord with his general system of thought.³

But it should not be overlooked in this connection that there are numerous statements in Royce's works, which are not in agree-

¹ *The World and the Individual*, II, lecture iii.

² *Op. cit.*, I, 339 f.

³ See *The Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 84 ff., 109 ff.

ment with his dialectic method. In the work, for example, which is distinctly devoted to the problem of religious knowledge, Royce speaks much of individual and social experiences as sources of religious insight and appeals to the actual experiences of those who practice religion as guides for us to the truth.¹ These and other assertions of Royce² show that one real interest of the author is to ascertain the data of our common individual and social experiences and to construct his theory of the world and human life on precisely such experiences. Hence just so far as he deals with our experience in its varied aspects, Royce is not in line with his absolutist method; one must pass by a metaphysical leap from the method of experience to an all-inclusive experience or thought.³ But on the other hand, just to the extent that Royce makes use of the data of our experience he is in agreement with the inductive method of the evolutionary theory; and to that degree he has worked out the bearing of the theory in the formulation of his conception of God.

To speak next of his attitude toward science, it is not difficult, in view of the fact that philosophically Royce does not employ the empirical method, to ascertain what it would be. He is not satisfied with the interpretation of the world given by science and offers his idealistic theory as the final view of the universe.⁴ There is much truth in his statement: "The modern naturalistic and mechanistic views of reality are not, indeed, false within their own proper range, but they are inadequate to tell us the whole truth."⁵ But to maintain that the theory of being, as Royce holds, must determine all the interpretation of nature and of man⁶ is against the empirical temper of our age. But on the other hand, the very fact that Royce affirms even the temporal reality of our experience

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 26 ff., 37 ff., 166 ff.; Cf. *The Problem of Christianity*, I, 12 ff.; *The World and the Individual*, I, pp. 55, 401; II, 362.

² See, *The Problem of Christianity*, I, 387 f.; II, 5.

³ *The World and the Individual*, II, 11 ff.; cf. *The Sources of Religious Experience*, pp. 109 f., 137, 144 f.

⁴ *The World and the Individual*, II, 207 ff.; *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 60 ff.

⁵ *William James and Other Essays*, p. 72.

⁶ *The World and the Individual*, II, 8 f.

of the world and assigns this temporal order to the work of science shows that he is interested in viewing the facts of life from an empirical point of view; and so to this extent he must modify his absolutist philosophical theory. But to the degree that Royce takes such an empirical attitude he illustrates the bearing of the evolutionary theory on the problem of God.

To come now to the nature of God, we find that Royce conceives of him as the Absolute Being, Thought or Experience, and Will or Purpose.¹ It is evident that such a conception of God is fundamentally different from that logically growing out of the evolutionary view. This demands that if there be a God, he must not only be immanent in the world but must himself be actually involved in the process of change and growth. The God of Royce is, it is true, immanent in the world of thought—engaged in the work of interpreting the world. He is not such a static absolute as that of Spinoza. But he is eternally what he is—there is no change and increase in his being.

Yet it is worthy of note in this connection that this conception of the eternal absoluteness of God needs modification in the light of many of Royce's statements which indicate finite aspects of this God. To cite a few, we note the following:

The only way to give our view of Being rationality is to see that we long for the Absolute only in so far as in us the Absolute also longs, and seeks, through our very temporal striving, the peace that is nowhere in Time, but only, and yet absolutely, in eternity. Were there no longing in Time, there would be no peace in eternity. . . . The right eternally triumphs, yet not without temporal warfare. This warfare occurs, indeed, *within the divine life itself*. . . . I sorrow. But the sorrow is not only mine. This same sorrow, just as it is for me, is God's sorrow.²

These and similar expressions of Royce indicate clearly a God striving to attain the goal of his perfection. But in the last analysis Royce would maintain that this impression of God's finitude is due to our finite temporal point of view. From the point of view of the Absolute, his will is completely expressed, his tasks perfectly done,

¹ See *The World and the Individual*, I, 339, 341, 394 ff.; II, 335, Lectures iii, vi; cf. *The Conception of God*, pp. 1 ff.; *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 296, 324, 373 ff.

² *The World and the Individual*, II, 386, 398, 409; cf. *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 183, 296.

his moral life absolutely finished.¹ If God is thus eternally complete in himself, why does he suffer, struggle, and long to be perfect at all? Is his suffering and struggle only apparent and his eternal perfection an actual fact? In other words, Royce, to be consistent, has to affirm either the suffering of God as real and so his God as finite or his sufferings as an illusion and hence his God as eternally complete. Royce does not wish to do either. He feels too keenly the realities of our life to pronounce his God all-complete and perfect, untouched by our finite experiences. Yet impelled by his absolute idealism, Royce maintains that the all-inclusive perfect being is at the heart of the universe.² But just in so far as he interprets God in terms of our evolutionary experience, Royce departs from his absolutist philosophical position and approaches the conception of God necessitated by the evolutionary theory.

These two aspects—those that are in agreement with his absolute idealism and those that are in accord with the evolutionary theory—we may note finally in connection with his conception of God's relation to the world and to man.

It is maintained by Royce that God is morally perfect.³ This moral perfection of God is not a result of struggle on his part.⁴ Royce, moreover, declares that God is not merely immanent in the world but is identical with the totality of the universe in all its expressions.⁵ This being the case, the world of nature and of man must be absolutely good.⁶ But the theories of evolution indicate to us that there are connected with the evolutionary process of the world merciless struggles, miseries, wastes, anomalies, sufferings. These forms of evil we cannot deny, nor can they be explained away. Yet Royce holds that the world is good when it is viewed in its entirety.⁷ An empirical evolutionist would, however, scarcely

¹ See *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 442 ff.; *The Conception of God*, pp. 8 ff.; *The World and the Individual*, II, 302.

² *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 436 ff.

³ *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 441 ff.; *The Conception of God*, p. 8.

⁴ *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 448.

⁵ *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 168 f., 285 f.

⁶ *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 444.

⁷ *The World and the Individual*, II, 379.

consider the processes of nature so idealistically as does Royce.¹ The actual process of nature suggests either that the God immanent in it is impotent to carry out his plans without evil consequences, or that there are evil forces which are counteracting his activities. But Royce admits neither hypothesis. He must contend for the view that the world considered *sub specie aeternitatis* is perfect. Yet he does not deny all reality to the evils in the world; he admits their temporal reality and seeks to give significance to their existence.² Here again we see a deviation from absolute idealism and a tendency on his part toward the standpoint of the evolutionary theory.

To speak now of Royce's view of God's relation to man, we need to observe that since God is the all-inclusive Individual of the world, embracing all finite beings and since the latter have no existence apart from the former, a logical consequence would be that finite beings possess no real freedom and individuality. Yet he distinctly attempts to show that finite spirits possess their own individuality and freedom.³ In view of the fact that each finite being expresses in his unique manner the will of the Absolute, he holds that he possesses freedom and individuality. Hence there are provided all the possibilities for a genuine moral life.⁴ And in the temporal order of the world there are real moral deeds done and real achievements toward a better world.

But this insistence of Royce upon moral activity leads us to ask: Why should we struggle against the apparent forces of evil to create a better world, when the world in its essence is all complete and finished? Why must we struggle through the evils of life to obtain perfection, as is held by Royce,⁵ when there are no *real* evils in the world, and we stand before our God all complete.⁶ Unless there are possibilities for change and growth in the world, we cannot see how there could be real moral life for us finite beings.

¹ *The World and the Individual*, pp. 219 ff.

² *Ibid.*, I, 380 ff., II, 388 ff.; *The Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 215 ff.

³ *The World and the Individual*, II, lecture vii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 343 ff.

⁵ *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 171 ff., 287 ff.

⁶ *The World and the Individual*, II, 150.

If the world is finished in reality, even now, as Royce holds, so that we cannot change its course, the only course open to us is to deny the reality of movement and progress in the world of our experience and engage in mystic contemplation of an "eternal" world. Moreover, as God is not ultimately found in the world where actual evolution is taking place, we can find him only in escaping from such a world. What other course than this can we follow when we are told that the real world is perfect, but that this perfection is not to be found in time, and that our comfort lies in the knowledge of the Eternal?¹ But Royce would not tolerate such a life. His interests lie in the actual experiences of the social realm.² A consistent absolute idealism would give up all real interest in our evolutionary experience and urge a life of speculation as to the eternal perfection of the world. Royce declines, however, to accept this path. The moral and religious appeals of our world are so great that he must accept and deal earnestly with them. In following this course he deviates from the standpoint of his absolute idealism and comes to the position of the evolutionary theory that stands for the reality of the time-process in which God and man are actually engaged for the creation of a better world.

With the criticism of Royce's solution of the problems raised by the evolutionary theory, we may now pass to another typical solution, that given in Eucken's philosophy of life.

The central thought of Eucken is his conception of a world-transcendent spiritual life, a whole of reality, which he identifies with God. This God, the cosmic spiritual life, furnishes the solution to all the problems of human life. A pertinent question is: How does Eucken come to his conception of such a God? He repudiates the intellectualism of idealistic philosophy, the subjectivism of Romanticism, and such voluntarism as that of Schopenhauer.³ In place of these methods Eucken uses what he calls the noölogical method. "To explain noölogically," writes Eucken, "means to arrange the whole of the Spiritual Life as a special

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 379, 411.

² *The Problem of Christianity*, lectures ii ff.

³ *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 73 ff.

activity, to ascertain its position and problem, and through such an adaptation to illumine the whole and raise its potencies."¹ It is through the use of such a method that Eucken arrives at his conception of an independent spiritual life and views all things from the standpoint of such a life.² And this a priori procedure of Eucken is in full accord with his philosophical position. Nevertheless, in spite of his interest in an absolutist metaphysics, Eucken, like Royce, is constantly concerned with the actual struggles and conflicts of our experience; he is incessantly engaged in setting forth the life-process in its progressive development. It is not something beyond human experience with which Eucken deals; but he investigates the living interests of the life-process itself. Yet believing that we cannot discover a stable basis of life in the empirically ascertained facts of life, Eucken distrusts this method and falls back on his a priori procedure. Thus we see in Eucken, as we saw in Royce, a double tendency: a tendency to deal with the facts of life empirically, and a tendency to view them from the standpoint of an a priori assumption.

This double tendency appears also in his attitude toward science. Eucken fully appreciates the worth of science as it enables us to control the forces of nature.³ This appreciation of science is made manifest in his repudiation of the naïve supernaturalism of traditional Christianity,⁴ and in his acceptance of the fact of evolution.⁵ He holds that it is not natural science that creates trouble for us, but our weakness in spiritual convictions.⁶ But a question here is: Can he really appreciate and do justice to scientific concepts, the evolutionary theory included, without accepting the method by which these concepts are formulated? The method and theory of evolution seem so closely bound up with each other that one will find it very difficult to accept the one and reject the other with any consistency. Eucken is willing to view

¹ *The Truth of Religion*, p. 178; cf. pp. 453 ff.; *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 154, 242 f., 351 f.

² *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 129 ff.

³ *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 345 f.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 6 ff.; *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 521 ff., 549 ff.

⁵ *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 257, 262 f., 278.

⁶ *The Problem of Human Life*, pp. 541 f.

man as a product of nature, provided he is allowed to maintain that in man there appears in the course of his evolution an independent life.¹ This insistence upon the superempirical factor in the evolutionary process is, indeed, in line with his absolutist position. But the very fact that Eucken views so much of reality from the standpoint of the evolutionary theory is significant.

Now in regard to the traditional conception of God as the transcendent supernatural personality we find that Eucken has set aside its supernaturalistic features and retains what he regards as its eternal element.² It is this retention of an eternal element—an Absolute Spiritual Life in union with man—that at once opens up the problem of God as the Absolute Being.

Eucken conceives of God as the Absolute Spiritual Life above the limitations of time and history.³ Such a God, for Eucken, is the very foundation of all time-order. Man cannot find satisfaction in history, if there is not disclosed in it to him "an over-historical nature."⁴ We seek for a basis of life. But we cannot find it in our immediate experience, thought, or activity; for in the whole life of immediate existence all is change and uncertainty. We must seek it beyond our psychic state—in a whole of life which is not subject to time.⁵ Moreover, to conceive of God in terms of history and evolution means to surrender the absoluteness of all truth.⁶ There are, however, many elements in his philosophy which would naturally lead him to conceive of God in terms of the evolutionary theory. For example, his emphasis on activity rather than on thought as an essential means of appropriating reality;⁷ his recognition of movement and history as characteristic of the modern age;⁸ his view of God as immanent in the world of

¹ *The Life of the Spirit*, p. 271.

² See *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 576 ff., 544 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 208 f., 214.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁵ *Life's Basis*, etc., p. 154, cf. pp. 275 ff.

⁶ See *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 379 f.; cf. pp. 537 ff.; *Christianity and the New Idealism*, p. 41.

⁷ *Life's Basis*, etc., pp. 220 ff., 255 ff.

⁸ *The Life of the Spirit*, pp. 104 ff.

man, helping him to be one with himself¹—all these and the other like elements call for the view of God as a changing being. But instead of carrying out the logic of these elements, Eucken would insist upon the view of God as the Absolute Spiritual Life above the changes of time.

This affirmation of God's unchangeability, however, can be consistently maintained by Eucken only as he views the ultimate meaning of the world of experience in static terms and conceives of God's relation to the world and man somewhat after the fashion of traditional supernaturalism. But his activist faith does not permit him to accept the traditional supernaturalism of Christianity. He conceives of God as involved in a vital relation with the movements of history.² If Eucken consistently followed out this conception of God's relation to a growing world and humanity in dynamic terms, it would be exceedingly difficult to maintain his absoluteness. For how can a God who is in dynamic relation to the world and who is involved in the processes of change and growth remain unaffected by such processes? We have sufficiently indicated many features in his philosophy that are irreconcilable with his contention for the unchangeability of God. And these very elements show clearly that he has not been able to escape the bearing of the evolutionary theory on his conception of God.

This influence of the theory appears also in his view of God's relation to the world and man. Eucken ultimately conceives of God's relation to the world in terms of immanent idealism.³ This conception, however, conflicts with his opposition to immanent idealism seen in his indictment of the evil processes of the natural world.⁴ The irrationality of the world and its oppositions to the values and aims of human life force Eucken to acknowledge that evils present to us an insoluble enigma of life.⁵ Eucken's admission of the reality of evil in the world and its consequent irrationality

¹ *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 221 ff.

² See *Christianity and the New Idealism*, pp. 45 ff.; *Life's Basis*, etc., pp. 188 ff.; *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 318 ff.

³ See *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 220 f., 165 ff.; *Main Currents*, etc., p. 459; *Life's Basis*, etc., pp. 270 f.

⁴ *Life's Basis*, etc., p. 20; cf. *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 290 ff.

⁵ *Life's Basis*, etc., pp. 280 f.; *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 490 ff.

suggests either that his God is impotent to control the evil forces in the world, or that they are due to some non-divine factors. In either case God would be finite in power. But Eucken, impelled by his avowed philosophical position, maintains that the world, despite its insoluble evils, is due to the immanent activity of God.¹

To come now to Eucken's view of the relation of God and man, we observe that he considers this relation from the standpoint of the practical interests of human life. God as the Absolute Spiritual Life is absolutely necessary to give content and subsistence to the life of man; without such a God man would be bound by the evil forces of the natural world and so could not attain to his destiny. It is through struggles, sufferings, conflicts, that we come to the sense of our union with God; we must fight with all our might against the forces of evil if we are to possess the life of God in our soul, for in the hardest fight we gain the clearest vision of God.²

A question arises at this point: What is God's relation to us in our struggle? Is he implicated in our conflicts with the antagonistic forces of the world? Eucken flatly denies that God participates in such depressing aspects of our experience. All that we need to know, according to him, is that God does help us out of the apparent defeats of our life.³ This is because Eucken desires to preserve the freedom of God from the changes and experiences of time. But we should particularly note that he gives very little space to an exposition of his contention that God is above the changes and sufferings of our existence. On the other hand, abundant space is given to his exposition of the life-process of man in its historical development. Moreover, the very phrase most used by Eucken to represent God, namely, "spiritual life," stands for a reality which is derivable in and through our changing experience.

III. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION

First, as regards the methodological problem, the result of our study of Royce and Eucken may be stated as follows:

Royce, whose method is fundamentally based on an Absolute Experience or Thought, or an All-inclusive Insight, which he

¹ *Life's Basis*, etc., pp. 270 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 246 f., 255 ff.

³ *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 432 ff.

assumes a priori, nevertheless gives much space to the examination of the facts of changing, growing, temporal social experience. He is fully aware of the movements of empiricism, especially since the days of Kant, and so is unable to ignore inductive investigation in matters of philosophy and religion.¹ In very marked degree, the same attitude toward empiricism in method characterizes Eucken. He has given up the power of thought relied upon by all intellectualistic systems of philosophy, for he finds it incapable of giving us the true insight into the problems of human life. True, philosophically Eucken undertakes to view the problems of life from the standpoint of an independent spiritual life. But in reality he is constantly dealing with the actual experiences of the life-process in its struggles, conflicts, oppositions, tasks.

This methodological tendency suggests that if theology is to keep in line with the inductive, evolutionary method of contemporary sciences, it cannot follow the method hitherto employed. The traditional method of expounding and systematizing a given quantity of supernatural revelation located in an infallible church or scripture² is becoming more and more untenable; for the investigations in biblical science are constantly bringing to light the differences between the content of biblical revelation and that of modern religion.

An increasing number of theological thinkers, who have felt the power of scientific investigations, especially in the field of religion, can no longer follow the traditional method. These men feel that theology, in order to take its place among the sciences of our age and to accomplish its work for the furtherance of religious life, should employ the method demanded by the evolutionary theory. In adopting such a method of experimentation and verification theology will indeed lose its claim to finality in content, but it will find a vaster field for its investigation and gain scientific worth for what it discovers through the medium of the new procedure.³ Theology, then, in following the inductive method of the evolu-

¹ See his article, "The Eternal and the Practical," *Philos. Rev.*, XIII, 113 f., 142.

² See, e.g., Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 182 ff.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, 70 ff.

³ See Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 320; "Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology," *American Journal of Theology*, X, 232.

tionary theory will seek for the sources of its doctrines in the common religious experiences of people as these experiences are critically expounded in investigations dealing, particularly, with the history of religions and the psychology of religious experience. Christian theology will, of course, study its religious inheritance in the records, especially of the Hebrew and Christian peoples, in order to gain suggestive contributions toward the solution of its religious problems. Significant personalities, notably the prophets and Jesus and his apostles, will constitute a specially valuable source of religious insight. Yet theology will not be limited to their contributions. It will, in accordance with its empirical, evolutionary method, deal with contributions on matters of religion coming from any other worthy source. It is thus the great field of human religious experience in the largest sense with which theology would empirically deal.¹

Secondly, what is the relation between theology and science? Royce, in accordance with his absolute idealism, maintains that philosophy has the last word on the subject of reality. Yet he recognizes the truths of science as inductive descriptions of the temporal order. Moreover, he gives a high value to the deeds and events of our temporal experience.² What he opposes in science (natural science) is its uncritical affirmation that all reality consists of physical elements and that all forms of existence are explicable in terms of such elements. Eucken likewise appreciates the place and worth of science in modern life. But he cannot tolerate the scientific naturalism which reduces all reality to the plane of physical mechanism. Thus these philosophers of religion hold that the discoveries of natural science do not constitute the whole of reality; and that, accordingly, theological or religious affirmations must be given their due validity; and yet they tend to ground these affirmations on the facts of evolutionary experience. This implies that both science and theology are called upon to face the facts of life and of existence in a thoroughly empirical fashion, and to consider themselves as co-operating means of furthering the

¹ Cf. Johnson, *God in Evolution*, chap. ii, "Concerning Method."

² See, e.g., "The Reality of the Temporal," *International Journal of Ethics*, XX, 296 ff.

ongoing evolution of life. This implication of our study calls for a brief comment.

It is fully manifest that such theories of evolution as those of Lamarck and Darwin are based on a more or less thoroughgoing empiricism; and that they assume an undogmatic attitude toward their theories. Bergson, too, does not claim finality for his system.¹ This undogmatic attitude of the evolutionists is characteristic of the best of our contemporary scientists. Pearson, for example, points out the incompleteness of science and considers its concepts or laws as mental shorthand, useful to the work of man.² This thoroughly empirical attitude of the evolutionists is not what we find in the case of traditional theologians; their theological declarations are marked by some dogmatic absolutism. They maintain that they have absolute truth in some form, and they contend for the immunity of their theological doctrines from the encroachments of science; for them the findings of empirical study cannot form the foundation of their theological affirmations—they must be grounded on some a priori principle underivable in and through human experience.

It is quite clear, then, that such a theological position does not seem to be in agreement with the implications of the evolutionary theory. It is quite apparent that the best way, in so far as our present age of culture and civilization is concerned, is to adopt the hints given both by the historians of religion and by the men of science and conceive of the doctrines both of science and of theology as working hypotheses, which we acquire through the process of experimentation, for the achievement of the higher values of life.³ In thus conceiving the work of science and of theology in relation to the interests of human life there is suggested a tentative relation between them, namely, the relation of co-operative activity in the interest of promoting the development of man in his struggle for existence. The whole realm of existence,

¹ See *op. cit.*, pp. 44 ff., 265 ff.

² See *The Grammar of Science*, pp. 25, 86 f.; cf. Ostwald, *Natural Philosophy*, pp. 28, 31; Poincaré, *The Foundations of Science*, pp. 340 f.

³ See Ames, "Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology," *American Journal of Theology*, X, 219-32; *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, chap. xvi; I. King, *The Development of Religion*, chap. xiii.

then, will be open to science for investigation,¹ so that it may go on with its work of observation, description, classification, explanation of the processes of nature, of human society, and of our psychological phenomena in order to have control over them in the behalf of man; while theology is to proceed with its task, aided by the results of scientific investigation in various fields, of interpreting particularly religious phenomena and of formulating concepts, doctrines, hypotheses of the objects of religion which will best further, in a given age, its ideal ends. Such a theory of the relation of theology and science seems to be the implication of the result of our study in so far as this relation is concerned.

Thirdly, let us look at the problem of God as the supernatural personality. Royce, as has been observed, has completely abandoned the Kantian things-in-themselves and conceives of God in terms of immanent idealism. For him there is no other world than the world of thought and will, and God is organically bound up with such a world. Eucken cannot indorse the view of God as belonging to a supernatural world and as coming to us by means of miraculous donation. God is considered by him to be the very basis of all existence, in spite of the appearances to the contrary.

The significance of this result for theology may be stated as follows: that, to be in line with and represent helpfully the evolutionary view of the world, theology must abandon its traditional way of conceiving God in terms of dualistic supernaturalism and must think of him as immanently active in the world of nature and of man. But orthodox theologians generally decline to carry out this implication; they refuse to view God in terms of dynamic immanence; and they are not wholly willing to surrender the supernatural transcendence of God in the traditional sense of the word. The underlying reason for the disinclination to conceive God completely in dynamic relations with the world is twofold: theologians have not, on the one hand, acquired scientific confidence in the normal evolutionary activities of the immanent forces in the world; and, on the other hand, they desire to preserve the supernatural character of their religion. This attitude is expressed by orthodoxy in its affirmation of the Scripture as the supernatural

¹ Pearson, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

revelation of God, of the incarnation of Jesus as the miraculous intervention into the course of history, of salvation as the supernatural act of the Holy Spirit—in fact, the whole system of orthodoxy is based upon specific supernatural acts of God interposed into the course of nature and of human history.¹

A suggestion toward an immanent conception of God's relation to the world is given by G. A. Gordon in his book *Religion and Miracles*, where he points out that religion does not stand or fall with the fate of miracles.² Thus to conceive of God in terms of dynamic immanence and to have confidence in his normal activities in the world would, indeed, be in accord with the evolutionary theory which eliminates the miraculous from the organic realm³ and would be also working out the implication of the result of our study on the problem of God as the supernatural personality.

Fourthly, we come to the problem of God as the absolute being. This is the most critical problem of our investigation. For it immediately opens up the question of absoluteness and finality versus finitude and relativity in matters of religion and ethics. The evolutionary theory stands for the relative and finite view of all reality. God, from this evolutionary view of the world, is to be conceived in terms of change and growth, the essential characteristics of the living world with which he is vitally related. Traditional theology, on the contrary, contends for the system of absoluteness and finality in religion and ethics. This contention of traditional theology is a direct consequence of its view of God as the eternally complete and perfect being of the world. With respect to the problem which arises in view of the antithesis involved in the two systems, Royce presents God as the All-inclusive, Absolute Being of the universe, free from the temporal aspects of our experience. Yet we found that Royce attributes to God such

¹ See William and Scannell, *A Manual of Catholic Theology*, Vols. I, II; Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 151 ff., 617 ff.; II, 378 ff., 675 ff.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, 61 ff., 533 ff.; II, 261 ff., 353 ff.; etc.; cf. W. B. Greene, "The Supernatural," *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, pp. 143 ff.; C. W. Hodge, "The Finality of the Christian Religion," *ibid.*, pp. 452 ff.

² See especially pp. 7, 33, 82, 130, 165 ff.; and for a very suggestive contribution on this subject of God's relation to the world, see G. B. Smith, *Social Idealism and the Changing Theology*, especially chap. v.

³ Weismann, *op. cit.*, I, 6; cf. Pfeiderer, *Evolution and Theology*, p. 9.

characteristics of our evolutionary experience as suffering, striving, satisfaction. Hence God, at least when viewed from our finite point of view, is involved in the process of change and growth, so is a finite being, although he is held to be the Absolute Being, when viewed from an eternal point of view.¹ God, for Eucken, is the Absolute Spiritual Life, the independent basis of all temporal order. But from the standpoint of actual experience, we must view God in terms of our conflict, struggle, and activity. Thus God, according to Eucken, would be involved in the evolutionary features of human experience. Thus we may say that Royce and Eucken tend, in spite of their absolutistic positions, toward the conception of God in terms of evolutionary experience.

The implications of this tendency would be a full cognizance of the evolutionary and finite characteristics of the conception of God, which appear in Royce and Eucken and which are hard to unify with their absolutistic position. Theology should conceive God in terms of those qualities that are in accord with the results of empirical investigation of the world and particularly of human religious experience. In assuming this attitude toward the facts of the world and life, we should be led to a theory of reality positively involved in the processes of change, movement, development. In fact, one of the clearest indications of our immediate experience is the consciousness of the time-process, of history, of something done. Höfding points out that in view of the fact that our empirical world is not finished but that it always presents new experiences and riddles, we are unable to have a complete knowledge. He suggests the idea that this unfinishedness of our knowledge "may perhaps be connected with the fact that Being itself is not ready-made, but is still incomplete, and rather to be conceived as a continual becoming, like individual personality and like knowledge."² So far, then, as our scientific studies and our empirical experiences show, we ourselves and the realities with which we are related are characterized by change, incompleteness, unfinishedness, growth, development.³

¹ *The World and the Individual*, II, 133 ff.; "The Reality of the Temporal," *International Journal of Ethics*, XX, 270 f.; *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 394 f.

² *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 120; cf. p. 136.

³ See Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*, essay xix; cf. Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 37 f.

Now a critical question is whether God can be conceived to be free from the process of evolution. We have observed that from the standpoint of our actual empirical experience, the philosophers of religion above consulted attribute to God in some measure the evolutionary features of human experience. This experiential mode of conceiving God, it would seem, should be made dominant, for it is not in accord with the empirical temper of our age to find reality outside of evolutionary experience and to define it other than in terms of such experience.¹ There may be a realm or realms in the universe where change, unfinishedness, development are not found and where God may be exempt from time and history; but the world of our empirical science and experience and God as he is known in the experiences of the race are all marked by temporal features. Consequently, God should be conceived under the category, not of completeness and of immutability, but of becoming and of development.

This conception of God in terms of evolutionary experience, rather than under the category of some metaphysical absolute, is demanded by our religion and ethics. If by religion we mean pietistic contemplation, philosophic knowledge, or passive receptivity, then the conception of God as the absolute being, free from the finite aspects of our world and experience, may be satisfactory. But if religion means not merely faith in the conservation of values,² but also an effort of life to attain to its highest values in the world, then we must conceive of God, not only in terms of immanence, but primarily as vitally and actively related with us in the achievement of the values of religion.³ The God demanded by practical religion must be a being who really shares in our struggles, conflicts, failures, successes, victories. Such a God, as James suggests, has really been the God of the Hebrew and Christian religions. Practical religion demands, not the Absolute who includes all beings by his all-embracing knowledge, nor the Absolute who is completely independent of the world of his creation, but a God who really hears our prayers and who is actually co-operating with us to real-

¹ See Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. 26, 317 f.

² Höfding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 9 ff., 215 ff.

³ Cf. G. B. Foster, *The Function of Religion*, pp. 173-83.

ize the aims and values of human life. Moreover, from the point of view of our ethics, we need such a conception of God. The futility of the traditional view of God as the absolute being who has determined the course of the world and of human history in accordance with his eternal plan becomes self-evident when we see that our moral life demands that it ought to and really can change the character of our moral universe. Höffding remarks thus on this point: "If Being were finished, harmoniously and unchangeably, Ethics would be impossible. All Ethics demands that there be effort. But there would be no room for effort, if everything were in eternal and actual completeness."¹ Thus both religion and ethics call for a view of God, not as an absolute, but as a relative being, actually interrelated with us in our religious and moral life.

But thus to bring relativity and becoming into the very being of God means, of course, that we must abandon that absolute ground of religious and ethical assurance which is believed to be given to us by traditional conceptions of God as the absolute controller of the world and human life. An evolving God does not guarantee beforehand the ultimate success of our moral universe.² But as a matter of fact the most staunch believers in the traditional view of God must admit that the absolute certainty as to their salvation is not a question of fact but of faith; they are to be religious and ethical in the hope that they may be saved. This uncertainty as to final victory will not necessarily lead us to pessimism and inactivity. For we are so constituted that even when we are thus uncertain of our ultimate success, we work so much the harder, hoping that we may, with God's help, bring the world to a happy issue. God, then, from the standpoint of practical religion and ethics, may be conceived of as that great environing reality of the growing universe, who is ever responsive to the calls of our need, who represents our highest ethico-religious ideals and values, and who is constantly working with us for the achievement of these ideals and values. At any rate, such seems to be the theological

¹ *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 151; cf. pp. 158 ff.; Schiller, *op. cit.*, essay xviii on "Freedom."

² Cf. McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, pp. 259 f.

implication of our study as to the problem of God as the absolute being.

And, fifthly, the problem of God's relation to man and the world calls for a brief comment. It has been partly discussed in the consideration of the preceding two problems. To begin with the problem of the relation of God and man, we observe that the philosophers, whom we have considered, differ on this point from the standpoint of their philosophies, yet in the main agree from that of empiricism. Royce's absolute idealism would reduce man to the plane of complete dependence on an all-inclusive being of the world, yet Royce, moved by his moral experience, contends for the ethical selfhood of man. Eucken is not interested in finding out the exact ontological relation of God and man; his interest is primarily a practical one: How can man be saved from the forces of this antagonistic world? His answer is that it is God who is the fundamental presupposition of man's salvation. Yet this salvation is not a matter of donation; man must achieve it through struggle and work. Thus Eucken assumes the dignity and power of man.

This suggests that the primary concern of theology should be to conceive the relation between God and man on the basis of the facts disclosed by experience. Theology, working from this standpoint, will be aided by such sciences as anthropology, biology, sociology, psychology, the history of religions, and the like. In studying the results of such sciences and in consulting the experiences of actual men and women, we discover their sense of dependence on, and independence of, the environing world. Man as we find him is conscious of his dependence on his social as well as his physical environment. But this consciousness of man's dependence on his environment is not all of his experience; he often finds himself superior to his natural environment, and while he feels himself closely bound up with his social environment, he refuses to surrender the sense of his own initiative and responsibility. Theology must take account, not merely of the consciousness of man's dependence on, but of his independence of, his environment, so that it may not define his relation to God wholly in terms of receptivity but perhaps primarily in terms of co-operative activity

directed toward the establishment of a society of love and righteousness. In thus conceiving the relation of God and man, we are enabled to meet the view demanded by the evolutionary theory which, as we have seen, holds that the forces making the evolution of life possible are resident in the organisms and in their environment.

To speak now of the problem of God's relation to the world, we must frankly admit that we cannot, so far as we know, give answer either to the question concerning the beginnings of the world or to that concerning its present ontological relation to God. The theory of cosmic evolution traces the development of our world to small beginnings, and the doctrine of organic evolution conceives life as arising from some protoplasmic germs; but we do not know, as James says, the whence and how of the world—they are matters, as yet, of speculation. Meanwhile, what religion wishes to ascertain is whether God is now in some way related with the process of the world. This raises at once the question of teleology and of evil.

With regard to these questions, Royce, as we have seen, considers the world of nature as embodying, though in a partial manner, the will of God; and affirms, at least, the temporal reality of the evils in the world. Eucken could not tolerate the idea that nature as such is the cause of human evolution; for him God must be working in the process of nature for the production of man. As to the problem of evil, he admits its reality, but confesses its insolubility. Thus, the tendency of thought is to hold that there is some purpose discoverable in the evolutionary process of the world and to assume a practical attitude toward the problem of evil.

That there is some limited purpose in the world-process is admitted by many evolutionists. Lamarck, Darwin, Bergson would hold that higher forms of life are produced through the evolutionary process.¹

Moreover, that there are evils in the world is admitted by all the evolutionists, though opinions differ as to the explanation of

¹ Cf. Baldwin, *Darwin and the Humanities*, pp. 81 ff.; Moore, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, pp. 257 ff.; Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, pp. xxvi ff., 367, 371 f.

evil. One may conjecture that God is a limited being and hence he is unable to control the world without involving it in evils. Or one may say that the elements in the world are not yet harmonized, hence the presence of evil.¹ This is indeed a dark problem. Theology must deal with it wisely and critically. But from the standpoint of practical religion and ethics, it seems sufficient to say, in view of our inability as yet to give a satisfactory explanation of God's relation to the evils in the world, that what is demanded of us is to recognize their existence and to struggle and work with God in opposition to the evils in us and in the world in order to create a world of love and righteousness.

We have been concerned in this study to show that men like Royce and Eucken who do not profess to stand philosophically for empirical evolutionary method and theory nevertheless employ many elements derivable in and through experience and make certain affirmations concerning God on the basis of these empirical elements. The theological implication of our study is that in order to be in harmony with the empirical temper of our age, theology is called upon to follow the inductive method demanded by the evolutionary theory and to formulate its conception of God on the basis of the facts ascertainable, particularly, in the field of religion and ethics. This, in short, seems to be the bearing of the evolutionary theory on the conception of God; and the typical recent philosophies of religion which we have examined give fruitful suggestions for the theologian who desires to grapple seriously with the problems raised by the doctrine of evolution and to construct a tenable conception of God in an age of evolutionary science.

¹ So Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 368; cf. Höfding, *The Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 136, 150, 158 ff., 173 f.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD IN RABBINICAL THEOLOGY

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1. The teaching that there is a blessed life after death, or that the dead will be revived from their graves to a better life, or that there is hope for the soul behind those invisible clouds dividing the past and the future, is a significant finger-post set up on the road of theological speculation to mark the development of religious thinking. The man to whom the idea was first revealed, the one who conceived it fully and proclaimed it, must be regarded as one of the greatest thinkers of religious belief of all times. There can be no doubt that the doctrine is the climax of belief and the highest development possible in theological thought and speculation. It is quite natural that we do not find the belief in this doctrine until after many centuries of human progress. We may ask such questions as: Whence did it originate? Who taught it first? and How did it develop?—but we find no answer. What we know for certain is that the teaching and belief lived among the Israelites when they settled on Jewish soil. Isaiah speaks of “the dead who shall arise and the inhabitants of the dust who shall awake and shout for joy” (Isa. 26:19). Isaiah also teaches that there will be a resurrection, but only for the righteous; the wicked ones, however, will never leave their homes in the dust (chaps. 24–27). It is generally thought that this passage cannot be older than the third century B.C. But Ezekiel cannot be understood unless we assume that there already existed among his people the accepted belief in the resurrection. Thus his book says: “Therefore prophesy and say unto them, thus saith the Lord; Behold, O my people, I will open your burying places, and cause you to come up out of your burying places, and bring you to the ground of Israel. And ye shall know that I am the Eternal, when I have opened your burying places, and brought you up out of your burying places. And I shall put my

spirit in you, and ye shall live, and I shall place you on your own ground" (Ezek. 37:12-14). The prophet who uttered these prophecies must have believed in the resurrection. Daniel (12:2) agrees fully with the view quoted above from Isaiah, for he says: "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the ground shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." Other passages from the Scriptures applicable to our doctrine will be mentioned in the course of this article. In the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha the belief is repeated in II Maccabees, I Enoch, and the Testaments.¹ In the last two or three centuries before Jesus it was a part of the Jewish belief. It is our task to set forth the history and development of this doctrine in rabbinical theology in the centuries after Jesus.

2. Although the belief was fully established at the time when the first endeavors were made, which led to one of the greatest crises in the history of the world, viz., that development of the Jewish religion which resulted in Christianity, we cannot state that there was no opposition against the belief. The rabbinical sources testify to the doctrine as having been regarded as one of the main teachings of Judaism. On the other hand, we see that there was opposition. It is probable that the Sadducees were the successors of an older school opposing the doctrine of a future life as a part of the reform of the old religion of Israel.² We know that the Sadducees were the conservative party in Israel. To abandon a belief held by former generations would contradict the traditions of this party. Josephus relates concerning this point: "But the doctrine of the Sadducees is this: That souls die with the bodies" (*Ant.* XVIII, i, 4). They denied not merely the belief in a revival after death, but also the doctrine of a blessed future life. It may be that Josephus, in accordance with a custom of his, did not like to put their doctrines more clearly, because of his heathen readers. The Gospels support the words of Josephus by saying that the Sadducees came to Jesus stating that there is no resurrection. Jesus proves the doctrine from the pas-

¹ P. Volz, *Jüdische Eschatologie* (Tübingen, 1903), pp. 126-33.

² See against this view Aboth of R. Nathan, chap. v, and Baneth, *Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums*, (1882), pp. 3 ff. (*Ozar Israel*, III, 74-75).

sage: "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." This God cannot be a God of the dead but of the living (Exod. 3:6; Matt. 23:23-33; Luke 20:27; Mark 12:18; cf. 9:10; Recognitions of Clement 1:54). From Acts 4:1 we infer that the idea of resurrection was the main objection of the Sanhedrim, which consisted mainly of Sadducees who fiercely opposed that doctrine.¹ The Mishna enumerates them among those who have no part in the future world as follows: "Whosoever says there is no resurrection of the dead (mentioned) in the Torah, that there is no Torah (given) from heaven, and the Epicureans" (M. Sanh. xi, 1). The point of dispute between Sadducees and Pharisees was therefore whether the doctrine can be proved from the Bible or not. It may be that in those times the prayer was instituted which was afterward recited by the Jews three times daily: "Thou, O Lord, art mighty for ever, Thou quickenest the dead, Thou art mighty to save, Thou sustainest the living with loving kindness, quickenest the dead with great mercy, supportest the falling, etc. . . . and keepest Thy faith to them that sleep in the dust. Who is like unto Thee, O King, who killest and quickenest and causest salvation to spring forth? Yea, faithful art Thou to quicken the dead. Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who quickenest the dead."² According to Elbogen, the repeated pronunciation of the dogma of the resurrection is too marked and cannot be accidental. It was the deliberate institution of the Pharisees in order to avoid the denial on the part of the Sadducees and was instituted during or after the time of John Hyrkanus.³ It is not impossible that the allusion to Exod. 3:3 in the answer of Jesus was chosen purposely with the intention of recalling the beginning of the daily prayer (Shemonah Esreh) which commences thus: "Blessed art Thou our God, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," meaning that He is a God of the living ones. Then we find another form of benediction: "Blessed art Thou who knoweth the number of you all and will hereafter judge you. He will in future restore you to life. Blessed art Thou who is trustworthy in his word (promise), the quickener of

¹ See A. Buechler, *Das Synhedrion* (Wien, 1902), p. 99.

² Singer's *Prayer Book*, p. 45.

³ *Geschichte des Achtzehngebetes* (Breslau, 1903), p. 51.

the dead."¹ This prayer was said by the visitors to the cemetery.² Another instance of combating the disbelievers is given in the Mishna Berachoth 54a: All the benedictions in the sanctuary ended with the former *מֶן הָעוֹלָם*, but since the Sadducees (or, according to the Tosefta, the Minim) corrupted their ways and said, "There is only one world," they (the rabbis) instituted that people should say: *מֶן הָעוֹלָם וְעַד הָעוֹלָם*.³ "Blessed art Thou, O God of Israel, from this world to the other world, O Redeemer of Israel."⁴ It is fairly obvious from these passages that in and before the first century A.D. there was a party among the Jews which did not believe in resurrection. In Christian circles we find the same movement. II Tim. 2:18 mentions Hymenaeus and Philetus, who were teaching that the resurrection was already accomplished. Paul disputes (I Cor. 15:12-34) with those who deny the resurrection.⁵

3. We turn now to the rabbis of the second and third centuries who endeavored to prove this doctrine from the Scriptures. The rabbis were frequently interrogated on the subject by three classes of people: (1) the Minim, who might be regarded in this case as the successors of the Sadducees;⁶ (2) the Samaritans (who did not believe in our doctrine as we know from the Recognitions of Clement 1:54); and (3) the heathen. Rabban Gamaliel II, about 110 A.D., was asked: "Whence do you derive the teaching that the Holy One, blessed be He, will restore life to the dead?" R. Gamaliel quoted from the Torah: "And the Eternal said unto Moses, Behold, thou shall lie with thy fathers, and this people will rise up" (Deut. 31:16); from the Prophets: "Thy dead men shall live, together with my dead body shall they arise, awake and shout, ye that dwell in dust, for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall drop the deceased" (Isa. 26:19); from the Hagiographa: "And thy palate like the best wine for my beloved, that goes down

¹ Tosefta, ed. Zuckerman, vi, 22; Jer. Ber. 13d; b. Ber. 53a. Cf. Singer's *Prayer Book*, p. 319.

² For other prayers see b. Berachoth, 58a, 60a; b. Megilla, 17b.

³ See Tosefta, ed. Zuckerman, p. 17, l. 8; p. 215, l. 28; p. 216, l. 3.

⁴ Cf. Jer. Taanit. 65d.

⁵ See Hoenicke, *Das Judenchristentum*, p. 153.

⁶ See on this point A. Buechler, *Das Synhedrion*, pp. 72, 78.

smoothly, causing those who are asleep to speak" (Cant. 1:10). All these proofs were refuted and rejected till he quoted Deut. 31:21, or, according to a different reading, Deut. 4:4 (see b. Sanh. 90b). R. Joshua b. Chananja, a contemporary of R. Gamaliel II, wanted to prove from the above-quoted passage, Deut. 31:16, the doctrine of the resurrection and the prescience of God, but only the latter was accepted (b. Sanh. 90b). The same teaching was handed down by R. Jochanan (died 278 A.D.) in the name of R. Simon b. Jochai (about 160 A.D., b. Sanh. 90b). R. Simon b. Jochai declares, with reference to Gen. 3:19: "For dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return," that there is a hint here pointing to the belief in resurrection, since it is not written "And thou shalt go," but "Thou shalt return" (see Gen. Rabba xx, 26). R. Eliezer, the son of R. Jose, had a dispute about our teaching with the Minim (b. Sanh. 90). According to another source the controversy with the Samaritans is attributed to R. Simon b. Eliezer (Sifre Numbers, § 112).

Finally we have to mention the views of two Tannaites, one of whom belonged to the latter part of the second half of the second century while the other lived perhaps about 150 A.D., dealing with the proofs for the doctrine of the resurrection. R. Jacob said: "There is no commandment in the Torah without the reward for fulfilling it being mentioned and the doctrine of the resurrection being written as it is said: 'But thou shalt in any wise let the mother go, that it may be well with thee and thou shalt prolong thy days' (Deut. 22:7). One man climbed to the top of a tree or a building (in order to fulfil this precept) & he fell down and died. Was it well with him and did he prolong his days? Say: 'That it may be well with thee' in this world and 'that thou mayest prolong thy days' in the world to come."¹ The other rabbi, R. Simai, says: "There is no portion (in the Torah) where the idea of quickening the dead is not mentioned, but we are incapable of finding it, as it is said (x, 50, 4): 'He shall call to the heavens from above, and to the earth that He may pronounce judgment on his people.' 'He shall call to the heavens from above' refers to the soul; and 'to the earth, that He may pronounce judgment on his people' refers to

¹ See Tosefta, ed. Zuckermann, p. 512, l. 18; b. Hulin 142b; b. Kid. 39b.

God who judges His people. Whence do you know that we speak here of the resurrection of the dead? Because it is said: Come from the four winds, O *spirit*."¹

In anonymous teachings we find further proofs from the Scriptures for the biblical origin of the doctrine. Thus from Deut. 32:39: "I slay and I make alive." "I strike and I heal."² In the citation from Sifre Deut. the following passages from the Bible are also enumerated: Num. 23:10: "Who has counted the dust of Jacob, and the number of the fourth part of Israel? Let me die the death of the righteous and let my end be like his!" Deut. 33:6; "Let Reuben live and not die"; and finally Hosea 6:2: "After two days will He revive us, in the third day He will establish, and we shall live before His face." The heretics to support their antagonism quoted Ps. 103:18: "For a wind passeth over it and it is gone." But, the rabbis argued, the verse does not refer to death, but to the evil inclination.³ Remarkable is the question of an Epicurean who said to a rabbi: "Is it possible that the dead will come to life again? Your forefathers did not believe it whilst you do? (See) what is written in the story of Jacob (Gen. 37:35): 'But he refused to comfort himself.' Had he known that the dead would be quickened would he have refused to comfort himself?" He (the rabbi) said: "Fool! It was so because he knew by means of the Holy Spirit that Joseph was alive and we do not accept comfort for the living."⁴ In the third century R. Joshua ben Levi (b. Sanh. 91b) and R. Jochanan collected proofs for this doctrine. First from the verse: "And ye shall give thereof the heave offering of the Eternal to Aaron the priest" (Num. 18:28). "Do you think that Aaron lives for ever? Behold, he did not enter the Holy Land. But it teaches us that he (Aaron) will rise from his grave and the Israelites

¹ Ezek. 37:3; Sifre Deut., § 306, p. 132a.

² b. Pes. 68a; b. Sanh. 91b; Sifre Deut., § 329.

³ See Midrash Tehillim, ed. Buber, pp. 348, 437; my *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien*, I, 72 ff.

⁴ Jalkut, 43, c; see Tanhuma, ed. Buber, I, 187. For the use of the word "fool" in the Polemics see I Cor. 15:35-38; Clement *ad. Cor.* xxiv. 5; Tertullian *De resurrectione* 52; Apraates *Hom.* 8. 1, and in the rabbinical polemics, see Mech. 57a; Gen. Rabba liii, 15; xci, 5; Lev. Rabba vi, 6; Pesikta, ed. Buber, p. 281a; Pirke de R. Eliezer, chap. 1.

will give him the heave offerings. This is a proof from the Torah for the doctrine of the resurrection" (b. Sanh. 90b). R. Hijja bar Abba states, in the name of R. Jochanan, that we infer this doctrine from Isa. 52:8. There it is said: "The voice of the watchmen—they lift up the voice, together they shall shout." It is not said "they shouted," but "they shall shout." Here we have another proof for the doctrine (b. Sanh. 91b). A Palestinian rabbi of the third century, R. Josia, refuted the proof of heretics: Prov. 30:16, where the grave (seal) and the barren womb are mentioned together (b. Berachoth 15b). We see on one side that the heretics sought verses in the Bible from which it could be proved that in the Scriptures there was nothing to rely upon for this doctrine; on the other hand, the rabbis were not slow in quoting all the verses which might possibly prove this teaching.

4. The resurrection cannot be experienced but may be proved by several passages from the Scriptures. For the believer in ancient times it was quite enough to state that the Bible teaches this or that idea, not for the heathen or the disbelievers. Through the liturgy and the homilies the belief sank deeply into the hearts of the people. In the third or fourth century an unknown preacher praised the Jews—or according to a various reading the Jewish-Christians—for believing in this doctrine and blessing the Lord, "who is trustworthy to revive the dead."¹ In Judaism the prayer and confession was on all lips: "We believe and recognize that Thou art the one who restores our souls into dead bodies."² However, the heathen world viewed the doctrine askance, although there are indications that the thinkers of the Old World were familiar with a similar teaching and thought of a blessed future life.³ Still the rabbis were asked: "How will the resurrection take place?" They entered into the problem from various points of view.

The first question asked ran: "Since the dead are but dust, how can dust revive?" This was asked by a man called "Caesar"

¹ Midras Psalms, ed. Buber, p. 240, and Hamanig, p. 55, by Abraham ben Natan of Lunel; cf. my *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien*, I, 27 f.

² See Midras Psalms, ed. Buber, p. 210; Singer's *Prayer Book*, p. 5; Gen. Rabba, chap. xlviii; Lam. Rabba, chap. iii.

³ See Friedlaender, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms.*, IV, 365 ff.

(emperor) of Rabban Gamaliel II. The patriarch's daughter gave the answer on his behalf. We have two versions of it. According to the first version, she gives an illustration of two workmen, one of whom made figures from earth and the other from water. Which is held in higher esteem? The latter one said: "He (God) created men of water, how much more so is He capable of forming (the dead) of dust." According to the other version, she said: "A glassblower makes glass which anyone can break, yet he is able to mend it. Surely God, who breathes His own spirit into the human being, has at least the same power."¹

A man called Gabiha ben Pasisa, who probably lived before the destruction of the Temple, was asked by a Min: "Ye wicked Jews! You say that the dead will revive, (true it is that) the living will but die, how can the dead revive?" Gabiha answered: "Ye wicked people! Woe to you who teach that there is no resurrection, seeing that those who have lived not come to life, how much more will those who have lived come to life again?" He (the Min) said: "You call me wicked, wait till after the resurrection and I will straiten thy crookedness!" Gabiha replied: "If you do it, I will call you an experienced doctor and you will receive a good fee" (b. Sanh. 91a).

R. Joshua b. Chananja was asked by the emperor Hadrian: "How will God breathe life into a human being in the world to come?"² A philosopher, Eunamaos of Gadara, wished to refute R. Meir's belief in the resurrection. He was ready to grant a possibility of a spiritual resurrection, and said: "(Do you think perhaps) that all the wool entering the pot comes out of it in the same weight?" (b. Hagiga 15b). R. Nathan, a contemporary of R. Meir, asserts that in the world to come the bodies will be clothed in the same garments as those worn at their interment.³

R. Hanina b. Hama (about 220-240) dealt with the problem whether those who had defects on their bodies would rise with or

¹ b. Sanh. 91a; cf. *Jewish Review*, V. 69. The same parable is quoted by R. Jose ben Chalafta, Gen. Rabba, xiv, 8.

² Midr. Kohelet Rabba 197, 2; Lev. Rabba, chap. xviii; cf. *Jewish Review*, v, 72, and Gen. Rabba, chap. xxviii.

³ Jer. Kelaim, chap. ix, p. 7.

without their old defects. From many statements which we are about to quote, it seems that the question was frequently asked, and resulted in a good deal of popular speculation. R. Hanina says: "If one died as a lame man he will revive likewise, if he died as a blind man, he will be restored likewise, so that people should not say: Some people died and other people were quickened."¹ The same argument is used by an anonymous author (Gen. Rabba 95, 1) where it is said: "God could heal those with defects, but in order to prevent argument against the doctrine, He does not heal them."² R. Simon b. Lakis (before 280) said: "There is a contradiction in Isa. 35:6 and Jer. 31:7, holding that the dead will revive with their defects, but they will be healed afterward" (b. Sanh. 91b).

R. Ami, a rabbi of the fourth century, answered the question, "How can dust come to life again?" with the following parable: "A king once said to his ministers: Go and erect for me great palaces, where there is neither water nor dust. They went and built them, yet after a few days the buildings fell into ruins. Then the king said: Go and erect palaces where there is plenty of water and dust! They (the ministers) said: We cannot do it. The king retorted: Where there was neither water nor dust you were able to build it, how much more where there is plenty of water and dust." Then R. Ami gave the illustration of the mouse as demonstrating the possibility of the resurrection (b. Sanh. 91a).³

From all these quotations we see that the queries of those who doubted the resurrection of the dead took the forms: Is God capable of performing this action or not? How will they revive?

It may be interesting to glance at the kindred literature of the church. We refer chiefly to two treatises—first, that of Athenagoras, and then secondly, that of Tertullian dealing with the resurrection. Athenagoras and Tertullian are both concerned with the very difficulties which the rabbis considered in their disputations. Thus is the reality of the problem shown.

¹ Midras Eccl. Rabba to Eccl. 1. 4.

² See Tanhuma, ed. Buber, I, 209; R. Berachja Eccl. Rabba to 1:16, and Midras Zuta, ed. Buber, p. 85.

³ See Plinius, *Hist. Nat.*, IX, 58, 84.

Athenagoras and Tertullian both deal with the following questions: (a) Has God the power to revive the dead? (Athenagoras, chap. iii). Athenagoras answers: Yes, God is able to do it. Tertullian goes farther and says: One ought not to regard the lowliness of the material (the body), but rather the dignity and the skill of the Maker (chap. v). We have seen above how the rabbis met these objections. (b) How can God revive those who were killed or devoured by wild animals or eaten by fish in the ocean or those who were slain on the battle-fields or those who perished in famine? (Athenagoras, chaps. iii-viii). Tertullian summarized the questions thus: Now you are a shrewd man, no doubt, but will you then persuade yourself that, after this flesh has been withdrawn from sight and touch and memory, it can never be rehabilitated from corruption to integrity, from a shattered to a solid state, from an empty to a full condition, from nothing at all to something, from the devouring fires, and the waters of the sea, and the maws of beasts, and the crops of birds, and the stomach of fishes, and time's own great paunch itself, of course yielding it all up again? (chap. iv). In the Jewish apocalyptic literature Elijah points out, no doubt with a polemical purpose, that God will gather the elements of those who have perished in the high sea and have found their grave therein.¹ (c) Shall the blind, the lame, the one-eyed, the leper, and the palsied come back again, although there can be no pleasure in returning thus to their old condition? (Tert., chap. iv). It is interesting to draw attention to the numerous statements in the rabbinical literature which allude to the objections of the heretics which are, of course, also quoted "in very subdued and delicate phrases, as suited to the character of our style," as Tertullian expresses himself. An anonymous rabbi states: "First as the man leaves this world, so will he return to life: a blind man returns blind, a lame one lame, and so on. Why? Has God no power to heal them? Yes, (He has) but they (the heretics) should not say: When they were alive, He (God) could not heal them, now after death He has healed them. It would then seem to us, that they are not the same people, but quite different people."² R. Simon b.

¹ Jellinek, *Beṭ-ha Midras*, III, 67.

² Gen. Rabba xcv, 1; cf. Tanhuma, ed. Buber, I, 208.

Lakis (before 278) also discussed the question (b. Sanh. 91b), as we saw above. R. Levi states: "After the resurrection all the mutilated ones will recover, except the serpent" (Gen. Rabba xx, 5). There seems to have been another question raised: How can there be room in the world for all those who have died since the first Adam to the resurrection?¹ (d) In this category we mention the questions put by Tertullian in this way: Will the flesh again be subject to all its present wants, especially meals and drinks? Shall we have to suffer pain in our bowels and with organs of shame to feel no shame and with all our limbs to toil and labor? (chap. iv). These questions with which the church Father deals at length were considered by the rabbis as well. We shall give here only a brief content of their doctrines. After the resurrection there will be no more death, and the revived will live without pain and sin.² They eat and drink joyfully and live in pleasure³ without any evil inclination, that is, feeling no shame.⁴ There can be no doubt that the rabbis endeavored to picture the life after the resurrection in this way in order to satisfy all the questioners on these points.

We infer from this fact that the rabbis as well as the church Fathers believed in the resurrection. One may add that they did not hold a spiritual interpretation as did Philo;⁵ but believed in a real restoration of the body. Epstein wanted to show that there were many among the rabbis who shared this view. It is a problem still unsolved whether or not these alleged Essene rabbis actually existed. First of all we have to consider R. Pinchas b. Jair's teaching: "The holy spirit leads to the resurrection of the dead" (b. Aboda Zara 20b). We cannot see that there is a word about spiritual resurrection in this dictum. The other rabbi, Hijja bar Abba, had probably never heard of the Essenes and their ideas. It is impossible, therefore, to agree with Epstein's theory.⁶ It seems clear

¹ See Tanhuma, ed. Buber, III, 20.

² See b. Ros Hasana 31a; Sanh. 9, 2a; Friedmann, *Seder Elijahu Rabba* (Vienna, 1902), pp. 7, 20 ff.

³ Cf. M. Aboth, 4, 1; b. Ber. 5a; and see *Seder Elijahu*, p. 14.

⁴ b. Sukka 52a; *Seder Eliah*, pp. 19, 81.

⁵ *De cherubim*, I, 159; Josephus, *Wars*, III, 8.

⁶ *Osar Hachochma Vehamada*, p. 17.

that the rabbis did not hold the view of a spiritual resurrection, thus agreeing with Athenagoras and Tertullian, although we find that some of the church Fathers (e.g., Origen) taught a spiritual resurrection.¹

5. The resurrection doctrine placed the rabbis of the second and third centuries in a difficult position. They were attacked on one side by Christians who referred to the reported deeds of Jesus who quickened many to life and who proved the doctrine by his own resurrection. On the other hand, there were the Gnostics, who denied the possibility of the doctrine. Thus we hear Rabbi Jehudah (after 135) preaching: "If one tells thee that God will restore the dead to life, reply to him: It was already done by Elijah, Elisah, and Ezekiel" (Lev. Rabba, chap. xxvii). This homily cannot be interpreted except as a polemical argument against those who laid so much stress on the events related about Jesus. The rabbi could not have denied the doctrine of the resurrection, which, as we saw above, was already established as one of the fundamental dogmas of Judaism, without being condemned as a dangerous heretic. He wanted to show that the deeds of Jesus were not at all unique. Such miracles happened also in the times of the prophets and also after their time.² The rabbis believed, as many of the midrashic legends show, that the pious and righteous are capable of reviving the dead. The belief in the resurrection doctrine is one of the most familiar motives in rabbinical legends. A few illustrations must suffice. A slave of Emperor Antonius died and the patriarch (Jehudah the prince) sent one of his pupils, R. Simon b. Chalafta, to restore the slave to life.³ King David was restored to life for a brief period at the dedication of the Temple in Jerusalem (Exod. Rabba viii, 1). We know now that such legends influenced in marked degree the legends of the saints in the mediaeval literature.⁴ It is obvious that Jews believed that pious learned and great men

¹ See Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, I, 223.

² See my *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien*, I, 37.

³ See Lev. Rabba x, 4.

⁴ See about them H. Guenther, *Die christliche Legends des Abendlandes* (Heidelberg, 1910), pp. 25 ff.; cf. Gaston Poris, *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Volkskunde*, XIII, 1 ff.

in the past as well as in the present were and are powerful enough to perform miracles which master even the angel of death and thereby overcome even the limits set by Nature herself. This was used as the test in the eyes of many Jews with regard to Jesus' mission, and wherever Paul and the apostles referred to these facts, Jews were silenced thereby.

We have given proofs for the undeniable fact that the rabbis fought against disbelief in the doctrine of the resurrection. It is a great mistake to assume, as is generally done by historians dealing with the first three centuries, that Jews abandoned their propaganda among the nations of the world and ceased to preach and call on the name of the God who created heaven and earth! and lost their courage to fight idol-worship and heathen mannerless customs after the first century when the church was first established. The rabbis did not give way. They fought bravely, true to their convictions and ancient mission, as their numerous sermons and statements testify. That their voice was not heard as it ought to have been was surely not their fault. The visible effect of their teaching was in no way equal to their great efforts. The reason is quite obvious. They were a small and moreover an oppressed minority; and even in spiritual matters might unfortunately ousts right. They had also to strive against many political and social hindrances and obstacles. Finally, owing to foreign influence and the great persecutions to which they were subjected, they had to keep their own people true to their religious ideals, a very difficult task when all the world's hatred and enmity surrounded them. We find opposition to the doctrine of the resurrection in the third century. Rabbi Simon ben Lakis (before 280) says: "If one tells thee that the dead will not revive, tell him there was Elijah, who revived the dead."¹ The Minim (or heretics) here are surely not Christians (κατ'ἐξοχήν) but, as is always the case, they were heretics.²

The rabbis give us the name of a famous heretic, Elisa ben Abuja (about 130), who denied the resurrection dogma.³ But they

¹ See Tanhuma, ed. Buber, IV, 41; Num. Rabba, chap. xiv, Agadat Bereschit., ed. Buber, p. 106.

² See the *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. III, No. 1 (1904), p. 196; Professor H. Oort's learned review on *Christianity in Talmud*, by R. Travers Herford (London, 1903).

³ See Midr. Kohelet Rabba clxxiii, 29.

also give us another type of heretic, who opposed this teaching. We have reference to "Esau." It is a very important point, and we refer to it briefly, for the understanding of Haggada generally and the rabbinical Haggada in particular. The point is that they represented the characters and habits of the biblical personages according to their own view and judgment. Of course the goodness and the saintliness of the pious patriarchs and prophets are glorified to the utmost in the light of piety and reverence, while the wickedness and cruelty, the faithlessness and atrocity of those who were condemned by the Scriptures, are depicted in the most glaring colors. Whether this attitude was just or not is not our concern. It reflects, however, the thoughts and ideas of the men who uttered these statements, and the circumstances which produced them. We know that the Gnostics liked such names in the Scriptures which were disliked by pious and good people. Thus Cain, the generation of the flood, Esau, Korah, Balaam, and so on became the heroes of the heretics.¹ We can therefore assert that when the rabbis speak of Esau as being a man who denied the resurrection,² they really meant their own contemporaries, who, whether they chose Esau as their ideal or not, did not accept this doctrine. We do not wish to imply that only this sect did not believe in the resurrection, for we find the denial also attributed to Cain and of course to his followers; however, the sect of Esau, so called by themselves or by the rabbis, existed.

Finally let us refer to a few of the rabbinic conceptions as to the resurrection. The resurrection will take place either before or after the advent of the Messiah. Old Tannaitical sources distinguish between the days of the Messiah and the time of resurrection.³ The resurrection will be one of the signs heralding the advent of the Messiah, according to the *Didache*, xvi, 6. This idea is borrowed from the Sybilline Oracles.⁴ The rabbis did not share this view. They held that the resurrection will take place after the appearance

¹ See Jrenäus, *Adv. Haer.*, I, 31.

² See *Gen. Rabba* 63, 20; *Pesikta Rabbati* 48a, 49b; *Midr. Psalms*, p. 10a; *Ps. Jon. Gen.* 36.

³ See Klausner, *Die messianischen Vorstellungen*, pp. 18 ff.

⁴ See Hoennicke, *Das Judentum*, p. 358.

of the Messiah.¹ In the later Jewish apocalyptic literature this sign plays an important part. We read that the Messiah comes to the Israelites and reveals himself, whereupon they say: "Go and revive the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." The patriarchs say: "Go to Adam; he shall be the first to be restored to life, then we come."² Another remarkable feature of these speculations is that those who are buried in Palestine will be the first to be revived.³ As we have already said, the mutilated will also be quickened, but with their defects; afterward God will heal them.⁴ Even those who found their graves in the depths of the sea—a problem dealt with at length by Athenagoras and Tertullian—will be quickened to life.⁵ The *Pirke of R. Eliezer*, a very important book of the sixth or seventh century (an English translation of which, by Rev. Gerald Friedlaender, will appear shortly) devotes an entire chapter to our problem (chap. xxxiv). Thus the belief in the resurrection became one of the most important dogmas of Judaism. Fortified by this belief, Jewish warriors, few in number, fought the innumerable legions of Rome (the children of Edom and Esau). Jews bore all their countless sufferings and the indescribable cruelties of martyrdom in many lands a thousand and thousand times during their history. The speculations of philosophers and theologians concerning a bodily or spiritual resurrection mattered very little. What did matter was what the rabbis taught concerning eternal reward and punishment. Israel believed and felt in its heart that the Day of Judgment would come, when God alone would decide who was right and who was wrong. This is in our days not merely the particular belief of a small community, but, through the teaching of Israel, the majority of believers of all denominations look forward to the great Day of God, when might will give way to right.

¹ See the material in Klausner's book quoted above, pp. 22-23.

² See Jellinek, *Bet-ha Midras*, III, 13; Horovitz, *Bet Eked Agadot*, I, 58; Wertheimer, *Leket Midrasim*, pp. 6, 12.

³ See Joma 71a; Gen. Rabba, lxxiv, 1; Tanhuma, ed. Buber, I, 214.

⁴ See Gen. Rabba xcvi, 1; Tanhuma, ed. Buber, I, 208.

⁵ See Jellinek, *Bet-ha Midras*, III, 67.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

BOOKS ON THE STUDY OF RELIGION

Four volumes on the reviewer's table illustrate the variety of interest which attaches to this subject. Most comprehensive is the work of Professor Toy¹ which doubtless condenses for us the results of many years of study. More completely than any single volume which has yet appeared it "describes the customs and ideas that underlie all public religion." The danger which confronts an attempt of this kind arises from the mass of material which must be handled. The reader may easily become confused by a multitude of details. The danger has been avoided in the book before us by a clear and simple scheme of arranging the material. After an introduction on the nature of religion we have a discussion of beliefs about the soul. This is followed by a chapter on early religious ceremonies and this by one on early cults. Totemism and taboo are next in order. After these we come to the gods and the myths. Magic and divination have a single chapter. The concluding portion of the book takes up in order the higher theistic development, the social development, and the scientific and ethical elements in religion. A bibliography which fills nearly forty pages is appended and the volume has both a detailed table of contents and an index.

A paragraph near the beginning of the book may be quoted here as giving the author's view of the development of religion:

As a basis of the religious feeling we must suppose a sense and conception of an extrahuman Something, the cause of things not otherwise understood. All things were supposed to have life and therefore to be loci of force; man's sense of social relation with this force constituted his religion. This sense was at first doubtless vague, ill-defined, or undefined, and in this form it is now found in certain tribes. Gradually as the processes of human life and the external world become better known, and the vastness of the extrahuman control becomes evident, the Something is conceived of as great, then as indefinitely great, and finally, under the guidance of philosophic thought, as infinite. Thus the sense of the infinite may be said to be present in man's mind in germinal form at the beginning of truly human life, though it does not attain full shape, is not formulated, and is not effective, till the period of philosophic culture is reached [§ 9, p. 5].

¹ *Introduction to the History of Religions*. By Crawford Howell Toy. (Handbooks on the History of Religions edited by Morris Jastrow, Jr.) Boston: Ginn & Co., 1913. xx+640 pages. \$3.00.

Although religion is thus something in man's mind—the mind of the individual—its importance in human history arises from the fact that it is a social force: religious development goes hand in hand with social organization. Hence the importance of ritual—the social activity in which the community expresses its relation to superhuman powers. Such activity may not *consciously* assume the existence of well-defined personal divinities, but it logically implies such personalities. The conception of an impersonal life-force (*mana*, *orenda*, *wakonda*) which some are inclined to make the first stage of religion does not, according to Professor Toy, have the importance attributed to it; it is rather a scientific biological conception. *Mana* itself is not worshiped; worship is directed toward the person or thing which possesses *mana*. Evidence that it is not the earliest religious conception may be found in the fact that it does not appear in the most primitive communities but in those which have made considerable advance.

By beginning his discussion with ideas of the soul our author apparently gives his adherence to the theory known as animism, although he does not trace all religion to the worship of departed spirits. In fact he allows some weight to the theory of a primitive monotheism. He says:

Very generally in low tribes a local supernatural personage is invested with great power; he is creator, ruler, and guardian of morals; where a tolerably definite civil and political organization exists he has virtually the position and performs the functions of a tribal chief, only with vastly greater powers and privileges; where there is no such organization he is simply a vaguely conceived, mysterious man who has control of the elements and of human fortunes and punishes violations of tribal custom. Such a personage is, however, at best only the highest among many supernatural Powers [p. 461].

It would be interesting to notice what the author has to say about totemism, magic, divination, ancestor-worship, the mysteries, the origin of religious communities (churches), but space forbids and the reader must consult the volume. The treatment is sane, cautious, and at the same time sympathetic. The book may be commended as an introduction to a subject of growing importance.

Different in character is Mr. Cook's volume.¹ Instead of a systematic treatise we have a series of essays on particular topics. The title might properly read: "Reflections on the Comparative Study of Religions." This is not said in depreciation; it is well that we should consider questions of method, especially where a rising science is

¹ *The Study of Religions*. By Stanley A. Cook. London: A. & C. Black, 1914. xxiv + 440 pages. 7s. 6d.

concerned. Mr. Cook, who is well known as an Old Testament scholar, has had occasion to notice the discord which accompanies the discussion of new theories. Something similar may be observed in other sciences; investigators are influenced more or less consciously by their presuppositions. There is a conservative attitude which feels a loss of value in giving up old positions. There is, again, the exclusively critical attitude, rejoicing in the destruction of old beliefs. A third party, not content either with the old affirmations or the new denials, seeks a reconstruction on a broader basis. This last is the one we should join, bearing in mind always that when we objectify "science" and speak of its "advance" we are using figures of speech. What actually takes place in the "advance of science" is a complicated psychological process, the interchange of views among a great number of investigators.

Apply this to the science of religion. When we speak of survivals, meaning customs which have persisted from earlier ages, we too readily assume that in thus labeling them we have disposed of them. We lose sight of the fact that if a thing survives it must have value for some minds. The worship of local divinities (saints or guardian spirits) in Palestine where Moslem monotheism has been the official religion for centuries is a significant example. To dismiss it as a mere relic of the past is to ignore its meaning. It attests the need of the human heart for a God near at hand rather than an Allah in the far-off heavens. The conclusion is that "from a scientific point of view the prevalence or persistence among ordinary individuals of beliefs and practices which we reject, repudiate, or are unable to understand is distinctly important for our conception of human nature," and of course for our conception of religion.

After a general statement of what is involved in the science of religion the author takes up the subject of specialism and individualism. Two chapters are devoted to survivals and their significance. Two discuss environment and change, and two more are given to development and continuity. The chapter on failure and success which follows is especially instructive, showing by historical example that the progress of mankind has been due not so much to what would-be reformers (whether saints, statesmen, socialists, or scholars) have tried to impose as to what the average thought could assimilate. Hence the persistence with which new movements represent themselves as a return to some earlier, supposedly purer and better state of things. The final chapter of the book sums up some features of the development of thought. Although not easy reading the volume is suggestive and stimulating and may be commended to the thoughtful reader.

Professor Beth devotes his monograph to the relation of magic and religion among uncivilized peoples.¹ The divergence of view among scholars on this point is well known. Some hold that magic is the earliest form of religion. Others maintain that magic is early science rather than early religion. Others again would say that magic and religion have developed along parallel lines from something which we might call premagical and prereligious. Finally some might say that magic is a degenerate form of religion. Professor Beth seems to incline to this last theory. He finds in Madagascar, for example, the residuum of an ancient monotheistic faith. In favor of this early faith he urges the importance of the idea of *mana*. "We discover along with the belief in demons and spirits, which is distinct and well marked, a less distinct belief in this invisible and incorporeal Power which is apprehended as something universal and yet which belongs to the individual, since it promises him protection and prosperity." One suspects that the author has fallen a victim to one of the presuppositions against which Mr. Cook warns us and has read more into the mind of the savage than is actually there.

The plan of the book is first to state the animistic and the preanimistic theory of the origin of religion, then to take up the arguments advanced by advocates of these theories, among whom Tylor, Frazer, and Marett are conspicuous. Next magic is described as it now exists among "primitive" peoples and its psychological basis is investigated. The next chapter discusses the supersensible power which appears under the names *mana*, *orenda*, and the others. The final section sets forth the results of the inquiry into the relations of magic and religion and the deductions as to the origin of religion. The arguments designed to refute the views of Tylor, Frazer, Wundt, and others are skilfully presented but I cannot discover that the author has made any distinct contribution to our knowledge and a number of his statements distinctly invite contradiction.

Dr. Nicholson's little volume² introduces us into the inviting field of oriental mysticism. It is one of the Quest series in which we have already the *Jewish Mysticism* of Dr. Abelson and the *Buddhist Psychology* of Mrs. Rhys Davids, besides a volume on *Psychical Research*

¹ *Religion und Magie bei den Naturvölkern*. Ein religionsgeschichtlicher Beitrag zur Frage nach den Anfängen der Religion. By Karl Beth. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1914. xii+238 pages. M. 5.00.

² *The Mystics of Islam*. By Reynold A. Nicholson. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1914. viii+178 pages. 2s. 6d. or \$1.00.

and one on the *Quest of the Holy Grail*. After a brief introduction which discusses the appearance of mysticism in Christianity, neo-Platonism, Gnosticism, and Buddhism we come to Islam in which Sufism and its experiences are the subject of the book. The sources here are mostly Persian. I am not competent to criticize Dr. Nicholson's renderings, but the phenomena he describes are those familiar to us in all mysticism. There is the same emphasis on asceticism, on self-renunciation, on quietism, on absorption in the Infinite. The Moslem saints are own brothers to the enraptured monks and nuns of mediaeval Christianity and to the Yogis of India. They experience the same illumination, and the experience in the one case as in the other cannot be described in words. All the saints are credited with miracles, though some of them lay no stress on them. Some in every communion despise outward ordinances:

The true mosque in a pure and holy heart
Is builded: there let all men worship God;
For there He dwells, not in a mosque of stone.

A recurrent phenomena is self-hypnotism, self-delusion rising to identification of the self with God. The temptation to antinomianism is never far away, for he who has the inner light is released from all legal bonds:

The man of God is made wise by the Truth,
The man of God is not learned from book.
The man of God is beyond infidelity and faith,
To the man of God right and wrong are alike.

Revolt as we may from some of these extreme declarations, we need not doubt that in the ranks of the Sufis are many sincere seekers after God and many who love Him for Himself alone.

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THE NEW TESTAMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The work here reviewed¹ is not an Introduction to the New Testament in the generally accepted sense of that phrase. In fact it omits any extended reference to some matters which would require consideration in a regular Introduction and discusses other topics which would

¹ *The New Testament in the Twentieth Century. A Survey of Recent Christological and Historical Criticism of the New Testament.* By Maurice Jones. London: Macmillan, 1914. xxiv+467 pages. \$3.00.

not be found therein. It is rather an attempt to give the reader a general but clear impression of the present positions of critical scholarship on the vital questions in the New Testament field. In the main it is a successful attempt, and the book will be found valuable to many who have neither the time nor the means to make more extended investigation.

The volume is divided into two "books," the first of which is mainly concerned with christological investigation and speculation. The Christology of the Liberal Protestant School, the "Jesus or Christ" controversy, the somewhat analogous discussion "Jesus or Paul," the Christ Myth, and the eschatological problem are all passed under review and evaluated. To the chapters dealing with these subjects two others are added, one on "St. Paul and the Mystery Religions" (a very useful chapter in spite of some defects), and a second which bears the title "The Language of the New Testament."

The second "book" deals with the literary problems of the New Testament. No separate treatment is given to the first three Gospels, but the Synoptic problem is succinctly set forth and the present positions indicated. The Acts of the Apostles receives an adequate share of attention, the work of Ramsay and Harnack being especially considered. Only those of the Pauline Epistles whose genuineness is doubted come in for detailed discussion. The Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, the Epistle to the Ephesians, and the Pastoral Epistles are thus singled out. The Epistle to the Hebrews and the General Epistles find a worthy place in the treatment. The book concludes with four chapters on the Johannine literature, considerable space being given to the Gospel. The conclusions reached and the positions held are in general those of the moderately critical English school. A method frequently used in this volume in presenting a problem is to give a condensed but clear statement of the views of representative scholars and then to pass judgment on the whole situation. The moderation of the book will commend it to a wide constituency, while the general fairness, the clearness of expression, and the fine spirit of the author make the reading of the work attractive.

A few minor matters call for attention in the way of criticism. While discussing the "Jesus or Christ" movement the author makes a statement which tends, doubtless unintentionally on his part, to create a wrong impression. "The attitude of recent criticism which denies the unity of the New Testament, and whose main purpose is to create a breach between the Jesus of history and the Christ of worship has attracted considerable interest in our own country" (p. 26). Are the

terms "purpose" and "create" used fairly and accurately here? The attempt to explain the predictions of the future judgment and kingdom which are attributed to Jesus is eminently unsatisfactory from the standpoint of a historical understanding of the Jewish eschatology which lay back of our gospel representations. The adjustments which the writer attempts are awkward. In speaking of the chronology of the mystery religions and arguing the point that they were too late to have effective influence on Paul, the author has surely been led into overstatement in the following sentence: "With the exception of the Serapis cult the mystery religions were not widely diffused in the Empire until the middle of the second century, and it was not until after this that they became transformed from local cults into universal mystery religions" (p. 137). In the chapter on "The Language of the New Testament" is not the question begged when the argument regarding the Greek used in their writings is based on the assumption of the use of Aramaic by the authors of "the Epistles of St. James, St. Jude, and I St. Peter"? Another instance of overstatement is found on pp. 230-31 where the author in speaking of the work of Hawkins and Harnack says that they "have subjected the Lucan writings to an exhaustive linguistic analysis, and have proved to the satisfaction of all who approach the subject, free from presuppositions, that the author of the diary in the later chapters of Acts is one with the author of the whole book and of the Third Gospel."

A valuable feature of the work is the inclusion of selected bibliographies which are placed at the beginning of the treatment of the various topics of the book. By means of these the reader is directed as to further pursuit of his studies in these fields. As a rule these bibliographies are carefully selected, but occasionally one is surprised to note the omission of books of the first importance. Surely Case, *The Historicity of Jesus*, Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur*, Radermacher, *Neutestamentliche Grammatik*, should be included. Others of equal importance could easily be mentioned.

But apart from these minor matters the work is a welcome one and should render a service of which other books are incapable. Its value will be increased if it should impel its readers to further investigation of the problems outlined. The author's excellent literary style and work of a high order on the part of the publishers combine to add to the pleasure of reading the volume.

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BOUSSET'S JÜDISCH-CHRISTLICHER SCHULBETRIEB

This volume¹ is an important contribution to the question of literary originality in the writings of Philo, Clement of Alexandria, and a few other Christian authors. The main part of the discussion is devoted to Philo (pp. 8-154) and Clement (pp. 155-271). The manner of conducting instruction in the ancient school supplies the starting-point for the investigation. In lieu of the modern textbook it was customary for the ancients to employ outline notes, somewhat like modern *syllabi*, as a basis of instruction. These γράμματα ὑπομνηματικά, in the first instance supplied by some teacher beforehand or else taken down by his pupils as he lectured, ultimately came to be a common possession of the schools and so circulated with no author's name attached. They are to be distinguished from books prepared for publication (γράμματα συνταγματικά) and were in fact sometimes taken as the basis for works of the latter sort. There was no conscious plagiarism involved in this use of these documents, since the ὑπομνήματα lacked any ἐπιγραφή.

In the light of this situation Bousset examines specimens of Philo's writings with a view to determining Philo's dependence upon older authorities. After noting a few instances in which Philo refers to predecessors, who are thought to have been Jewish exegetes with strong leanings toward Stoic teaching, Bousset examines in turn a selection of cosmological fragments, *Legum allegoriae* i-ii, *De ebrietate*, *De congressu eruditionis gratia*, *De somniis* i-ii, *De fuga et inventione*, and, lastly, a group of writings assigned to the youth of Philo (*De aeternitate mundi*, *De providentia* i-ii, and *Quod omnis probus liber*). Inconsistencies in thought-content and structure lead to the conviction that Philo composed his exegetical writings, and especially his allegorical commentary, from source materials supplied by the Jewish exegetical schools of Alexandria, which antedated Philo. He is thought not to have employed to any appreciable extent pagan ὑπομνήματα, and indeed to have been much less favorably disposed toward Greek ways of thinking than were some of his Jewish teachers. Furthermore, he was not primarily interested in Hellenistic intellectualism; his temperament was rather that of the ecstatic and mystic. An exception, however, is made of his earlier writings, where direct use of Hellenistic materials is allowed.

While the author seems to us to minimize unduly Philo's direct obligations to Greek life and thought (e.g., to Posidonius), the importance

¹ *Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom: Literarische Untersuchungen zu Philo und Clemens von Alexandria, Justin und Irenaeus*. Von W. Bousset. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1915. viii+319 pages. M. 12.

and suggestiveness of this study are self-evident. It not only sheds light upon literary questions but it also furnishes a new point of view—or reinforces a method as yet too little used—for studying the life and work of Philo, as well as the content of Alexandrian Judaism.

The writings of Clement of Alexandria are investigated along similar lines. Following Callomp, Bousset finds that in the *Excerpts* and the *Eclogues* Clement used freely a source, derived from Pantæenus, which in a general sense may be called "gnostic." In the *Hypotyposes* he also used notes taken in the classroom of Pantæenus, and the sixth and seventh books of the *Stromata* are mainly an assemblage of traditional *Schulgut*. These writings are all pervaded by a "gnostic" atmosphere derived, not from Christian Gnosticism, but from oriental thought which found a congenial home in Egypt even in pre-Christian times and a trace of which is to be seen in the Hermetic literature. But in the earlier books of the *Stromata*, as well as in the *Paidagogos* and the *Protreptikos*, the situation is different. It is conceded that sources are employed in these compositions, but the tone of the substrata is less gnostic and they are thought to come from a time when Clement was in actual charge of the catechetical school of Alexandria. During this period he was less gnostic than Pantæenus had been, but after retiring from this position he took up again the notes he had taken earlier in life while attending the school of Pantæenus and their gnostic coloring dominated the thinking of his declining years. To this period, accordingly, are to be assigned those compositions which show a gnostic bias.

In a third section, which is scarcely more than an appendix, Bousset employs the idea of heritage from the schools to shed light upon the literary characteristics of Irenæus, Justin, and a few miscellaneous documents from other Christian writers of this same general period. In each instance school notes are found to play a considerable part in the composition.

The importance and suggestiveness of this whole study must be emphasized again, although the book is somewhat sketchy at many points and not sufficiently exhaustive to prove convincing throughout. But its value lies not alone in its proposed solution of specific literary problems. Perhaps even more significance should be attached to its incidental demonstration of the necessity of studying the activities of these ancient authors primarily in the light of their own immediate environment.

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TWO NEW NEW TESTAMENT COMMENTARIES

Plummer's *II Corinthians* in the "International Critical Commentary"¹ is one of the most needed and one of the best numbers in the New Testament section of this series. II Corinthians is a very difficult letter to interpret, and the author of the present work candidly states that he has no new solutions to offer for any of the numerous problems presented by the epistle. But he has carefully compiled current opinions and passed critical judgment upon them. As illustrating his conclusions, chaps. 10-13 are taken to be the main portion of the severe letter mentioned in II Cor. 2:3 f.; 7:8 f. which had been dispatched between the writing of I and II Corinthians. But II Cor. 6:14-7:1 is not, as has sometimes been supposed, an insertion in its present context. The question whether Paul visited Corinth between the writing of I and II Corinthians is answered affirmatively. The offender of II Cor. 2:5-10 is not to be identified with the sinner of I Cor. 5:1 f. but with some other person who had defied either Paul or Timothy, but more probably Paul. The opponents whom the apostle resists in the Second Epistle are not a continuation of any of the parties mentioned in I Corinthians but are new arrivals, a band of traveling Hellenistic Jewish-Christian missionaries who ascribed the moral laxity of some of the Corinthian Christians to Paul's abrogation of the Jewish law. Between the time of writing the first and second letters Paul's thought about the resurrection is believed to have undergone a slight change. At first he had fixed upon the judgment day as the time for clothing the soul with its proper spiritual body, but as the Parousia was delayed and the possibility of the apostle's own death became more imminent he came to believe that the soul would receive its appropriate spiritual embodiment immediately after death.

The formal arrangement of the commentary is the same as that of the earlier volume on I Corinthians. A new English rendering of the epistle section by section is followed by an explanatory paraphrase, and to this is added a detailed exposition of the Greek text phrase by phrase. Textual, lexical, and grammatical data, and the opinions of other interpreters, particularly of the ancients, are noted. The whole forms an excellent compendium of information arranged along the lines of the usual commentary. But the author makes little or no use of data from

¹ *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians*. By Alfred Plummer. New York: Scribner, 1915. lviii+404 pages. \$3.00.

the Hellenistic setting of Paul and the Corinthian Christians as a means of illuminating the content of the epistle.

Wohlenberg's commentary on I and II Peter and Jude in Zahn's *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament*, Band XV,¹ is a model of German conservatism in the treatment of critical problems. The traditional position is defended throughout. I Peter is thought to have been written from Rome early in the year 64 and to have been intended mainly for gentile readers in the territory mentioned in the opening sentence of the epistle. Although Peter was the author, the task of actual composition was performed by Silas who had been so long associated with Paul that Pauline coloring in the language of I Peter is not surprising. Moreover, Peter may be supposed to have had a knowledge of Paul's epistles. The composition of II Peter is placed about a year before that of I Peter. It was written from Antioch, originally in Hebrew and was sent to Christians in Galilee. The Epistle of Jude, written by the brother of Jesus, is dated early in the seventies. The author used the Hebrew original of II Peter and wrote to the same community to reinforce the earlier admonitions of that epistle. The main body of the commentary is devoted to an exposition of the Greek text. No attempt is made to lighten the reader's task by the help of a fresh translation or free paraphrase. As exemplifying the author's treatment of interpretative difficulties, we may epitomize his discussion of the passage which speaks of preaching to spirits in prison (I Pet. 3:18-20). The natural meaning, to the effect that Jesus between the time of his death and resurrection performed an evangelizing mission in the lower world, is rejected in favor of a strained interpretation designed to conserve traditional teaching regarding the impossibility of repentance after death. Accordingly, Christ must have preached to the spirits in prison before they went to prison. In other words, the pre-existent Christ preached to the Noachian sinners through the mouth of Noah shortly before the latter entered the Ark. This interpretation is typical of the method employed throughout the commentary, which in other respects is a substantial and scholarly piece of work, to bring first-century thinking into line with the orthodox wing of German Lutheranism.

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¹ *Der erste und zweite Petrusbrief und der Judasbrief*, ausgelegt von G. Wohlenberg. Leipzig: Deichert, 1915. lv+344 pages. M. 11.

A HISTORY OF THE JESUITS

Twenty years ago the Jesuits resolved to publish official histories of their labors in the various countries of Europe and America. Most of the volumes which have thus far appeared have dealt with the sixteenth century; thus Fouqueray has put forth two tomes which bring the history of the French Jesuits to the year 1604. The centenary of the restoration of the Society by Pius VII in 1814 has occasioned a number of works dealing with their activities in the last hundred years; following the precedent of the famous *Imago primi saeculi societatis Jesu* (Antwerp, 1640), Albers has given to the world *Liber saecularis historiae societatis Jesu* (Rome, 1914). The present volume of Burnichon is devoted to a detailed discussion of the work of the Order in France from the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1814 to the Revolution of 1830.¹

When the Jesuits returned in 1814 to the country from which they had been expelled under Louis XV a generation before the French Revolution, their leaders were aged exiles, who had survived in England or in Russia, and their primary task was to impress the Jesuit traditions on the members gathered by a preliminary organization, the *Pères de la Foi de Jésus*. Though some of the Jesuits engaged in revivalistic preaching and others gave themselves to the promotion of various "congregations" of women for religious work, the chief interest of the Society lay in the field of education. Lacking the financial means and the legal right to own schools, they obtained from friendly bishops the control of eight *Petits-Séminaires*, or schools designed to prepare boys for the study of Roman Catholic theology. Making no effort to exclude pupils not destined for holy orders, the Jesuits transformed these diocesan institutions into boarding-schools. The most successful and fashionable of these, situated in the old abbey of St. Acheul near Amiens, had at one time 900 pupils (p. 236). The ideals and operation of these schools, described in chaps. v and vi largely on the basis of unpublished sources, is of considerable pedagogical interest. There was manifest the tendency to react more and more from the eighteenth-century methods favored by the Fathers of the Faith in the direction of the *Ratio Studiorum* of 1599. One fundamental difference there was, however, between the Jesuits of the early nineteenth century and their predecessors: whereas the ancient

¹ *La Compagnie de Jésus en France. Histoire d'un siècle, 1814-1914*. Tome premier: 1814-1830. By Joseph Burnichon, S.J. Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1914. xlviii + 568 pages. Fr. 8.

Jesuits had maintained day schools, the members of the resuscitated order, having lost their endowments, and desiring to make money from the rich pupils to pay the expenses of poor lads of promise, embarked upon the untried sea of keeping boarding-schools. Here the boys were under perpetual supervision. Older pupils, called censors, were appointed in the interest of the community to report misdemeanors; in this the author sees not organized delation but something analogous to modern systems of self-government (p. 268). All the pupils and not merely the censors were required to report offenses of their fellows against the Catholic religion and against the groups of virtues signified by the word *honnêteté* (p. 269). Thus heresy-hunting, often regarded as a privileged sport, was considered a solemn duty "in which one cannot fail without sin."

The legal situation of the Jesuits in France was precarious: they were not authorized but merely tolerated by authorities who did not enforce existing laws. The ambiguous but transparent responses to governmental inquiries (p. 391, n. 1), concocted between Mgr. Cheverus, archbishop of Bordeaux (better known in America as the first bishop of Boston), and the heads of the French Jesuits, failed to save them from their implacable enemies, who insisted on the letter of the law. As the Jesuits refused to submit to the inspectoral authority of the university, which dominated what passed for a public-school system, there arose bitter conflicts in which the old accusations of lax morality, regicide, and ultramontanism played their part. The result was that in 1828 the Jesuits were excluded from the conduct of *Petits-Séminaires*, and these were forbidden in turn to take in other than bona-fide candidates for the priesthood. This enforced retirement from the field of secondary education set Jesuit priests, scholastics, and coadjutors, to the number of 456 (p. 550) free for the work of theological education and of securing a more thorough training for those of their own number who had been drawn too rapidly into the expanding activities of the schools. The interval of quiet was ended abruptly by the revolution of July, 1830, which cost Charles X his crown, and with him drove away those superlative representatives of the alliance of throne and altar, the French Jesuits. Slandered, plundered, threatened by mobs, the disciples of Loyola fled. Later they crept back to what they considered the post of duty. From the standpoint of M. Burnichon, they may have made mistakes in the difficult times of improvisation and of reorganization, but if they were not always wise as serpents, they were harmless as doves; the victims of evil men, of whom there is little good to say.

Like the work of Fouqueray, the book is an apology; its permanent value lies in the very considerable new material that it brings and in its vivid discussions of a famous boy's school. Even here one misses the keenly critical element, such as is supplied for a later period of Jesuit education in the biographies of the disillusioned ex-Jesuits Hoensbroech and Tyrrell. The publication is no doubt timely, for the present war might conceivably bring a reversal of the anticlerical policy of the Third Republic, to say nothing of the possibility of a throne whose main prop would be an adjacent altar. Even apart from these vain imaginings the book may be read with special interest in this country; for as the author remarks concerning the Society of Jesus (p. xl): "Nowhere at the present hour is it more alive and more flourishing than in North America."

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REALIGNMENTS IN THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

The first volume of *Systematische Theologie nach religionspsychologischer Methode*, by Professor Georg Wobbermin, of the University of Breslau, is devoted entirely to the question of method. This is because the author feels, after his twenty years of service as a theologian, that a unified and unequivocal method is the great need of theology at the present time. The method which he proposes and defends, as the special title of this first volume shows,¹ is that of the psychology of religion; and in working out the meaning of this method for theology Wobbermin effects a combination of the standpoints of Schleiermacher and William James. Here then is a new alignment in the field of the science of religion. Wobbermin, a neo-Ritschlian, goes back to Schleiermacher as a means of correcting Ritschl in respect to method—substituting the method of the psychology of religion for the explicitly normative method of Ritschl. But, also, the father of modern theology is held to need supplementing from the American philosopher, James; and the new work in the psychology of religion during the last two decades is to be given constructive value in the working out of a treatment of systematic theology. This is a broader approach to theology than the christocentric method made possible, and it promises different results from those which

¹ *Die religionspsychologische Methode in Religionswissenschaft und Theologie*, Band I of *Systematische Theologie nach religionspsychologischer Methode*. By Georg Wobbermin. Leipzig: Hinrich, 1913. vii+475 pages. M. 10.

the older Ritschlians, Kaftan, Wendt, and Häring, have put forth. At the same time Wobbermin carefully distinguishes his method from the *religionsgeschichtliche Methode* and assures us that by his procedure the evangelical conception of faith will be given full significance, and that the Reformation principle, which makes the Scriptures the sole source of articles of faith, will be carried through.

The author develops his position by very full and elaborate *Auseinandersetzung* with many other writers, particularly with those who have been influential in forming his own thought and with those who have criticized his previous writings. The first half of this volume is given to the presuppositions of the method. First of all the author takes up the task of determining the place of theology among the sciences. He finds Rickert's classification of the sciences into *Naturwissenschaft* and *Kulturwissenschaft* preferable to the prevailing classification into *Naturwissenschaft* and *Geisteswissenschaft*, chiefly because psychology has followed the natural science method; and he characterizes theology as a *selbstständige Kulturwissenschaft*. But this makes it necessary for him to distinguish the method of the psychology of religion from "mere empirical" psychology and the true *Kulturwissenschaft* from the positivistic treatment of culture. The needed distinction is effected in each case by insisting upon an epistemological orientation in essential accordance with the critical thinking of Kant. With respect to the general relation between theology and philosophy, Wobbermin holds that the former needs to presuppose from the latter a logic of the sciences and both a *Werttheorie* and an *Objekttheorie*, but in forming its *Weltanschauung* theology must not be subordinate to philosophy, but must work out directly the theory that is immanent in the Christian religion.

Passing to the task of theology and its subdivisions, the author again conceives his subject very broadly by defining theology as simply the science of religion. This view he defends over against the conceptions of theology as *Bibelwissenschaft*, as *Offenbarungs-Lehre*, and as *kirchliche Wissenschaft*, maintaining that, when the method of the psychology of religion is rightly used, justice is done to the element of truth in each of these other conceptions. Then, in harmony with his definition of theology, he would subdivide its systematic section simply under two heads: the essence of religion and the essence of Christianity. The distinction between dogmatics and ethics disappears, except for practical purposes, because in Christianity the fundamental religious conception, faith, is so thoroughly ethical in its meaning. Also dogmatics and apologetics largely merge; for in the apologetic task of determining

whether the Christian view of the world, or some other, gives the most satisfactory answer to the questions about the meaning of the world as a whole, the argument will turn largely upon the grounds of validity which are immanent in religion itself and in Christianity.

But the chief interest of the book lies in the positive development of the method of the psychology of religion. What is gained from James? According to the author, James is no less convinced than Schleiermacher of the independent value of religion and at the same time he goes much beyond him in bringing out its inner intrinsic contents. He also gives full recognition to the "truth interest" in religion. This is the real value of his pragmatism. At the same time Wobbermin emphasizes James's lack of historical interest and insists that his pragmatism is uncritical. Hence he holds that James in turn must be corrected by Schleiermacher. "James muss hier also durch den nach James zu korrigierenden Schleiermacher korrigiert werden" (p. 290). Now the fundamental tendency with Schleiermacher in respect to method is that he maintains an equilibrium between the transcendental analysis of religious experience and its historical aspects. Hence Wobbermin's position may be summed up as an advocacy of a *religionspsychologische Methode* which is kept true to its purpose by epistemological orientation and historical sense. Upon this method the author places his reliance in guarding against dogmatic traditionalism, constructive rationalism (Troeltsch, Otto-Fries), and every form of historicism.

There are some hints in this volume of what the proposed method will lead to in the construction of theology. Wobbermin accedes to the objection against speaking of religious knowledge as a special kind alongside of theoretical knowledge and maintains that for theology the ideas of religion represent, not knowledge, but convictions of faith. But though valid convictions of faith are not knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) they do give us truth (*Wahrheit*). Further, the critical analysis of the "logical structure" of the religious consciousness emphasizes the basic character of the idea of revelation. In the interpretation of revelation, however, there is an inevitable and legitimate "circle." For we test the purity of our own religious experience by historical revelation, and at the same time we read historical revelation in the light of our own religious experience. Finally, the Scriptures alone are made the source and norm of theology, and personal religious experience, notwithstanding the above-mentioned "circle," is not to be co-ordinated with the Scriptures. (Nothing is said here about the collective evolution of Christianity since New Testament times.) This emphasis upon the Scriptures

is held not to be contradictory to the use of our own experience in Scripture interpretation, because the Scriptures themselves are witnesses of personal faith. But within the Scriptures themselves there is a higher norm—not the teaching of Jesus, but the total impression of his personality, to be determined through the mutual corroborations of the Synoptic Gospels, the Pauline letters, and the Johannine writings.

This vigorous, thorough, and lucid introduction to Wobbermin's system, with its fresh method and its many-sided contact with the thought of the time, gives promise of much interest and fruitfulness in the future—notwithstanding the too elaborate *Auseinandersetzung* of the first volume and the too voluminous plan of the whole work. But two misgivings arise in the mind of the present reviewer. It is a disappointment to have the *religionspsychologische Methode*, which promises so much in the way of broad scientific interchange between theology and other departments of thought, suddenly narrowed down to the position that the Scriptures are the sole source and norm for Christian theology. This is incompatible with the idea, now gaining considerable acceptance, that later types of Christianity have a significance in some degree comparable with New Testament types, and so it is not the truest way to maintain the value of the Scriptures themselves.

And, secondly, it is regrettable to see the social interest, so strong in Ritschl himself, withdrawing almost beyond the horizon of Wobbermin's introductory volume. Of course it may be said that the social interest belongs, not to the setting forth of method, but to the later development of contents. But this was not true in the case of Ritschl, in view of his emphasis upon the Kingdom of God, and however the scientific methods of Ritschlianism need to be broadened, its social interest must be guarded and developed further. This regret is confirmed by the "example" of his method which Wobbermin gives in his closing chapter. He there contrasts his method with the *religionsgeschichtliche* method by considering the eschatological aspect of Jesus' idea of the Kingdom. Pointing out that the *religionsgeschichtliche* method has led to the view that the eschatological conception of the Kingdom, while primary for Jesus, is secondary for us—in contrast to which the critics of the school have been wont to hold that it was secondary for Jesus as it should be for us—Wobbermin maintains that the eschatological conception is primary, both for Jesus and for us. This position he takes because he considers the religious essence of the eschatological conception to be that the Kingdom of God is something above the whole space-time process, above the whole of empirical reality—some-

thing eternal in the Johannine sense of the term. Now from the social point of view the eschatological conception of the Kingdom must be secondary—if it was not so for Jesus, still it must be so for us. Seemingly here is a clear indication that Wobbermin in shaping his method is allowing the social interest of the Ritschlians to fall into the background.

The question then must be raised whether the author has succeeded in establishing the superiority of the *religionspsychologische* method over the *religionsgeschichtliche*. If the progressiveness of Christianity and the modern social interest of theology are to be guarded, will not the *religionsgeschichtliche* method, coupled as it may be with pragmatism, prove more adequate than Wobbermin's *religionspsychologische* method supplemented with Kantian criticism?

In Galloway's *Philosophy of Religion*¹ we are given a comprehensively constructed system instead of elaborate discussion of method. This volume of the "International Theological Library" replaces the one long promised from the late Professor Flint, and its author is one of Professor Flint's pupils; but the present book is entirely the work of Dr. Galloway, as Professor Flint on account of ill health had not accomplished any part of his projected task. In this work too we have evidence of new alignments in the scientific treatment of religion. These transitional tendencies appear in each of the three parts of the book. Part I, which is phenomenological, is indicative of the tendency to base theism upon religion instead of religion upon theism. Part II (epistemological) shows great hospitality toward pragmatism, though in the end rational consistency is placed higher than practical worth as a test of truth. In Part III (ontological) the metaphysics of absolute idealism is rejected and that of personal idealism is put in its place. The chief interest of the book centers around these three attitudes.

In the introduction the author defines the task which his subject presents as "the problem of the final meaning of religion as a constituent element in human development." He then sets aside the practice of giving a definition of religion at the outset and proceeds in Part I, on the basis of inductive study, historical and psychological, to discover what religion is. As a result he gives as a tentative definition: "Man's faith in a power beyond himself whereby he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and gain stability of life, and which he expresses in acts of worship and service." Religion as thus defined is regarded as a normal aspect of

¹ *The Philosophy of Religion*. By George Galloway. "International Theological Library." New York: Scribner, 1914. xii+602 pages. \$2.50.

human life, interacting fruitfully with its other aspects for human development. Science is described as having a utilitarian origin and as dealing only with quantitative relations. This leaves the realm of qualities, values, and ends to morality, art, and religion. Morality, in turn, gives us general rules or norms. "But they are not stereotyped principles, and they partake of the flexibility of the developing social system, where the good is a growing content." Hence morality must interact with religion in order to be fully fruitful. "The God who is the ethical Ground of the world guarantees the validity and persistence of the ethical values; and it is in and through man's relation to God, the perfect Good, that the ethical ideal can be transcended and completed." But though the author does most of his own interpretation by the use of the idea of development, he objects to the functional view of religion, holding that we must go beyond that standpoint to the question of the ultimate truth of religion. The upshot of Part I is that the development of religion gives us the idea of a living relation to a personal, ethical God as that which, according to the needs of religion, is the supreme truth of experience. Thus the existence of the Ultimate Value is a postulate of faith. This position raises two questions: What standing does faith have in the general field of knowledge? and What grounds of rationality does the idea of a personal ethical God have in comparison with the various speculative interpretations of reality? The discussions of these questions form the subjects, respectively, of Parts II and III.

After criticizing the various theories of knowledge, and justifying the use of analogy, teleology, and values in getting truth, Galloway brings out his own idea of what truth is. It is "not correspondence with transsubjective reality, but adequate *interpretation* of it." In gaining an adequate interpretation there are two factors. The first is working value in practical experience. This is the pragmatic test, and here faith has a large and inevitable rôle. The second is coherency with the system of knowledge. This is the more comprehensive test, but often it is indecisive, and then the determination of truth must be left to the pragmatic test. But since "coherency between all the elements of our experienced world is the most complete criterion of truth," the question of the ultimate truth of religion takes us into the ontological realm and demands that "a speculative theory of religion" be given. It may be pointed out here that, on account of the author's strong emphasis upon the developmental character of all experience, he has not really carried us beyond the principles of pragmatism, of which he makes such liberal use.

In the ontological discussions of Part III Galloway rejects absolute idealism because of the dilemma: "Either the Absolute Self is real and finite selves are an illusion, or finite selves are real and the Absolute Self is a fiction." This dilemma arises from the fact that every consciousness has a "being for self" which simply cannot be made a constituent of another consciousness. In the place of absolute idealism the author, working in dependence upon the personal idealists, Ward, Stout, and others, develops a monad theory, a doctrine of a plurality of experient centers ranging from human personalities down to simple monads far below the protozoa. He does not leave us with an ultimate pluralism, however, but on account of the harmony and interaction between the monads he recognizes an Ultimate World-Ground, which must be the personal and ethical God of religious faith. "God gives unity or system to the plurality of spiritual substances or experient centers, though he is not himself the unity in which they subsist." Galloway also makes a concession to realism. He does not believe in a complete reduction of matter to monads. In order to explain the relatedness of the monads there must be a continuous medium, and this medium should not be thought of as the World-Ground, for then the monads would be merged into something like the All-inclusive Consciousness of absolute idealism. "We must rather think of it as something brought into being and constantly sustained by the Supreme Will, and having no reality apart from that Will." Out of this medium the monads are differentiated and developed.

On the basis of this ontology Galloway proceeds to develop his views of the attributes of God, of the problems of evil and of human freedom, and of human progress and destiny. The results here attained represent a reasonably satisfactory working adjustment of Christian postulates and prevailing philosophical ideas. But as for the ontological basis itself, while personal idealism is a movement of much promise for the interpretation of religion, the present reviewer must confess that the author's notion of a "continuous medium" seems to him a decidedly unclear and dubious conception; and the notion of a World-Ground which "actively conditions experience" and which continuously "sustains" all finite selves, and yet which "is not himself the unity in which they subsist" seems to require much critical examination before it can be accepted as a consistent constructive idea.

In general, Dr. Galloway's book will be recognized as a very serviceable manual of the philosophy of religion, touching every phase of the subject, by way of allusion at least if not by more thorough treatment,

and fully abreast with contemporary movements of thought. It would have gained, however, by some such exactness of method as characterizes Wobbermin's work. The author's practice of giving a historical survey of what has been thought and said upon each several topic which he takes up, beginning almost *de novo* in each case, interferes with the impression of the forward movement of his own thought, and perhaps has obscured somewhat a lack of full correlation between the various parts of his work.

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There are those who believe that powerful preaching is a lost art. Jonathan Edwards, Chalmers, Spurgeon, Beecher, are giants of the past who cannot be equaled today. Where would one find sermons to match those of Martineau or Edward Everett Hale in their beauty of literary form and their mellow ripeness? Is there a living man in the pulpit who will leave behind him such volumes of sermons as those of Phillips Brooks or F. W. Robertson? Even if there were great preachers, would their sermons find enough readers to pay for their publication?

Such statements cannot, however, be lightly affirmed, or such questions quickly answered in the negative, without injustice to the real state of things. Most of the powerful preachers of the past were stimulated to unusual achievements by some great social or national crisis or by some exceptional religious awakening which followed an age of barrenness when there was no prophet in the land. Similar conditions will produce similar effects in the future. Again, it must be considered that the mental habits and the ecclesiastical conditions of the past, when the church-going public looked to the pulpit for information and intellectual guidance on all questions, and when the church had not recognized the claim or heeded the challenge of social problems, gave the preacher an opportunity and furnished him the leisure for sermon making which the minister of the present lacks. To develop literary charm or oratorical excellence requires leisure, time for pruning, exercise in the art of expression, to the exclusion of other things which are now held to be more essential. Still further, whatever may be said of the exceptional heroes of the pulpit, the *average* of preaching is higher now than in the age of the Wesleys and the Beechers. The days of formal pulpit eloquence, of long sermons with purple patches and florid descriptions of Swiss scenery,

are gone. Men today want something less flowery, more direct, more workman-like. If the competition of the newspaper and the sensationalism of the headliner have betrayed the superficial pulpiteer into methods unworthy of his calling or degrading to his message, the spirit of criticism and research which enters every precinct of human thought and endeavor is holding the teacher of religion to a strict account; and there is scarcely a denomination, even in sect-ridden America, whose ministry is not showing the effect for good in a gradually rising standard of excellence.

Meantime, there is good reason to suppose that the present age feels the need of spiritual ideals, of moral and religious motives and quietives, as much as any other. To satisfy that need grows increasingly difficult, to be sure. The pulpit is in competition with many agencies which either share its field or draw its hearers from the pews to other scenes, to sit, perhaps, on the bleachers of a baseball park, or possibly in the seats of the scorners who have outgrown prayers and sermons. But deep in the heart of every serious man and woman are roots of life which are nourished only by reverence, which feed upon those primal elements of faith and hope and love that flourish best in the religious atmosphere. Growing intelligence does not lessen the pangs of conscious evil, the stress of sudden sorrow, or the strain of continued moral pressure in a world whose complexity grows apace in every region of experience. Most people who read at all crave a touch of religion in the literature they favor in their more serious moods. It may be that good preaching will be sought out more eagerly in the near future than it was in the immediate past.

Preaching is truth conveyed through personality; good preaching depends as much on the character and responsiveness of the hearers as on the solid ability of the preacher. Sermons which have proved worthy to represent the best religious thought and feeling of their generation were usually preached to discerning listeners. Only a combination of good preachers and appreciative audiences could have produced such a set of discourses as those found in the volume of *University of Chicago Sermons*¹ published early this year. These sermons were preached by professors in the Divinity and allied departments of the University of Chicago, many of them being given at the regular Sunday morning religious services of the University. They were not made with the idea of publication, but represent the occasional pulpit ministry of these men

¹ *University of Chicago Sermons*. Edited by Theodore Gerald Soares. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1915. xii+348 pages. \$1.50.

to the churches. The volume contains eighteen sermons whose authors represent the departments of Sociology, Philosophy, History, Education and Comparative Religion, in addition to the Divinity School. There is a suggestive introductory essay, by the editor, on "The Need of Power in American Preaching," which none ought to skip. The first sermon will have added interest to many scores of readers because it was one of the last delivered by the beloved chaplain of the University, the late Professor Charles Richmond Henderson.

These sermons will be welcomed by every type of thoughtful person, of whatever creed or school, who desires to discover the trend of religious thought in its more dynamic forms. They might not stir the popular audience which is out for a sensation; but if they are as widely read as they deserve to be by ministers, teachers of religion, thoughtful laymen looking for light, they will advance the quality of many another sermon and prepare many a hearer to listen with greater discrimination. It would be difficult to gather into one volume of 350 pages a group of sermons which could cover more thoroughly and suggestively the great fundamental ideas, feelings and convictions which underlie all genuine religious experience. What is the real Test of Religion? What are the foundations of that Everlasting Kingdom of Righteousness with which the gospel of Jesus deals? Is the idea of God a mere hypothesis covering our ignorance, or is there some eternal, divine reality, transcending the Manufactured Gods of our self-will, which sanctions the confidence of the human soul in a power that creates a growing structure of enduring life in the midst of daily decay? Is there a Voice of God which can be understood, and is Prayer a mode of communion which intelligent men may use, which will satisfy "the craving of the blind for light, of the hungry for bread, of the oppressed for justice, of the weary for rest," and fill the hearts of men with genuine praise for the wonder and mystery of life? Wherein do the true Riches of Life consist? How shall we interest the race in those nobler values the investment of which would produce a "steady output of men and women of progressively higher quality"? The sermon titles of this volume (repeated in these queries) suggest answers to such questions as these, and, whether we agree with all of them or not, the answers are sincere, profound, and provocative of further thought. The reader is captured by a new faith in that Revival of Idealism the hope of which is set forth in such vivid terms in one of the best of these fine sermons; an idealism which unites all God's messengers who have caught visions of truth from noble heights and have

led men to believe that "God's best strikes hands with our best, and every man's best is equal in the sight of God."

If ministers and students of homiletics were to use this book of sermons as a guide to re-examine the factors with which the preacher must deal in order to be effective—the fundamental ideas which underlie our religion, the motives for faith and action, the quietives for fears or troubles—there is no doubt in the reviewer's mind that the process would serve a most desirable object. What were the inherited convictions and impulses which issued in the religion of Jesus? What more was there in that religion? What was new in the faith and experience of the early Christian church? What elements in the New Testament are the essential deposit of racial experience, the elements of faith and hope which will always be operative and which are contingent upon passing conditions or circumstances, the product of outgrown ideas, customs and formalities? What is the meaning of that prophetic attitude of religion which looks for the fulfilment of the profoundest hopes, not in the matching of events and beliefs with ancient words or symbols, but in the realization of the will of God in the souls of living men? What is the abiding significance of Jesus through the matchless influence of his spirit? How did the Christian doctrine of the atonement come into being and how is it actually related to what Jesus thought of his own death? If the teaching of Paul, as the chief interpreter of primitive Christian beliefs, has given shape to much of our theology, by what authority was he led and how is that authority operative now? Is it not true that if we are to discover the will of God for our day we must both "glean from the yesterdays what they have to give" and "turn to the present and the future there to find the ultimate authority for our religion" as the Spirit guides us? Recognizing the remarkable "persistence with which Christian faith has insisted upon the better future as the source of hope and courage," how can we make Christian men more faithful in the pursuit of that righteousness which will fit them to be worthy members of the Kingdom of Righteousness when it shall come, and so fulfil in our day and way the ancient vision of the New Heaven and the New Earth? Least of all in these active days of ferment can it be held that religion consists in any kind of institution or formality; it must be held that Christian men and women are like salt in the world to cure its corruption. Religion is not sugar-water, it is not sweetness thinly spread; it is the salt of the earth if it is worth anything—sharp and stringent in its antiseptics where any moral disease or plague threatens.

Having read these sermons with such questions in mind, questions suggested and answered by the sermons themselves, one cannot fail to be inspired anew with the wealth and power of the motives and ideals with which it is the noble privilege of the pulpit to deal. So far from losing faith in the "preaching of the Word," one is impressed with a fresh sense of the dignity of the Christian message, and stimulated with a new desire to prove with solid reasons that the church has a message for the modern world. There are multitudes today, as ever, who are seeking eagerly the way to the unseen; some are sad; many are weary; most lose faith and courage now and then. Death invades all homes sooner or later; the depths of sorrow are plumbed by thousands every day. Thank God that there are those who can interpret even death in its noble function; men who have learned by deep experiences of their own that "in the gospel of Jesus, in the Kingdom of God, there is the apocalypse of a world other and higher than our world of shadows and of dust!"

Truly, if the American pulpit lacks power, the reason does not lie in the subject-matter with which the preacher deals, the values of the religion which he ought to interpret. This volume of sermons may well convince both the pulpit and the pew that there is a dynamic in the modern point of view in religion which is able not only to win the reason, but to stir the will to noble conquests.

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EARLY ZOROASTRIANISM¹

In Moulton's recent interpretation of early Zoroastrianism the style is very opaque. The overlapping and confusion of order make it difficult to follow the arguments, which sway back and forth, like a swinging pendulum, and never come to rest. The book deals, however, with a very tangled skein of facts which do not allow of an easy methodical unraveling. Moulton propounds many new and valuable theories but does not suppress or distort evidence in order to make his own theories seem more plausible than they really are. He has utilized all the most recent material, including even the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (ed. 11) and the first five volumes of Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. He has done a great service in impartially sifting all the evidence and analyzing all the possibilities. More facts and time alone

¹ *Early Zoroastrianism*. The Hibbert Lectures for 1912, second series. By James Hope Moulton. London: Williams & Norgate, 1913. xx+468 pages. 10s. 6d.

can show how many of the new and plausible theories are correct. The book should stimulate discussion and will afford many clues for more detailed investigation.

Moulton argues for the early date of the Gāthās and for the historicity of Zoroaster whom, with Meyer and Geldner, he would place several generations earlier than the generally accepted date 660–583 B.C.; pronounces Darius to have been the first true Zoroastrian among the Achaemenian kings; emphasizes the fact, brought out by an inscription of Hommel, that Ahura Mazdāh is not a mark of Zoroaster's teaching, since it was hereditary in a small aristocratic caste before his time; discusses the popular religion of Persia before the time of Zoroaster; places the scene of the prophet's life and activity in Bactria; and tries to prove that the more esoteric teachings of Zoroaster, such as the doctrine of the Amshaspands, remained for centuries within the land of their birth which was far away from the main stream of history, and that they spread westward when they were adopted by the Magi and in the form they gave them; argues, against the unanimous Greek tradition that Zoroaster was a Magus, that the Magi "slaves" (cf. pp. 186 and 429) were an indigenous tribe of non-Aryan priests. The ritualistic elements in Zoroastrianism which are due to the Magi and represent survivals of primitive magic are examined; the alleged influences of Babylon on Zoroastrianism are discussed and shown to be without any real foundations; a Median story-book, full of Magian ideas, is traced behind the Book of Tobit.

The juxtaposition of the Greek evidence about Zoroaster with the linguistic and metrical evidence from the Rig Veda leads us into an *impasse* from which at present there is no satisfactory escape; the theory that a despised class of slaves, against whose animistic and magical religion Zoroaster fulminated, could so soon have secured paramount authority in Persia needs much more evidence to support it; the arguments against the theory of Babylonian influence on Zoroastrianism are not conclusive. Moulton has rendered a great service in pointing out weak points in present theories and in endeavoring to set up other tentative theories which are also consonant with many of the facts. Many more definite points must be located before the curve of development can be plotted with any accuracy.

The Boghaz-keui material is used with caution, but even more caution is necessary. Moulton seems to believe in "a prehistoric migration out of India backwards to the north-west" (cf. pp. 7 and 25–26), and goes much farther than Jacobi (*JRAS*, 1909, p. 726) who argues

that a tribe in eastern Iran, which had been influenced by Vedic culture, migrated westward. Moulton makes no reference to the recent discoveries in Turkestan and their bearing on theories of Indo-European migration.

Tentatively Moulton would connect the Tishtrya myth with India and find in it a reference to the breaking of the monsoon around Delhi. The only reasons adduced are very uncertain astronomical ones. He accepts the connection of the name Gaotema in the Yashts with the name Gotama Buddha and rejects Oldenberg's connection of Varuna and the Adityas with Babylon.

A map would have made the arguments much more intelligible.

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BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

CHIERA, EDWARD. *Legal and Administrative Documents from Nippur, Chiefly from the Dynasties of Isin and Larsa*. Philadelphia: University Museum, 1914. 110 pages+LI autographed plates and X photographic plates. \$5.00.

This book forms Vol. VIII, No. 1, of the "Publications of the Babylonian Section" of the University Museum, Philadelphia. It is an enlargement of Dr. Chiera's dissertation that formed a part of the work for his doctorate. It marks, therefore, the advent of another fellow-worker into the field of Assyriology—a worker who, judging by the first fruits of his work, will have no need to be ashamed. The autographed plates present 102 new texts, 12 of which are also reproduced photographically. An introduction discusses the "Place and Origin" of the texts, their "Characteristics," "The Seals," and the "Personal Names" and "Rim-Sin and the Fall of Isin." Specimen translations of nine different classes of documents are then given. These include purchases, leases, loans, donations, exchanges, protocols, and accounts. The date formulae are then discussed, a list of the date formulae for the dynasties of Isin and Larsa are given, as well as lists of proper names, and of the tablets in the volume. The work is on the whole well done. Dr. Chiera is a good copyist. His copies are clear and readable. If he has any fault it is that he shades too much. The work of the Introduction is also creditable, though, as Dr. Chiera himself recognizes, it is not final. The Yale Babylonian Collection has a new dynastic tablet covering this period, as well as many documents dated in the period of the Isin and Larsa dynasties. It is understood that Professor Clay and his pupils are preparing these for publication and that they will clear up many difficult problems in the chronology of this period. Nevertheless we heartily welcome Dr. Chiera's book.

G. A. B.

LAURÉ, MARTIN JOHN. *The Property Concepts of the Early Hebrews*. [Research Bulletin, Vol. IV, No. 2, of the series entitled "Studies in Sociology, Economics, Politics and History."] Iowa City: University of Iowa, 1915. 98 pages.

The writer sets himself the task of analyzing the property concept of the early Hebrews from the standpoint of its psychic genesis, that is, the *idea* of property. The development is traced down to the Deuteronomic code under the following chapter divisions: "The Divine Property Right," "Slavery," "Personal Property," "Real Property," and "Special Concepts." The final chapter deals with the theory of property in relation to the Hebrews and forms a proper introduction to the main discussion. The writer concludes that the idea of property in Israel, as elsewhere, originated in taboo, while the first object of property was woman taken in war. The writer takes as his basis the critical analysis of the sources; and it is refreshing to look at Israel's early traditions at times from some other than a religious standpoint. The results of this brochure which rest on the principles of economics and sociology are highly interesting, but the author's critical handling of the early Hebrew tradition is not always such as to inspire confidence in his conclusions which are made to rest upon that basis.

L. W.

DRIVER, S. R. *The Ideals of the Prophets*. New York: Scribner, 1915. xii+239 pages. 3s. 6d.

This consists of a selection of twenty sermons chosen as illustrative of the title, and also as representative of the late Dr. Driver's ordinary teaching and preaching in his capacity as Regius professor of Hebrew, and canon of Christ Church, Oxford, from 1882 to 1914. The collection is edited and provided with an appreciative preface by Dr. G. A. Cooke, Dr. Driver's successor at Oxford.

The value of the volume is still further enhanced by the addition of three appendices arranged by Dr. Driver's son, Mr. Godfrey R. Driver. Appendix A comprises a complete bibliography of all of Dr. Driver's published works, arranged in chronological order, furnishing at once a ready means of reference and an illuminating perspective of the author's literary life-work. Appendix B enumerates the main events in Dr. Driver's career and Appendix C gives a list of the chief obituary notices.

If the reader looks for impassioned oratory in these sermons he will meet with disappointment. Dr. Driver made no pretense at oratorical skill or imaginative appeal. He was first of all the careful scholar and painstaking teacher, whose chief aim in pulpit or classroom when dealing with the prophets of Israel was to let them clearly speak their own message with all possible fulness and precision. It was in this way that he sought to counteract false notions of the nature and function of prophecy and at the same time to allow those teachings to commend themselves by their own intrinsic worth. In one important particular it was not possible to do this merely from the prophet's own words, viz., in the matter of the fulfilment of prophecy, and here the author is repeatedly at pains to emphasize the fact that the prophets never aimed nor professed to write history in advance, but when they drew their vivid pictures of coming doom or future glory it was primarily for the purpose of molding the life of their own times in accord with what ought to be as the seer saw the problem. In a very real sense, therefore, this volume is a biographical contribution to the life of a great prophetic interpreter of Scripture, and it has the merit, in that case not too often shared

by biographies, of telling so much more than it says. It is gratifying to learn that we may expect two further publications from Dr. Driver's pen, the one to be *Studies in the Psalms*, and consisting of a reprint of articles previously published, and the other an unfinished commentary on the Book of Job in the International Critical series, to be completed by the co-operation of Dr. G. B. Gray and Dr. A. H. McNeile.

L. W.

KITTEL, RUD. *Die Psalmen Israel's nach dem Versmass der Urschrift ver-
deutschl.* Leipzig: Deichert, 1915. viii+217 pages. M. 2. 50.

In *Die Psalmen* ("Kommentar zum Alten Testament," Band XIII, 1914) Professor Kittel gave to the scholarly world his interpretation of the Psalter. The present volume is a reprint, practically without change, of his translation of the Psalms, which was the basis of the commentary. There is no introduction, notes, or comments. This translation seeks to accomplish two things for the general reader aside from rendering the thought in a modern tongue: first, to present the poetic meter of the original in German dress, and, secondly, to reproduce as far as possible the phraseology of Luther's Version. Both motives are doubtless praiseworthy. It is an open question, however, whether Hebrew poetry with its totally different verse measure can be brought home to the average reader in this manner. Certainly much of this translation can scarcely be rated as poetic according to any standard of German poetry. Nevertheless the translation itself is by a master-hand and is based upon full cognizance of the state of the text. It presents in compact yet lucid form this careful writer's basic interpretation of the Psalter.

L. W.

DAHL, GEORGE. *The Materials for the History of Dor.* [Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences.] Yale University Press, 1915. 131 pages. \$1.40.

A painstaking enumeration and a critical examination of all literary references to the Palestinian coast town of Dor from remotest antiquity to modern times. The array of references is impressive, as one sees at a glance at how many levels in the strata of literary remains the life and existence of this place may be touched; moreover, the extent of time covered and the frequency of the notices vividly suggest that these "materials" are but the prelude to more important archeological materials which lie beneath the soil. This thorough presentation of the available evidence ought to do much to stimulate the excavations of the actual site.

L. W.

NEW TESTAMENT

[DIEKAMP, FRANCISCUS.] *Patres Apostolici.* Editionem Funkianam novis curis in lucem emisit FRANCISCUS DIEKAMP. Volumen II. Clement's Romani Epistulae de Virginitate eiusdemque Martyrium Epistulae Pseudo-Ignatii Martyria Fragmenta Polycarpiana Polycarpi Vita. Tübingen: Laupp, 1913. xc+490 pages. M. 8.

In Funk's second edition of his *Patres Apostolici* (1901) he made relatively little change in his second volume, and this fact and subsequent discoveries have led Diekamp to re-edit and expand that volume. His additions include some Greek fragments of the Epistles of Clement on Virginité, the Latin version of the Martyrdom of

Clement, and the Anglo-Latin version of the Pseudo-Ignatian Letters, together with numerous textual emendations and notes. While the materials of the second volume are of less interest and antiquity than those of the first, they are even more difficult to edit and discuss, and Diekamp's advance upon Funk's learned edition is the more welcome.

E. J. G.

GOODSPEED, EDGAR J. *The Freer Gospels*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1914. 65 pages. \$0.50.

Students of the New Testament text will find indispensable Professor Goodspeed's collation of the Freer text with Westcott-Hort. For all practical purposes it puts the new manuscript into every study. The value of the codex is so great that no textual study can now be done without it, and the most convenient shape in which it can be used is in this collation, prepared with notable care and accuracy. There is a brief introductory note, a photographic frontispiece reproducing the last leaf of Mark, and, incidentally, a valuable list of corrections of Professor Sanders' earlier collation with the Oxford edition of the *Textus Receptus*. Such work as this, toilsome and exacting, demands the scholar's special gratitude.

C. R. B.

PARSONS, ERNEST W. *A Historical Examination of Some Non-Markan Elements in Luke*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1914. 80 pages. \$0.50.

To the synoptic student the Third Gospel offers today the most remunerative field of study. Its literary and historical problems are notable and still in large measure await their solution. Dr. Parsons attacks a very small portion of the whole question and is therefore the more certain to shed some light. His method of approach is the pragmatic or functional method. Each passage is scrutinized to see what special interest it conserves, to what need it ministers. The place, the time, the circumstances of that need are those which called the passage into being. It must be said that Luke very obviously reveals such special interests; nothing is plainer than that they do actually condition his presentation. He is an apologist and does not conceal the fact, despite the avowed historical interest of his preface. Dr. Parsons does real service in showing how influential are the missionary interest, the Samaritan interest, the ascetic interest, the anti-Baptist interest, and many more, in shaping the chief non-Markan passages of Luke. He might have shown also how they notably affect Luke's handling of his Markan parallels. He finds three sources used in addition to Mark, that containing the "Great Interpolation" of 9:51-18:14; that giving the "Sermon on the Plain"; and a christological document whose material is now scattered in chaps. 3-7. These three arose in Palestine, probably in Jerusalem, during the missionary decades of the first century.

C. R. B.

MACNEILL, HARRIS L. *The Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1914. 145 pages. \$0.75.

The New Testament professor in Brandon College, Manitoba, has made a very careful and detailed study of all the passages in Hebrews which have any bearing on its author's Christology. The treatment of separate statements and phrases is often admirable, putting every exegete of the Epistle very greatly in the author's debt. Possibly he does not see the whole so clearly as its parts; the writer's general christological position is not set forth as convincingly as the significance of single utterances.

But undoubtedly this corresponds to the exact situation in the writer's own mind, and is not to be set to Dr. MacNeill's account. Students of Hebrews will be especially interested in the strong emphasis here laid on the Alexandrian elements of the Epistle, and upon its points of contact with the mystery-religions. The book's original contribution is to be found in the main here, and is of real value.

C. R. B.

SHARP, DOUGLAS S. *Epictetus and the New Testament*. London: Charles H. Kelly, 1914. 158 pages. 2s. 6d.

The Introduction of Mr. Sharp's little book informs us that "in Epictetus there are often found the same nouns, adjectives, pronouns, verbs, verbal forms, prepositions, conjunctions, particles, the same syntax, as in the New Testament." The somewhat unnecessary demonstration of this statement fills the first nine chapters. But since "in the preceding pages it has become evident that Epictetus was a moral and religious teacher," a chapter is added on resemblances in thought and teaching between the philosopher and the New Testament writers. The exegete and commentator will be glad to have these parallels so conveniently tabulated. The closing chapter of five pages discusses the reasons for the lexical similarities. It is argued that Epictetus was neither a Christian nor acquainted with the New Testament writings. "Our conclusion then is that the language of Epictetus resembles that of the New Testament because it was the language as spoken by the people of the time."

C. R. B.

MILLER, LUCIUS HOPKINS. *Our Knowledge of Christ*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1914. ix+166 pages. \$1.00.

This reprint of articles appearing originally in the *Biblical World* should prove a very useful book. In brief compass (166 pages) it summarizes the reasonable net results of critical scholarship as to the courses and substance of our knowledge of the historical Jesus, and succinctly states the practical attitude of one who has given criticism its due weight and yet finds in Jesus of Nazareth a supreme and satisfying revelation of God. The chapter on the divinity of Christ sets forth with clearness the difference between a practical and a metaphysical appreciation of Jesus, and also suggests a simple philosophical foundation for such practical evaluation. It is an excellent book to put in the hands of thought-disturbed Christians. Some, however, will feel the logical obscurity of the author's treatment of the Resurrection problem, and his a priori tendency. "That Jesus personally survived his death we must believe, or deny the heart of the Christian faith" (p. 37). Is that then the heart of the Christian faith? And what is it, "personally" to survive death? And is it quite clear that, and in what sense, "objective" and "spiritual" facts are "equally real" (p. 84)?

A. C. W.

CHURCH HISTORY

SCHULTZE, VICTOR. *Altchristliche Städte und Landschaften. I. Konstantinopel* (324-450). Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1913. x+292 pages. M. 15.

Victor Schultze, of Greifswald, needs no introduction to the readers of the *American Journal of Theology*. This latest book from his pen is intended to begin a series, which, if carried out to anything like completeness, should prove a most interesting

and useful departure in the field of early church history. Monographs upon persons and periods, upon parties and provinces and peoples, we have had. The series begun by Schultze purposes to describe in detail early Christian cities and districts. Schultze's book takes up the history of the first city to be founded as a strictly Christian municipality, Constantinople, from its foundation in 324 to 450 A.D. The reason for this limitation, which excludes among other things the present St. Sophia's, is that in Schultze's estimation at about this point the city loses the antique Greek character and becomes mediaeval Byzantine. In the case of Constantinople the wealth of material makes such restriction doubly wise. Schultze takes x+292 pages to tell us, first, in eight chapters, the political history of Constantinople from its embryonic stage as Byzantium to the death of Theodosius II in 450, and then, in eight further chapters, he sketches the rich and variegated life, work, and play of the great metropolis. Of especial interest are the chapters on the social strata, on education, on art, and on popular or folk piety. In the scientific thoroughness with which it is done this book, with its companion volumes, should furnish another good, broad base for general church history to stand upon. This does not detract from the readability of at least the present volume. Schultze is the possessor of a good literary style and handles his subject in masterly fashion, so that the reader's interest does not flag from beginning to end. If any adverse criticism need be made, it might be that of a slight overindulgence in Herodotean breadth of detail. But aside from Schultze's personality, the pioneer nature of the book and the great fertility of the subject are sufficient to account for this. There are topics to come in this series, and those not unimportant ones, on which the writer will do well to fill his hundred pages. But, be they long or short, it is to be hoped that the successors of this volume will not tarry too long and that they may measure up to the standard of this their first-born brother.

M. S.

S. Ephraem Syri Opera. *Textum syriacum graecum latinum ad fidem codicum recensuit*. . . . SYLVIVS JOSEPH MERCATI. Tom. I, Fasc. I. (Monumenta Biblica et Ecclesiastica 1). Rome: Bretschneider, 1915. xvi+231 pages. L. 12.00.

Italy seems just now to be the land of colossal undertakings by remarkable individuals. Though not as pretentious as the astounding labors of the Prince of Teano, the work inaugurated by Mercati in the present volume, as announced with lapidary brevity on the title-page and outlined in some detail in the proem, is aptly designated by the title of the series of which it forms the first number: *Monumenta*. To begin with, Mercati is publishing, with voluminous introductions, textual apparatus, and notes, those homilies of Ephrem Syrus in Greek translation, which have not received a place in the collections of that father's works, but are found scattered about in Greek liturgical literature. Next, still keeping the Greek translation in the foreground, adding its Latin companion or its Syriac original only where special circumstances make it advisable, the publication of the manuscript corpuses or collections of Ephrem's works is to be undertaken. A third stage, bringing out the Syriac texts not yet published in the editions of Assemani, Overbeck, Lamy, etc., is to lead to the grand consummation: a new edition of the works of Ephrem in Syriac—"a consummation devoutly to be wished for."

Meanwhile the pace set and the space consumed in this first instalment promise an *ouvrage de longue haleine*. Nearly 250 royal 8vo pages, just 248 to be precise

have been used to present the Greek text with apparatus and notes of three homilies: one on Abraham and Isaac, the second an encomium on Basil the Great, the third on Elijah. Eight further similar homilies are announced to be followed in a separate volume by the homily *In Antichristum* with its congeners—all this before the collections in Greek are begun. It is no puny undertaking for which the Pontifical Biblical Institute is furnishing the means. One of the reasons why so much space is consumed is that Mercati prints his text in lines or verses of seven syllables or thereabouts; for he is a pupil and adherent of Norden's celebrated adversary, Wilhelm Meyer, of Göttingen, the discoverer of the Semitic origin of Greek and Latin rhythmic (as opposed to quantitative) verse. This "discovery" is still *sub judice* (cf. Norden's *Kunstprosa*, pp. 810 ff., and *Nachträge*, p. 11). Rarely does a scholar have the opportunity to present a disputed case so sumptuously and so unrestrictedly as does Mercati for Wilhelm Meyer. As the evidence is not yet all in, we reserve our judgment on the total case. Mercati's offering in this instalment is smooth to faultlessness, conjectural readings *metri causa* being much less frequent than might be expected, in fact, conspicuous by their absence from so many pages. The externals of bookmaking used are excellent to a degree.

M. S.

Lateinische altchristliche Inschriften mit einem Anhang jüdischer Inschriften.

Ausgewählt und erklärt von DR. ERNST DIEHL. 2. Auflage. Bonn: Marcus und Weber, 1913. 86 pages. M. 2. 20.

This little volume of eighty-six small octavo pages constitutes Nos. 26-28 of the "Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen und Übungen," edited by Hans Lietzmann, a series whose usefulness to students of theology and philology seems not to be as widely known in America as it deserves to be. As the title-page shows, it shares with many of its companion volumes the honor of having received a second edition. Most of the changes of this wholly revised edition are distinct improvements. Among the 125 inscriptions which have been added are rather important ones; e.g., the list of bishops, No. 89; the poetic numbers, 321-50; the pagan-Jewish, 351; the Jewish-Christian, 352; and the Jewish, 353. The new indexes add greatly to the usability of the little *vade mecum*. The index of proper names might be made a little more complete. The compact review of linguistic peculiarities, pp. 67-74, and the general information gathered on pp. 74-79, will prove most valuable and agreeable to the student. Less agreeable to the beginner, but more valuable to him in the end, is the list of abbreviations now gathered in alphabetical order on pp. 79-82, a change which is accompanied by a great reduction in the number of resolutions printed out in full in the text of the first edition. The new page looks in consequence somewhat more crowded, no great detriment as compared with the gain. This pamphlet constitutes an invaluable aid at very small expense to students of early church history or of late Latin.

M. S.

CLAYTON, J. H. *Studies in the Roman Controversy*. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co., 1914. \$1.00.

MCKIM, RANDOLPH H. *Romanism in the Light of History*. New York: Putnam, 1914. \$1.25.

Mr. Clayton's work is a conventional handbook of polemics, with the divisions, "The Papal Claims," "England and Rome" (two chapters), and "Anglican Orders,"

comprising four lectures delivered by request as part of a church-defense program. No pretense is made of contributing anything new to the subjects treated, even by way of striking restatement, and the treatment of history is conventionally "Anglican," but the book is pleasantly written and the tone is dignified. Two supplementary chapters on "The Pallium" and "Co-Consecrators" touch a higher level. Here the author has done some less conventional research along liturgical bypaths and has collected material of interest.

The bulk of Dr. McKim's book is a reissue of two pamphlets, *Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical on the Reunion of Christendom*, originally published in 1896, and *Fundamental Principles of Protestantism*, originally published in 1879. Neither seems sufficiently important to warrant the permanence of a bound volume, and, moreover, they both say about the same things in about the same language. And both represent the older polemical writing of church history, which represented the growth of the Papacy as due to the conscious and conscienceless designs of successive popes. As a collection of *tu quoque* arguments to use against perfervid Roman controversialists the volume may be of some service, but this is not a very high mission. It is a pity that Dr. McKim did not write an entirely fresh work instead of republishing this older material, the more so as his new introductory essay shows that his own tone has changed with the passing years. An appendix, "Religious Liberty and the Maryland Toleration Act," has independent value, but there was no point in printing three letters that all urge exactly the same arguments.

Neither Dr. McKim nor Dr. Clayton makes any effort to understand why Romanism has the hold it has on such myriads of devout souls, many of whom are in no way ignorant. And both writers (notwithstanding Dr. McKim's third chapter) content themselves with destructive criticism, foregoing any attempt to set up a consistent system in opposition to the one attacked.

B. S. E.

KELLER, LUDWIG. *Die Freimaurerei: Eine Einführung in ihre Anschauungswelt und ihre Geschichte*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1914. 147 pages. M. 1. 25.

This neat little volume of one hundred and forty-seven pages is an introduction to Freemasonry, along with a brief history. The author is enthusiastically in sympathy with his subject. Freemasonry does not rival any of the other great institutions of humanity, such as, for example, the church. It is unique in that it meets a peculiar need that no other institution does or can meet. There are in the world about 23,000 lodges and 2,000,000 members, distributed over all the leading nations, but North America leads with 15,000 lodges, and 1,500,000 members. The author thinks that the future of the order is full of hope.

J. W. M.

RICHTER, JULIUS. *Weltmission und theologische Arbeit*. Habilitationsschrift für einen Lehrstuhl der Missionswissenschaft an der Universität Berlin. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1913. 124 pages. M. 2.

Dr. Richter is widely known through his monumental work on *The History of Missions in India*. This little work of 122 pages takes up world-missions and their relations to theology. The author's whole habit of mind is scientific, but not dead, for his sympathies are as wide as the needs and aspirations of men. He always deals with central problems, and no essential element in any problem escapes his keen insight. We do not know any other publication in which so much material is so thoughtfully presented in so small a space.

J. W. M.

BAUDERT, S. *Die evangelische Mission: Geschichte; Arbeitsweise; heutiger Stand.* Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1913. 123 pages. M. 1.25.

The author tells us in his preface that but for the great work of Warneck in his *History of Protestant Missions* his own book would not have been possible. But in a small compass he gives us the history, the methods of work, and the present condition of missions. The one who wants the whole subject in a nut-shell will find it here.

J. W. M.

MERRIAM, EDMUND F. *A History of American Baptist Missions.* Revised Edition with Centennial Supplement. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1913. 288 pages. 50 cents net.

When Professor Gammell published his *History of American Baptist Missions*, in 1849, the subject was comparatively simple and easy. But today it has become one of great complexity and difficulty. The change is due to prosperity and growth. Fourteen years ago Dr. Merriam attempted to do for the later period what Dr. Gammell had done for the earlier. The present volume is a revision, with the addition of a centennial supplement. The result is a substantial contribution to general church history as well as to Baptist history. Within the small compass of about three hundred pages the leading facts are given in an attractive style.

The chapter on "Civilization and American Baptist Missions" will interest all students. It shows what the Baptist missionaries have done for geography, physical science, philology, literature, education, sociology, and commerce.

J. W. M.

BONWETSCH, D. NATHANAEL. *Texte zur Geschichte des Montanismus.* [Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen und Übungen herausgegeben von Hans Lietzmann, Nr. 129.] Bonn: Marcus u. Weber, 1914. 32 pages. M. 0.80.

In his *Texte zur Geschichte des Montanismus* Professor Bonwetsch, of Göttingen, reprints, with variant readings, extracts from twelve early Christian sources that discuss or mention Montanism. A brief bibliography would have made intelligible to the student the laconic references to the critical editions from which the well-chosen texts are drawn.

W. W. R.

LIETZMANN, HANS. *Symbole der alten Kirche.* [Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen und Übungen herausgegeben von Hans Lietzmann, Nr. 17-18.] Bonn: Marcus u. Weber, 1914. 40 pages. M. 1.00.

The second edition of Professor Lietzmann's *Symbole der alten Kirche* is over a fifth larger than the issue of 1906. It contains critical texts of the Apostles' and of the Nicene creeds and of the chief formulas which preceded or paralleled them. It is not a mere reprint of extracts from the latest edition (1897) of A. Hahn's *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln*, for this contains some errors in texts and in variant readings, which are here corrected. The matter added by Professor Lietzmann in preparing this second edition is for the most part not easily accessible, even in Hahn's comprehensive work. The pamphlet is so full and yet so inexpensive that teachers of the history of Christian thought might easily require each student to purchase a copy, thus placing before each of the auditors those Greek and Latin texts on which one comments in elucidating the ancient symbols.

W. W. R.

LOOFS, FRIEDRICH. *Nestorius and His Place in the History of Christian Doctrine*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. vii+132 pages. 3s. 6d.

The four lectures printed under the foregoing title were given at the University of London two years ago by Professor Loofs. Since 1905, when he published in his *Nestoriana* the previously known literary remains together with over one hundred additional fragments preserved chiefly by Monophysite writers, another lengthy work of Nestorius has seen the light. The Syriac translation of the Greek, which probably bore the title *Πραγματεία Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ Δαμασκηνοῦ*, was published in 1910 by P. Bedjan; and the same year there appeared also a French translation by F. Nau. Prior to these Professor Bethune-Baker had given long extracts in English, in his *Nestorius and His Teaching* (1908); now Professor Loofs examines the material still more closely in order to throw new light upon the career and opinions of the anathematized bishop.

Nestorius lived longer than was formerly thought. Instead of dying soon after 435, when he entered upon his exile in the Oasis, he certainly survived till the autumn of 450; and while there is no adequate evidence that he lived till 452, as Dr. Bethune-Baker thought, there is no chronological improbability in the legend which makes him perish horribly while on his way to the Council of Chalcedon, which opened in October 451 (p. 22).

The Council at Ephesus which condemned Nestorius in 431 is reckoned ordinarily as the third ecumenical synod; but Professor Loofs maintains that "an ecumenical council of Ephesus never existed. Two party-councils had sat and cursed each other; the dogmatic question had remained undecided" (p. 53).

Nestorius asserted that his life was a tragedy. How far was he to blame for his troubles? He was "incautious, passionate, and reckless" (p. 60). It is impossible to agree with Dr. Bethune-Baker's assertion that "Nestorius was not a Nestorian but was perfectly orthodox" (p. 25). The latter's opposition to the term *Θεοτόκος* was not absolute; if rightly understood he considered it not heretical, though he himself preferred to say *Χριστοτόκος* (p. 30). His beliefs were misrepresented at an early stage in the controversy; thus in 429 he was accused of agreeing with the doctrine of Paul of Samosata that Christ was a mere man (pp. 20, 32). More than Nestorius is Cyril of Alexandria to be held responsible for the conflict (p. 41); the Egyptian saint was not above distorting the truth and bestowing bribes where they would advance him on the path to power (pp. 52-56). Nevertheless, Nestorius is technically a heretic; for the views which he actually held were condemned at the second Council of Constantinople in 553 (p. 107). The doctrine of the synod of 553, however, makes the Trinity become through the Incarnation something which it was not prior thereto, i.e., it consists of the merely spiritual Father, of the Crucified, and of the Spirit. In Cyril also "something heterogeneous is added to the Trinity by the manhood of Christ." In formulas such as these Professor Loofs thinks that "a mythology, actually contradicting the monotheistic belief, had gained the victory" (pp. 126-29). Only by following the lines of the Antiochian theology, as revived by Dörner, Kähler, and Seeberg, does he hold that one can frame a theory of the Incarnation which is in harmony with the New Testament and at the same time not contrary to reason (p. 130). With this practical suggestion Professor Loofs closes the detailed yet suggestive treatment of the once notorious Nestorius.

W. W. R.

SRAWLEY, J. H. *The Early History of the Liturgy*. [The Cambridge Handbooks of Liturgical Study, edited by H. B. Swete and J. H. Srawley.] Cambridge: University Press, 1913. xx+251 pages. 6s.

Dr. Srawley's *Early History of the Liturgy* seeks to present the essentials in the liturgical development during the first four centuries, without pretense at completeness, and without pronouncing judgment upon inadequate evidence. The term liturgy the author restricts to the order of service employed in the celebration of the Eucharist.

The Table of Contents indicates the method pursued. After an examination of the evidence of the New Testament and of the second century there follow six chapters analyzing the stages in the development of the liturgy in the major divisions of the empire, from Alexandria and Egypt to Italy and Rome. These longitudinal sections of the various local liturgies presuppose in the reader a strong interest in details which are easily confused and soon forgotten. The order of investigation which the author follows does not lend to a book written professedly for beginners either clearness or charm. The mental picture which makes the details significant might have been supplied by putting at the front of the volume a cross-section, such as is furnished by the chapter entitled "The Development of the Liturgy in East and West" (pp. 195-223). The work closes with a discussion of early conceptions of the Eucharist as illustrated by the history of the liturgy, which shows clearly facts such as the rise of a doctrine of *ἐπιτέλεσις* in connection with the tendency to consider the Holy Spirit and not the Logos the efficient cause in the consecration of the elements.

The book is carefully compiled from the sources, with painstaking use of recent French and German literature, both Roman Catholic and Protestant. It is a handy summary of researches on a topic to which the majority of American theologians have given but slight heed. Its chief defect, apart from dullness, is the omission of comparisons with the contemporary religions, especially with the mystery-cults.

W. W. R.

DOCTRINAL

REVIÈRE, JEAN. *Le Dogme de la rédemption*. Paris: Lecoffre, 1914. xvi+570 pages. Fr. 6.

A semipopular presentation of the dogma of redemption following the author's more scholastic treatment of this dogma eight years ago. The first part outlines the development and fixes the marks of the Catholic dogma. The second part sets in clear light the common element of this dogma as it appears from Anselm and St. Thomas to Suarez and Bellarmin, with a view of making this essential reality more intelligible and more acceptable. A third, negative and critical, is occupied with non-Catholic explanations of this mystery with the aim of bringing into sharper relief the direction and value of the Catholic faith. The spirit of this and of Dr. Schumacher's work noticed above is admirable, the learning adequate, and both are readable.

C. A. B.

ALTHAUS, PAUL. *Die Prinzipien der deutschen reformierten Dogmatik im Zeitalter der aristotelischen Scholastik*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1914. viii+274 pages. M. 7.50.

The questions here dealt with are, first, the general relation of philosophy to theology; that is to say, the bearing of this on dogmatic method and the influence of

the neo-Aristotelian metaphysics on the doctrine of God; secondly, reason and revelation—natural theology—where law and gospel, the two covenants, and Calvin's doctrine of predestination are discussed; thirdly, the doctrine of religious certitude as related to the Calvinistic view of salvation and the Scriptures and to pre-scholastic theology, the influence of Aristotelianism on this doctrine, and the development which culminated in seeking a rational basis for this certitude. The treatise supposes an acquaintance with Troeltsch's *Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Joh. Gerhard und Melancthon*, Weber's *Philosophische Scholastik des deutschen Protestantismus im Zeitalter der Orthodoxie*, and *Einfluss der protestantischen Schulphilosophie auf die orthodox-lutherische Dogmatik*, and Keim's *Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher*. The author claims no more than to test, complete, and in part limit the presentation of the foregoing writers, yet only so far as concerns the Reformed field. Keckermann and Alsted are selected as representative theologians to and from whom the inquiry proceeds. The book is a valuable contribution to our too-scanty knowledge of a stage of thought which, however lamentable, was, as our author declares, inevitable.

C. A. B.

MAINS, GEORGE P. *Christianity and the New Age*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1914. xii+364 pages. \$1.50.

Another of the rapidly multiplying attempts to put on exhibit the material for a reformulation of theology. The author is a Methodist clergyman and has been long connected with the publishing house of his denomination. His earlier volume, entitled *Modern Thought and Traditional Faith*, has helped many ministers and laymen in this time of transition. The present work will have a similar function. The book shows no evidence of original thought. It is rather one of the respectable media through which a portion of the newer thought of the age filters into certain minds that are not equipped for first-hand works. The chapters on higher criticism, socialism, and plutocracy show that the author feels the impulse of the tidal movement which is now drawing the currents of biblical and sociological scholarship into the same channel. But he has not explored the contents of the categories with which his book deals in such wise as to correlate them within the terms of a constructive interpretation. While the volume, therefore, is not one which is likely to be of use to readers of this journal, the fact of its publication is welcome and significant to all who feel a scientific interest in theology.

L. W.

MARIANO, RAFFAELE, *et al.* *Verso la Fede*. Rome: Edita dalla direzione della scuola teologica battista, 1913. xi+223 pages.

The intent of this volume is to meet religious problems peculiar to Italy, owing, in part, to the relations existing between the kingdom and the papacy. But so far as these problems arise from the reaction of modern culture against a church opposed to science and democracy, the essays are of general interest.

The first two essays comprise half of the volume. Raffaele Mariano writes on "Becoming and the Absolute in the Hegelian System." He is frankly a Hegelian but opposes the neo-Hegelian identification of the Absolute and Becoming, or history. The second essay is "Ideas on the Immortality of the Soul." It is by Francesco De Sarlo. It discusses the origin, nature, and destiny of the soul on a priori grounds.

Immortality cannot be proved by scientific observation, nor does it result from empirical generalization. Neither, however, do these contradict it. It alone gives significance to the world and to historical evolution.

The briefer essays also present important themes. Ernesto Comba writes on "The Question of Authority in the Matter of Faith." As against the Roman Catholic idea of external authority, or the Protestant view of the Scriptures as external authority, he maintains that the moral conscience is the supreme authority. "Sin" is treated by Giovanni Arbanasich. Its essence is action opposed to normal development and, therefore, inhuman. It is none the less violation of God's laws, though these are not arbitrary impositions. Giovanni Luzzi's essay on "A Modern Concept of Dogma" follows Lobstein's idea of dogma as "the scientific expression of the Christian faith of the church in the present day." "Are Miracles Possible?" an essay by Vincenzo Tummolo, combats Strauss. He concludes, after citing views by Lodge, Reinke, and others, that a miracle is merely the extraordinary intervention of a spirit working in the physical world. This is on the ground that there is a spiritual intervention in the ordinary phenomena of nature. The final essay is on "Christianity and Human Worth," by Angelo Crespi. It discusses the effort of idealism to save human dignity at the expense of the transcendent element in religion. The argument turns upon the dignity of service to a superior. In serving God we are not humiliated but exalted.

W. T. P.

TOWNSEND, HARVEY GATES. *The Principle of Individuality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green*. [Cornell Studies in Philosophy, No. 10.] New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1914. vii+91 pages. \$0.75 net.

This work, on the whole, is carefully done, although it is inevitable that such a discussion should awaken some dissent. This is particularly true of the self or spiritual principle which is said to be beyond the usual methods of thought. Even our author admits that in Green's account of it "there is a kind of vagueness." This vagueness extends even to Green's concept of God. God is "the ideal of a self-conscious being" and yet the highest reality.

For Green individual things are real. Through universal relations they are knowable. Without such a relation there would be no intelligible properties. Relation is meaning, and meaning, which is not fact, becomes such through consciousness. Hence object implies a subject. But there is a total of objective relations, and this implies the complete subject of that total system of objects. This complete subject is God. He is spiritual, like our understanding in principle. He may be known only piecemeal. He is not an abstract universal, but a concrete individual, and therefore the most completely determined being. "The key to Green's philosophy is found in the significance of individuality made possible in a world of struggle for completion."

The discussion, of course, touches many mooted points, such as "the eternal self," the creation of the matter of experience by the understanding (p. 63), the reality of the ideal, the possibility of change and development, though time is not "an ultimate and independent reality." In all of these instances the author contents himself with exposition. He may criticize Green's critics, but for Green's views he offers no critique.

W. T. P.

BAILEY, MARGARET LEWIS. *Milton and Jakob Boehme. A Study of German Mysticism in Seventeenth-Century England.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1914. vii+200 pages. \$0.50.

While belonging more strictly to the history of literature, this study is not without interest for the theologian. Milton's *Christian Mythology* was derived from Boehme, and its influence upon the English-speaking world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, our author believes, was greater than the study of the Bible. We are given the history of mysticism before Boehme and the rise of seventeenth-century English mysticism by way of prelude. Then the scientific, religious, and political influence of Boehme on England after 1644—the date of the first English acquaintance with him—is rapidly traced. One chapter presents the historical proof of contact between Milton and Boehme while another by quotation shows the actual similarity of thought. The quotations show that Boehme shaped Milton's thinking on God, the Trinity, the creation of angels, the origin of evil, the creation and fall of man, and the place of punishment. Considering Milton's subsequent influence, shown in German eighteenth-century romanticism and in early nineteenth-century French romanticism as well as in English writers, the book furnishes a starting-point for more detailed investigation of the thought-relation indicated. The present work is presented as the first of a series of monographs on Germanic literature and culture, edited by Julius Goebel.

W. T. P.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

GARVIE, ALFRED E. *The Joy of Finding: Or, God's Humanity and Man's Inhumanity to Man.* New York: Scribner, 1914. v+138 pages. \$0.60.

This is a theological exposition of the story of the Prodigal Son. The standard categories of God, Man, Sin, Judgment, Penitence, Pardon, Righteousness, and Blessedness are treated conservatively on the basis of the text. The volume belongs to the Short Course series, edited by John Adams, and is calculated to bring to the popular mind the dogmatic values which traditional theology finds in this superb parable of Jesus.

A. H.

ZENOS, ANDREW C. *The Son of Man: Studies in the Gospel of Mark.* New York: Scribner, 1914. v+137 pages. \$0.60.

The author reviews briefly the history of the significant term, Son of Man; indicates the moral import of Jesus' use of the same, and elaborates very suggestively the social and individual deductions involved.

A. H.

JOHNSON, FRANKLIN WINSLOW. *The Problems of Boyhood: A Course in Ethics for Boys of High-School Age.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1914. xxv+130 pages. \$1.00.

The author of this textbook is, by virtue of his position as principal of the University High School of the University of Chicago, well qualified to issue these twenty-two studies in ethics for boys of high-school age. Moreover, he has given the studies a four years' trial in successful classwork outside the school and on a purely voluntary basis. The key to this success seems to be faithful adherence to the vital interests of

the boys themselves and full and frank discussion on their part. This is secured by the discussion of such concrete subjects as "Property Rights," "Clean Speech," "Self-Control," "The Choice of a Life-Work," etc. The experience recorded in the book, the lesson scheme, and topics for discussion will make it a valuable handbook for all who endeavor to instruct youth in the serious affairs of life and will further the acceptance of the principle that the real issues of the adolescent boy are paramount in determining the method and material of his religious education. A. H.

THOMAS, W. H. GRIFFITH. *The Prayers of St. Paul*. New York: Scribner, 1914. vii+144 pages. \$0.60.

One gets a fresh appreciation of the prayers of the great apostle when they are thus brought together and held under devout meditation. Needless to say, the comment is not critical but designed to help the ordinary reader in finding larger access to Paul's source of power. A. H.

CONN, HERBERT W. *Social Heredity and Social Evolution*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1914. vi+348 pages. \$1.50.

The author is professor of biology in Wesleyan University. He has already issued some very serviceable popular statements of biology and evolution. The purpose of this volume is to show that the laws of the evolution of animals and plants apply to human evolution only up to a certain point, beyond which man has been under the influence of distinct laws of his own. In the author's view, the "eugenic" philosophers, while presenting truths of great cogency, are overlooking certain factors in human development which weigh more heavily in determining human progress than the laws of inheritance upon which eugenics is based. This book aims to present the other side of the case. The volume can be used in a course on the biological approach to sociology. L. W.

THOMPSON, T. *The Offices of Baptism and Confirmation*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. x+253 pages. 6s.

This is the fourth of the series of "Cambridge Handbooks of Liturgical Study" (general editors: H. B. Swete, D.D., J. H. Srawley, D.D.). It is the work of a painstaking scholar who aims to elucidate for the general reader and the serious student entering upon this subject the development of these ceremonial rites from their early origins to the forms which they assumed in the Ordines and Sacramentaries of later times. These forms are then roughly classified and a brief chapter on "Liturgical Areas" is the preface to a more detailed discussion of the Eastern, Egyptian, and Western rites. Comparative tables are supplied in an appendix. All this research work leads up to the consideration of topics which have a bearing on present-day conceptions and customs, such as the Age of Baptism and Confirmation, the Minister, Submersion, Immersion, and Affusion, Theological Aspects of the Rites, etc. The author has very positive convictions of where the truth lies in matters of controversy, but those who expect to find controversy in these final chapters of the book will be disappointed, as a matter of course. A bibliography of about a hundred titles, representing the materials used in this study, and an index of subjects and terms complete the volumes. T. B. F.

A Book of Offices. Services for Occasions Not Provided for in the Book of Common Prayer. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co., 1914. viii+179 pages. \$1.00.

Twenty-five years ago the movement for "liturgical enrichment" in the Episcopal church resulted in some important additions to the Prayer Book offices, also in a few rubrical alterations permitting greater "flexibility of use," but the revision was not carried farther. As a by-product of the movement, a *Book of Offices* was issued in pamphlet form, but this failed to attract notice and speedily passed into oblivion. Again there is a demand for revision, and it finds the church better prepared to deal with the problem. There are certain kinds of special services which may well be authorized by the church without the necessity of incorporating them in the Prayer Book. Accordingly this new *Book of Offices* has been prepared by a special committee of the House of Bishops for adoption by the General Convention in 1916. It is the work of competent experts, it provides for a great variety of needs, and follows the lines of sound liturgical precedent. Ultimately some of its contents may become more familiar to the people than certain parts of the Prayer Book itself. T. B. F.

MUSS-ARNOLT, WILLIAM. *The Book of Common Prayer and Books Connected with Its Origin and Growth.* Catalogue of the Collection of Josiah Henry Benton. 2d ed. Privately printed. Boston: The Merrymount Press, 1914. ix+143 pages.

There are few such valuable collections of Prayer Book Miscellany as that of Dr. Benton and none, we believe, that can boast of such attractive presentation as the catalogue before us. Dr. Muss-Arnolt has long been familiar with this material, having published as recently as last year a volume of 500 pages—the fruit, chiefly, of his study of this collection. Under his guidance the reader is introduced to all the editions from the first Prayer Book of Edward VI (1549) to the Memorial Prayer Book of Edward VII (1910). There are over 100 editions and reprints for the Church of England alone. In other sections of the catalogue may be found the Book as used in other parts of the Anglican Communion, adaptations of the liturgy by Non-jurors, Non-conformists, etc., special forms of prayer issued by the authorities from time to time, translations of the Book, into about eighty languages, and various collections of metrical psalms and hymns. The Prayer Book origins of the fifteenth and earlier centuries, commentaries on the Prayer Book, and a wealth of critical and polemical literature—some of it very curious—are all represented in the list. Finally an index of names and titles facilitates reference to any of the 685 books of the collection.

T. B. F.

MEARNS, JAMES. *The Canticles of the Church Eastern and Western in Early and Medieval Times.* Cambridge: University Press, 1914. x+105 pages. 6s.

The technical sense of the term "canticle" in liturgics is almost equivalent to the etymological meaning, being understood to include those parts of the offices not comprised under the heads of "lections," "preces," "versicles and responses," "psalter," etc. The Creeds and the Lord's Prayer, certain of the Psalms in frequent use, passages from the Pentateuch, the Prophets, and the Gospels come under this designation,

as well as non-scriptural compositions like the *Te Deum* and a great variety of hymns and odes. The recently rediscovered Odes of Solomon were used in the fourth century in Asia Minor as "canticles." To sort and classify all this material, the task involving as it must an examination of hundreds of manuscripts of missals, breviaries, and psalters, and to supply sufficient comment to make the results of the research patent to the student was the aim of the author. The result is this book, which was intended as a sketch of a proposed volume to be entitled "Hymns and Canticles" in the "Handbooks of Liturgical Study" series. The editors having pronounced it too detailed for their purpose, the "sketch" is issued in the present unexpanded form. The data here given represent, therefore, a book three or four times the size of the volume just issued. While a fuller treatment of the subject would be most welcome, the author deserves the thanks of scholars for placing at their disposal such a wealth of valuable material, not to be found elsewhere in such a compact form. T. B. F.

HUTCHINS, NORMAN. *Graded Social Service for the Sunday School*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1914. xii+135 pages. \$0.75.

EVANS, HERBERT FRANCIS. *The Sunday-School Building and Its Equipment*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1914. xv+116 pages. \$0.75.

Dr. Theodore Gerald Soares, head of the Department of Religious Education of the University of Chicago, is editing a series of books on the "Principles and Methods of Religious Education" for the purpose of presenting "to the large body of workers in the field of religious education some of the results of the studies and practice of those who have attained a measure of educational success." Two books of this series are now ready.

Dr. Hutchins assumes that education, and, therefore, religious education, is a *social process* and that the value and significance of an individual depends upon his vital relations to others in the various life groupings. "The purpose of social service in the Sunday school is to socialize the young people, to develop their powers of sympathetic imagination and friendly co-operation; and this it does by promoting, enriching, vitalizing genuine personal relations with other groups." In the various chapters the author gives the meaning of social service; the dangers to be avoided in well-meant but undirected service; several significant programs of social service which are in actual operation in churches; money-getting as a form of social service; the values that should be realized in the children from social service; and lastly a suggested curriculum of social service as a guide to those finding their way in this important form of expression. The author gives a keen, sane portrayal of the real function of the Sunday school and how this function can be fulfilled in a very practical way. Every minister and Sunday-school worker should read this book.

Professor Evans has prepared another book that every pastor and Sunday-school worker should read. The book is of value in two ways: It contains a wealth of information for those contemplating building a new church or remodeling an old one. It shows the all-important part the building and its arrangement play in making possible efficient religious education. The author holds that the most important task in connection with the construction of a church building is the provision for genuine efficiency in religious education. This means (in the arrangement of the building) provision for real teaching, for recreation and play, and for normal social expression. The needs of children in the different grades are discussed, together with

the most up-to-date ways of ministering to these needs architecturally. Numerous drawings of plans of the more efficient church buildings—from the costly city church to the village or country church of moderate cost—together with suggestions for remodeling old buildings add to the value of the book.

J. M. A.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

MARGOLIOUTH, D. S. *The Early Development of Mohammedanism*. New York: Scribner, 1914. x+265 pages.

In the Hibbert Lectures (second series) delivered in 1913, Professor Margoliouth, the learned Arabist of the University of Oxford, discusses the elements which entered into the making of early Mohammedanism. The Koran is the basis of Islam, but the unbeliever cannot obtain it from the believer. "It is a noteworthy fact about the Mohammedan system that since the Migration it has demanded no qualifications for admission to its brotherhood [p. 1]. . . . Let the people pay homage to it (the Koran) first, recognize that it is the divine revelation, and then they may, or indeed must, study it" (p. 4). During the Prophet's lifetime portions of the heavenly archetype of the Koran were revealed to him from time to time, enabling him to decide the daily questions which were put to him as leader of the new community. After Mohammed's death, tradition tells us, the first Caliph ordered the collection of the fragments of the Koran, and some twelve years thereafter an official edition was issued. But it was soon discovered that in spite of the dogma which was growing up that the Koran was a sufficient rule of faith and conduct, a thousand and one questions arose to which the Koran gave no answer. "Yet in some way the community had to be supplied with something more than was contained in the fragments put together by the first Caliph's order: with law, ritual, morals, theology, and even history. The task before us is to trace these several supplements to their source" (p. 35).

The book is very interesting, displaying on every page the author's intimate acquaintance with the Arabic literature, but it will probably appeal to a limited audience.

D. D. L.

LAMMENS, HENRI. *Le Berceau de l'Islam*. Vol. I. Rome: Sumptibus pontificii instituti biblici, 1914. xxiv+371 pages.

The volume on the "cradle of Islam," by Henri Lammens, S.J., professor in the Institut Biblique at Rome, should and undoubtedly will find its way into the hands of many who are not specially interested in Mohammedanism. The *Berceau de l'Islam* is the first of a series of volumes, promised in the author's preface to *Fatima et les filles de Mahomet*, to form when complete a new Life of the Prophet. This, the introductory volume, gives a minute account of the climate and the Bedawin of western Arabia. The modern demand that the rise of a civilization be studied in the light of its physical environment and with special reference to the divers elements which entered into its make-up is certainly met by our author. It is this fact which will create for the work a wide circle of readers.

With such a splendid introduction, scholars will await with keen interest the other volumes which will cover the early development of Mohammedanism. It is to be hoped that the fact that the author is a leader in another church militant will not

keep him from giving an unbiased account of the movement in which militancy played so great a part, for it is becoming more and more evident to the unbiased modern observer that the worst that can be said about Mohammedanism is the truth.

D. D. L.

MISCELLANEOUS

PHILOSTRATUS. *In Honor of Apollonius of Tyana*. Translated by J. S.

PHILLIMORE. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912. cxxvii+141 and 296 pages. \$2.00.

These two volumes include an introduction, a translation, textual and interpretative notes, and an index. The notes are very meager, but the translation is clear and accurate, thus lessening the need of extended annotation. For the most part the text of Kayser (Teubner, 1870) is followed.

One of the most valuable parts of the work is the introduction, where the translator endeavors by critical research to sift fact from fancy and give us a historical estimate both of Apollonius himself and of the work of his biographers. The main outlines of Apollonius' career are thought to be discernible, although Philostratus' work is largely a literary romance. Instead of accepting the traditional date, the birth of Apollonius is placed at about 40 A.D., and the legend of his great age is doubted. The translator follows most modern scholars in rejecting the opinion of those Christian apologists who held that Philostratus composed a mere fiction in imitation of the Gospels. He is thought to betray some slight acquaintance with canonical and apocryphal Christian tradition but to have worked in the main independently, employing genuine tradition about Apollonius as a basis for his highly embellished narrative. But whether the work was so designedly a romance—rather than a "Life"—as to justify the present translation of the title, "In Honor of Apollonius" (*ἐς τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον*), seems to us open to question. Did Marcus Aurelius write "In Honor of Himself" (*ἐς ἑαυτὸν*)? S. J. C.

MOTT, JOHN R. *The Continuation Committee Conferences in Asia, 1912-13*.

New York: Chairman of the Continuation Committee, 1913. 486 pages. \$2.00.

BEACH, HARLAN P. *Findings of the Continuation Committee Conferences, Held in Asia, 1912-13*. New York: Student Volunteer Movement, 1913. 430 pages. \$1.75.

It was an admirable plan that Dr. John R. Mott formed after the Edinburgh Conference of 1910, to hold in each of the great missionary lands of Asia a conference of Christians of all Protestant denominations, including both missionaries and native citizens of these lands, for the discussion of the great problems of modern Christian missions where those problems were actually being worked out and by the men who were most directly responsible for their solution. The result amply justified the attempt, and the value of the "Findings" of the various conferences properly demanded their publication in a volume; or rather in two volumes, for, as indicated above, they have been issued, first with all the Findings of the various conferences grouped together, and later with all the Findings of the various conferences on each great subject placed together.

The extent to which these various bodies agreed in their conclusions is very significant, and the more so in view of the diversity of conditions and of antecedent history in the various lands. The significance of the agreements is moreover heightened by the fact that only such opinions as were unanimously approved were given place in the Findings. Even a synopsis of them is beyond the limits of this notice. But a few facts stand out with especial clearness. For example, the emphasis laid upon education by all the conferences gives good ground for the hope that we shall never see another such wave of anti-education sentiment as in past years has in various missions led to the closing of schools and the abandonment of educational enterprises. Not less significant is the general tendency, though not so general as one could wish, to include all human welfare in the scope of missionary effort. Medical missions and medical education, which even in the Edinburgh Conference received scant attention, here assume a place more commensurate with their real importance. Industrial missions, though still in the background, are evidently destined to receive increased consideration in the near future. Yet evangelism, so far from being crowded into the background by these more broadly humanitarian lines of work, is still emphasized as of primary importance. Women's work for women has evidently come to stay until work for women shall be merged in the work of men and women for humanity, meantime being recognized as inferior in importance to no other type of work. Interdenominational co-operation within Protestantism has made marked progress in a decade. There is practically no one now to raise a voice against it in principle, however much practical difficulty may delay its progress here and there. But perhaps the most notable thing about the report is the fact of the conferences themselves being held and the remarkable degree of unanimity manifested in the findings.

It is a terribly saddening thought that the process of unification of Christendom, not in ecclesiastical organization, but in spirit and in effort, of which these volumes were a most cheering evidence, should have been so soon and so rudely interrupted by the European war. Yet the news that is coming to us constantly from the non-Christian countries of Asia gives ground for the belief that the process here reflected is still going on and that the progress of Christianity in the Orient though hindered will not be seriously interrupted even by the armed conflict of Christian nations.

For the student of contemporary Christianity these volumes are an invaluable source of information; for the future historian of Christian missions they will constitute, along with the Reports of the Edinburgh Conference, a milestone to reckon from.

E. D. B.

AINSLIE, PETER. *The Message of the Disciples of Christ for the Union of the Church*. New York: Revell, 1913. 210 pages. \$1.00 net.

The Disciples of Christ have a history covering about a century, and a membership of somewhat more than a million. Chief among the ideals that gave motive and form to the movement has been that of Christian unity. In the recent development of interest in this theme in all the churches it is natural that the testimony and activities of the Disciples should receive fresh attention. Mr. Ainslie is minister of the Christian Temple in Baltimore, and president of the Disciples' Commission on Christian Union, appointed to confer with similar bodies from other churches, with the object of furthering interdenominational fellowship. The present volume contains three addresses delivered before the Yale Divinity School. The first outlines the message of the Disciples to the Christian world on this theme. The

second and third trace the origin and progress of the Disciples as a religious body. Mr. Ainslie reveals on every page his conviction of the urgency of the task, and the irenic spirit in which it should be undertaken. He records the eagerness of the pioneers of this movement to contribute to some amendment of the unhappy and divided condition of the church in their day, and insists that it was the last of their purposes to add another to the already too numerous bodies in Christendom. But the Disciples are here, and their testimony regarding Christian unity has been explicit and insistent from the first. If in statement and practice it could always have manifested the spirit of courtesy and good will which marks Mr. Ainslie's addresses, much greater progress might have been made. But it is symptomatic of a greater sensitiveness to the true meaning of their mission on the part of the Disciples that Mr. Ainslie's book has been received everywhere among them with appreciative regard as the best presentation ever made of their aims, history, and present status. An appendix contains Thomas Campbell's "Declaration and Address," a document historic in its contents and results.

H. L. W.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

Barton, George A. Sumerian Business and Administrative Documents from Publications of the Earliest Times to the Dynasty of Agade. (Publications of the Babylonian Section, Vol. IX, No. 1, of the University Museum, University of Pennsylvania.) Philadelphia: University Museum, 1915. 64 pages.

Dahl, George. The Materials for the History of Dor. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915. 131 pages. \$1.40.

Hodge, Richard M. Historical Geography of Bible Lands. New York: Scribner, 1915. vii+84 pages. \$1.00.

Kent, Charles F., and Jenks, J. W. The Testing of a Nation's Ideals. Israel's History from the Settlement to the Assyrian Period. New York: Scribner, 1915. vii+149 pages. \$0.75.

Robinson, Theodore H. Paradigms and Exercises in Syriac Grammar. Oxford: University Press, 1915. 148 pages. 5s.

Sanders, F. K., and Sherman, H. A. How to Study the Old Testament. New York: Scribner, 1915. vi+64 pages. \$0.50.

Vaccari, Alberto. Un commento a Giobbe di Giuliano di Eclana. Rome: Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1915. viii+218 pages. L. 3.00.

Van Hoonacker, A. Une Communauté Judéo-Araméenne à Eléphantine, en Égypte, aux VI^e et V^e siècles av. J.-C. London: Humphrey Milford, 1915. xi+9 pages. 3s.

NEW TESTAMENT

Abbott, Edwin A. The Fourfold Gospel. The Proclamation of the New Kingdom. New York: Putnam, 1915. xxvi+546 pages. \$3.25.

Charles, Canon. An Attempt to Recover the Original Order of the Text of Revelation XX. 4-XXII. Oxford: University Press, 1915. 19 pages. 1s.

Lummis, E. W. How Luke Was Written. New York: Putnam, 1915. viii+141 pages. 4s. 6d.

McNeile, Alan Hugh. The Gospel according to St. Matthew. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xxxvi+448 pages. \$3.75.

CHURCH HISTORY

Holl, Karl. Epiphanius. Erster Band. (Ancoratus und Panarion Haer. 1-33.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1915. viii+404 pages. M. 20.50.

Robinson, C. H. History of Christian Missions. New York: Scribner, 1915. xiv+533 pages. \$2.50.

Schaff, David S. A Translation of John Huss' The Church, with Notes and Introduction. New York: Scribner, 1915. xlv+304 pages. \$2.50.

DOCTRINAL

Ballard, Frank. The True God. A Modern Summary of the Relation of Theism to Naturalism, Monism, Pluralism, and Pantheism. London: Kelly, 1915. 176 pages. 1s.

Dunkmann, Karl. Die Nachwirkungen der theologischen Prinzipienlehre Schleiermachers. (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, Heft 2.) Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1915. 191 pages. M. 4.

Halfyard, Samuel F. Cardinal Truths of the Gospel. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 252 pages. \$1.00.

Hughes, H. Maldwyn. The Theology of Experience. London: Kelly, 1915. 285 pages. 3s. 6d.

Illingworth, J. R. The Gospel Miracles. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xvii+213 pages. \$1.50.

Keyser, Cassius J. The New Infinite and the Old Theology. New Haven and New York: Yale University Press, 1915. v+117 pages. \$0.75.

Rees, T. The Holy Spirit in Thought and Experience. New York: Scribner, 1915. viii+221 pages. \$0.75.

- Schlatter, A. *Recht und Schuld in der Geschichte.* (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, Heft 1.) Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1915. 24 pages. Pf. 60.
- Sheldon, Henry C. *Studies in Recent Adventism.* New York: Abingdon, 1915. 160 pages. \$0.50.
- Stork, Theophilus B. *The Will in Ethics.* Boston: Sherman, French, 1915. xii+190 pages. \$1.25.
- Vogelsang, Friedrich. *Der Begriff der Freiheit bei Robert Grosseteste.* Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1915. 105 pages. M. 2.50.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

- Frazer, J. G. *The Golden Bough. Bibliography and General Index, Vol. XII* (third edition). New York: Macmillan, 1915. vii+536 pages. \$6.00.
- Macnicol, Nicol. *The Religious Quest of India. Indian Theism.* Oxford: University Press, 1915. xv+292 pages. 6s.
- Phythian-Adams, W. J. *Mithraism.* Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1915. xi+95 pages. \$0.40.
- Stevenson, Mrs. Sinclair. *The Religious Quest of India. The Heart of Jainism.* Oxford: University Press, 1915. xxiv+336 pages. 7s. 6d.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Benson, Louis F. *The English Hymn, Its Development and Use in Worship.* New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1915. 624 pages. \$3.50.
- Bertholet, Alfred. *Religion und Krieg.* (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, Heft 20.) Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1915. 35 pages. Pf. 80.

- Brown, Arthur J. *Unity and Missions.* Chicago: Revell, 1915. 319 pages. \$1.50.
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
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